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Abstract 
 
Abstract - The Vital and the Positive: A Genealogy of the Science of Man 
 
The thesis presents a historical study of the Enlightenment project for a Science of Man which 
takes its perspective from the 20
th
 century philosophical „death of man.‟ From the contemporary 
move against humanistic ideals associated already from the 1930‟s exemplified contrasting 
interpretations over an Enlightenment Science of Man and its ambitions.
 In the 1960‟s Michel 
Foucault‟s pivotal approach gave this dispute the perspective of the „death of man,‟ which this 
thesis frames in relation to his reading of Kant. This forms a perspective from which to examine 
Kant‟s positive ambitions, as Foucault saw them extending beyond Critique. But a second 
perspective is taken up through what Gilles Deleuze ascribed to an empiricist tradition 
subjugated under a vitalism. This is indicated by the „age of Bichat,‟ the French medical tradition 
which Deleuze contrasted with Foucault‟s „rarefied form of positivism.‟ A genealogical history 
of the Science of Man frames these as alternative models to a critique of reason, two perspectives 
derived of the Enlightenment project. 
 
The „age of Bichat‟ is understood around the French Enlightenment discourse on vitalism 
modelled on a post-Cartesian concept of the body. This gave the positive ambitions for early 19
th
 
century Positivism explored through Saint Simon‟s „concept of labour‟ and August Comte‟s 
epistemological critique, intended as substitute for an older Enlightenment model. However, this 
becomes further complicated by the new positive paradigm of experimental medicine. The effect, 
during the early Third Republic, was to re-orientate the philosophical perspective on the older 
project for a Science of Man. This served Henri Bergson‟s critique of Positivist historical 
formations, but also the neo-Positive model of Emile Durkheim and the ambition for an 
autonomous new science that delimits a collective „order of things.‟ The dilemma was 
legitimating vital norms in a modern society. This genealogy situates these as perspectives seen 
through the 18
th
 century Science of Man from which the vital and the positive remained elements 
historically resistant to being the determinable object of study. 
4 
 
Table of Contents 
 
 
 
 
Abstract          page 3 
Contents          page 5 
Introduction          page 6 
Chapter One: A “Rarefied Positivism”      page 19 
Chapter Two: Kant‟s Anthropology and the Science of Man  page 67 
Chapter Three: The Science of Man and the Medical Revolution  page 117 
Chapter Four: Radical Positivisms      page 170 
Chapter Five: The Concept of the Positive: Organic and Critical  page226 
Conclusion         page 284 
Bibliography         page 287  
5 
 
Introduction: The Vital and the Positive: A Genealogy of the Science of Man 
 
From the theoretical disputes between Structuralism and Existentialism leading up to the period 
around 1968, Michel Foucault saw the positive sciences as a media driving social processess 
against contemporary humanism. After 1970, he took up a genealogy serving as a „training‟ of 
historical conditions which was credited with invigorating critical possibilities with the radical 
concept of power, which he later called his positive approach.
1
 It has been claimed that this 
positively served new and concrete ways of how “power penetrates the subject‟s very body,” and 
gave the “biopolitical potential of a new paradigm,” and which saw Foucault opening “a 
promising alternative to a critique of reason.”2 In the 1986 commentary by Gilles Deleuze, 
Foucault‟s concept of power is described as close to an empiricist tradition that was validated 
according to an aesthetic „of the body.‟ Yet this appeared to define more closely Deleuze‟s own 
thought. His commentary describes Foucault‟s epistemological practice as a “rarefied form of 
positivism” which expressly distinguished Archaeology from the concept of power on the basis 
that the latter did not pursue a positivistic form of validation.
3
 Rather, the concept of power was 
a positivistic empowerment – something which Deleuze subjugated under a vitalism. Others, 
however, saw this as lacking scope for critical autonomy. Critical theory, for example, which 
associated itself with an anti-naturalist intent, saw both Positivism and a vitalism as inherently 
problematic.
4
  
 
This is a problem defined in this thesis through a stance vis á vis an Enlightenment Science of 
Man. During the Enlightenment, a Science of Man meant an idea that could be sustained of a 
unified science that would expand the understanding of man‟s nature through the active study of 
human beings and their world: since science stood as the creation of man‟s higher faculties, a 
                                                          
1
 Foucault (1997a) p124-125, Foucault‟s comment on a „felicitous positivism‟ in „The Discourse on Language‟ in 
Adams (1986) p162, Foucault discusses the background to his development during the 1960‟s in Foucault (1991) 
esp p131ff. 
2
 “Biopolitical potential of a new paradigm of Power,” Hardt & Negri (2000) p23. The possibility accorded to an 
“unpredjudiced analysis of the concrete ways in which power penetrates the subjects very bodies” according to 
Agamben (1998) p5  
3
 Deleuze (1988) p13 
4
 On anti-naturalistic argument see Popper (1961) and Adorno (1976) p xxxvii, Habermas „A Critique of Human 
Reason as the Unmasking of the Human Sciences: Michel Foucault‟ originally chapter 9 in Habermas (1987), 
reproduced in Foucault (1994a) 
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Science of Man looked to sustain this through the ambition for creating a higher language, a 
scientific form of discourse adequate to the task of articulating man and his world.
5
 Such a 
reflexive ambition is, for example, evident in Germany towards the end on the 18
th
 century, 
where the drive for new and rich philosophical languages culminated in Kant‟s 
Transcendentalism. Separated from the Kantian tradition, an Enlightenment ambition in France 
grounded general theories of societies a relation to the history of science. At the start of the 19
th
 
century, this was an engagement evident in a nascent French Positivism, commonly associated 
with Saint-Simon and Auguste Comte. This aimed at displacing a scholastic legacy with modern 
science they followed an ambition that remained closely tied to a political legacy of the French 
Revolution and its universalising hegemony. The paradox is that even as the scientific 
foundations on which they initially drew disipated through diverging scientific practices during 
the 19
th
 century, the aspirations persisted in various theoretical forms. These give twin 
perpectives to be taken up as a problem of an Enlightenment Science of Man 
 
In this thesis, the positive and the vital relate to the idea of what could be sustained under this 
unified science of this era. When a later Critical perspective took up a twofold stance to such an 
Enlightenment project it was without rejecting what it understood as the ideals or ambitions of 
the Enlightenment, while also seeking to extend these as an impulse through a dialectic. From 
this perspective, it could claims that Foucault‟s concept of power could only extend its discourse 
in “a prejudiced way.”6 The Critical perspective likened this to a form of history simply 
grounding a “naturalistic theory of society,” it is because is already a problematic legacy of 
humanism in modern social theory.
7
 The controversy which surrounded the category of power 
emerged from Foucault‟s critique of anthropocentric thinking, which he presented as a form of 
scepticism for displacing a „nature of man.‟ 8 But Foucault also intended to give agency to a new 
ethico-political discourse which was seen as an ambition for giving tools of analysis for 
“contemporary dangers” in society.9 A later essay on Kant saw Foucault relates this to his own 
                                                          
5
 See introduction to Fink & Marchand (1979) p1-3 
6
 This was a prejudice claims Habermas that followed the fact that Foucault “never returned to the epistemological 
role of the clinical gaze,” „Questions Concerning the Theory of Power‟ Habermas (1987) reproduced in Foucault 
(1994) p85.  
7
 „The Critique of Reason as the Unmasking of the Human Sciences‟ Habermas in Foucault (1994) 
8
 “a positivist attitude with a critical claim,” Habermas Ibid p83 
9
 Dreyfus and Rabinow, „What is Maturity?‟ Rabinow (1986) p118, see also Bernstein in Foucault (1994) p225 
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interpretation around the legacy of the Enlightenment dispute, and gives one perspectives under 
focus in this study.
10
  
 
This perspective is characterised by Foucault‟s relation to his own intellectual development and 
two models which reached beyond academic interests in the political “crisis of the 1960‟s.” A 
division within French thought that focusses on what in the early 1930‟s was introduced by 
Phenomenology but, according to Foucault, this followed an earlier division, “one that separated 
a philosophy of experience, hermeneutics, and the subject, from a philosophy of knowledge, 
rationality, and the concept.”11 The theoretical significance for him was in the new confrontation 
between the new interpretations of psychoanalysis, and a historical legacy of that “great postulate 
of French philosophy from Descartes to our own time,” the subject. An emerging Structuralism 
supplemented with Foucault‟s reading of Nietzsche gave him the significance of an idea of 
human subjectivity as a “limit-experience,” which served as the suitable rupture for the formation 
of his own thought.
12
 From the broad context of the 1960‟s dispute on humanism, Foucault took 
up a perspective on an Enlightenment Science of Man that followed the historical impetus in the 
polarities in French thought through the 19
th
 century. His early focus was derived from the 20
th
 
century French „epistemological tradition‟ which analysed autonomous ambitions behind the 
diverse forms of scientific reasoning, notably associated with medicine, as they related to the 
progressive project. Science was understood as the modern knowledge that could perpetually 
revise its own reasoning and substitute errors with the spontaneity of a new language.
13
 From the 
                                                          
10
 See the essay by Foucault What is Enlightenment? Foucault (1997). Also Hiley (1998) p110-114 
11
 On one side, the filiation of Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty; and another of Jean Cavaillès, Gaston 
Bachelard, Alexandre Koyré, and Canguilhem. Foucault (1998) p466. The 1985 revised version published in Revue 
de Métaphysique et de Morale within French philosophy leads Foucault “much further down the timeline, as if the 
divergent readings of phenomenology were only the symptom of a deeper fracture.” Of Bergson he writes 
“doubtless this cleavage comes from afar, and one could trace it back through the nineteenth century : Henri 
Bergson and Henri Poincaré, Jules Lachelier and Louis Couturat, Pierre Maine de Biran and Auguste Comte.” 
Foucault (1994) vol. 2 p764.  
12
 “What struck me most in Nietzsche is that for him, rationality of a science, a practice or a discourse, is not 
measured by „truth‟ it is in a position to produce. Rather „truth‟ itself has a share in the history of discourse, and in 
some way has an internal effect on discourse and on a practice.” Foucault (1991) p62, also p55- 56. For Foucault, a 
new historical perspective on scientific man emerged along with the historical origins of a science to be “found 
precisely in this reciprocal genesis of the subject and object.” Ibid p63 
13
 Canguilhem‟s suggestion in Rabinow (1986) p88-89 
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legacy of Alex Koyré, Gaston Bachelard, and Georges Canguilhem, Foucault followed a critical 
evaluation of an emerging history of shifting norms.
14
  
 
Foucault characterised these two models as ultimately reaching the political “crisis of the 
1960‟s,” and the first chapter focuses on the „death of man,‟ brought into sharp focus Foucault‟s 
1966 The Order of Things.
15
 But this is read as a perspective on an Enlightenment Science of 
Man giving the modes of knowledge which Foucault scrutinised through an idiosyncratic reading 
of Kant. This is a framework through which the early Foucault describes Positivism‟s status as 
emerging from pre-critical thought fuelling perpetual controversy extending behind European 
thought in the 19
th
 century, a failure was summed up an aspiration to be a technical philosophy 
extending to general functions in society. His narrative disrupts the ground for the socio-political 
projects drawn from a French medical experience during the early 19
th
 century and this chapter 
shows why he reflected on the legacy of the „new positivities‟ through an epistemological 
analysis. As a critical perspective this served a wider historical dispute on man as it appeared in 
its contemporary form. Later, his „felicitous positivism‟ served a special epistemology for 
conceptualising man‟s world through Foucault‟s concept of power and later technologies of the 
self.
16
 The positive and the vital, however, give a genealogy which does not exactly correspond 
to Foucault‟s models. 
 
The context for the positive and the vital follows the later commentary by Gilles Deleuze which 
notes the contradictory role that Positivism occupies for Foucault‟s early Archaeology. He 
identifies Xavier Bichat as the notable distinction informing a dynamic mode of thought 
emerging around the life sciences. In Deleuze‟s commentary, Bichat‟s practice largely 
functioning as a substitution for the neo-Kantian elements that he saw in the epistemological 
Foucault.
17
 Foucault singled out Enlightenment physiology as becoming truly transformed in the 
                                                          
14
 Outlined by Foucault in „Life: Experience and Science‟  Foucault (1998) p465 the modified form of the 
introduction to Canguilhem (1989) p9 
15
 This „crisis‟ follows the theme of the interviews where Foucault discusses his own development during the 1960‟s 
in response to a wider social climate, Foucault (1991) p58, p78, p88-92. 
16
 Foucault (1997) p124-125 
17
 Deleuze (1988) p127 the curious reading of The Birth of the Clinic in which Deleuze aligns Xavier Bichat with 
Spinoza. Ibid p63. Bichat is also pivotal in George Canguilhem‟s influential text The Normal and the Pathological 
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modern era and The Birth of the Clinic indicates Bichat as initiating an epistemological shift in 
French thought at the start of the 19
th
 century where pathological anatomy gave a determinable 
measure for the historical concept of the life. This was understood to mark a limit to naive 
epistemologies of an Enlightenment Sciences of Man. In France, the naive Positivism was 
eclipsed after the 1870‟s, notably with the experimentalism of Claude Bernard who gave the new 
paradigm for physiological thought. But Foucault‟s later positive approach looked back at the 
Enlightenment Science of Man as a significant parallel appears during the 20
th
 century around 
the new genetics in serving to give a new context for how biological debates could be oriented 
wider social arguments through an open concept of life sustaining and integrating error.  
 
The first chapter explores how Foucault‟s theoretical perspective on an Enlightenment Science of 
Man is derived from an early reading of Kant‟s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. It 
looks beyond his reading of the „death of man‟ as Kant served as the original approach for his era 
by giving the critical reflection on man‟s world. Foucault also held this perspective on the 
dissolution of the Enlightenment ambition, when he developed an alternative model to a critique 
of reason through the socio-political forms of a concept of power. It follows Kant‟s positive 
ambition beyond the Critiques. By contrast, Gilles Deleuze identified a dispersion of an 
Enlightenment Science of Man from within the French medical discourses following the „era of 
political constitutions.‟ This gives a different orientation with respect to a „certain idea‟ which 
Deleuze interpreted as Foucault‟s „micropolitics.‟18  
 
The theme of the positive and vital indicates a knowledge that straddles the dissolution of the 
18
th
 century discourse on the physical and the moral. In this respect, the medical sign was a 
radicalism: both Foucault and Deleuze followed Nietzsche in a “belief in the body is more than a 
fundamental belief in the soul,” but this distinguishes itself around interpretations of early 
Positivism.
19
 What Deleuze saw in Sensationalist epistemology behind Enlightenment medical 
practices, was a technical use of the sign for a phenomenology of life which he linked to a 
specific interpretation of vitalism. Bichat represented this modern struggle for the concept of life 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Auguste Comte and the Broussais effect‟ Canguilhem (1989) p61-62 where Bichat functions in the similar way as he 
does in Foucault‟s The Birth of the Clinic, which is not the context indicated by Deleuze. 
18
 Deleuze (1988) p121  
19
 Nietzsche (1967) sect 491 
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that looked historically to physiology for the knowledge to serve civilisation. His rational 
physiology took a domain of nature as the „sum of the functions‟ attributed to life for a res 
extensa were the function of the sign was to indicate what constituted vital and positive 
phenomena. The function of the sign was that which Deleuze associated with his own „delicate 
problem‟ of constituting the positive concept.20  
 
As a philosophical problem, Deleuze was looking to distinguish between an empirical 
conditioning and an epistemological conditioning. But this also defines what was at stake for a 
Science of Man that drew on the practice of physiology: it distinguished itself from a 
metaphysics of subjectivity as the 18
th
 century concept of the „organic machine‟ brought into 
question what constituted a sign of the vital. During the early 19
th
 century the physiological 
model served to ground Positivist ambitions in mapping a domain of knowledge whose 
legitimate evaluation could extend to socio-political theories. What was historically constituted 
under the values of the positive and the vital was disputed in the 19
th
 century following the 
legacy of an Enlightenment Science of Man and left an inherent instability evident in late 20
th
 
century and leading to the „death of man.‟ 
 
The second chapter explores a perspective on an Enlightenment Science of Man as it appears 
through reading of Kant. This frames the Science of Man as a project derived from Renaissance 
humanism, understood in the Enlightenment as driving the development of new philosophical 
and scientific languages as the creation of man‟s higher faculties. Christian Wolff was significant 
in this regard, and after 1740 it was the Berlin Academy that was engaged with a series of 
extended debates on such ambitions. Along with the problems introduced by Locke and Hume 
this gave Kant the impetus that developed as his transcendental philosophy. This chapter will 
look at the transcendental ambition from the perspective of Kant‟s late Anthropology since it was 
central to Foucault alternative model to a critique of reason.
21
  
 
                                                          
20
 Deleuze (1994) p13-16, p98, Deleuze (1983) p53, and Deleuze & Guattari (1994) where Bichat is specifically the 
example, p161 
21
 Wolff‟s systematic philosophy considered Newtonian philosophy as scientifically narrow. It marks the initiation 
of the long running debate around the Newton-Wolffian controversy at the Berlin academy from 1740.  
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A Science of Man relates to Kant‟s transcendental ambitions of relating a concept of rational 
metaphysics to an 18
th
 century motif of power. But it also led to his divided strategy. He 
questioned earlier ambitions for establishing a legitimate science function to sustain a scholastic 
psychology through concepts of sensibility, while also expressing an allegiance to its broader 
ambitions.
22
 By questioning the epistemological „modes of thinking‟ that distinguished between 
metaphysical and philosophical foundations in a domain of experience, he gave conditionality 
the dissymmetry that extended to the very possibility of a Science of Man. But this also gives 
Kant‟s broader ambitions for a general metaphysics seen as the „indispensable service‟ of giving 
legitimacy beyond conditionality and substitutes for an earlier ambition for a Science of Man.  
 
Kant‟s engagement with a Science of Man was defined by the epistemological problems of 
representing man‟s world as a logical system of concepts. This is the context in which the late 
Opus Postumum maps out shifting relations within contemporary life sciences of the era. From 
this Kant distinguished two modes of what the concept of nature hoped to apprehend; it defined 
an experience of organic nature under an interpretation of vitalism, but also the broader 
phenomena that made living nature evident as a world-system. Opus Postumum explored these 
epistemologically as a synthetic capacity to theorise the natural world phenomenologically. Kant 
followed this by hypothesising the „ideal archetype of man‟ whose empirical disposition could 
think this transcendental world conceptually.
23
 Opus Postumum gave a transcendental system as 
a way of thinking the physical and the moral concept united in one domain, but this complicated 
his earlier opposition of nature and freedom from the critical perspective. 
 
This frames the late Kant and informs the Anthropology. This perspective on man‟s ways of 
being now took this as an engagement with social, political and historical elements in the world. 
Although evidently excluded from an anthropological domain, this is Foucault‟s reading of 
Kant‟s citizen, following the cosmopolitan archetype whose engagement with a world-system is 
dominated by history and culture. This took the complicated transcendental perspective of Opus 
Postumum, but in Anthropology man could only „by rights‟ become conscious of the system. 
                                                          
22
 Foucault‟s point to the cosmopolitical ideal in Kant (1974) p251 
23
 Kant models this on an ideal of the physical (theoretical) as well as the moral practical reason united in one sense 
object. Kant (1993) p284n 
12 
 
This deliberately left a tension between moral and the technical practices for an empirical 
consciousness and the transcendental idea was judged as temporal „principle of the future.‟ This 
is what parallels the displacement of a Science of Man in the post-critical Kant.
24
 Anthropology 
introduced a world-concept which could only be brought into play historically in an empirical 
domain of competing discourses on the physical and the moral: this appears as what the French 
Enlightenment tried to define this around the positive of the vital. 
  
The third chapter then depart from the categorical thinking of Kant to examine how the French 
Enlightenment looked to constitute a Science of Man. The positive and the vital will now define 
a separate genealogy. This draws on the significance for this era of the progressive anatomical 
studies in its relation to the 18
th
 century discipline of physiology as it mediated the domain of 
medical knowledge. Physiology followed a philosophical debate within French medical circles, 
notably around the Montpellier school of medicine, where a neo-Hippocratic dynamism served 
the study of vital phenomena. By the late 18
th
 century, this was supplemented by the technical 
discipline influenced by Condillac‟s Logic, understood as the successful method for developing 
logical functions in a progressive way.
25
 In this sense, the sign aimed to approximate sensible 
origins as a naturalism put under the test of experience. This semiotic practice, rather than a 
doctrine of thought, was an influential practice for scientific disciplines during this era, notably 
for a historical doctrine of physiology which extended to a Science of Man and its social and 
political discourses.  
 
The chapter shows how new anatomical studies confronted the physiological discipline and its 
historical idea of living being. This also follows the significance of employing Condillac‟s sign 
as the post-Cartesian theory mediating the understanding of sensible phenomena according to a 
visible mean. It is examined in what Ideologue Jean Pierre Cabanis took to extend wider 
discourse on the physical and moral, but it is Xavier Bichat who had the significance of 
developing a rational discourse of the body to ground the synthesis of a new localised anatomy. 
His rational physiology was subject to interpretive difficulties in delimiting a natural state. 
Bichat‟s distinction came from using the technical use of sign through the observation of disease 
                                                          
24
 Kant (1974) p206, p237ff 
25
 Albury (1979) in his introduction to Condillac‟s Logic.  
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to aid interpretation and to ground what constituted the positive and legitimate knowledge of life. 
Although rational physiology was theorised according to purely physical conditions, its aim was 
explaining the fluctuating sum of vital powers that necessitated a reasoned living norm. Bichat‟s 
concept of the habituated body was seen under a constant struggle for a „mean‟ and had a 
significant impact on a revolutionary era Science of Man in France. Bichat grounded an idea that 
modern society could delimit certain functions around the „state of civilisation,‟ through a 
concept of distinct physical powers that „preside over exterior bodies.‟ This was a model which 
also had a significant impact on early French Positivism.
26
  
 
At the start of the 19
th
 century, Bichat exemplified the relation between an investigating 
anatomist and the synthesizing physiologist. The fourth chapter describes how this grounds early 
French Positivism: firstly in Saint-Simon‟s ambitions for a new Science of Man understood as 
the necessary synthesis informing a provisional and relative understanding of the forces of 
history on society, secondly in Auguste Comte, whose Positivism stood against frivolous 
defenders of an outmoded Enlightenment Science of Man. Both saw Bichat‟s physiology as the 
modern knowledge legitimately delimiting forces evident in life‟s capacity for organization. 
Positivism grounded itself through this distinction of biological beings from „mere‟ objects, 
despite epistemological model derived of vitalism lost its status during the early years of the 19
th
 
century. 
 
The central problem appears in Bichat‟s 1801 text, Reserches physiologique sur la vie et la mort. 
Here Bichat was establishing the nature and limit of the force of organisation. Signs of the vital 
gave the paradigm famously describing life as „the sum of functions by which death is 
resisted.”27 The sign made evident the „natural relation‟ to such exteriority, not as a quantitative 
or physical analogue of force, but as an index to functional stability in the conceptual mean. 
Pathology served the method of analysis by extending subjective techniques over the legacy of a 
historical physiology - to rationalised life‟s functional capacity according historical interpretation 
of significant phenomena meant Bichat was looking to Montpellier vitalism, and its neo-
Hippocratic dynamism, to uphold the heuristic values of medicine, rather insisting on an 
                                                          
26
 Bichat (1827) p34-40 
27
 Ibid p10 
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apodictic new science. In this way, the Sensationalist sign serves to rarefy values attributed to 
life, while pathology delimited a new positive knowledge - less as knowledge of man than 
function of living. But this was inherently problematic since its observational practice was 
limited to historical understanding of vitalism and its disputed explanations of life.  
 
The chapter takes the „age of Bichat‟ to mean the vitalism as practiced in the medical disciplines 
whose intrinsic values were the positive and the vital a priori to the sign. It is a practice which 
influenced early Positivism despite the fact it was moving beyond the physiological debate. After 
1814, Saint Simon looked to re-invigorate a Science of Man for the socio-political crisis of the 
time, but this was primarily taken up as an aesthetic concern mediated through the language 
debate of Louis de Bonald. Saint Simon was also looking to the sciences of the day which now 
saw him describe society as facing forces that could „plunge the human species back into the 
state of nature.‟28 This was implicated by the new anthropology with theories of animality, 
degradation and „aboriginal difference‟ which opened the central ontological problems of innate 
difference in early 19
th
 century biological sciences. Saint Simon‟s new ambitions for a Science of 
Man took the form of a synthetic knowledge that could relate to forces dominating history, an 
idea which was primarily a socio-political concern. It becomes clear after 1814 that his concern 
to uphold these ambitions became overtaken by the „industrial values‟ that could express man‟s 
inner drives, now become a class struggle. These values now appear as a „concept of labour‟ and 
describe excessive material force, something psychic, against which idlers seems destined to 
enfeeblement and death.
29
  
 
The contention is that Saint Simon‟s concern with the concept of labour was to support core 
values understood of a Science of Man. But Bichat‟s physiology equivocated between a 
progressive theoretical stance and its ambitions as a discourse on the body. This became 
superceded after 1916. On the one hand, Maine de Biran was directly critical of Bichat‟s 
physiology for giving a misleading account of subjective functioning of the ego, a psycho-
physical parallelism that assumed naturalistic functions as a positive knowledge of man.
30
 On the 
                                                          
28
 Saint Simon (1966) XL p254.  
29
 The work around 1819 with Auguste Comte in L’Organisateur. This thesis chapter 4. 
30
 Maine De Biran (1949c) p39-40. 
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other hand,  Auguste Comte took up his Positivism through an epistemological analysis to avoid 
spurious philosophical claims to a Science of Man. Cours de philosophie positive contends that 
Bichat‟s ambition to constrain knowledge to regions „proper to living bodies‟ and was a „truly 
philosophical‟ revolution.31 However Cours reveals a curious relation to Bichat; he is seen as 
exemplary in the field of method, but leaving an „incomplete Positivism‟ open to a regressive 
metaphysics.
32
 According to Comte, Bichat‟s vitalism was lacking because it was premised on a 
concept of resistance rather than a concept of integration. This identified the historical role of 
physiology as following the hierarchical perspective on anatomical studies to which Comte‟s 
Positivist enterprise was a „mapping.‟ It demonstrates a structural thinking that overtook the 18th 
century debate over a Science of Man. But the paradox of Comte‟s Positivism is its polemical 
intent of furthering an ethico-moral project through the new biological sciences having displaced 
Bichat‟s pathological perspective and its doctrinaire equivocation of the sign along with its 
question of values. This was something Comte‟s philosophical agenda avoided, despite 
remaining close to an 18
th
 century Science of Man in many other ways. 
  
The last chapter will finally consider the impact of a new experimental medicine in France on the 
period after 1870. Claude Bernard gave the new positive paradigm that clearly distinguished 
between medical practice and determinable science. The significance for French philosophy in 
the Third Republic was that this fully distinguished scientific medicine from a philosophy of life 
with an impact on both spiritualist and rationalist philosophical traditions. The chapter looks at 
how François Magendie re-oriented physiology‟s central problem of apprehending „true 
function‟ in the study of the living. This ambition was to displace an older medical knowledge of 
life which also appears as a „paradoxical link‟ with Bichat‟s method. To focus on the delicate 
nature of the experimental procedure as true function now meant rethinking „conditions of 
existence‟ for a concept that could affirm only functions attributed to life. Magendie redefined a 
phenomenology of living function, avoiding Bichat‟s pathological perspective and substituted his 
observational method with an experimental conditioning. The limited domain of an inner living 
environments, internalised positive and vital values within a separate and autonomous domain of 
physiology. 
                                                          
31
 Comte (1893)p298-299 
32
 Ibid p299 
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With no ideal notions of normal and pathological states, and radically separated from the 
historical physiology, this chapter examines an assessment by Henri Bergson who noted this 
experimentalism was following Aristotle‟s positive method for internalising alterity in the logic 
of nature within the understanding of man. Physiology‟s autonomy accords with the line of 
thinking that privileges phenomenal relations derived from empiricism prior to historical 
discourses. Bergson saw Positivism as the failure to retain this empirical perspective on scientific 
problems, but the late essay written for a conference on Claude Bernard describes the 
experimentalist‟s disposition as a suppressed vitalism.33 This meant not separating empirical 
observation from its theoretical synthesis. The significance of Bernard‟s anticipative idea is that 
this was undertood to represent the positive and vital elements that Bergson held necessary of 
empirical activity in its orientating function. Both Bergson and Bernard aimed for particular 
precision in their methods but this chapter conciders Bergson‟s focus on an adaptation between 
positive experience and vital intelligibility as the basis of his theory of psycho-physiological 
states. By reintroducing the problem of the normal and the pathological, through distinguishing 
between „norm‟ and „real,‟ he returns to the evolutionary paradigm of the day for the wider 
philosophical context. This confronts Positivist historical formations with a true or false 
divergence and served a critique of post-Enlightenment science seen as carrying the deeper 
implications of an older practice around Science of Man.
34
 
 
Bernard‟s interior milieu gave the ideal model which was also the starting point for constituting 
the “new way to a Science of Man” in Emile Durkheim‟s sociology.35 Durkheim‟s social 
formations equated to an autonomous domain of free and independent life, through evident 
loosening metaphysics of the past, and upheld the possibility of determinable relations of the 
alterity intrinsic of a social logic. But the question is whether Durkheim‟s neo-Positivism 
followed a break which Bernard effected with vitalism? Through the conditions of existence that 
substituted social fabric for the historical idea, he looked to map possible origins of an 
associative function. This serves his account of historical order through evidence of an earlier 
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lack. An objective synthesis expressed as a collective order of things, followed the potential 
presupposed of pre-scientific forms of logic. These were open to the intervention according to a 
special positive reasoning, notably distinct from an individual‟s logic. Durkheim identified this 
with a primary categorisation of the sacred and the profane; the potential for autonomy 
represented the vital capacity to invest and positively ground new norms.  
 
Durkheim identified the system of signs and its potential with what an earlier epoch‟s protected 
under a notion of the theological, and later a philosophical project, and this reflected Durkheim‟s 
ambition to follow the perspective through relations to an Enlightenment project identifiable in 
the notions of the positive and the vital. In the capacity for „fluid‟ forms of intelligibility which 
was held evident behind the phenomena of dérèglement and anomie has the significance 
appearing through treating sacred representations as profane and vice versa. Here it is the loss of 
positive knowledge that indicated the vital problem of „norms‟ for modern societies. Durkheim 
described social assemblages without stabilised and definite knowledge of the normal type, but 
that could, if properly interpreted, “tell us the secret of the future.”36 This was the open ambition 
to constitute a functional knowledge extended beyond scientific methodology while taking its 
perspective from an Enlightenment project for the constitution of a Science of Man. This chapter 
shows how this was no simple humanism but had links to the post-Cartesian practice which had 
no clear idea of what man was.  
 
The thesis gives this genealogy as a perspective on what the late 20
th
 century attacked as stable 
notions of man, and is pivotal for a contemporary thought understood of the „death of man.‟ 
Foucault dismantled this as a progressive ideal in The Order of Things, but this was already 
under dispute from the 1930‟s. Positivism was already the target of Critical theory which is 
exemplified by contrasting interpretations over an Enlightenment Science of Man. Positivism in 
this era meant a range of practice, from a reconstruction of scientific languages developed as a 
broader linguistic philosophy, to the broader theoretical approach to science and its methods, to 
be incorporated into socio-political thought.
37
 During the 1960‟s the Critical dispute focussed on 
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what the Positivist legacy failed to account for in socio-political practices by claiming that its 
critical horizon was substantially restricting a domain of modern knowledge. In this way, the 
claim was that it was not true to the Enlightenment ambitions.
38
 This study gives a genealogy of 
the Science of Man that does not start from a humanism but through delimiting values which 
were historically resistant to being the determinable object of study. This moves in parallel to 
what was framed as the 19
th
 century „death of man‟ through constituting its field around the 
positive and vital. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
„Post script.‟ Horkheimer Critical Theory (1972). For an account of Logical  Postivism, Rudolph Carnap‟s work as 
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Chapter 1:  A “Rarefied Positivism” 
 
Introduction  
 
The chapter takes its title from Gilles Deleuze description of Michel Foucault‟s early work, the 
early engagement with the „crisis of the 1960‟s.‟39 The “rarefied form of Positivism” refers to 
Foucault‟s interpretation of a historical dispute over the legacy of an Enlightenment Science of 
Man. In this chapter, Foucault‟s interpretation is contrasted with what Deleuze called the 
„delicate problem‟ of constituting a positive concept. In Deleuze‟s commentary on Foucault, this 
was associated with a historical event described as „the age of Bichat,‟ and the chapter will 
outline how these two contemporary discourses took their perspectives from an interpretation of 
what an Enlightenment Science of Man intended. This will constitute the basis for the historical 
work in subsequent chapters.   
 
From the early 1960‟s, Foucault‟s epistemological analysis served the critical function of 
humanistic discourses. After 1970, a self-declared „felicitous positivism‟ developed a concept 
with which to describe socio-technological orders of power. The chapter reads Foucault‟s 
positive ambitions from the perspective of his early reading of Kant‟s Anthropology framed as 
the theoretical context for an original approach to an Enlightenment Science of Man at the end of 
the 18
th
 century. This also served Foucault‟s The Order of Things seen as narrating the 
dissolution of Enlightenment ambitions for positive knowledge through a critical reflection on 
the legacy of the human sciences. The chapter makes the connection between what Foucault 
absorbed from Kant‟s original approach and his later use of the concept of power for narrating 
socio-political discourses. In this way, what is to be understood as a Science of Man is delimited 
through Foucault‟s perspective on the dissolution of the 18th century ambition. His positive 
ambition in later works substitutes for this and this chapter will relate this to his biopolitics. The 
consideration of populations sees Foucault implement the concept whose autonomy remains 
close to Kant‟s positive ambition, namely relating a universality of knowledge, intended as a 
freedom from socio-hegemonic contexts.  
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A second perspective appears by examining Gilles Deleuze commentary on Foucault. He claims 
„a certain idea‟ haunted all his work, extending an idea behind Foucault‟s micropolitics of the 
sign, which he identified with the „age of Bichat.‟40  This claim that Deleuze makes of the 
„Bichat event‟ also indicates the wider ambitions to legitimate socio-political concepts. But this 
is centred on the ambiguity of medical physiology, the dispute over vitalism and its ambition to 
apprehend true function. Deleuze relates this to Nietzsche‟s „delicate problem‟ of constituting a 
positive concept through an empirical conditioning.
41
 The chapter draws out the context of 
Bichat‟s medical vitalism as following techniques of evaluation posited of the sign. These relate 
to the distinctly post-Cartesian practice attributed to Condillac.  
 
In this way, the theme of the positive and vital will differentiate a knowledge that straddles the 
dissolution of the late 18
th
 century discourse on the physical and the moral. This question frames 
the ambitions of an Enlightenment Science of Man. In this sense, Xavier Bichat‟s physiology 
opened a domain of nature to a logic of man; a res extensa as sum of the functions of life. To 
constitute positive phenomena of life was a question of method and significantly Bichat‟s 
vitalism was not a metaphysics of subjectivity but related to the 18
th
 century concept of an 
„organic machine.‟ It is also significant that Bichat‟s physiology left a historical legacy for 19th 
century French Positivism. Hence the vital and the positive give the terms that delimit an 
inherited dispute from an Enlightenment Science of Man, explored in this chapter as perspectives 
on the „crisis‟ of the 1960‟s. Both Foucault and Deleuze shared Nietzsche idea that a “belief in 
the body is more than a fundamental belief in the soul,”42 but by questioning what constitutes 
phenomena of the body in Xavier Bichat, Deleuze is seen as presenting a historical parallel to the 
theory of knowledge derived from Kant.  
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Archaeology as a „Rarefied Positivism‟ 
 
When Gilles Deleuze described Foucault‟s early work a „rarefied Positivism,‟ it was intended as 
a double edged critique; the negative sense of a transcendental stance of an “urdoxa.”43 But it 
also implicated certain positive ambitions as deeper formulations of conceptual thought that his 
commentary would reveal. According to Deleuze, this only became apparent with Foucault‟s 
revaluation of the normative aesthetics „of the body.‟ His early Archaeology was confused in its 
ambition, a negative practice that simply fell short of any „true critique.‟44 Deleuze could define 
„true critique‟ as the measure of conditions for knowledge, rather than of the conditioning of 
knowledge which he specifically identified with scientific epistemology. This distinction was 
made explicit in his own idiosyncratic reading of The Order of Things which he subjected to his 
own Nietzschean „symptomatology‟ of 19th century practices. In the original text of The Order of 
Things the central problem is posited through its survey of relations between being and language 
which serves to question as a historical a priori, the subject of knowledge. But Foucault‟s 
subsequent transition, notably following a history of populations, also appears in his ambiguous 
relation to a philosophical anthropology; - 
“anthropology constitutes perhaps the fundamental disposition that has governed the path 
of philosophical thought from Kant until our own day. This arrangement is essential since 
it forms part of our history; but it is disintegrating before our eyes...”45  
What he maintained through subsequent analyses of the constitutive conditions under which 
subjects could be formed and modified, was the extension of these conditions into a socio-
political domain through an analysis of power.  
 
From the early 1960‟s Foucault used epistemological analysis as the critical reflection that 
targeted a concept of man‟s world by foregrounding a historical study of discourse. The 
Archaeology of Knowledge describes this as a rationalising process from which an „unthinkable‟ 
had be removed. Archaeology located a specific problem around the difficulty of the „subject of 
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knowledge‟ and developed its method by following epistemological “continuities to define their 
discontinuities.”46 The significance of these “positive elements” gave his analysis of history its 
intended break with continuous history. Continuous history was equated with the “founding 
function” of subjectivity, a function understood as indexing an origin with its necessary image of 
development, serving to exclude dissociation and difference. A dynamic analysis of structural 
formations in the history of ideas was, therefore, to exclude an idea of origin
47
 Foregrounding 
discontinuities served to inform a theory and method that positively aimed to distinguish 
knowledge from an intuition.
48
 
 
Foucault‟s discourse studies aimed to elide both socially determined and autonomous 
individuality. By suppressing this „anthropologising function‟ as the tendency of the empirical 
field, discontinuity events indicate the spontaneity of new concepts.
49
 The basis for this was that 
the ego functions to hide the synthetic activities of the subject. The image of transcendental 
history that emerges is of dispersive and divergent series of knowledge. Spontaneity is associated 
with transcendental understanding in its polemical function which displaces an anthropological 
style discourse. A polemical strategy battles against an ideology of “preconceptions, resistances 
obstacles,” to give a perspective on the constitution of subjectivity through discourse.50 The 
Archaeology of Knowledge was following an epistemological method developed under 
Alexandre Koyré and Gaston Bachelard. It was the latter to which Foucault attributed the study 
of epistemological thresholds through which scientific praxis appears as the significant product 
of conformation of human logic to a concept of the world.  
 
In this sense, Foucault took up his perspective from within French intellectual history by drawing 
on the early writings of Bachelard. Bachelard‟s motivation was explicitly against the legacy of 
Bergsonism and the ontological status of duration taken as „real‟ time.51  Bachelard identified a 
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philosophical task as bridging two elements between which Henri Bergson had drawn a 
distinction; philosophy and positive science, or the intuition and the instant. Here was a gap into 
which Bergson had introduced his idea of duration. The reason for this was that, Foucault 
reflected Bachelard‟s philosophical ambition to oppose an ontological approach to philosophy. 
Three points historically situate the Archaeological strategy in its ambitions of extending the 
rigorous function of the concept.  
 
- The primary criticism that Bachelard held was of Bergson‟s conception of „nothing.‟ This is 
articulated in Bergson‟s Creative Evolution. -  
“The problem of knowledge is complicated, and possibly made impossible by the ideas 
that order fills a void and that its presence is superimposed on it virtual absence. We go 
from absence to presence, from void to the full, in virtue of a fundamental illusion of 
our understanding.”52  
Bachelard comments that by the pansychism transformed into a panchronism, a simple 
continuity between states of Being avoids any threat of true nothingness, namely the void. 
Bergson‟s positive metaphysics were an “ingenious theory of negative attribution,”53 which, 
according to Bachelard, flattens positive possibilities for higher human thought. Bergson saw in 
memory the possibility of unifying discontinuities in knowledge; Bachelard insisted that bringing 
the possible and the probable into an idealistic continuity did not necessarily bridge a gap in 
Being. Rather, an undisputed positive value attributed to a plurality of life represented a 
frivolity.
54
 In this sense, Bachelard characterised the danger of misrepresenting the functional 
nature of a correlation between words and their translation into a „language of action,‟ the sign 
and its idea.
55
 A truly negative action means a non-function and implies the possibility of 
extinction, while a positive function attributed to thinking plenitude behind the intellect, takes on 
the ontological value of a true function in general. Archaeology opposes this. 
 
It opposes it because this was the passivity that Bachelard attributed to thinking a continuous 
history. The problem of such passivity was carried in an idea, into which his epistemology 
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introduced conceptual lack. Against this, he attributed active construction as necessary for 
productive new functions in knowledge. New concepts were understood to be intellectual 
products by Bachelard who followed a scientific disposition to make a claim on the world by 
developing experimental ideas. His reason for opposing Bergson‟s force of the unconscious, was 
its ontological base. Foucault‟s discursive discontinuities inherited this opposition in the 
discourse of negative attributions, particularly in undisputed positive values attributed to a 
plurality in a concept of life. 
 
- Secondly, Bachelard foregrounded an idea of an objective synthesis. One justification for this 
was from Henri Poincare who claimed that mathematics had reinvented itself. It was, he wrote,  
“making itself over…by means of a revolution…in some sense the opposite of the 
Cartesian reform. Before Descartes, chance alone, or genius, made possible the solution 
to a geometric problem. After Descartes we were in possession of infallible rules for 
obtaining results”56 
As a new active „method of discovery‟ this substituted for a speculative positing; Bachelard 
called the latter a „method of solution.‟ Poincaré was proposing that a new mathematics of 
complexity could present new synthetic concepts to that surpassed a primitive science of spatial 
measurement and renewed the ambitions for a true „science of relations.‟ Bachelard took this as 
extending a critical domain of scientific objectification and Foucault took this up as a technique 
of critical historicism. 
 
- Thirdly, Bachelard followed Pierre Janet‟s later criticism of Bergsonian „psychology.‟ Janet 
opposed the „plenitude‟ with a „psychology of commencement.‟ The importance was placed on 
the event of commencement in thought to limit its effect. Bachelard could in turn write, “we need 
the concept of the instantaneous in order to understand the psychology of beginning.”57 The 
psychology of beginning drew on Janet‟s idea of memory being a „social‟ function aiming to 
„triumphing over absence;‟ memory held a continuity where there is no reality as such.58 Janet 
maintained that the idea of memory manifests the higher functions when given through the word,  
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“the first populations were delighted by all these accounts by victories and of defeats, 
they were affected; it is the third period of the memory, the period that we called 
fabulation.” 59 
The power of fabulation extends memory and captivates through literature and poetry. It gives 
memory power, not to be understood as forms of the spirit, rather as a power of construction. 
This distinction leaves human knowledge - its objects, people, space and time – in need of a 
transcendental perspective on its constructions, although this represents a departure from an idea 
attributed to nature in general. Foucault‟s discourse studies followed a historical idea as the 
fabulation or construction, but these representerd an epistemological object to any evident deeper 
nature of man and his concept of world.
60
 
 
Through questions of function, method and power, Foucault‟s structural analysis followed a 
strategy that drew on the radical shift in the psychology of scientific thinking. Bachelard had 
described contemporary sciences as transforming the orientation of its „epistemological vector,‟ a 
new orientation moving from the idea towards the „real.‟ This paradigmatic shift looked to 
bridge realistic and rationalistic modes of thought and represented a significant break with earlier 
Positivist models that assumed a sum of experience of the „real‟ would move towards a 
transcendental idea of nature.  A new realism, limited to the products of scientific experience, is 
illustrated, for example, by the physiology of Claude Bernard who distinguished his concept of 
scientific epistemology from that of Auguste Comte. Bernard accepted different modes of human 
understanding while refusing an interpretation that viewed these as historical progress. He 
refused this on the basis that science was necessarily stood as a distinct form of knowledge from 
philosophy; this was a distinct break with a historically rationalising form of science. He 
characterised this as two ways of writing history; firstly, an internalising way, accumulative or 
scholastic, and secondly, a functional way, externalising an immanent perspective on the activity 
that produces it. Through his own method, Bernard saw the new task as freeing human 
knowledge from the ideological tendencies of a human mind encysted in systems of thought.
61
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The polemic of the epistemological method aimed at a corrective to narrow ideologies by 
opening these systems to a critical reflection.
62
 
 
The critical task of Foucault‟s Archaeology was, by extension, an analysis of the utility of 
ideational structures. The philosophical disposition was that of an ethics that would actively hunt 
diversity beneath identity opening thought to the autonomous concept.
63
 The reflection that 
appears in The Order of Things brought this out from the point of view where new rules of 
discourse come into play, and whose function extends through a history of the sciences of man. 
This was an analysis aimed at the internal economy of scientific discovery. It served to implicate, 
as Foucault later said, “what has eluded consciousness,”- 
“ [it] describes the unconscious of science, the negative side of science as that which 
resists it, deflects it and disturbs it. What I would like to do, however is to reveal a 
positive unconscious of knowledge: at a level that eludes the consciousness of the 
scientist yet is part of scientific discourse, instead of disputing its validity and seeking to 
diminish its scientific nature.” 64 
The deeper significance of the human sciences, behind their rules of formation, was in the 
constitution of a historical practice of subjectivity. This brought out a paradox, the question 
which Foucault described as “often highly embarrassing,” namely of accounting for this higher 
conditionality of man‟s world at the conceptual level.65  
 
The Concept of Power as the „Rarefied Positivism‟ 
 
In the texts Discipline and Punish and The Will to Knowledge Foucault took a different approach 
to such conditionality. By introducing a shift in focus to non-discursive disciplinary practices 
from a broader social perspective, he focussed on histories of human bodies engaged with a 
“machinery of power.” Describing a distributed network through an analysis of power gave 
Foucault a social perspective delimited through a normalising judgement.
66
 Discipline and 
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Punish introduces a „mechanics of power‟ to distinguish how new conditions for the life of the 
body are explicitly related to Enlightenment issues of social and political reflection on a positive 
knowledge of the individual.
67
 The Will to Knowledge described „crystalisations‟ emerging to 
sustain a domain of strategic investments. Notably these displaced stricter determinable models 
of law in the account of shifting social formations that gradually become invested with an order 
of political power.
68
  
 
Foucault accounts for the profound transformations in the modern era through a socio-political 
ordering of life where a concept of power serves the productive aspects seen of a force „within 
itself.‟69 The concept of power distinguished what was earlier attributed to a „commencement‟ in 
the epistemological models. The externalised spontaneous form of knowledge has a correlation 
to an internal capacity of a concept of power. But this appears on the social level and made 
evident by what Foucault reflected upon as “rights of death.” He claimed that massacres were 
vital to a political modernity, as the counterpart of forces exerting a positive influence over life.
70
 
This indicates that power becomes increasingly the determinable element in the empirical 
domain, and the concept of power can demonstrate an emerging representational capacity that 
functions as a mechanism to apprehend „biological dangers‟ through a productive discrimination. 
This concept internalises the limits of productivity attributed both to movements of life and the 
processes of history. Foucault‟s ambition for the concept of power was therefore to capture an 
essential function at the level of societies.  
 
From the discursive perspective, it is notable that Foucault was reflecting on the new genetics in 
the context of such a bio-logic in the period up to 1970. His review of François Jacob‟s The 
Logic of Life described the new genetic discourses that defined chance as an internal limit to a 
concept of life.
71
 This limit appeared as an internal fault and gave a new concept of life which no 
longer carried fundamental postulates of continuity. In the transcription of codes, errors, 
omissions and inversions, life had a new concept that was disruptive of the legacy of older 
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concept of life in their relation to cosmological ideas of nature; a new discourse on information 
was of a program whose „nature‟ presented the new epistemological challenge to traditional 
Western doctrines of „man,‟ as absorbed within the human sciences. The new technical discourse 
focused on „communication‟ and the arbitrariness of a genetic limit.72 It subordinated any 
individuals terms of natural growth or possibilities for transmissions and intensification of vital 
„force‟ as compensation for the negativity of death, and gave a significant re-modeling of a 
concept of „nature‟ such as those upheld by a 19th century Positivist discourses on energetics.  
 
The consequences for discourses on subjectivity was to present them with a “fierceness of 
reproduction,” as a negativity within the very notion of subject.73 Inserting randomness into the 
knowledge of living systems moved away from debates absorbed from the 19
th
 century 
physiological era; genetics had a significance for our epoch which differentiated a new domain 
for life fundamentally reflecting a potential for absence. The analysis of living being, from the 
perspective of a program, was limited to the „encoded,‟ and constrained within fixed margins of 
the organism. By situating a possibly inert order at the heart of the living, Foucault pictured an 
ego as consulting a program from a limited perspective, merely translating a code against the 
order of the given. Here was an intrinsic limit to any speculative bio-logic in contending with 
arbitrariness, conversely it offered Foucault certain possibilities for expanding philosophical 
elements around a concept of life. There are two specific points, - 
  
- This displaced the axiomatic that saw thermodynamics overtake categories of vitalism in the 
early 19
th
 century debates on life. In the image of life, a negative notion of entropy became a 
measure of disorder from the point of the whole, this subordinated a lack of knowledge of 
internal structure. But the genetic analysis of living systems gained information at the local level, 
to compete statistically with the concept of equilibrium in the image of the whole. Such 
competing ways of thinking about the nature of life, one an inversion of the other, had 
consequences for the statistical genetics in displacing any absolute arguments over general 
definitions of life. Thhis substitute the scientific discourse on energetics with the focus on 
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biological-history studied as integration of increasingly abstract functional elements whose 
effects remained to be determined at a higher level.
74
  
 
- By introducing the logic of reproduction, and internalising the concept of the genetic pool, a 
compelling new dynamism appears in the complexity of biological systems. Grounded by an 
apparently natural concept, the wider perspective on a genetic communication places the 
individual program within the wider collective; conversely, an internalised „natural‟ death 
implicates individual genetic death has the necessity attributed to the wider functions of an 
evolution of the general code. This offers a broadly naturalistic perspective to an idea of 
evolution limited only to terms of the expression of the pool; in this respect, any ideas of general 
conservation of life compete against the perpetual revolution within parameters given under the 
notion of selection. A logic of the genetic program, of which nothing specific is understood, 
necessitates the interpretation that ascends though various levels of living systems; from genetic 
element in the individual, to cultural, moral, socio-political, economic, and religious codes. It 
lends a philosophical privilege to the interpretative power that can situate such knowledge with 
respect to any wider discourse; its interpretation is open to confrontations with competing 
accounts of histories of the world since the wider nature now effectively appear buried in 
unknown internalised principles, and is expressed only in a social space. 
 
The concept of man‟s world at the level of populations frames the new confrontation between an 
„economy of man‟ and an „economy of nature.‟75 But it reverses an idea of life now subordinated 
to the concept of a „natural‟ evolution. Georges Canguilhem was content to describe this as the 
great gulf emerging with the current information theories of organisation and the explanatory 
systems of the past.
76
 But Foucault takes a philosophical departure through this method of 
interpretation at levels of the ego, the social, political etc, which extends through a concept of 
power.
77
  
 
                                                          
74
 See Jacob (1989) p304-305 
75
 Foucault (1994b) vol. 2 pp99-104 
76
 Canguilhem asks “does not information theory have more to say about, in its own algorithmic language about 
living things than Henri Bergson did in the third chapter of Creative Evolution ?” Canguilhem (1994) p86-89 
77
 Foucault (1979) 92-93 
30 
 
History of Sexuality follows this as a positive concept grounding the conditions of existence as 
they were historically developed through a discourse on forces that “could be modified…and 
distributed in an optimal manner.”78 From a “theory of signs, ideas and sensations” as they 
appeared in the early nineteenth century, came a discourse that facilitated tools of analysis to 
describe socio-political processes of life - to which a socio-political order derived its perspective 
of control.
79
 Here the concept of power could serve as counter-function to a disposition for 
juridical forms of knowledge to apprehend power within a socio-political order; Foucault meant 
this counter-function to delimit functional criteria attributed to social order by mediating what a 
bio-logic fundamentally internalised; the counter-function opens to philosophical interpretation 
around the concept of world at the socio-political level. 
 
Focussing on what this bio-logic internalises for its discourse on life‟s potential served 
Foucault‟s ambition behind the coupling of „power/knowledge‟ structures. The concept of power 
explains an “agent of transformation of human life” by extending a domain for life in a positive 
sense.
80
 It served a “point of attack,” open to a substitution, reversing the activity of juridical 
discourses. Foucault employs this for constitution of subjective relations within the social 
domain, a positive ambition identified with his socio-political project.
81
 Internal lack in a bio-
logic made it possible for a concept of power to extend a domain of knowledge, to harness a 
coupling of power/knowledge seen as an aggression of “egoism turned against one another.”82 
He framed this as a historical struggle for knowledge and would later return to categories of 
subjectivity.
83
  
 
Foucault‟s late return to subjectivity took the perspective from an analysis of the rules of 
discipline in constituting a self. Already in 1970, Foucault indicated that Genealogy was working 
on the „side of discourse,‟ through taking power to constitute the domain of objects by following 
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a “felicitous positivism” to achieve his positive ambitions.84 What motivates this shift can be 
understood by exploring Foucault‟s early reading of Kant‟s Anthropology from a Pragmatic 
Point of View. Here the ethical subject was already identified as a „doubly‟ determined object, 
under both juridical rules and under a universal moral law. It is a text that has been recognised as 
the pivotal perspective on The Order of Things which in turn can be seen as describing the 
dissolution an Enlightenment Science of Man.
85
   
 
Foucault Reading Kant‟s Positive Ambition  
 
In the early text, Foucault tracked Kant‟s positive ambitions through the “three fundamental 
questions enumerated in the Transcendental Method” which he took to dictate the general 
organisation of Kant‟s Critiques.86 These ambitions were repeated in his later Logic and 
supplemented by the question, „what is man?‟ Foucault saw this serving an „order of descent‟ 
from historical ambitions from a mathesis universalis in the 18
th
 century, through „anthropology, 
metaphysics, morality and religion‟ in which Kant pre-empted problems of representation of 19th 
century. Archaeology takes its relation in this series as the „practice amongst practices‟ opening 
an alterity under a concept of nature.
87
 Archaeology of Knowledge mapped the admixture of 
disciplinary knowledge and ideology, indicating relations between empirical rules and 
transcendental structures, to identify an open limit that specified where an empirical function 
came into play. This indicated an active struggle operating at the level of the externalised 
concept. Foucault often gives Nietzschean terms to this struggle, the power extending its 
disposition for transformation of values, but his target is the internalised qualities of the concept 
that appear at the level of disciplinary practices.
88
 
   
These internalised qualities gave the context for a thematic exploration of an objective synthesis 
that culminates with his work on subjectivity. Foucault‟s Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology 
from a Pragmatic Point of View describes a text following a central ambition of mapping a life 
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of logic.
89
 This ambition avoids discussions of intuitive essence which corresponding to 
Foucault‟s focus on epistemic knowledge. However, Kant‟s Anthropology was also understood 
as mapping an actuality explored under questions of desire and prudence. This pragmatic 
element behind the evident strategies of knowledge presuppose what become apparent through 
the „network‟ of human activity: it implicates undisclosed intentions behind the constitution of a 
system of the world. In this way, Kant‟s Anthropology followed the strategy that deliberately 
targets positive difference between the concept of nature and an intelligible idea of natural 
man.
90
  
 
What was intelligible of such an idea was the central problem of the Anthropology. The evident 
objectivity that appears as natural man, can be distinguished into different empirical life practices 
and seen as different “possible uses of reason.” Foucault shows that such an „object,‟ rather than 
having an intuitive „psychological‟ nature, is the product of multiple logics which necessitates a 
principle that distinguishes the diverse epistemological modes that an inner-sense can expresses 
as the possibilities of its world. Although Foucault found nothing in the text to indicate what 
kind of principle accounted for this difference, Anthropology revealed a “progressive 
investment” of man and his world with an “imperious sovereignty,” which Foucault 
speculatively took as oriented towards the theme of Geist.
91
 
 
The elements of this sensibility are formed between the following,- 
- Foucault understood Geist served ultimately as the function of a universal perspective from 
which all anthropological experience of the world was pragmatic, and to which a „nature of 
reason‟ cannot be fully determinable. This signifies a crucial apophatic element throughout 
Kantian thought, which necessitated Critique serving to regulate any positive sensible 
determinations, i.e. any concepts produced and positively constituted were to be measured 
against this transcendental „nature‟ of man.92 
- But this concept was itself the product of subjective freedom. This positive source of 
representation draws potential from the Gemüt to extend itself and give a transcendental image 
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as its virtual „potentia.‟ However, since Anthropology excludes any transcendental perspective, 
describing only how empirical faculties follow divergent lines, these individual freedoms also 
have the concrete negative attribute of being open to the possibility of frivolity and error.
93
 
Because Kant necessitated “something a priori in the consciousness of our existence” that can 
orientate this potential towards the transcendental theme of Geist, Foucault identifies an evident 
power of organisation with the anthropological domain as its positive horizon of conditionality. 
This conditionality delimits an anthropology to being the “space of the research of powers in 
virtuality.”94 It indicated the historically positive sense of a Gemüt coming to an awareness of a 
concept that can be positively constituted through its own self-representations. 
 
Kant‟s transcendental concept covered a domain that included all possible predicates, but since 
the Anthropology lacked such transcendental possibility, its necessity appears from the empirical 
perspective as what could limit itself under a „natural‟ knowledge. Foucault further correlated 
this with what Kant‟s Opus Postumum extended through the wider speculative source of 
possibilities.
95
 From this, a natural concept meant a normative knowledge of the world which 
follows from the existential conditions with which any pragmatic idea must contend. Foucault 
carried this over into his own research as the conceptual possibilities of positive determinations 
subordinated by the historical world of man.  
 
The historical limit has its relation to Kant‟s critical context, as Foucault puts it, by offering the 
“interrogation of the interrogators themselves.”96 Its significance is located in a distinction 
between differing approaches to time consciousness in Anthropology and Critique; the 
anthropological perspective leaves time as no longer intuitively given but as the dispersive 
negative element to which the wider synthetic combinatory must work against. The combinatory 
has the necessity of functioning against errors or „slippage‟ in logic but, conversely, its 
dispersive nature allows, in an inverted way, an intrinsic space of possibilities to be attained in 
the functioning of positive practices working against natural „slippage.‟97  
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This gives values to practical disciplines as the form of the freedom attributed to the knowledge 
adopted to avoid its own dissolution. But Anthropology took this as a positive functional 
knowledge whose power was attained from the successful reciprocation of phenomena through 
the exchange of signs.
98
 Strictly speaking, an Anthropology saw such this function neither in 
strictly in terms of a historical tradition nor an extended theoretical technique, but as an open 
discipline defined only by its successful extension through the „logic of an illusion.‟ Because this 
depended on an „art of interpretation‟ the function reaches beyond any logical principle as it 
appeared as a natural concept. Since the anthropological domain lacks any transcendental 
perspective, the context for such a power is the exchange of signs that emerges only through a 
competition of disciplinary practices. What becomes historically conditioned by compromise and 
negotiation under an interpretation of the given internalises this disciplinary power, but remains 
open to a progressive investment whose positive potential for transformation takes the form of a 
real determination. 
 
There are two ways to read how Foucault contextualises the Anthropology text; one where 
positive empirical practices map an orientation as an idea of world whose transcendental 
knowledge has the noted in the correlation to Kant‟s Opus Postumum. But secondly there 
appears a relation to what Foucault later indicated with the reading of Kant‟s Was ist 
Aufklärung?
99
 Kant was seen as taking the function of reason as upholding a predisposition in 
human nature revealed through the concept that extends through successive ruptures in social 
formations. Foucault called this the „moral‟ predisposition to avoid war behind political 
constitutions and social formations, which appears in the disposition behind spontaneous 
ruptures of socio-political formations.
100
 This stands as Foucault understanding of Kant‟s „deeper 
understanding of a philosophical task embodied of an ethos. The significance for the early 
reading of Anthropology is what Foucault carried over a practical task, evident as orienting the 
new concept that emerges across historical breaks, constitutes autonomous subjects and through 
                                                          
98
 Ibid p18 
99
 Foucault (1998) p439-440 
100
 „What is Revolution?‟ Foucault (1997a) p96 
35 
 
what Foucault later understood of the disposition to open a “limit attitude” or “frontier.”101 Here 
was the important element that later saw a return to discussing subjectivity. The historical 
perspective becomes evident during the 18
th
 century event as a „signum prognosticum which 
„haunts‟ 19th century thought (“if not all modern philosophy”102). This should be taken as 
reflecting the positive ambitions that form a continuous element in Foucault‟s work and give his 
perspective on the Enlightenment ambitions.   
 
Ideology and Criticism in the Enlightenment Science of Man 
 
This historical break gives the particular context that is framed as an internal confrontation 
identified with the legacy of the 18
th
 century Science of Man. It appears in Foucault‟s 
Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology but also informs what is mapped in The Order of Things 
under the expansion and disintegration of the unified ambitions for a modern knowledge of man. 
This confrontation with the emerging Positive sciences from the start of the 19
th
 century leaves 
this text as instructive for understanding how Foucault implements his positive ambitions.
103
 The 
narrative of The Order of Things distinguishes these ambitions on the basis of two departures 
from the 18
th
 century paradigm.  
 
- Firstly, the Ideological method which is given through sensationalist techniques of 
representation. These followed aspirations for a new and positive scientific language by a 
method derived from the classical domain of representation; it analysed through a 
phenomenology of signs intended to apprehend a new objective knowledge. This was dependant 
and limited by the combinatory techniques that grounded a subjective practice, notably empirical 
observation.
104
  
- Secondly, the approach that was followed by Kant‟s Critique reached beyond simple realism. 
Kant foregrounds questions of subjective appearances as the basis of judgment. Through 
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reflective detachment from physiological specificities of the combinatory, Kant could question of 
the status of a domain of reason through its conditionality.
105
  
 
Foucault was looking to delimit this to a dispute around the specific nature accorded to the 
conditioning of positive experiences within the practice of representation. Both approaches had 
ambitions for a universal necessity but the issue was whether sensationalist techniques could 
sustain a new language as a positive concept; this pivots on whether they simply translated 
empirical scientific practices into systematised social-political practices. On the other hand, 
Kant‟s Critical approach is attributed with bringing out the difficult „nature‟ of the combinatory 
by reference to the negative concept. This carried a necessary conditionality a prior to a problem 
posed of any posited knowledge.  
 
Foucault makes two particular points; 
- Kant took metaphysics itself as a functional concept. The Critique of Pure Reason draws this 
sharp distinction between spatial and dynamical relations by localising analogical relations in a 
specifically Cartesian style physics. This exposed the physiological limits to the scientific 
paradigm of day. Critique therefore initiated a departure from the „naïve model‟ of the positive, 
identified as the metaphysical dimension of 18
th
 century thought. Archaeology interrogated 
discourses that naïvely extending derivative concepts into social or moral discourses. The critical 
reflection on human sciences displaced this for a deeper reasoning; these reasons follow what 
Kant initially sought to mobilise in his Critique.
106
  
 
- The ambition which is central to The Order of Things pivots around the discussion of what an 
earlier Science of Man distinguished between „human nature‟ and „nature‟ in general.107 In the 
emerging discourses of the Enlightenment, a new fundamental opposition around what orders a 
history, and what disrupts it. New scientific discourses took on the philosophical function of 
representation which had earlier served to reconcile a split between discourses on nature and 
man. These gave the positive ambitions within classical knowledge. At the turn of the 19
th
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century, scientific disciplines were limiting determinable nature to a designated domain that 
could contain the specific elements of knowledge. The legacy for an Enlightenment Science of 
Man at the beginning of the 19
th
 century was to restrict legitimate representational possibilities. 
This became the positive field which analysis externalised in its relations to man and initiates 
what Foucault describes as the analytic of finitude.
108
  
 
Kant‟s analytic that brought into focus the conditionality of this conceptually positive domain as 
it becomes separated from a philosophically positive discourse. It addressed the dispute by 
introducing a new necessity for distinguishing what constituted a transcendental concept from a 
transcendental style of understanding of an empirical experience. This new necessity followed a 
devaluing of metaphysics which emerged as the real problem around an Enlightenment Science 
of Man.
109
 The devaluing of metaphysics initially followed from the ambition for the positive 
knowledge to substitute for a discursive history across a range of positivistic disciplines. This 
ambition was to define a transcendental style of knowledge, dependant on what could be 
positively defined around a knowledge of man. An emerging Positivism in the 19
th
 century 
extends this ambition through freeing itself from a metaphysical practice of 18
th
 century, but 
faced the dilemma of a double system of reference; this meant it limited its transcendental 
perspective with respect to the positive contents of an empirical domain. Foucault shows how 
such „new positivities‟ opened the problem of a necessary empirical compensation, namely, a 
dispute over what concept could posit a knowledge in relation to its human object. The 
Ideological method extending through new forms of Positivism implicated a series of practices 
whose objectivity sustained an anthropological illusion.
110
 Foucault‟s history saw Kant‟s 
epistemological break as making possible the inverse problem, giving the transcendental 
ambition of extending a question over the nature of man philosophically.  
 
It is the failure to follow this philosophically which had the reductive consequence that appear in 
the legacy of the 20
th
 century humanities. In The Order of Things, the dense history of these roots 
of analytic of experience finds a categorical problem as it appears around a priori principles of 
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coexistence in their relation to 20
th
 century discourses. Foucault later explained that the text was 
intended as a polemic against the Phenomenological method which upheld „scientific‟ ambitions 
without restricting itself to pre-grounded data.
111
 Phenomenology did not follow Positivism‟s 
ambition of freeing itself from metaphysics, and therefore considered its ambitions positive in a 
different sense; it was to be positive in the sense of taking a domain of experience as the reality 
to substitute for the limited science of nature. This strategy was pursued through Edmund 
Husserl‟s epoche by taking experience of the world as a natural grounding for presenting 
experiences as „real.‟112 Husserl gave an innovative description of evident logic and its positive 
categories of meaning that could delimit a Cartesian style res extensa over ego-experiences. 
Because this was considered detached from a broader world of consciousness itself, its values 
indicated the activities of object-constituting whose reality was grounded as a formal and 
positive concept.
113
 This gave renewed potential for the rarefaction that moved towards what 
Kant held of a transcendental a priori. Husserl‟s phenomenology was absorbed in France from 
the 1930‟s but, from Foucault‟s perspective, it avoided the consequences of the difficult 
anthropological question over man.
114
  
 
Anthropology and the Concept of the Positive 
 
Writing in the context of the 1960‟s, Foucault saw Phenomenology‟s latent intent to redefine 
discourse on the rational animal through implicating an intrinsic reason.
115
 Archaeology opposed 
such intrinsic reason as a „thought of the same,‟ seen to lack the philosophical ambitions of Kant 
questioning the limits of universalising science and The Order of Things proposes that a modern 
Cogito is grounded in a network “that does not think.”116 Foucault distinguishes a modern Cogito 
in its fundamental confrontation with the dissimilar, discontinuity and difference, initiating a 
shift to analytic possibilities attributed to reflecting on an „unthought,‟ -  
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“...established far removed from both Cartesianism and Kantian analysis, a form that 
involves for the first time, man‟s being in that dimension when thought addresses unthought 
and articulates itself upon it.”117 
The discursive model that The Order of Things tracks, moves historically from the „natural‟ 
origins that sustained 18
th
 century thought through its strategies of history and culture, through 
the start of the 19
th
 century and the divergence of new human sciences. In an era of Positivism‟s 
expansion, the dissolution of discursive possibilities for an Enlightenment Science of Man were 
compensated for through legitimised forms of pseudo-scientific concepts attributed to man‟s 
natural being. Despite redefining the concept of the natural, Foucault saw 20
th
 Phenomenology as 
still being implicated in this.
118
  
 
The ambition behind the Enlightenment sciences remained something that the wider reaches of 
Positivism had hoped to discover. For an Enlightenment Science of Man, the ambition for a 
natural function of the subject that could displace a historical-metaphysical concept, had lent 
itself to a particular facet of the Kantian ambition for the transcendental concept during the 19
th
 
century. The Order of Things attributes to this the limited forms of a meta-psychology that 
informed human sciences formalised through a particular combination of mathesis, science and 
philosophical reflection.
119
 From this perspective Foucault echoes Martin Heidegger‟s estimation 
that Kant „shrank back‟ from acknowledging the power of representation as an „independent‟ 
power,‟ and The Order of Things follows Heidegger‟s line of thought around the compromise of 
extending a Cartesian approach into man‟s world. 120 A dispute within an earlier Science of Man 
was about constituting a legitimate horizon that could account for both a sensibility and the 
rational thought in man: Heidegger identified an independent power in Critique of Pure Reason 
with a metaphysical analytic whose „pure synthesis‟ was accounted for by power of imagination. 
This unity of time was understood to open the space of possibility for the transcendental 
knowledge, it derived its root concept from this and served to account for latency in all actions 
and reaction attributed to human reason, as well as the finitude in the transcendental horizon. 
Heidegger‟s objection was that Kant left this power of imagination suppressed within the second 
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edition of Critique of Pure Reason, displaced in favour of the power of an understanding. For 
Heidegger, the theoretical possibilities of a „pure sensibility‟ in the subject was downplayed by 
Kant for an emphasis on limits of human understanding.
121
 
 
The function of this power was in reproducing time in the imagination where it gave the space of 
play for inner sense. Heidegger contended that Kant „wanted to say‟ that the concept of time was 
produced under limits of this broader transcendental horizon of sensibility, a self-affection that 
accounted for limits of what could be attributed to the power of representation. But by 
prioritizing a transcendental time over his metaphysics, Kant “just develops into the positive 
problem of showing that, like time, space, in a certain sense also belongs to the self as something 
finite…”122 Kant‟s transcendental horizon becomes, therefore, “essentially spatial,” serving 
merely to emphasize its status as the product of „something else.‟ The question of what this 
excludes as the source attributed to a root concept of any positive transcendence, is the 
„unspoken‟ function behind the polemic of transcendental finitude. This source stands as the 
power behind an idea which “shines forth, must drive and guide…”123 It becomes the basis for 
the problem taken up in Being and Time which saw Heidegger looking beyond conditionality, to 
the positive sense given in terms of a fundamental ontology. 
 
Kant‟s Anthropology also had a significance for Heidegger in demonstrating how the empirical 
domain had an evident lack of pure reason. Anthropology opens an important dissymmetry for 
any transcendental logic that follows the wider ambitions of the Critique. The account of 
transcendental power as delimited according to a transcendental logic meant that Kant was 
opening the reverse question - what concept could account for the „nature‟ of this power? In this 
sense, Kant‟s Critique could be seen as the original approach within the ambitions for a Science 
of Man to considering two domains, of pure and empirical reasons; Anthropology’s significance 
was that these domains converge encompassing the space of competing forms of reason. What 
Heidegger characterised of an Enlightenment Science of Man was its framing of the question of 
constituting a rational psychology around this empirical field of man. These were the twin 
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intentions of both grounding philosophical practices within an empirical domain, and upholding 
the question of a fundamental nature of man‟s activities within the world.124 As broader 
philosophical problems, these extend behind the ambition for a special concept that could unite 
both explicit and latent reasons around disciplines of psychological, biological, sociological etc. 
But since the object of anthropology remains completely mired in indeterminacy, Kant‟s 
Anthropology only highlights how an Enlightenment Science of Man becomes limited in its 
ambition by approaching an empirical Science of Man in terms of a rational psychology.
125
  
 
The ambition to apprehend a contemporary situation of man‟s activity in the world extends the 
limits of any positive interpretation as the fundamental problem around man‟s reason to a socio-
political discourse. Transcendentally critical questions avoided this original problem derived of 
an Enlightenment Science of Man. Heidegger formulates his philosophical question around what 
positive concept such transcendental knowledge would depend on? He conceives of positive 
knowledge as a „positum‟ that “springs forth from the pre-conceptual understanding of 
Being.”126 This is a Being that positively presents itself as self-evident, but whose question is of 
the relation between what is self-evident and that which gives its concept - what can be held to 
exist behind the drive directing constancy of human understanding? This is what exists despite 
Kant‟s finitude. Original positivity is defined by Heidegger as this constancy, prior to any 
positive horizons and beyond strict distinctions of inner and outer determinations.
127
 Historically, 
it is the positivity of the sign that accounts for a power projecting an idea onto what is self-
evident in time. This gave the temporal horizon that defined the terms of Aristotle‟s legacy for 
the history of metaphysics; here constancy meant the idea that could sustain the natural concept. 
Heidegger thereby characterises Kant‟s critical legacy as the return of an original finitude for the 
modern world, but through bringing man‟s psychic structures into view as man‟s actual relations 
to his general existence. 
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The main significance of Kantian finitude is in reversing Aristotle‟s constitution of the positive 
sign of nature. A power of self-affection projects, as a positive concept, that which Critique 
constituted negatively as the constancy of a norm. But Heidegger also places this legacy within 
the dispute over an Enlightenment Science of Man and when Kant „shrinks back‟ from the power 
of imagination in the later Critique of Pure Reason he restricted this to a dispute over the power 
of representation. Foucault closely follows this legacy in The Order of Things from the 
perspective of the status of a Science of Man during the 19
th
 century. 
 
The Anthropological-Critical Reflection  
 
Foucault draws his own significance from Anthropology’s account which follows from his 
reading of the Opus Postumum. This text is understood as aiming to explain how a 
transcendental knowledge could link a positive knowledge to the universal experience of the 
world. Such a relation to appearances of the world is derived from the logical judgment of 
relation, and follows an exhaustive deduction of the scholastic tri-partite scheme of subject, 
predicate, copula. But it also left the necessity of the conceptual link between the subject and its 
predicate at the level of an aesthetic activity.
128
 
 
Both the thinking subject and its “changing powers of sensation” are here described under the 
„concepti subjecti,‟ which is a domain of subjective activity becoming positively grounded, 
despite any particular logic concerning itself only with the distinction of identity and 
difference.
129
 Beyond the strict logic of identity and difference, positive values are affirmed by 
the repetitive actions as experienced in the world. Importantly, the positive experience of the 
world necessitates an a priori opening of the critical reflection on the source of its activity in 
order to give it transcendental meaning. This is the questioning reflection that Opus Postumum 
followed through an originary principle attributed to the Gemüt, which was excluded from any 
transcendental thought. 
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However, Foucault did not read this as as a transcendental resolution to the problem left by the 
Critique. Rather it served a theoretical concept in its virtual form; the possible understanding of a 
transcendental domain of man and his world. Kant always maintained as problematic the actual 
limit in man‟s relation to his world, but this text reversed the possibilities of the Gemüt in its 
metaphysical function. This distinguishes his approach from Heidegger. The function follows 
from a necessity that Foucault attributed to Kant not taking a naturalist perspective. This saw the 
Gemüt provide a transcendental stance as the means to instigate what a Science of Man could not 
limit to an empirical knowledge of the world.
130
 Such a stance follows from Kant‟s concern for a 
disciplinary perspective whose higher ambitions were in developing the self-awareness 
necessitated by subject becoming an object of an empirical world. 
 
Foucault also understood Kant as wanting to differentiate what was subjectively conditioned 
over time through a distinction between soul and Gemüt. The subject‟s positive knowledge 
relates to an inner sense as modes of empirical knowledge and the Gemüt could account for the 
animation behind the “work of ideas.” It “offers life the realm of the possible orientating towards 
a virtual whole” as an account of objective possibilities in the power of reflection. This was what 
Foucault noted in his Introduction as mapping a distinction between the transcendental and 
empirical perspectives.
131
 
  
- In transcendental thinking, the Gemüt serves the metaphysical function which was negative 
since the principle is necessarily absent from any positive structures of knowledge – these are 
accounted for by the spontaneity of the imagination. However, in an empirical observation, the 
principle accounts for evident functional differences within knowledge and thereby given to a 
conceptually positive structure.  
- Although any positive function in knowledge can be „self-evident‟ in the empirical field, when 
exposed to a regressive analysis this reveals a descent - moving from an ideological form of 
naturalism to the philosophical possibilities around the originary principle. Because the empirical 
field does not follow the common Kantian distinction of receptivity and spontaneity in an 
understanding, the positive function appears as continuous to the relation of the power of 
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knowledge in its admixture of irreducible possibilities. Conversely, an empirical analysis 
necessitates an existence of such “seeds of powers,” a priori to any constitution of a positive 
concept.
132
  
 
What does Foucault understand of such „seeds of power‟? Heidegger‟s ontology puts the 
conditioning of inner sense a priori in accordance with the metaphysics of finitude. This also 
works through the questions followed by Kant‟s Logic to arrive at the fundamental question of 
man. But by following the dialectic of Critique of Pure Reason, the idea of nature did not 
succeed in constituting nature as a theatre of living organisms; the a priori system of Newtonian 
physical laws meant abandoning an intrinsic relation between logic and life. It is Critique of 
Judgement that revisits this through the regulative idea, an abstract concept introduced as the 
transcendental horizon that takes the form of a conceptual viewpoint that delimits an idea of 
nature.
133
 But Foucault distinguished the relation of anthropology to the Critical logic as 
„interrogating‟ the critical stance. Rather than relating to the Critique of Pure Reason, by 
following Kant‟s explorations in the Opus Postumum which concerned itself with fundamental 
problems of philosophical reflection, the „seeds of power‟ point to the activity by which 
synthetic thought unifies its world-view according to its powers of transcendence.
134
 The 
importance that Foucault attached to this was through reading Kant as having „re-inserted‟ the 
exploration of inner sense in the domain of Anthropology. This gave a reflection structured 
around a traditional logic as it extended behind both a rational psychology and a rational 
physiology.  
 
Here is a reflection that gives the perspective on an „unthought.‟ While the Gemüt has „no 
language,‟ The Order of Things attributes meaning to a critical rendering apart of man‟s world 
from its historically positive concept – namely, the concept of man. Man‟s world is this 
empirical projection inherently lacking a transcendental concept, which is emphasised by 
Foucault‟s reading of Anthropology. The empirical perspective follows the „changing powers of 
sensation‟ in a world that is extended by a reflection on individualised logic. Foucault could 
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further point out that Anthropology makes no textual relation to the Critiques, rather it was now 
following a function of empiricity which puts time at the root.
135
 Therefore an anthropological-
critical reflection gives positive meaning to such a concept of world as a perspective on inner 
sense. The emphasis on the functional aspect derived of the Gemüt at the fundamental level of 
man embodies this radical root, but at the transcendental level it grounds his concept of world - 
which is necessarily positive. But positive meaning will ultimately be indeterminate because 
sensibility is distributed internally at the different levels that embody a complex of necessity and 
freedom. From this, Foucault concludes that the empirical domain of Kant‟s Anthropology 
depicts a systematic projection of a general empirical principle across time, to which any positive 
concept will necessarily retain an admixture of reason and praxis. Furthermore this concept will 
only become evident through a functional relation of man to world, although the theoretical 
cohesion follows from what the Opus Postumum explored as a self-determination that gives 
positive content to an experience in general. But the particular significance in relation to an 
Enlightenment Science of Man, with its ambition of discovering a legitimate birthplace for a 
universal signification, leaves the positive concept as internalising empirical differences in 
favour of an account of human dispositions in the world. This no longer follows Kant‟s sharp 
distinction between positive reason and existence in general and Foucault could extend this to his 
concept of power. 
 
In Kant‟s era, a metaphysical dimension informed Enlightenment thought, to which he took up 
the non-naturalistic position. Foucault‟s Archaeology followed a similar approach against the 
philosophy of the subject, but after 1970 his positive ambitions followed a transition against an 
abstract “denial of the body.”136 This meant constituting the basic epistemological function 
whose perspective on historical discourses could follow a continuity with the natural function 
mediating the foundations for life through a genealogy. When he developed the criteria of a 
concept through the study of non-discursive practices, it was to introduce the perspective for a 
historical narrative. Foucault brought into play the „felicitous positivism‟ that maintained a 
philosophical perspective on the empirical world of man; from the anthropological-critical 
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reflection on the „matter of logic,‟ he moved to an engagement with an empirically positive 
discourse behind evident forms of human experience. This was already identified with what 
Kant‟s Opus Postumum extended through degrees of “changing powers of sensation,”137 and 
informed Anthropology with the practical means for man to define his concrete world. Foucault‟s 
shift beyond strict historical conditionality, was through the discourse by which positive content 
was given for a self-determination. From the reading of Opus Postumum, this was described by 
the world-concept as a positive domain of existence, but which remains a virtual hybrid of 
freedom and necessity and retains actual possibilities to be explored around a tri-partite scheme 
of source, domain and limit.  
 
Biopolitics as a Science of Man  
 
Foucault‟s historical discourses constitute a genealogy that gives his perspective on the core 
dispute around an Enlightenment Science of Man.
138
 What is significant in his analysis of bio-
power orientates itself at the level of the sociological and anthropological, through a practice of 
knowledge whose effect is “modifying something in the biological destiny of the series”.139 This 
is particularly evident in the texts of Foucault‟s lecture series, Security Territory Population and 
The Birth of Biopolitics, which follows the theory of state as capitalising on an emerging concept 
of its milieu from the 17
th
 century onwards. Milieu is conceived as a domain of action and 
reaction where a multiplicity of individuals are biologically bound to a material world within 
which they live. The biological species carries the capacity for a „second nature,‟ to which the 
social means an artifice that functions as a concept to be intervened into by a power; the concept 
of power delimits what constitutes this knowledge only to pragmatic structures.
140
  
 
Following a history of the 18
th
 century discovery of homo economicus, a biopower unfolds from 
“the political action that it proposes,” a narrative of new techniques of power. 141 Homo 
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economicus integrates the self-disciplines of modes of conduct of a production, parallel to that 
which Enlightenment political thought looked to understand as a physics. In this era, physics had 
a relation to a Science of Man in the sense of being a domain of nature potentially open to a 
unified knowledge. But this aspiration, which Foucault now distinguishes from an ideology, was 
based on a political sense of what nature signified in relation to a population.
142
 For a 
contemporary idea of population, the new question also parallels a Science of Man but breaks 
with negative political models of sovereignty. Population in itself serves the new positive 
concepts as they extend theoretically to the mechanisms of power through an art of 
government.
143
 Biological discourses on populations contend with a “mass of juridical, political 
and technical problems” at the confluence of a series of existing domains of knowledge. 
Population supersedes models of sovereignty, the substitute for man who did not exist. It informs 
government with its positive content in the form of statistics, which Foucault identifies as the 
matter for a new science of state. From this perspective, the analysis of economic power means 
that population is always excessive: population is a heterogeneous knowledge open to be 
“governmentalized”144  
 
Foucault‟s phenomena of “governmentality” serves a knowledge as disciplinary model. A 
disciplining of population derived its ideal function from a model of the Greek magistrate 
applied as a typology of man. While Philosophy offered critical models, the positive model is 
attributed to the archaic Christian pastorate whose positive function was to apply an “economy of 
souls” bearing comparison with the doctor. The significance of this practice is affirming 
difference for psychic structures, a reflection on the Other, which produces the new power, 
namely, the subject of community. The product is an understanding which is the prelude to 
governmentality.
145
 However, from the perspective of a Science of Man, the true significance 
appears through what Descartes philosophy proposes as representing a power to be rationalised 
according to a domain of scientific practices and principles. Foucault takes this as a subject 
continuous with the world of scientific principles which lent the central political problem of the 
Classical age. In the ambition for an open practice of government, the public domain of man 
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lacks a model, hence the question for the Classical epoch of its principia naturae. Italian 
humanism could provide a provisional answer as the basis for a raison d’etat which was the 
concept of man.
146
 One can see the parallel with intuition and understanding, the two stems 
which informed Kant‟s domain for a Science of Man.  
 
Foucault later lectures insert an anthropological multiplicity into this domain, rather than 
questioning the unity of its objects. Raison d’etat has to contend with a blur of positive and 
negative attributes, “it has become a domain, a set of objects, a type of organisation of power.”147 
Organisation is something to be constituted from the reflective practice of a „second nature,‟ but 
the dispute over the anthropological domain will leave the state with only one perspective. 
Hence, as a Science of Man, it is a reflection open to a new form of politics, “politics is not 
something that falls within the form of legality or a system of law. Politics is something else...it 
is concerned with necessity.”148 One understands why the question of political freedom is what 
Foucault contends is the pure form of reason extending intrinsically to violence. Populations are 
central to this knowledge composite and any technical power that serves a practice of 
government needs to resist revolutions and temporal cycles with the distribution of intrinsic 
resources, individual interests, and competition within populations, whose specific problems are 
dynamic. This is why an Enlightenment political science, like the sciences of nature, is proposed 
around a pure “notion of force.”149 
 
This second dimension lends itself to the theory of balance in the multiplicity of forces in the 
interiority of the population. Foucault proposes that historically Germany has served as the 
“microstate laboratory...and a site of experiment” for developing the theory of population 
through Polizeiwissenschaft.
150
 This was an anthropological systematic that appeared from the 
beginning of the 17
th
 century as a regulatory concept of state, but the excessive nature of an 
anthropological domain transcends its mechanisms of power and effectively dismantles a police 
state and any concept of right that it can propose. By the 18
th
 century, the concept of nature 
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serves to displace a traditional cosmo-theology, giving political science its definitive break with 
the past. While a new cosmopolitics remained to be theorised, its criteria were understood to 
require a, -  
“naturalness specific to man‟s life in common that economists ultimately bring to light as a 
domain, a field of objects, a possible domain of analysis, knowledge and intervention. 
Society as the field of naturalness specific to the naturalness of the many will be called 
civil society, emerges vis-à-vis” (p349)  
When the concept of man emerges at the level of a scientific phenomena during the 
Enlightenment, the significance appears as a problem of government in relations to its 
population. Here, Foucault‟s biopolitics turns to a concept of power for a genealogy of the 
modern state. 
 
Biopolitics, Vitalism, Positivism 
 
The contemporary problem on which his biopolitics focuses attributes the power of constitution 
over society to the market, and is the specific form of liberalism theorised in Germany around 
the mid 1930‟s. But according to Foucault‟s „genealogy of economic style,‟ this in turn follows 
from a 19
th
 century idea and marks an important schism with an earlier understanding of 
liberalism. The neoliberal form no longer takes „nature‟ to indicate a circulation and exchange 
values, but a notion of competition. This is specifically identified with social and economic 
discourses from around the 1890‟s, an analysis of processes which took a principle of 
competition in its „pure form.‟151 The market was no longer predicated on equivalence but on 
inequality and difference. This historical development no longer took its measure according to a 
naive naturalism of the 18
th
 century, but was formalised and extended as a new style from certain 
constituted rules of practice identified within the market. “Competition is an eidos” says 
Foucault.
152
 It developed an internal logic that it formalised. The market was a power taken as 
productive of society and its state, under certain conditions. These are conditions, “carefully and 
artificially constructed” to be a milieu of „pure competition.‟ The market now serves as 
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confluence of diverse domains of knowledge under this composite concept of milieu – the 
reverse of how 18
th
 governments orientated policy towards a hybrid concept of natural milieu. 
 
Foucault calls this rarefied concept of market competition a „positive liberalism.‟ This intends 
government to be master of economic development, through a concept no longer concerned with 
separate domains of knowledge. These become subordinated under an integrated multiplicity of 
knowledge constructed as a “governmental style,” whose composite domain serves for an 
intervention into social structure, and acts to eliminate archaic phenomena, historically “foreign 
to the economic process.”153 From a theory of competition comes the dynamic whose threshold 
requires a vigilant intervention necessitated of a neo-liberal art of government: it appears against 
a pathology of historical anomalies that run contrary to an idea of pure competition. Its schema, 
or mechanism of competition, is constructed around a new concept of labour.  
 
This was the concept of labour that Foucault saw developed during the 19
th
 century. As a 
concept, it was not a return to 18
th
 century laissez faire economics, but a 19
th
 century idea that 
followed from what a contemporary vitalpolitik took as formative power for society from an idea 
of enterprise. Vitalpolitik historically emerged from a debate on economic theory after the 
1890‟s: Foucault identified this with the crossroads of the criticism of the homogenised and 
standardised societies that extended behind the 19
th
 century concept of labour informing both a 
politics of left and right.
154
 The critique shifted to an energetic of labour for its analysis of 
population, as the enterprise unit now lent itself to a theory of human capital. Foucault‟s 
contention is that after the 1890‟s this served a genealogy for a „way of thinking,‟ a “general 
style of thought, analysis and imagination” which historically gave the new economic-juridical 
couplet to be constituted through the concept of labour.
155
 The competitive enterprise unit lent a 
historical specificity to an emerging political style as point of view. 
 
In The Birth of Biopolitics, Foucault relates the theory of human capital to an older concept of 
labour precisely because classical economics was unable to analyse labour in its qualitative 
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aspects. “It was a blank page, a gap or vacuum in its theory that a whole philosophy, 
anthropology and politics, of which Marx was precisely representative, rushed in.”156 Foucault 
returns to this ambition for a special epistemology over the domain of competing ends, the 
ambition for a political science of human behaviour over man‟s activity, or internal rationality, 
that accounts for the strategies of individuals from the perspective of an economic effect. It aims 
to encompass all the “physiological and psychological” factors which contribute to being an 
enterprising, human capital, a “machine for generating an income stream”157 Labour and the 
concept of human capital, give the intrinsic elements to be theorised positively. For example, 
when genetics lent itself to an analysis around the elements of risk, it served to convey its 
positive knowledge over the future of human capital. Human capital also serves to bind itself 
culturally to an extended domain through its investments around its conditions of life. It 
embodies a principle of order that previously fell to domains of physiology, psychology, 
anthropology, etc.  
 
For Foucault, the concept of labour also justifies a permanent political criticism of any 
aspirations to “economic positivism.” From the perspective of an „economic tribunal,‟ the idea of 
human capital will embarrass juridical administrations by offering the negative perspective on 
any juridical concept of right.
158
 This is the paradox of micropolitics as ideological inflation of 
knowledge within the activity of the subject. Through questions of conduct and acceptance of the 
reality of the milieu, it opens up a concept to behavioural techniques of governmentality, but 
Foucault‟s emphasis on human capital is as irreducible, unconditional element as it appeared in 
the 18
th
 century, not susceptible to regressive analysis. The return, through his concept of power, 
is to the permanent conditioning of the positive system that must accept a certain negativity for 
the constitution of its world. Human capital exists within a domain that cannot be totalised, only 
opened to the calculation which accords to the idea inserted into its reality, which is the 
positivity of man‟s world.  
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What is this idea? In the 18
th
 century, it was nature which remained the “theological conception 
of natural order,” but whose possibility was of the point of view over all the dispersed interests 
that remained coupled to the empirical. “Political power is not to interfere with this dynamic 
naturally ascribed to the heart of man.”159 The idea of nature served to resist the sovereign state 
as paralogism of political totality; this was also an idea attributed to man, - 
“Homo economicus is the one island of rationality possible within an economic process 
whose uncontrollable nature does not challenge, but instead founds the rationality of 
atomistic behaviour of man.” (p282)  
This idea guaranteed the world of man was constituted from multiple points of view, to which an 
economic discipline remained an aesthetic, lacking totality. The juridical problem for the 18
th
 
century was formed around such intrinsic difference, a heterogenous power that precisely eluded 
a founding of positive law and natural right. The Order of Things identified this with the 
dispersion of an Enlightenment Science of Man.  
 
The problem of political economy in the 20
th
 century was the converse problem - the 
impossibility of constituting a positive Science of Man meant that Enlightenment liberal theory 
remains an example of a science that could no longer lays claim to government rationality. As 
political theory it must co-exist within a domain represented by civil society, an assemblage or 
multiplicity of practices that exists only as a transactional reality, and subject to the dynamics of 
governmental reasoning.
160
 It is here the pre-critical status of the „zoological singularity‟ of The 
Order of Things followed Foucault‟s positive ambitions through the concept of power as the 
practice whose open dispute was the status of man.
161
  
 
Gilles Deleuze and the „Rarefied Positivism‟ 
 
Deleuze‟s famous works with Guattari also follow the “fundamental problem of a political 
philosophy” in the productivity of social structures but this is explicitly distinguished as a theory 
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“not of power but of desire.”162 This distinction marks Deleuze‟s own idea of critical freedom, 
often related to his work on Spinoza inspired by Nietzsche.
163
 But in his book on Foucault, he 
points to divergent interpretations of early 19
th
 century practices around the emergence of 
Positivism that highlights the „age of Bichat.‟ This follows his claim that Foucault developed 
symbolic values while Deleuze was indicating a form of vitalism understood in a functionally 
different way.  
 
Foucault‟s „felicitous positivism‟ captures, in his own words, the investment that followed a 
“double movement of liberation and enslavement.”164 Transcending historical concepts with the 
functionally positive concept was legitimated by an abstract principle that followed from Kant‟s 
Gemüt. It took Positivism‟s power in the form of a will to truth but followed the Kantian sense of 
subject becoming an object. The „felicitous Positivism‟ serves effective mode of subjectivation 
understood here through the context mapped out from Kant‟s Anthropology and its concern with 
knowledge was vital “in so far as it is philosophically relevant to the self.”165 It meant the 
necessary ethical „equipment‟ for a life-struggle in the empirical domain. History serves this 
value as ambition, disposition or drive behind any positive knowledge, but its critical test, or 
practice, remains explicitly related to what Descartes defined paradigmatically, i.e. an domain 
open to a universality of knowing, in as far as it serves the vital function freed from any socio-
hegemonic context.  
 
For Foucault, a naive Positivism was implicated in shortcomings of its own universalising 
ambition, and necessitated the anthropological-critical function to return empirical actuality. 
However Gilles Deleuze attributed this to Foucault‟s anti-naturalistic stance and the distinction 
appears in what Deleuze claimed as intrinsic values of the sign.
166
 In his commentary on 
Foucault he explains how intrinsic values specifically serve to re-orientate empirically positive 
practices,-   
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“There are only practices, or positivities, which are constitutive of knowledge: the 
discursive practices of statements or the non-discursive practices of visibilities.”167 
This conflation of positive practices marks Deleuze‟s fundamental distinction with an 
epistemological project which pivots around a Cartesian problem of universalising intelligibility. 
Deleuze thought this already displaced intrinsic elements of empirical sensibility and this 
captures the tension embodied in his comment that the early Foucault followed a “rarefied form 
of positivism.”168  
 
By contrast, in his own text on Nietzsche, Deleuze‟ saw the „delicate problem‟ of producing a 
positive concept as foregrounding the theme of positivity and objectivity around the significance 
of a combinatory. This indicates a differential that accounts a priori for constitutive tendencies 
within an empirical sensibility.
169
 When Deleuze downplayed Foucault‟s “neo-Kantianism” it 
was for the specific aesthetic activity of constituting meaning from the sign.
170
 Power meant an 
active faculty of synthesis of meaning, rather than an explanatory concept. In his discussions of 
the function of the sign, Deleuze distinguished representational norms from objective 
appearances, specifically against the legacy of „neo-Kantianism,‟ since Deleuze saw true critique 
as the form of practical philosophy that distinguished itself from an account of formative power.  
 
The underlying theme of the Foucault text is how a wider analytic process conceptually 
substitutes ideas, rather than being conditioned under a history. Deleuze presents this inverted 
use of history as justified by the limitations held of the Critical Kant,- 
“Kant had to invoke a third agency beyond the two forms that was essentially 
mysterious and capable of taking account of their co-adaptation as truth.”171  
Kant‟s third agency was necessitated by both attributing power to imagination and conversely 
excluding it a priori from schematics. This left Kant displacing a “hidden art at the depths of the 
human soul,”172 for the function reflected through the Gemüt as a power of judgement. The 
question of sensible apprehension follows from a priori transcendental principles grounding an 
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understanding, which was what Critique of Judgement took to inform an aesthesis accorded to 
the normative idea.
173
 In this account, an image is drawn against the multiplicity of an empirical 
imagination had a necessity explained by a doctrine of mean representation a priori. When 
Critique of Judgement explored this, it was through an ideational organisation taken up through 
basic principles given to teleology.
174
 Because this was centred on a norm constituted under an 
ideal schematics, Deleuze did not see this as „true critique.‟ Instead, the issue was the 
combinatory power which delimits certain positive functions attributed to reason; this becomes 
the central question informing his own aesthetics. When he gave this the context for a reading of 
The Order of Things in the Foucault text, Deleuze‟s aesthetics are inserted within a context of 
Foucault‟s socio-political domain. 
 
Deleuze and the Question of Power/Knowledge 
 
In the Foucault text, Deleuze takes a combinatory as delimiting certain positive functions in the 
relation between knowledge and power. The question of power now denotes a relation between 
forces, but considered as active categories of power with a primacy over the passivity of 
knowledge. Knowledge means formalised functions, objects of seeing and speaking, stratified 
and archivised. By contrast, power is an active function which orders and composes, leaving the 
mark of force. Deleuze designates the diagram as the particular feature in the distribution of 
strategic power which he relates to the practice of a micropolitics.
175
  
 
Knowledge is no longer an explanatory but merely an attribute of a power‟s orientation and what 
constitutes this domain remains under a wider effect of the combinatory. It is the activity of the 
combinatory by which Deleuze avoids a transcendental perspective since power no longer 
depends on an ideal capacity to function. This is illustrated explicitly in the pivotal fourth chapter 
of the Foucault text („Strategies or the non-Stratified: The Thought of the Outside (Power)‟) 
which impacts on Foucault‟s „analytic of finitude.‟ Deleuze inverts the historical relation with 
force as it appears during the 19
th
 century, - 
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“In order for man to appear as a specific compound, the forces that create him enter into 
a relation with new forces that evade that of representation, even to the point of 
deposing it.”176 
In Foucault‟s terms, life, language and labour, are finite forces that impose history on man. 
However a substitutive combinatory is an activity that evades subordination to representation and 
gives a loss of perspective that appears as the legacy of the 19
th
 century science. Deleuze‟ 
substitutive history gains the particular significance that,-  
“man replaced life and the subject of law, the moment his image was composed of vital 
forces during the political era of constitutions…but today law has again changed subject 
because even within subjects, the vital forces are entering into new combinations and 
composing new figures...in this way producing effects not of universality but of 
transversality.”177  
Correlated to the Science of Man which lost its universal perspective, „transversality‟ gains a 
new object of a science through the knowledge of „vital forces‟ in combination with „what the 
will wants.‟ The shift is parallel to the advent of Positivism and the move from a critique of law 
to the description of the status of the vital.  
 
The parallel shift also appears in Deleuze‟s book on Nietzsche. Here determinable reason relates 
to the differential typology where the differential has the status of the third element.
178
 
According to Deleuze, Nietzsche looked beyond Kantian paralogisms and, reading The Order of 
Things, puts this active/passive opposition within Foucault‟s socio-political space. It serves to 
relate what Nietzsche & Philosophy had already emphasised around the differential element and 
what Deleuze took as the qualitative determinations,
 understood to be behind Nietzsche‟s 
intention in On The Genealogy of Morals. This distinguishes the question of an orientating 
principle around the will to power rather than a subjective capacity for freedom. In the Nietzsche 
text, this appears in the surplus force of a binary opposition between the sign of the „material 
body‟ and the idea of the „will to power.‟179 
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Foucault‟s concept of power followed a historically constituted socio-political domain but 
Deleuze‟ differential element transforms such a domain into an „open field‟ by avoiding 
specifying human relations. In the open field, power is associated with an idea of positive 
categories in general, - 
“we can therefore conceive of a necessarily open list of variables expressing a relation 
between forces or power relations....these are the categories of Power.”180 
Positive categories presuppose a general theory of relations and Deleuze‟s „diagram of power‟ 
gives an idea of positive categories that drew on an interpretation from Nietzsche and Philosophy 
which defines genealogy as specifically aiming to radicalize Kantian critique. When Deleuze 
constitutes this as a problem of the „true‟ measure of value in Nietzsche & Philosophy the 
radicalisation of critique becomes the primary task of evaluation of knowledge as „force.‟181 This 
served Deleuze by distinguishing two types of criticism,-
 
 
- firstly a criticism implicated of the archaeological Foucault who „stood behind‟ a critique of 
knowledge. This distinction follows what Deleuze had already earlier described as the problem 
with Kant‟s transcendental philosophy;  
“transcendental philosophy discovers what remains external to the conditions. 
Transcendental principles are the principles of conditioning, but not of internal 
genesis.”182  
- a second critique related to Nietzsche‟s ambition to account for principles of a substitution in 
reason rather than of principles to account for reasons in themselves.
183
   
 
In the Foucault text, Deleuze‟s reading of History of Sexuality focuses on the crucial concept of 
bio-power for another distinction in his interpretation;-  
“Is not the force that comes from the outside a certain idea of life, a certain vitalism, in 
which Foucault‟s thought culminates? Is not life this capacity to resist force,”184  
In the idea of „life‟ of the „era of political constitutions,‟ Deleuze introduces the question of an 
Enlightenment Science of Man by foregrounding a „certain vitalism.‟ The Foucault text follows 
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the central dispute behind The Order of Things but opens this as a vitalism within Foucault‟s 
histories through the question of the practice of the physiology in Xavier Bichat.
185
  
 
The reading of The Order of Things pivots on the event which a history of modern thought 
normally associates with Kantian critique. But Deleuze referred this to an event as “thought 
through and lived out in the multiple deaths in the manner of Bichat.”186 This event appears as 
the potential to „apprehend‟ forces of finitude „within the body‟ and is parallel to the dispersion 
of the Enlightenment Science of Man around life, labour and language. Likewise, the epistemic 
shift that appears in The Birth of the Clinic around a new medical Positivism at the start of the 
19
th
 century. The particular significance derives from the role of pathological anatomy for new 
positivistic discourses as a death became coextensive with life. Foucault attributed this as the 
basic function of psychoanalysis indicating a concept of normativity derived from a 
physiological understanding of the body as it becomes limited to psychic structures and their 
expression.
187
 But in The Birth of the Clinic, Positivism in itself remained a negativity.  
 
However, Deleuze sees this event as having a wider significance beyond any ensuing new 
medical function; it has “much wider implications” for the re-centring of a history of the subject 
- it expressed the „new axis.‟188 This axis he claims “haunts” all Foucault‟s thought as “a certain 
idea.”189 When Deleuze pursued the significance of this practice identified with the „age of 
Bichat‟ it gave the context for his Foucault text around the „micropolitics of the sign‟.190  
 
Signs of Difference 
 
Deleuze‟s departure from Kantian critique is mapped out in Difference and Repetition with a 
question; “in what sense does Kantian reason, in so far as it is the faculty of ideas, pose and 
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constitute problems?”191 He intends to separate this from the constitution of infinite nature that 
Kant proposed to eliminate, as well as ideal conditions of a Kantian time and space. The primary 
concern for Deleuze was the sign and its evaluation as attributed to a positive production of 
concepts. Although Kant‟s autonomous values were attributed to an empiricist base, Deleuze‟s 
question is why Kant‟s conditionality apodictically avoids the empiricism of such activity, while 
paradoxically taking an empiricist nature as explanatory for a necessary transcendental function. 
This “cuts the aesthetic in two parts,” and makes excessive the element that constitutes 
empiricism. This was what Deleuze understood Critique‟s conditionality served to negate.192 
 
Foucault‟s The Order of Things distinguishes between Critique and a pre-critical Ideological 
analytic, as a primary division in narrating the history of dissolution of the Science of Man. The 
Ideological method, rooted in the series and its repetition, was derived from a Sensationalist 
epistemology of an idea-sign; Difference and Repetition identified this specifically with respect 
to the critical problem. The idea-sign is seen as removed from hypothetical conditioning and 
thereby altogether removed from Kantian difficulties of predication in transcendental experience. 
Deleuze relates this to David Hume‟s naturalism where a double articulation of the sign held up 
an “irreplaceable subtlety” when following a description of an „open variable.‟193 The 
Sensationalist method similarly predicated certain elements which could be „naturally‟ extended 
as actualities and the idea-sign was understood to index a grounded synthesis prior to any 
subsequent synthetic activity. It is a „sensible synthesis‟ meaning a general grounding both for 
physiological possibilities of organic composition, and repetitive functions of psychology and its 
domain of memory- a phenomenal field for integrating what was significant in intelligible 
composition.
194
 
 
The problem for Deleuze is to constitute a „naturalism‟ from the attributes of the sign. In this 
respect, Difference and Repetition also invokes, with a single claim, to be “following 
Condillac.”195 This indicates the context understood of grounding an artifice as a temporal 
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synthesis from elementary habits. Habits predicated on primary experience of the world, are the 
historical root of the Sensationalist idea-sign, whose method served to constitute a „second 
nature,‟ or sign, that could extend the articulation of empirical nature. The sign, stood a priori as 
aid to memory, grounds an understanding and Deleuze saw its particular importance for 
constituting a „synthesis of time,‟ in the sense understood of an empirical conditioning a priori of 
the thinking activity. Such synthesis accords with a virtual idea a priori to sensible compositions 
but whose limit unfolds a double articulation of a combinatory. It also correlates to Bergson‟s 
problem of synthesis where the „power‟ of virtuality should be understood as the technical mode 
that allowed Deleuze‟ to distinguish a method from the Critical philosophy.196 
 
This distinction extends over what Kant opposed in autonomous will with the power of being in 
a state spontaneously. A pure power and its concept of freedom were held as the completely 
transcendental idea. However, the Kantian will could also become pathologically affected by 
sensuous or animal motives such as desire which was deemed the contrary or negative to the 
ideal concept of human will.
197
 This is what Deleuze claims “cuts the aesthetic in two parts” and 
offers the differential analysis of the sign, attributed to a „will to power,‟ whose technical method 
is related to a virtual idea. Deleuze could claim that, “we necessarily affirm something of the 
object of a representation which is not contained within it,”198 and the virtual gives an alternative 
model to the division between sensuous and ideal wills. This also explains the historical context 
in which Deleuze invokes the „Bichat event‟ as claim the overcoming of a historical vitalism 
while retaining the technical function of evaluation in the idea-sign.
199
 
 
The Vital and the Positive 
   
Both Deleuze and Foucault followed Nietzsche‟s belief in the body as “more than a fundamental 
belief in the soul,” but interpretations of Xavier Bichat‟s physiology illustrates how 
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Enlightenment vitalism serves a conceptual narrative on the Science of Man.
200
 Bichat represents 
the form of vitalism that conceived of the vital as evidence of „force.‟ It was understood as 
coextensive with a possible knowledge of the body and attributed to the positive categories of 
life. But vitalism also stands for a historical series of physiological models that followed the 
ambition to naturalise the image of the living body and its limit by understanding the basic 
functions apprehended as a proportionate response between an active organism and its milieu. 
This image served the medical account of dispositions in life to change and express an 
orientation towards the limits of the positive categories of life and accounted for as constitutive 
norms of vital function. In this sense, it gave the positive criteria as guiding norms for 
physicians, moral philosopher, educator and statesman. Rational physiology anticipated certain 
values as coextensive in the possible relations for a general concept of life. But positive 
categories had a visible finitude through the study of pathology. The radicalism that Deleuze 
attributed to the idea-sign was of the methodology that could relate this to the ambitions for an 
Enlightenment Science of Man. In this era this stood as a standard for the micropolitics through 
extension to the physical and the moral.
201
  
 
During the early 19
th
 century Xavier Bichat was of a generation not looking to the past but 
towards developing a new scientific language. Bichat represents the new clinical medicine being 
developed from a rational physiological theory. He described two inner lives in a binary relation 
that relates a will to its passions, the struggle between spirit and body rarely in evident 
equilibrium.
202
 The new physiology integrated an organic base as the dissociated form of visible 
life to which an animal state was the organised complex higher order with evident regularity to 
be accounted for rationally. The latter informs a normative image corresponding historically to 
vital ideas of life. Bichat understood the pathological as a contrary power at the limit of the idea 
to which his rational physiological synthesis was oriented around delimiting the historical 
concept of life. The Birth of the Clinic describes the practice of pathological anatomy as 
preceding the epistemic shift from which emerges French medical Positivism at the start of the 
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19
th
 century.
203
 The significance for Deleuze was in the claim of Bichat as first modern 
interpretation of death. Bichat functions in the Foucault text as a substitution, whose method 
contrasts with abstract principles such as the Gemüt or transcendental concepts that divide a 
„natural‟ logic from an idea of life.  
 
Xavier Bichat‟s vitalism was ambiguous. Kant‟s abstract transcendentalism gave 
unconditionality as negative, serving real positivity in representation. By contrast, Bichat‟s 
empirical horizon of vital function takes the sign as upholding an objective standard as an idea of 
life. By delimiting a universal concept of reason this avoids a metaphysics of subjectivity 
through substituting a historically derived idea of the body and its soul for a physiology of 
animal reasoning, methodically unfolded in the form of the organic machine. Rational 
physiology would explain what phenomena could be attributed to vital force and give the 
conditions for a debate to which Bichat‟s physiology marks the limits of a project for the 
universalising values in modern knowledge. Universality was initiated for modern times with 
Descartes 6
th
 meditation which gives the interpretation of nature as the concept grounding the 
Cogito sum and opening a positive horizon to development though a physiological knowledge. 
The Cartesian ambition grounds both an idea of the vital and its positive sense – as measure and 
conditioning of the sign. The parallel is with Descartes 4
th
 meditation for distinguishing the true 
and the false.
204
 In this sense, Bichat‟s vitalism is a technique of the idea-sign that relates the 
historical idea of the body to a logic of life.  
 
Historically vitalism could explain properties attributed to life. But medical vitalism also has 
origins in the Hippocratic idea where reading the sign served the conditioning of nature. The sign 
had this power held with respect to vital activity to sustain idea of life. It was a necessary 
conditioning of possible phenomena of life according to an intrinsic understanding of 
significance in the living which is distinct from a concept of right or an archaic concept of the 
good. The sign surveys and values a priori of a medical intervention. In this sense vitalism meant 
the value of the sum of empirical conditions constituting a perception to which the idea-sign 
attributes possible significance. Historically, the medical sign attributed this to an energeia, but 
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Bichat‟s vitalism took force as composing an image of the body which gave the radical concept 
of life for his epoch. He looked to pathology to delimit this economy of life within the series of 
intermediary states between life and death.  
 
The pathological differential brings the sign of the vital to the idea of life which is inherently 
ontological.
205
 But the sign also makes possible the event where the idea itself became eclipsed 
and therefore functions to separate the sign from a general ontology. The sign gives positivity, 
but vitalism gives unity to an idea of life. The idea of life means the terms of possible predicates 
for a concept of the body and governs the articulation of its metaphysics a priori to constituting a 
new physiological synthesis. The attributes of life, both temporally and in order of composition, 
use the differential which necessitates an empirical awareness and vigilance within its 
constituting order to compose or rationalise a new concept of life. In this sense, vitalism gave the 
perspective an order of priority: this is not a concept in the Kantian sense, but the idea of what 
was to be ordered in the world; not idealistic but as determining value.  
 
The significance is twofold; in the Birth of the Clinic this initiated a new medical Positivism for 
the 19
th
 century. But Bichat‟s method of interpretation, derived of Condillac‟s empiricism, gave 
the medical sign an intrinsic limit in the constitution of values of life. In this sense it correlates to 
the basic philosophical problem articulated in Difference and Repetition which looked to 
distinguish an empirical conditioning from an epistemological conditioning.
206
 The philosophical 
problem for Difference and Repetition is posed around the activity that delimits positive function 
as a problem of the vital. The activity of the sign has to account for the internalised coordination 
of value and limits of significance for a cognitive function. This is the function of the 
combinatory as it extends to a positive domain to describe a series of phenomenal events; 
Deleuze calls this the delicate problem of constituting a positivity from minimal identity. The 
product is the concept of the understanding and the limit of its application.
207
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Difference and Repetition makes a central point around whether Heidegger‟s turn beyond 
metaphysics was truly disengaged from a subordinating relation in identity of representation.
208
 
Deleuze understood these as being the terms for displacing the naturalism of sign that follows 
Nietzsche‟s „overturning Platonism.‟ Heidegger‟s reading of Platonism defined the problem of 
method as drawing the distinction between the sensuous and the true.
209
 To displace a value 
attributed as true meant overturning an a priori ideal image, to which representation was 
necessarily held as simulacral. Identity in the sign denied or blocked primary distinctions of 
original or copy. For a positive aesthesis, the status of the sign was to be co-extensive with both 
senses intended, both true and sensuous. These are the criteria that serve to converge multiple of 
points of view within an objective domain of the sign to which the function of affirmation serves 
lived reality. The problem of the combinatory is foregrounding the vital ordering of 
representations, and it is this ordering that gave a philosophical problem for the natural sign 
which became central to an Enlightenment Science of Man. In this respect, Condillac‟s idea-sign 
substituted for „natural function‟ through distinguishing significant differences from external 
resemblance.  
 
The function of the sign is therefore to reproduce the qualitative divide between modes of 
resemblance and difference in the idea. Deleuze uses the example of the Platonic sign that 
prioritises positive identity over difference which he understood to be Plato‟s “moral vision” of 
the world. This was because the sign specifically addressed an idea of ordered life of the soul to 
be governed by concepts of reason rather than a passionate life.
210
 In this sense, vigilance over 
difference was held as the empirical criterion for attaining a moral point of view. But the 
implications for a micropolitics of the sign are that true function of the sign is in the activity of 
selection, making possible the evaluation or test that serves to orientate empirical ideas in their 
purposive acts. This is a necessary method of orientation in a chaotic world to which empirical 
function of differentiation of ideas can be considered a vital production. The differential process 
carries an unstated ontological necessity attributed to the cognitive idea.
211
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Historically, Sensationalist method prioritised analogy, but the new medical pathology 
represented a re-evaluation within the conceptual priorities of the sign. Pathology brought the 
problem of difference within the phenomenal series around an idea of life but since death could 
not itself an object of representation with the series of life, the pathological sign served as limit 
to the transcendental idea of life. The pathological sign separated the historical idea from its vital 
attributes in what constituted the living. Deleuze culminated his reading of The Order of Things 
with a description of the „man-form‟ as the composition of „forces of the outside,‟ which marks 
the distinction from Kantian orthodoxy and the analytic of finitude. The new historical idea was 
now characterised as the „age of Bichat‟ which he claims opened a new fundamental ambition 
for the positive categories of life incarnate with the 19
th
 century turn in knowledge. 
 
The „outside‟ carries an implication associated with the legacy of an Enlightenment Science of 
Man in the sense understood as embodying the „anticipations‟ fundamental for the new 
conditions of life. Deleuze claims that Foucault identified a new man-form that appeared by 
incorporating the death of man; but this was not the loss of sovereign, nor described against a 
metaphysics of death, but against Bichat‟s terms of violent death. A re-organisation of life had 
historical implications for the micropolitics of life.
212
 The significance of the Positivist turn was 
of an „inner commitment‟ to Positivism‟s truth which Deleuze held in relation to Nietzsche‟s 
social values. This meant a confrontation of the problems of Positivism with the physiological 
style diagnosis around the degeneration or strengthening of the species. This is a conceptual 
point associated with the 19
th
 century thought which Nietzsche and Philosophy saw as an internal 
power, dispersing all value-giving schematics and the important differential element behind 
Nietzsche‟s „will to power.‟ It also explains the central task behind what Deleuze understood of a 
Genealogy.
213
 The general imperative of an unconditioned „will to truth‟ gave the disposition 
held to be constitutive of the new systematic of values. Therefore, from the dispute over the 
Enlightenment Science of Man which is central to The Order of Things, the historical context 
was provoked by the ambition to delimit a legitimate birthplace of the sign. At the start of the 
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19
th
 century this was a dispute over the positive and the vital and gave dual possibilities for re-
constituting an ambition for a Science of Man in a new form.
214
  
 
Conclusion  
 
The„rarefied Positivism‟ delimits an original problem around an Enlightenment Science of Man. 
Foucault followed what his reading of Kant‟s Anthropology as an empirical perspective on how 
the positive concept was historically brought into play. This chapter has contended that there was 
both a critical impetus in Foucault‟s Archaeology and, after 1968, gave the positive ambitions for 
constituting the concept mediating juridical power. Beyond the epistemological discourse, 
Foucault‟s positive ambitions extended through socio-political discourses with a philosophical 
legitimacy identified with Kant‟s legacy which the critical function was integrated within a wider 
horizon of the felicitous Positivism.  
 
Another perspective has been described in Gilles Deleuze. This focus was on medical discourses 
identified with the quest for true function in the „age of Bichat.‟ This identified Sensationalist 
epistemology as informing the micropolitics and explained Deleuze‟s reasoning for attributing 
intrinsic values to the medical sign to a vitalism. The „Bichat event‟ explains discourses on the 
physical and the moral to which Deleuze attributed the dissolution of an 18
th
 century dispute. 
The delicate problem around of values of 18
th
 century vitalism centred on constitutive norms 
following Condillac‟s idea-sign to which Deleuze saw medical Positivism as a radicalism. 
 
The original problem for an Enlightenment Science of Man has been characterised in its 
ambition to delimit a legitimate birthplace for the sign. The medical sign carries values both 
positive and vital and this will serve to constitute the field for a genealogy of a Science of Man 
during the 19
th
 century in subsequent chapters. The next chapter will look at Foucault‟s post-
critical Kant to accounting for the „bifurcation‟ in a practice around the Science of Man; 
subsequent chapters follow what he considered a pre-critical context emerging from the „age of 
Bichat.‟  
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Chapter 2: Kant‟s Anthropology and the Science of Man 
 
Introduction 
 
The last chapter focussed on the debate that invigorated French thought during the „crisis‟ of the 
1960‟s. This was framed as a historical dispute over an Enlightenment Science of Man. This 
chapter identifies this with what emerges from a Renaissance Humanism and was taken up as an 
Enlightenment project. The context for understanding what was meant of an Enlightenment 
Science of Man takes its initial perspective from the new philosophical and scientific languages 
debated in the Berlin Academy from around 1740. From the work of Christian Wolff, along with 
the epistemological problems introduced by Locke and Hume, this gave the Enlightenment 
debate whose context came to define Kant‟s ambitions. 
 
The previous chapter described the particular significance that Michel Foucault attributed to 
Kant‟s Anthropology in relation to an Enlightenment Science of Man. This chapter examines 
Kant‟s divided strategy for attaining a rational metaphysics in relation to an 18th century motif of 
power. The transcendental motif questions the ambition for true and legitimate function of power 
at the core of a Science of Man. But Kant‟s earlier allegiance to the Enlightenment project saw 
him substitute „modes of thinking‟ of an earlier psychology for a distinction between 
metaphysical and philosophical foundations in the domain of experience. In this way, Kant gave 
an asymmetry that extended into the very possibility of a Science of Man.  
 
As an ambition of a Science of Man, this chapter explores Kant‟s two responses; firstly, the 
necessity for a general metaphysics as „indispensable service‟ for giving legitimacy beyond 
conditionality in moral philosophy. Secondly it follows what he addressed as an original problem 
for a Science of Man through a special epistemology. Foucault identified Kant‟s ambition to 
constitute positive ground for inner sense with the late Opus Postumum. This hypothesised 
transcendental possibilities for representing man‟s world as a logical system of concepts. Opus 
Postumum further distinguished two modes of what a concept of nature could hope to apprehend; 
firstly, a system of phenomenal experience understood through contemporary interpretations of 
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animal powers; secondly, a wider domain of force phenomenally evident in the totality of a 
world-system. While Kant‟s transcendental system of representations looked to a totality of such 
empirical observations, by following a historical problem of seeking legitimacy for a Science of 
Man the Opus Postumum is also understood as the transition between „modes of being‟ to 
„modes of thinking,‟ serving the hypothesising of the „ideal archetype of man‟ who could think 
the world.  
 
Kant‟s citizen of the world also appears in the Anthropology. This is Kant‟s late text seen as 
following his cosmopolitan ideal of the citizen required think the world. But this now entails an 
engagement with the social, political and historical elements as sustaining evident practices in 
the world and Anthropology is rooted in the difficulty for accounting for a diversity of empirical 
practices. Kant took his perspective on what man „ought‟ to become conscious of in this world 
„by rights.‟ The transcendental doctrine of Opus Postumum explored this extended possibility as 
a world-concept, but Anthropology excludes such a unified perspective and returns the central 
difficulty of constituting the idea behind practices that differentiate the world. The world concept 
is dominated by history and culture and has an evident lack of unity. Anthropology is shown to 
leave this as an idea to be judged by the „principle of the future‟ and taken to prefigure the 
destabilisation of a unified Science of Man. It a problem identified with the positive practices 
historically brought into play and the parallel is drawn with the historical emergence of organic 
theories and their ambitions to apprehend inner experience of symptoms, desires, and evident 
external purposive forces in Opus Postumum. When Foucault framed a narrative of the 
dissolution of an Enlightenment Science of Man through the ideologies seen as an admixture of 
positive and vital, this was a domain of empirical practices which served his study of the 
epistemic shift associated with French Positivism. This will be taken up in the next chapter. 
 
Renaissance Anthropology and Enlightenment Science of Man 
 
The Renaissance was an era self-conscious of opening a new cycle in history, a new approach to 
negotiating forces of history in which man could play a part. In this context, Anthropology was 
an emerging discipline that lent itself to a body of knowledge branching out from a philosophical 
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discourse. But the new perspective did not originate with the observations of contemporary 
differences, rather, from the study of Roman and Greek antiquity and the cultural contrast 
distinguishing between past and the present. This was the achievement of the Italian renaissance; 
its effect was a renewed interest in the ancient world that inspired the study of contemporary 
cultural differences. By taking the past as the measure of the present, a dynamic reform 
movement could distinguish in human beings a creativity that grounded its shared activities as a 
unifying force. In the second half of the 18
th
 century, the contemporary concept of man 
embodied the idea that subjects were capable of being enlightened.
215
  
 
In the Enlightenment, Anthropology stood between the range of human knowledge; for example, 
psychology as the discourse on the rational soul, and its counterpart in the body to which 
anatomy reveal the structure of man. Anthropology also offered aspirations for a new science 
extending a view as social anthropology historically parallel with an anatomy of the polis. This 
dissection of the body politic meant that an Enlightenment Science of Man could transform 
arguments on body and soul into a science of mind/body relations, beyond earlier reservations 
about the values of Cartesian mechanism.
216
  
 
From the early 18
th
 century, anthropology stood as a natural history of human nature following 
the impetus for an enlightened science which drew on a broad psychology, a metaphysics of soul 
and extended medical practice. The search for a natural unity led anthropological practitioners, 
through the analytical approach, to a division of humanity into races, sexes, temperaments. 
Fuelled new intellectual fascinations with wild children, the blind, orang-utans, exotic races etc, 
this developed into a battleground of ideas. By the early 19
th
 century, the impetus behind such a 
Science of Man had the paradoxical effect of dispersing the systematic approach initiated by 17
th
 
century thinking. The expansive and fluctuating range of intellectual activity lost the earlier 
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sense of unity. Yet in the 18
th
 century, a Science of Man can be taken as dominated by a 
fundamental idea, the sense that science and reason could be taken to define man‟s higher 
faculties. 
 
Two Approaches to an Enlightenment Science of Man 
 
In the early 18
th
 century, two strong impetuses for a Science of Man can be characterised through 
the philosophical methods of John Locke and David Hume.
217
  
 
Lockes‟s Sensationalism offered to extend a method to free the human body from dogmatic 
thinking. Locke was a physician and his An Essay Concerning Human Understanding of 1690 
traced „symptoms‟ laid out after an anatomical fashion that ground his intended practice for a 
Science of Man.
218
 Moving beyond Descartes break with scholasticism, the primacy was given to 
an epistemology that framed a history of human understanding and implied transforming the 
metaphysical discipline into a psychology. Locke‟s sensationalism offered an empirical doctrine 
of knowledge as base for a new rationalistic theory of the real. This was limited only by human 
faculties and their abilities to makes empirical deductions. The question was of progressive 
adaptation,- 
“The first step to towards satisfying several enquiries of the mind of man was very apt 
to run into, was to take a survey of our own understandings, to  examine our own 
powers, and see to what things they could be adapted.”219  
Being a physician meant an awareness of interpretive difficulties as the problem of total 
comprehension of the data of sensation.
220
 The physician emphasised practical skills of 
observation, using experience as the basis for judgement, but Locke was also looking for the 
possibilities of moving beyond an aporetic metaphysics. Being a Newtonian, despite shifting 
away from a science of certainty, meant the progressive ambition towards a deduction that could 
forge a world whose measure was man. Historically, the measure of the man drew on a 
physiological discourse for a natural explanatory schema, but the new anthropology also 
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introduced new possibilities for analysing representations according to the necessarily elemental 
and successive orders of language. This was an idea, especially influential in France where 
Etienne Bonnot de Condillac set out to redefine metaphysics as the study of mental operations 
extended through degrees of certitude towards a „new language.‟ His initiated influential projects 
taken up under the broad definition of a „Science de L‟homme‟ during the French revolutionary 
era.  
   
Another example from this epoch was David Hume. His 1739 Treatise on Human Nature 
upholds the central premise that all sciences are derived from their relation to a human nature, - 
“Tis‟ evident that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less to human nature, and 
however wide any of them seem to run from it they still return back by one passage or 
another. Even mathematics, natural philosophy and natural religion are in some 
measures dependant on a science of man: since they lie under the cognizance of man 
and are judged by their powers and faculties.” 221 
The pivotal question was the a priori attributed to the principle of causality. Hume‟s emphasis on 
the practical nature of ideas was in their values being distinct from theoretical ideas, he 
concluded that synthetic reason could be merely generalised belief and given through natural 
instinct. This meant that Hume‟s scepticism left “human nature as the only Science of Man.”222 
As a programmatic approach to a philosophy that was allied to a method moving “from a kind of 
scepticism to kind of positivism,”223 which would not be uncharacteristic of later schools of 
Positivism in its intention to turn a polemical cutting edge to both realist metaphysics or religious 
dogmas. Hume‟s central criticism around the originary concept of causality was intended to 
question the judgement concerning perceived qualities but also served to undermine anything 
attributed to divine orders in nature. Such scepticism towards the a priori not only undermined 
proofs of God but also any existence of order in nature from which rational principles could be 
derived. By displacing the possibility of inferring the infinite from the finite, Hume‟s thinking 
can be considered positivistic in another important sense; it does not advocating against an 
affirmative judgment but rather strategically brings negative judgements to bear on every kind of 
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metaphysical reality.
224
 Here is the paradoxical anti-positivist polemic whose effect was of 
clearing the way of metaphysical concepts, but whose polemical destruction of any finite of 
knowledge positively implies a possibility of „true‟ knowledge, not unlike a “compelling power” 
of the infinite.
225
  
 
What a later Positivist spirit takes from Hume was the rejection of the absolute legitimacy of 
induction in favour of the question of values in the relationship between experience and 
knowledge. The question of value produces, unsurprisingly, a variety of often contradictory 
responses; for example, by uncovering a concept of man, firstly from a physiological approach 
and secondly, through a pragmatic approach, may inform with differing values. The strong 
connection with an emerging anthropology during the 18
th
 century gave such disputes another of 
Hume‟s legacies; the relation to a political thought. Hume‟s emphasis on an immanent practical 
approach, upheld as qualitative concepts over quantitative sciences, informs his particular 
approach to a Science of Man. This attempted to view man‟s natural physical and social 
environment with the positive ambition of transforming concrete conditions of human existence 
through the accumulation of pragmatic knowledge. Here he foregrounded a specific task behind 
the programmatic study of the human needs. The pragmatic method overlaps with the systematic 
method offered by Locke‟s empiricism and appears therefore that both are anti-positivistic in one 
sense and positivistic in another. This is a paradoxical characteristic which is often also the 
feature of later Positivist thought.  
 
In both instances, what was important was that man was held to have a fundamental „nature.‟ 
David Hume expressed this as, “it is universally acknowledged that there is a great uniformity 
among the actions of men, in all nations and ages, and that human nature remains the same, in its 
principles and operations.”226 And Locke wrote, “Men, I think have much the same for natural 
endowments in all times.”227 By the mid 18th century this concept of human nature crucially 
revolved around what could be attributed to this universality. In this era this was underpinned by 
the influence of Newton, Bacon and Descartes, but also what anthropology looked to sustain 
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through its exploration of the increasing varieties of customs and institutions indicating the 
diversity of the world appearing through increased travel outside of Europe.  
 
To this end, whether it was attributed to pragmatic powers of reason or pursued through a 
question of sensible experience, the diverse strands of an 18
th
 century Science of Man pursued 
this as a common question of what could be positively upheld as a „truth‟ of man. The question 
of truth focussed on the notion of man‟s origins. In 1762, Johann Gottfried Herder attending a 
lecture in Königsberg, could note that Kant understood this as a method which,-  
“in order to distinguish what is art from what is nature we must push towards the origin, just as 
we are accustomed to distinguish traditional beliefs from certainty. We would better need to 
study the consciousness of primitive tribes and this is far better than ours which is a product of 
art. Rousseau has examined it.”228  
The pursuit of origins was a method of enquiry by which a Science of Man could proceed and a 
device for interrogating concepts of human nature. By specifying constancies as the positive 
element, as both necessary and conjectural, this countered assumptions of divine origins. This 
was understood by the more philosophically inclined early researchers. Rousseau, for example, 
noted as much in his second discourse,-  
“The researches that we may enter into on this subject must not be taken as historical truths, 
but merely as hypothetical and conditional reasoning, designed more properly to throw light 
upon the nature of things rather than showing us the actual origin, like the reasoning our 
physicists engage in all the time in the formation of the world.”229  
Hence, when Rousseau attributed this to a difference between man and animal, he intended a 
sharp distinction between the moral and the physical. By placing an idea of man above nature it 
emphasised man‟s capacity to create artificial worlds or the second nature. This followed 
Condillac, who also implied as much grounding his later Logic (1780) through his earlier Essay 
on the Origin on Human Knowledge (1746). But in theorising this as a sharp distinction, 
Rousseau was particularly influential for Kant in confronting the legacy of Christian Wolff and 
his followers. Moving against a systematic approach developed around a Science of Man, Kant‟s 
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approach followed a positive ambition to modify 17
th
 century ideas on psychology and 
anthropology through epistemological practices that characterised 18th century debates.  
 
The Science of Man in Kant  
 
Locke and Hume are indicative of the epistemological problems around an analytic of sensation 
and sensibility as pursued by a Science of Man in the 18
th
 century. The broad intersection this 
thought had an importance for Kant from the 1750‟s. This appears as a confrontation of values 
derived from 18
th
 century aesthetics in relation to a systematised logic; the problem of a priori or 
a posteriori knowledge.  
 
Later, Critique of Pure Reason described Locke‟s ambition for a rational science coextensive 
with the realm of the „real‟ as being dependant on a „true method.‟230 Kant took Locke‟s method 
as prone to transcending limits of experience, opening to a fictitious “genealogy” and given to 
new dogmatisms or even indifferentism.
231
 On the other hand, Kant took Hume‟s sceptical 
method as belonging to “a species of nomad, despising all settled modes of life…”232 However, 
earlier when Kant pursued the broad themes of a Science of Man in the reflective essay 
Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime (1764), he intended a contribution 
to the general analysis of feelings and their values, grounded in a reflective historical observation 
rather than a strict philosophical enquiry. Here Kant was following the wider motifs and ethical 
thinking of the time in his discussion of ideas of temperament discerns relations between 
aesthetic feelings and social order. His consideration was how aesthetic feelings can constitute a 
principle, Observations finds, 
 “as a consciousness of feeling that lives in every human breast…the feeling of beauty 
and the dignity of human nature…first as a ground for universal affection…second as a 
ground for esteem…Only when one subordinates his own inclinations to one so 
expanded can our charitable impulses by used proportionately and bring about the 
charitable being that is naoble virtue.”233   
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The grounds for this universality of feeling and its status as a principle of virtue, was following 
his well documented enthusiasm for Rousseau during this period. Observations accounts for a 
turn away from scholarly elitism through a sympathy with Rousseau‟s call for philosophers to 
become educators of mankind. Kant was following an Enlightenment ethos, later to be expanded 
as the basis for his moral philosophy. The notes made in his own copy of Observations describe 
Rousseau as proposing the concept of „natural man‟ as the metaphysical ideal, for inferring what 
was wrong with civilised man. Kant comes to understand this as the synthetic procedure which 
can be taken in the sense of the regulative idea, but defines his own strategy against this, 
although retaining its principle aim.
234
  
“Rousseau: he proceeds synthetically and begins from the natural human being. I 
proceed analytically beginning from the civilised human being.”235  
In this way, Kant understood both analytic and synthetic approaches as diverse strategies aimed 
at the concept of the civilised man. It also marks the division for Kant between a practical 
philosophy derived from an observational science, and the theoretical needs for a speculative 
metaphysics.  
 
This is the sense in which Kant went on to pursue diverging strategies: firstly, he limits a concept 
of „natural man‟ by transposing Rousseau‟s political community into a transcendental world 
where the free-willed individual can be given full autonomy. This stance stays close to 
Rousseau‟s concept of freedom in taking an ethical self as given to possibilities of intervention 
through a categorical imperative. Rousseau had given Kant an alternative model of intellectual 
practice in relation to the wider current of the Enlightenment. In the Critiques, this appears as the 
commitment to an ideal limit of human reason by defining a transcendental concept of the 
thinking subject to be conditioned by the material world, yet whose power is logically prior to 
the senses.
236
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The second strategy has been described by Foucault as a „research into the Gemüt‟ and 
associated with Kant‟s later Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View.237 This saw Kant 
depart from „observed facts‟ of Observations while retaining the possibilities of representation as 
a communicable and sociable activity. This general field of representation was conditioned under 
a concept given to a wider anthropological consciousness; its „special epistemological structure‟ 
that stood behind both Critique and Anthropology as general conditions for a determining 
subject. This gave a general problem for any Science of Man. While Critique places a 
transcendental freedom as the speculative concept a priori both to a concept of nature and the 
concept of the thinking ethical subject, Anthropology did not see an ethical subject as a thinking 
and unified being of the Critique. In Anthropology, like in Observations, the classification of the 
anthropological domain gives an observed of network of human tensions which is attributed to 
the Gemüt. The special epistemological structure stands as a principle of limited freedom, the 
schema mediating both a concept of nature and a concept of freedom. 
 
While the split in the thinking of the concept of „natural being‟ can be identified as early as the 
1770‟s, it is the late Anthropology where Kant succinctly distinguishes the division between an 
intellectually systematised knowledge and an actualised knowledge.
238
 He associated this with 
two types of research,-  
“Physiological knowledge [which] aims at what nature makes of man, whereas 
pragmatic knowledge aims at what man makes, can, or should make of himself as a 
freely acting being.”239   
The latter division appears in Critique as practical reason, and is designated through a relation to 
an imperative. But Anthropology retains the earlier notion of artifice or device through the 
Gemüt. It is this division that produces the two crucially different perspectives; a analytic of the 
imperatives of reason of the „I think‟, and a concept of the synthetic network preceding the 
subject.  
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Kant introduces Anthropology in terms of an activity of the citizen of the world developed under 
the „nature‟ of cosmopolitical bonds through the possibilities of an inner sense.240 But Critique of 
Pure Reason maintains this as a problematic that cannot be justifiable as a pure reason. Here 
Kant looked to a future science for the “establishment of its own in a complete anthropology, the 
pendant to an empirical doctrine of nature.”241 This problematic „nature‟ was, in the later 
Anthropology, strategically restricted to a question of an empirical Science of Man. He retained 
all possibility of mapping “the consciousness that man experiences” that are characteristic of the 
cosmopolitical „object.242 But while the ambitions of the dialectic in the Critique displaced 
empirical experiences, Anthropology remains such an admixture that offers only successive 
possibilities for knowledge available to the object on the empirical level.  
 
As two intellectual strategies derived of the problem of a Science of Man, these can be seen to 
move apart in Kant‟s texts around 1770-1780. On the one hand, there is the interrogation of the 
„I think,‟ the synthetic function of the Cartesian ego and its logic; on the other, questions of 
evident types in an anthropological domain, appearing as evident repetitions in a world system. 
This left the possible uses of reason aligned only with the aspirations for a Science of Man and 
shifted the debate to a dispute over metaphysics. 
 
Newtonians and Wolffians: The Dispute in 18th century Metaphysics  
 
Kant began his career as a student of the Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy. The fundamental 
divergence from followers of Christian Wolff emerged through the Newtonian approach, which 
particularly fuelled a conflict at the Berlin Academy of Science during the years 1740 to 1760. 
Under the directorship of French Newtonian, Pierre-Louis de Maupertuis, the debates surrounded 
the nature of Wolffian metaphysics, as a system extending a schematic idealism into historical, 
philosophical and mathematical branches of human knowledge.  
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Wolff‟s philosophy held a status as a national intellectual product, subordinating other fields 
within a framework that sought to encompass German religious and political thought. It‟s 
systematic considered Newtonian philosophy as scientifically narrow in a sense not worthy of a 
general philosophy. In 1740, Fredrick II of Prussia wanted to appoint Maupertuis and Wolff joint 
leaders at his Berlin academy, they represented two opposing brands of scientific philosophy. 
Wolff declined the offer and, in the event, the Swiss mathematician and Newtonian sympathiser 
Leonhard Euler gave the academy its Newtonian grounding. Subsequently this came into conflict 
with the Wolffian system with its theological and political implications. Even within the 
academy, allegiances of its members were divided. From 1745, the first of the famous series of 
essay competitions began to explore this division and Maupertuis initiated these through an 
invitation to discuss the controversial topic of Monads. It initiated a long running and heated 
debate around a Newton-Wolffian controversy.
243
 
 
Kant entered this debate in 1756 with the essay on Physical Monadology which was his attempt 
to redress the ambition of Leibniz/Wolffinan metaphysics in the light of Newtonian natural 
philosophy. Its central division was between non-spatial and non-temporal monads, whose status 
was determined by internal principles of active force, as contrasted with Newtonian absolute 
space-time extending continuously as an external framework for all laws of interaction. The 
implications of Newtonian science were exemplified by the paradigm of universal gravity, i.e. 
moving mathematically from phenomena to principles of natural bodies. Kant was arguing for a 
revised metaphysics which needed to be subordinated to certain results of the exact sciences. He 
addressed the prize question of the Berlin academy in 1764 with Enquiry Concerning Clarity of 
the Principles of Natural Theology and Ethics as a supporter of the „Newtonian/Euler‟ position 
of a synthetic mathematics. This moved against any general analytic metaphysics that proceeded 
from obscure concepts and originary notions of necessity and freedom, body and time, etc. Kant 
was aiming at avoiding such a priori definitions, and instead looked to establish a regressive 
metaphysics advancing only from established concepts delimited by exact sciences.  
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A more specific differentiation appeared in Negative Magnitudes (1763). This distinguished two 
uses of mathematics in philosophy and was aimed particularly against the Wolffians. Kant now 
presented a modified Newtonism which found its key idea in taking the certainty of experience 
to inform the „material principles‟ of human reason.‟244 By following the basic laws of dynamics, 
this was to express a schema of universal coexistence that constituted a domain of derived 
properties that related to a schema of a general intellect or understanding. This schema was 
important in a new sense; space and time were presented as ideal, and given through two distinct 
principles of human cognition: an intellectual faculty of understanding and one of sensibility 
which formed the two branches of human knowledge. Against such ideality, the limit of 
subjective knowledge could be brought into question and given as something that would only be 
securely grounded by exact science. This domain had radically revised conceptions of space and 
time, which brought into question the interplay of intellect and intuition: the formal logic of 
understanding confronted metaphysical relations to an actuality which was limited by subjective 
finitude. 
 
The significance in defining this limit marks Kant‟s departure from a general analytic tendency 
of the day. Kant now held a logical negativity against the affirmative of an originary given a 
priori. In this respect, it is his Negative Magnitudes essay that makes the crucial new distinction 
between a logical nothing and a physical nothing,-  
“Inner feeling tells us that displeasure is more than a negation. (lack is not a 
displeasure)…but a positive sensation….positively opposed to pleasure….a positive 
ground which wholly or in part cancels it out. On the other hand a lack of pleasure is 
called indifference, whereas the opposition between pleasure and displeasure is called 
equilibrium.”245 
In distinguishing between an absolute notion of indifference and a relative notion of an 
equilibrium, Kant leaves only the second as negation proper, while the former indicates only an 
absence. By proceeding from this relative notion, he could with certainty claim that all real 
oppositions must have real predicates, and that it is only these predicates that can be taken as 
positive.  
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Real predicates mean both a positive desire for an object and its opposition, the feeling of 
aversion in its opposite, a positive displeasure. Both are qualitative aspects and exist “because 
pleasure connected with it, is the ground of desire being satisfied.”246 It is the relativity of this 
ground that serves to delimit the distinction from the perspective of absolute understanding and 
is contrasted with the ambitions pursued by the analytic practice of the era. This leaves Kant 
asserting that the law of identity and difference has only a relative relation to real ground which 
can be given only through speculative concepts and therefore “can in no wise be judged.”247  
 
With this Kant introduced the notion of a logical horizon. Ground appears as a „logical horizon,‟ 
by distinguishing itself from real ground in the absolute sense. This defines the concept as a 
logical expression, rather than as an absolute,- 
“the relation of real ground to something, which is neither posited nor cancelled out by 
it, and cannot be expressed in a judgement….only expressed in a concept.” 
It is because speculation is the source of human error, and error marks the finitude of 
understanding, that the concept operates only through logical contradiction. Although Kant finds 
that this concept can be regressed through logical analysis, the positivity of the whole, is “the 
single unanalysable concept of a real ground, the relations of which cannot be rendered distinct 
at all.”248 Therefore, the distinction that defines the order of positive affirmation in the domain of 
predicates, is the negative - as a second order affirmation – and this gives an active disjunctive 
between a concept‟s necessity and its contingency. The distinction is between the real ground 
and its logical ground. It restricts the interpretive judgement to a logic, while its positivity is 
what the concept maintains through the ambition to condition a given domain. 
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Scepticism in Kant‟s Logic 
 
This is the separation that appears in the Transcendental Aesthetic of Critique of Pure Reason 
where sensibility gives both an intuition and its object.
249
 The doctrine was that sensation 
ambiguously retains something as a psychological effect, whose real element the transcendental 
judgement aims to make distinct.
250
 This informs the central difficulty behind Critique of Pure 
Reason’s aim for more „positive‟ values given as concepts of the understanding, which are to 
account for both aesthetic experiences and a rational knowledge. However, Kant notably limited 
values of sensibility at the start of the Transcendental Aesthetic following the “abortive attempt 
made by Baumgarten” for defining a concept that is integrated under an aesthesis.251 
 
Kant made his radical distinction by bringing the critical treatment of judgement under rational 
principles of logical analysis which distinguished a systematic formal logic from a general 
aesthesis. When Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten used the word aesthetics to mean taste or 
„sense‟ of beauty he gave the word in its modern usage; earlier aesthesis refered to an ability to 
apprehend according to bodily senses and was a „sensitive knowledge,‟ given as something 
„indistinct.‟252 Baumgarten defined „taste‟ as meaning an ability to judge according to the senses, 
rather than intellect. Historically aesthesis drew on feelings of pleasure or displeasure, but 
Baumgarten‟s science of aesthetics would offer the deduction of rules or principles of an 
individual taste. Taste was the domain, “fusing together of elements” of confused perceptions 
whose status was beyond the reach of the concept and a pure logic. Yet, this sensitive knowledge 
of the „dark‟ and the indistinct, could be brought under a higher reason through „powers of the 
soul,‟ which Baumgarten subsumed under a Leibnizian framework taken to express a vita 
cognitionis, or a „life of knowledge.‟253 But the Critique of Pure Reason opposed taking this 
speculative domain of sensibility as the basis of pure knowledge. Kant had already explored in 
Observations how feelings constituted a principle of virtue and aesthetics values, by relation to 
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an „image of perfection.‟ By the 1770‟s, his Logic lectures reveal how Kant was taking a more 
rigorous approach to what could be attributed to sensibility and experience.
254
  
 
Firstly, this meant applying an active negative disjunctive as the „distinctness‟ (as the logical 
cognition) which served to separate it from an order of aesthetic feeling (Baumgarten‟s lively 
„indistinctness‟).255 Although Kant had earlier considered Baumgarten the “exemplary analytic 
thinker,” by insisting on this radical difference between an analytical logic and an aesthetic 
sensibility - a difference in kind rather than difference by degree - he makes the distinction 
between “making our cognitions logically perfect, [and] another that makes our cognition 
aesthetically so.”256 Although Kant rejected his aesthetic theory, he maintained as „exemplary‟ 
Baumgarten‟s ambition, which was to be pursued beyond this sharp divisions of a logic and an 
aesthesis.
  
 
This is illustrated already as an ambition evident in his Logic lectures of the 1770‟s (Blomberg 
lectures).
257
 Kant was taking the apprehension of an aesthesis in terms of an active intuition, 
whose possibility was in making a productive distinctness (“the distinctness when we can 
distinguish well the mark of what we intuit”). Aesthesis presented the possibilities of positive 
values in relation to a judgement beyond a purely logical one - “we achieve distinctness in 
intuition through more attention per synthesin.” The activity of aesthesis gives sensation its 
action of „making distinct,‟ rather than just a passive affection, or something simply given to a 
concrete sensation, and was an activity that makes a judgement possible. However, Kant defered 
any elaboration on how aesthesis could provide such conditions of possibility to logical 
judgment on the grounds that this was beyond the limits of a strict logic.
258
  
 
Beyond the radical distinction evident in the logic lectures, Kant retained an ambition for 
producing this positive qualitative difference. But he emphasised the need for abstraction and 
active combination of elemental data, to be effected through „coordinating marks‟ which 
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themselves could constitute a communicable „distinctness;‟ these constituted the universality 
which Kant regarded as the necessary purpose of a logic. Coordinating marks relate, in a relative 
way, to a more positive knowledge in the Lockean sense (“Locke made an effort to show that 
none of our objects of experience can ever be absolute but completudo comparitiva”259).  
 
However, since Kant also held that cognition of experience could become profound only when 
subordinated to logical rules, his focus was on the subordinating action of judgement whose 
activity gives approval, withdraws approval, or withholds of approval. Kant accords this to 
positive, privative, or negative. An affirmative judgement can increase our cognitions and are 
thus positive, while the negative serves to avoid error.
260
 The importance of the coordinating 
marks was to distinguish a logic from what previously was accounted for by „taste,‟ or what 
Baumgarten was delimiting under laws of sensibility, and defined by an „empirical psychology.‟ 
Laws gave judgement its logical relation between subject and predicate, the importance of 
defining this aesthetic activity through its logical link, or copula, extends to the domain of the 
„concepti subjecti.‟261  
 
This domain now accounted for the positively grounded „mark‟ in its natural relation to 
distinctness. The Logic was concerned only with the distinction of identity and difference, yet 
beyond these values, what the copula derives from intuition introduced the problems of 
purposive reflection. Reflection was an affirmative action by which Critique of Pure Reason 
introduced its discussion of concepts of reflection employed in the act of judgment.
262
 But these 
no longer have a direct reference to the object but are concepts used for orientation and applied 
to both understanding and intuitions for a judgement held prior to, and guiding, an action.  
 
It is because Kant sees human reasoning as essentially metaphysically, functioning to condition 
an animal existence, that the primary conceptual difficulties arose from what was earlier 
expressed in the Logic (Blomberg). The significance for Critique of Pure Reason was that both 
negative and positive forms appear as two lines of thought that appear behind the Transcendental 
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Dialectic. Further on, in the Architectonic of Pure Reason, Kant left the nature of this relation 
between an indistinct idea of the unconditioned and its limited rational expression, only as a 
“peculiar unity.”263 However, it was specifically differentiated from an anthropology, which he 
later returned to as a research into inner sense, as the nature of the Gemüt. However, in Critique 
of Pure Reason the specific problem was a metaphysics that thinks how objects of outer space 
relate to the concept of the Cartesian subject. This subject is the peculiar a priori unity of the “I 
think,” and Kant left the nature of this a priori as the task for a future metaphysics to study.264 
 
Aesthetics and Power in Kant‟s Metaphysics  
  
The Critique of Pure Reason also proposed metaphysics as the study that could distinguish itself 
from an empirical psychology. The latter was the practice that belonged to a rational metaphysics 
“no more than empirical physics does.”265 Aesthetics presented the particular difficulties for the 
study of consciousness and this can also be traced to the early 1770‟s through Kant‟s lectures in 
psychology. Here a rational psychology took its ambition in accounting for an intellectual 
activity attributable to an inner sense and given to the Cartesian “I think,” which was contrasted 
with what empirical psychology took as „I perceive.‟ Working from Baumgarten‟s Metaphysica 
as a textbook, Kant taught that an outer sense was clearly distinct from the thinking principle, 
and which comes together through the soul. It is this perception which describes “a knowledge 
which belongs to me…a representation of my representations…a self perception,”266 which Kant 
took as the apperception informing a rational psychology. Rational psychology was the study of 
inner cognitions as they far as they can be given as concepts of reason to the thinking subject.  
 
Kant‟s Lectures on Metaphysics show him differentiating the active representations of the 
senses, from an empirical psychology which meant passive affectivity. This had its parallel with 
what Logic distinguished between the distinct or indistinct. But the significant difference is that 
Metaphysics frames its discussion in terms of higher or lower functions of the soul. In these 
earlier lectures this function was understood as a power which was either self-active or passive; 
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higher functions of the intellect are active, while sensibility is the passivity of the lower function. 
It is a distinction which has a significant relation to what Logic excludes from its discussion of 
the thinking consciousness as an aesthetic sensibility. In his psychology, he holds that sensible 
representations can “either be given or made” through the activity of the thinking consciousness, 
or attributed to the spontaneity of a “formative power.” Such a power is not the same as the 
power of logical understanding; a “formative power” is attributed to both higher and lower 
functions of the soul.
267
 As such, power here accounts for a relation to an indistinctness, and 
appears as an unconscious of perception. The significance of this formative power is that Kant 
thereby avoids a relation of equivalence to the material doctrine of pure sensation.   
 
However, the difficulty of such an unconscious power introduces a converse problem, that of 
„subreption.‟268 Subreption meant a reflection of an empirical habit that confuses sensible 
intuition with something from a domain of discursive logic: this is no longer a distinct cognition. 
On this basis, a distinction became dependant on the question of judgment. This was the measure 
discussed under powers of the soul, and historically attributed to the drives of pleasures and 
desires, both basic but diverse powers. But the notion of a psychological soul, by definition a 
unity of such powers rather than a distinct principle, related these diverse powers to the „I think‟ 
of the Cogito which demonstrated a more basic power that arose from the determinations of 
conceptual thought. The Metaphysics lectures do not show Kant elaborating on this; the question 
of this unity was again retained as a future task of a philosophy “so far as it is possible.” 269  
 
These early lectures in Logic and Metaphysics indicate what the Critique of Pure Reason was 
bringing together under a more specific goal, delimiting what could be understood of the peculiar 
unity through a problem of formal logic. The Transcendental Dialectic relates this as two 
fundamentally opposed forms of knowledge, one a constituted finitude of the Logic, another the 
unconditioned but creative intellect, understood as retaining the 18
th
 century motif of power. This 
                                                          
267
 Ibid p49 
268
 Ibid p51-52 
269
 Ibid p75 
86 
 
was the infinity that an „intuitive intellect,‟ immanent and formative, carries in its ambition for 
knowledge which Kant played out between the „natural‟ and „ideal‟ aspects.270  
 
Power/Knowledge: Transcendental Analytic and Synthetic Judgement  
 
In the critical context, this relates to a distinction between the modes of judgement which 
distinguished the transcendental doctrine of knowledge. What the Critique of Pure Reason 
pursued as the possibility of a rational metaphysics, was the ambition for a transcendental 
knowledge which gave meaning to an analytic judgement reproduced in grounded concepts. 
Judgement selects by defining its subject-predicate under the relation to a particular concept. Its 
empirical nature, defined by aesthetic activity under the domain of a „concepti subjecti,‟ upholds 
its positive reason by relating the ground of the concept to possibility of the judgment. But while 
a general logic gives this transcendental ground, the power to constitute the judgment becomes 
the question of transcendental principles. Kant said that the analytic judgement thinks only 
according to the concept, but this was not a true object of experience. Rather, the distinction 
between the analytic and synthetic was understood through what the negative separates concepts 
out by virtue of identity within reproducible concepts; the analytic judgment can be given only 
by such identity. But identity was grounded by positive difference, whose relation was to the 
indeterminate. In this sense, the negative was not concerned with metaphysical principles but 
with the reasoning which distinguishes a priori from a posterior knowledge.
271
  
 
It is important to distinguish an empirical logic from what was offered by scientific knowledge. 
This is because the positive sciences were exemplary in being universalised domains that 
separate historical admixtures into a constituted a prior knowledge. One could see the ambition 
for a Science of Man in giving a transcendental perspective on an empirical domain in general: a 
transcendental logic as a general logic. In this sense it aims at both a transcendental knowledge 
and a transcendental power. But the question that Kant brought to an Enlightenment Science of 
Man was delimited to legitimate unity beyond the particularity of subject-predicate relations. 
While a rational metaphysics studies the functional knowledge that could relate the inner 
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experience of outer possibilities, the transcendental principles gave the objective for a Science of 
Man merely because such principles were posited as grounding its true and legitimate function. 
 
The problem of empirical knowledge was precisely this historical admixture given according to 
diverse principles. Because science was taken to displace an analytic knowledge with a new 
synthetic knowledge, the ambition for transcendental logic was of the substitution of an 
empirical analytic for a pure synthetic understanding.
272
 The difficulty of a new synthetic 
knowledge is that it draws on the problematic principles given to the source of such synthetic 
judgments beyond the logical horizon of the grounded concept, - 
“But in synthetic judgements I have already advanced beyond the given concept, 
viewing as in relation with the concept something altogether different from what was 
thought in it. This relation is never either a relation of identity or contradiction; and the 
judgment, taken in and by itself, the truth and falsity of the relation can never be 
discovered.”273 
Because Kant‟s ambition for a pure understanding requires that “...the conditions of the 
possibility of experience in general are the same as the conditions of the possibility of the objects 
of experience,”274 he premised conditionality on mathematical principles of Newtonian 
dynamics. Importantly, this was not axiomatic in itself: the issue was rather that he was 
following this as the principle by which a power gives unity in representation through concepts 
of understanding. This power was the function of understanding, of organising according to 
positive categories of experience. 
 
The positive categories follow from Kant‟s table of judgment. (A80/B106). This characterised a 
faculty of rules for defining the inner nature of human understanding and the unity brought 
together actively through the “I think.” (A126) While the representational activity of the thinking 
„I‟ uses concepts that derive their power of understanding from a claim on a reality, it is the 
positive categories that delimit a domain of constancy as a schematism, or „art.‟ It is this 
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categorical function that ultimately remains hidden.
275
 The question of the activity of a power to 
relate sensation - as the „matter of appearance‟ - to inner sense, by a conceptual „filling out‟ or 
reduction to nothing as the continuous production of states that could index a relation to Being 
itself. (A20/B34) This meant that while the formative power of synthesis determined the 
magnitudes of space as well as its temporal qualities, along with their relations and modalities, 
yet the conceptual succession and coexistence of such a priori determinations in this time-series 
was also necessarily limited and ultimately retained “no other possible employment” other than 
the empirical. (A146)  
 
This gives the schematism the power of conditioning a purely logical unfolding of reason, while 
the “peculiar unity” of the architectonic was the empirical element which Critique of Pure 
Reason described as “due to sensibility.”276 In this sense, the problem for Kant‟s Science of Man 
was that it retained the legacy derived from of 18
th
 century aesthetics, which he had earlier 
characterised in Baumgarten as an „abortive analytic.‟ Drawing on the “merely empirical,” which 
was a theory of taste derived from the historical doctrine of pleasure and pain, Kant did not think 
could furnish apodictic laws in terms of the science of the day (A21n). However, it is in the 
Critique of Judgement where Kant shifts his perspective on this ambition. The ambition was to 
reflect on „something‟ that necessarily must be accounted for, and in this he returned to 
conceptual possibilities of perception through considering the twin concerns of „art‟ and „organic 
form.‟ This return was also to the ambition of discovering the conditions of „a nature‟ being 
judged under a power of judgment. It meant the ambition of discovering principles behind 
positing the natural concept.  
 
The Critique of Judgement extended the problematic idea derived of an 18th century Science of 
Man into the account of an evident capacity at the origins of the positive categories of an 
understanding. Kant now made a new distinction; a determinate form that carries a concept into 
the determination of the particular, and the concept of reflection on the particular, to which a 
reflective judgement is „compelled to ascend.‟ (§ 4) This is the reflective judgment seen as 
inseparable from the particularity of aesthetic experience of pleasure and Kant thereby gave 
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sensibility a new reflective role for the empirical art of schematism which related to the 
experience of the body. (§ 6)  
 
The Concept of Nature and a Technics of Power  
 
The Critique of Judgement moved away from questions of predication and logic towards 
reflective techniques of knowledge. This study was of the power that underlies concept 
production and the categories for ordering the world at the level of anthropological 
consciousness. It meant the empirically positive function of mediation of human experience 
through a critical reflection on the „matter of logic,‟ or intuition. This „matter‟ appeared either 
under the schematic of an understanding or under the symbolic mode of analogy, to which the 
latter gave the reflection which stood for an indirect intuition accounted for through the 
imagination.
277
  
 
The mediation of imagination through feelings of pleasure and displeasure was a power which 
served to ground the “inner possibility” of concepts in their practical application. It followed the 
concerns of a Science of Man in the sense that it served a positive distinction of functional 
concepts from “the narrow low life of animals.” (§60) These required techniques of reflection 
prior to any expressions of desire as they offered the possibility of reasoned transformation of 
habituated moral interests. But this also looked back to an earlier conception of pleasure and 
displeasure for its positive source, reflection was to account for the principles ascribed only to “a 
feeling of life” by which Kant indicated the „vivacity‟ in representation in its relation to a 
historical concept of the living. (§1)  
 
The disposition that life took up in its purposiveness was driving the teleology which appears in 
the second part of Critique of Judgement. Kant associated the positive predispositions of our 
cognitive faculties with the orienting of what was conceptually apprehended of an external order. 
This was moving beyond the strict divide of reason and experience and served his positive 
ambitions for explaining an evidently conditioned nature,- 
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“To discover in nature an intelligible order…divide its products into genera and species 
through a principle of explanation and interpretation, and, out of material coming to 
hand in such confusion, to make a consistent context.”278  
This is the technic of nature to which reflection gives the consistent context of an „undesigned 
purposiveness‟ in the logical order evident behind the power of concept production (§72). Kant 
proposed that „imaginative ideas‟ predicated the practical necessity of the concept, this grounded 
the subject‟s freedom. It also meant that transcendental philosophy could look beyond a narrow 
understanding of schematics by adopting something beyond a conditioned necessity. It is this 
speculative freedom that gives the „root origin‟ to subjective reasoning beyond its empirical 
nature.  
 
What constituted this problematic source for any ideas of reason in the „feeling of life‟ now also 
constituted the positive principles in the concept of subjective physical ends. Despite the fact that 
Kant‟s teleology finds such universality compromised by what subjective necessity drew from 
objective reflection, (§77) he maintained that underlying possibilities for transcendental 
knowledge was to be discovered something to be accounted for by techniques of representation. 
These effects appear in the conformation of faculties. (§77) Because these relate the power of 
synthesis to a higher source of finality (even an originary cause of the world, §78), it was the 
causality which could only find its expression only through a positive notion or heuristic 
principle, that accounts for an orientation of the concept of life in the concept of nature.  
 
Kant returned to an anthropological predisposition in understanding for such a positive notion. 
Paradoxically, he also attributed this to a spontaneity that thinks “different from the human.” 
(§77) This predisposition to difference was aligned with what Critique of Pure Reason gave as 
the possibility of attaining a pure intuition through the account for new element beyond any 
constituted finitude. It drew on a completely transcendental concept, no longer focussed on the 
nexus of intuition and understanding, but explained by the ambition to account for predicates of 
judgement. This was a power underlying any possible representation or discursivity.
279
 
Transcendental theorising referred this problem to an anthropology through its account of 
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vivacity as positively relating pleasures to a predisposition of our cognitive faculties; but the 
practical necessity of moral perspective on our “consciously vain desires” gave the „nature‟ of 
this relation between pleasure and desire.
280
 From this perspective, Kant‟s engagement with a 
Science of Man was exploring a doctrine of nature that pointed to the domain of empirical 
psychology. As a doctrine of nature, this converged with the particular difficulties of legitimacy, 
to which CPR demanded the apodictic certainty of a science.  
 
Extending the Legitimate Grounds for a Doctrine of Nature   
 
The 1785 text, Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, saw Kant follow a natural 
description of objective knowledge of bodies to the limit given as apodictic science. Historically, 
a doctrine of nature was the ontological ground of knowledge in general expanded as a natural 
science. When Kant extended a „metaphysics of bodies‟ derived from Newtonian dynamical 
principles it was to see how far they served a modern metaphysics.
281
  
 
In Critique of Pure Reason, the foundational relation is given in the Transcendental Deduction: 
in the „general notes on a system of the principles‟ Kant indicates the ambition to delimit 
schematically an objective reality given to „outer intuitions,‟ in so far as they contain the 
“conditions of possibility of real relations of action and reaction, and therefore the possibility of 
community.”282 For an empirical thought of outer intuition to be comprehensible as movement of 
points in space, this implicated successive existences of an inner self in different states. Critique 
of Pure Reason states that “space alone is determined as permanent, while time, and therefore 
everything in inner sense, is in constant flux.”283 From this assertion, Kant went on to state that, 
“all alteration presupposes something permanent in intuition, and through an inner sense no 
permanent intuition is met with.”284 In this way, an affirmative succession of inner sense carried 
the ambiguity of permanent causality into all the wider empirical sciences. 
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However, Critique of Pure Reason also looked to objectivity as upholding the positive ambitions 
that followed from the categorical approach to representation. This meant the possibility of 
synthesis that serves the two following points;  
- Firstly, it states in „The Refutation of Idealism‟ that the positive ambition was to ground the 
Transcendental Aesthetic. This was the central task of giving meaning beyond what was 
dogmatically denied to positive content in the objective relations of subjective representations. In 
this sense, Kant‟s Transcendental Idealism defines itself against what could be considered a 
sceptical approach, i.e. it does not completely exclude an empirical possibility at some level.  
 
By denying both an absolute transcendental realism as well as an empirical idealism, Kant leaves 
the path open to what can be considered under the positive content of an empirical 
representation. The „Refutation of Idealism‟ leaves this to the composite origin of experience 
which Critique of Pure Reason indicates in space and time, considered in terms of an intuitive 
composite which is open to the transcendental domain of representation. However, since this 
excludes the empirical position which takes time and space as simply given, or the real in it-self 
as an independent sensibility, Kant retained a complexity in experience itself. This had positive 
value as an objectivity beyond a simple empirical intuition.
285
 
 
- Secondly, by following a science of natural description, Kant points to the determinations of 
outer nature as implicating the positive domain. This domain carries the ambition of true 
representation of the transcendental concept. It necessitates invoking a certain theoretical notions 
of what a positive domain could express about actual states of affairs which, in turn, implicates 
the principle of causality behind all positive determination of nature, since this domain extends 
towards a wider empirical nature.
286
   
 
The question of such a domain was followed in Critique of Pure Reason through possibilities 
required of a perspective on the general doctrine of bodies. To this end, it was Kant‟s „table of 
categories‟ that gave the important theoretical approach to be followed by transcendental 
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philosophy, this supplies the “indispensible” plan for the science which is a complete theory of 
knowledge. If one follows the „table of categories,‟ one finds that it moves from a synthetic 
mathematics by analogically extension into a dynamic science and Kant indicates that while the 
former can stand as fully constitutive, the latter could only be the regulative for a wider 
systematic knowledge. The parallel is for the progression of any speculative science as projected 
into Kant‟s general systematic of human understanding.287  
 
By taking the legitimate ground of Newtonian dynamics as a general „metaphysics of bodies,‟ 
the Critique of Pure Reason merely pointed to as possibilities around an expanded analogical 
thinking. But Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science considers these by degrees of 
determination of the senses from a pure mathesis. This is a progression that follows from the 
determinable kinematics, through the dynamical aspects of a mechanics and extends to a general 
phenomenology of matter. This phenomenology relies increasingly for its determination through 
the reference to a mode of representation by the senses, and thereby depends on a power of 
representation generally. So the progression from the most formalised to the least formal opened 
increasingly to an empirical practice of concept production.
288
 On the one hand, degrees of 
determination relate the dynamical concept to the data of intuition, but on the other, this relation 
gave laws of thought as they appeared from the perspective of an empirical finitude as it chases 
an exhaustive determination. The important point of this schematic was to indicate that more 
empirical sciences, as built up through observation and experiment, appear as open to the 
“infinite manifold of intuitions,” and ultimately leaves their explorations in an infinite regress.289  
 
What were the specific ambitions of Metaphysical Foundations in setting out principles of 
constructing concepts on this scale? Was it to give legitimate grounds to a wider schematic that 
related to a Science of Man with a natural scientific concept of nature at its foundation? Or did it 
show what was unfolded through phenomenal by degrees of empiricism under the law of 
reciprocity was actually a limited axiom of the real in as far as it offered sufficiency? By 
sufficiency, Kant meant to distinguish his thinking from Leibnizian system which had a 
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presupposed notion of pre-established harmonies to accounting for principles of discursivity.
290
 
This notion returned the problem of knowledge as a concern of community, and Kant 
emphasised this in the „Postulates of Empirical Thought.‟ (B292ff) Here a principle of 
discursivity worked within the laws of space and time for which reciprocity sufficed as long as it 
is not taken as noumenal existence. It merely offered possible conceptual relations as they 
extended experience. But such knowledge always suffered from the danger of confusing of 
subjective experience with an objectivity.
291
  
 
The latter could not give apodictic certainty from the Newtonian perspective. This was a 
perspective whose legitimacy followed a principle of inertia in matter and Kant further qualified 
this as a passive domain. In turn, this passivity marks the distinction from speculative 
internalised principles which, although lacking such apodictic certainty, he attributed to concepts 
of life, - 
 “Life means the capacity of a substance to determine itself to act from an internal 
principle, of a finite substance to determine itself to change, and of a material substance 
to determine itself to motion or rest as change of its state.”292 
Because such internalised principles do not conform to a Newtonian view of matter, 
Metaphysical Foundations was therefore also arguing that natural science gave natural limits of 
knowledge in relation to a universal doctrine of experience. This was an emphasis on limits 
which now appear as essentially philosophical, rather than simply empirical or mathematical. 
This left the positivity of experience as defining a special domain whose specificity in relation to 
sciences of human reason, was upheld thorugh philosophical ambitions for a general doctrine of 
wisdom. This means that Metaphysical Foundations ultimately indicates what mathematical 
sciences lacked between giving metaphysical and philosophical foundations to the 
anthropological domain of experience. It is an asymmetry that extends to the Science of Man and 
all wider domains under the influence of natural history, physiology and anthropology, etc. 
These now necessitated a special epistemology to give the wider philosophical grounding.
293
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Distinguishing Between Physics and Phusiologia  
 
The need for the new epistemology was at the limit to what Metaphysical Foundations and 
Critique of Pure Reason derived from the paradigm developed under an argument for universal 
gravitation and its law of inertia. In Book III of Newton‟s Principia, the inertial concept of 
matter is understood as empirical to the extent that it depends on the perceptions and actions of 
the senses. In Critique of Pure Reason, The Analogies of Experience followed this as empirical 
reasoning about causal relationships with an emphasis on the power of application of an 
understanding.
294
 In expanding Newton‟s conceptions on moving forces to an empirical limit, the 
Metaphysical Foundations illustrated the distinction between a natural science and a broader 
philosophy of nature: the regressive analysis of Newtonian principles pushed this point to a 
phenomenology which necessitated a physiologically grounded concept of nature accounted for 
by the senses.
295
 
 
What is significant of an epistemology grounded by Newton‟s mathematics was that a concept of 
matter was externalised force and notably opposed to an idea of hylozoism, the doctrine of 
matter attributed to an internalised force.
296
 During this era, the expansion of new empirical 
sciences was opening wider conceptions of what could constitute legitimate foundations under 
which specific forces of matter could be apprehended by natural scientific speculation. For 
example, in the 1724 work by Herman Boerhaave, Elementa Chemiae, he described specific 
phenomena in particular bodies through a speculative understanding although did not assume 
these as universal principles. While these were not taken as a priori, Boerhaave and others - 
notably the important contemporary, the chemist and physiologist Georg Ernst Stahl - held 
unanimously that the Newtonian paradigm presented the ideal of experimental philosophy. The 
chemist Georg Stahl, often associated with the theory of the virtually weightless substance 
known as phlogiston, is also associated with a vitalistic system in the field of medicine. But he 
notably opposed the materialisms of Boerhaave and also the physician and physiologist Friedrich 
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Hoffmann.
297
 Following an ideal science meant discovering what new relations could be 
established for phenomenal thought through the disciplined method of empirical observation. 
This meant following the analogical model by which Newton derived the universal law of 
gravitation.  
 
Kant was well grounded in the 18
th
 century sciences and familiar with the discussions of such 
forces and other new ideas emerging to account for the science of specific bodies. These were 
being understood, not begining with natural definitions or general theories such as the universal 
and generic forces of gravity, but addressed through epistemological questions becoming 
necessary in justifying new physiological views of the body. Kant shared this view of 
introducing a priori concepts as hypothetical representation of the body to account for intrinsic 
powers evident in living organisms.
298
 It had a significant bearing on his progressive 
philosophical ambitions that followed a transition between a natural scientific concept and the 
physician‟s concept of nature. This appears most developed in Kant‟s last unfinished work, the 
Opus Postumum, which was moving away from discussion of feelings and reflective judgements 
of Critique of Judgement and has been identified with the ambition for exploring purposiveness 
within the experience of the body.
299
  
 
Extending a concept of the vegetative body through its experience of force gave a significance 
that emerges around what Kant considered an important estimation in understanding positive 
activities in other bodies. A speculative concept of vegetative body and its experiences could 
offer the possibility for new forms of science, - 
“we experience organic forces in our own body; and we come, by means of analogy 
with them (with a part of their principle), to the concept of the vegetative body, leaving 
out the animal part of principle”300  
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The Critique of Judgment already conceived of the human as the highest example of a biological 
organism, the animal as self-moving machine with the possibilities for giving subjective ends to 
itself under a concept of nature,
301
 Opus Postumum describes an experimental science of the self-
moving machine as opening the possibilities to a wider experience of nature, -  
“he can, and is entitled to, introduce a priori organic moving forces of bodies into the 
classification of bodies in general…although only indirectly according to an analogy 
with the moving force of the body as machine.”302  
The context for exploring the wider possibilities for a system of thought was already mapped out 
by the architectonic of Critique of Pure Reason. Kant indicated the future science of metaphysics 
was divided between the „metaphysics of nature‟ and a „metaphysics of morals.‟303 The latter 
found its fullest expression in the text of 1797, while Kant‟s requirement for a new epistemology 
beyond the infinite regress of Metaphysical Foundations indicates the full metaphysics of nature 
that never appeared.  
 
Bowever the Architectonic gave a sketch of what was intended of such „metaphysics of nature.‟ 
Kant subdivided a general science of nature into, ontology, rational physiology, rational 
cosmology, rational theology; beyond this a further division of rational physiology comprised of 
rational physics and rational psychology.
304
 This classification was presented as a progressive 
program of study for the physics that would become the metaphysics of bodies in general. A 
natural system of thought was an ambition for his transcendental project, the phenomenology 
that necessitated a physiologically grounded concept of nature of the senses. It addressed two 
specific problems;
305
  
- Firstly, the positive domain of a rational physics as the ultimate goal of a general metaphysics 
proper: Metaphysical Foundations could only give the limited formulation, falling short of the 
ambition of attaining a reasoned knowledge beyond the boundaries of experience with regard to 
all bodies.  
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- Secondly, since the general metaphysics of nature was considered an “indispensable service” 
for giving rational sense beyond conditionality, its ambition was giving positive „sense and 
meaning‟ to a future schematics that constituted a phenomenological basis for the inner sense 
and its time determinations. It aimed at an epistemologically basis for a complete Science of 
Man.
306
  
The Metaphysical Foundations was not intended to provide such a general concept of nature, as 
its positive content was excluded by the relativity of the domain. However, it marked the limit 
for advancing through identity and difference. By diverging from simple relations of observable 
physical differences, it indicated the necessity in the wider philosophical program for exploring 
latency in a phenomenal knowledge of nature. The wider systematic investigation of nature 
would look to a transition grounded by new concepts of moving forces which was converging 
with the life sciences. 
  
Kant wrote an appendix to Samuel Thomas Sömmering‟s Uber das Organ der Seele (1796). 
Sömmering was an encyclopaedic anatomist and one of the most experienced and renowned 
neuro-anatomists of the late eighteenth century. His description and illustrations of the brainstem 
gave an early classification of cranial nerves (circa 1778). These representations of structure and 
function was understood as hypothetical, but Sömmering was convinced that mental faculties 
were executed by certain brain regions which his treatise gave as localized functions of the soul 
within cerebrospinal fluids in close contact with presumed nerve endings within walls of 
ventricular cavities. This attempt at synthesising anatomy and metaphysics fuelled contemporary 
discussions around epistemological legitimacy. Sömmering placed the organ of the brain at the 
centre of a debate central to a Science of Man with far-reaching consequences for the wider 
discourses on man well into the 19
th
 century. This provoked a complicated picture that was 
unfolding under a Science of Man which emerged around the inherent confusion between what 
constituted the positive and the vital concepts of life.
307
 Another example discussed by Kant in 
The Conflict of the Faculties was Christoph Wilhelm Friedrich Hufeland‟s Makrobiotik, a 
contemporary work on preventive medicine that engaged with contemporary scientific thinking. 
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Hufeland took an organizing principle as the lebenskraft, the vitality as conception of living 
force which could be weakened or strengthened through external influences, This concept of life 
was legitimated on the basis of a theory of moral and physical health from which Hufeland 
advanced theories on the ethical life. Kant‟s commmentary, however, saw him emphasise the 
powers of mind, as carrying the normalising judgement over a concept of the body along with its 
conditions of mastery.
308
  
 
The wider experience of the system of nature was theorised in Critique of Pure Reason as the 
„System of all Principles of Understanding.‟309 It aimed to constitute a priori knowledge for the 
relations to sensibility through a system of experience under a broader physiological system – to 
which physics only represented a narrow relation. In Opus Postumum, Kant followed the „table 
of judgment‟ with a transcendental ambition of converging the system of observations as 
surveyed in the new formal elements through their progression from axioms of intuition to an 
experience in general. This ambitious systematising of a wider domain of force alongside the 
contemporary interpretation of animal powers, and meant theorising from the perspective of 
affectivity, to the possibility of thinking phenomenally, as constituting a world-system.
310
 
 
The New Life Sciences and the Scientia Natura 
 
The kind of a world-system that Kant was discussing in the Opus Postmum is exemplified by 
Erasmus Darwin‟s Zoonomia.311 In 1796, Darwin systematised zoological phenomena into a 
dynamic image of empirical progression according to a non-material principle of living force 
considered “effective according to purpose” of explaining a world-system.312 This progression 
followed from an organic system of nature derived of observable nervous forces of general living 
being (excitability), to reactive forces (irritability), forces of conservation between the two, and 
then intergrated as a description of organisational forces in the whole.
313
 This systematic 
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description defered specific epistemological difficulties in the elements for a relation to 
representation in the whole on the basis of what accords with the apparently natural system.  
 
Kant‟s ambition was also in justifying rational experience in general as possible experiences of a 
system of nature beyond the division between the Transcendental Aesthetic and the 
Transcendental Analytic. This is despite the natural division between the logical aspect, (the 
elements of a science of relations) and appearance of organisation qualities of sensible „matter‟ 
(experienced as the distributed system of nature). While only the former sufficed under 
Newtonian principles, the latter appears in the progressive apprehension of a domain of 
experience, phenomenally apprehended and thought of as positive for purposes of producing a 
positive representation.
314
  
 
Kant‟s stance in the Transcendental Dialectic emphasises negative principles purposefully 
avoiding the naturally given (ontologia).
315
 However, in the Architectonic, he also treats a 
physiology of pure reason as a „nature‟ in the sense of being principles subjectively given as 
elements of a logical system of concepts, in as far as they accord with empirical representations, 
- “although only rationalis.”316 In this way, the composite of experience aims to indicate the sum 
of objectivity addressed as the „matter‟ of experience in its aesthesis.317 The Critique measures 
affective experience against the constituted mathematical knowledge demanded of the 
Newtonian concept, but Opus Postumum returns to seeing objectivity in terms of the aesthetic 
capacity for the given. This serves Kant‟s philosophical ambitions in its positive reasoning.  
 
Opus Postumum takes this capacity as derived from an aesthesis prior to an analytic and is 
hypothetically justified by Kant‟s ideal account of how the animal-machine can distinguish 
passively through organic sensitivities, its experience of force.
318
 The a priori determination of 
such a capacity gives the determinative mode of thinking which accounts for an underlying 
empirical experience of objectivity in moving forces. Kant‟s wider ambitions for a scientia 
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natura was to envelope both objects of inner and outer sense as necessitated by the 
phenomenological representation of the system of sensations. This posits the domain that could 
be considered as a „natural‟ system that must accord with demonstrable concepts experienced a 
priori and is a problem of defining the concept of a logical system, which could sustain the 
experience of living being.
319
  
 
It is important that Opus Postumum takes this capacity as theoretically apprehending empirical 
sensibility by following the principles that science embodied historically as a philosophical 
problem. Kant defined how to conceptualise the “primitively moving material,” through a 
systematisation of individual cases.
320
 The parallel would be in the physician judging the 
effectiveness of his action through a living body‟s reactions to pleasure and pain.321 This 
historical emphasis brings out the progressive difficulty of understanding how general laws 
operate in particular concrete situations, and whose historical context was of constituting this a 
positive science. As a historical problem of knowledge, this is evident in what Plato praised in 
Hippocrates, and informs the concept that notably finds a universal extension in Timaeus as the 
picture of an ideal living being.
322
 But further progress of the general notion of this composite of 
vital function was advanced on the level of organised sensation, and correlates to what Aristotle 
understands as a „capacity‟ to respond with proportion accorded to an internal disposition.323 
This is the capacity to constitute the dynamic response implicit of an „affective soul‟ which, in 
Aristotle, finds its application extended to ethics and politics.  
 
Opus Postumum unfolded a series of ether proofs to give the determination that extends the 
theoretical approach towards a concept of “hypostasised space itself.” It identifies a material 
posited as caloric. While the demand for physical proof could be argued over, Kant‟s focus was 
only on the hypothetical position in that it could be related to pure intuitions of time and space; 
these were understood to lack actuality but given the philosophical status of a virtual ground.
324
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Since any sensory experience finds its legitimacy only through intuitive correspondences, this 
historically related to the position that no experience of force is possible in a void, and any given 
possible experience requires a priori sensation of something.
325
  
 
It remained an open question what ultimately grounded such an empirical „fact‟ embedded in the 
intuitive manifold. But Kant‟s intuitive manifold was by definition a self-unifying capacity given 
to the objective account of organic space. It was also a unity in the conditions of possibility 
which was axiomatic for Kant. In this way, this intuituive capacity ultimately gives the unity to 
outer experience in general.
326
 Opus Postumum takes this axiomatic as the problem of knowledge 
that necessitates the virtual material mediating a capacity for deduction of any categorically 
given. As with the historical problem of knowledge, it looks to the systematic relation with 
contemporary physiological discourses.327 But Kant‟s aim was not psycho-physical parallelism, 
nor simple mechanical proof, but a mediate framing of wider possibility in the problem left of 
Critique of Pure Reason. This problem was characterised as the “unity of consciousness of the 
manifold, successively intuited, and reproduced in representation.”328 In this was the virtual 
material gives certain possibilities for a transition to fulfilling Kant‟s positive ambitions for a 
transcendental philosophy. 
 
The Root Concept and its Transcendental Reflection  
 
The Critique of Pure Reason is split between empirical and transcendental forms of 
consciousness which defines is problem of inner possibilities; but the empirical „fact‟ is that 
objects of experience represent succession through a „peculiar unity‟ intuited as objective 
totality. Taken as an objectivity accorded an a priori capacity, this lends the empirical horizon its 
possibilities to be transcendentally constituted. 
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The „Selbstsetzungslehre‟ of Opus Postumum sees this as the synthetic capacity that follows the 
progression expanding the modal functions of the concept. Through an intuition of a fundamental 
material, as the inherent unity of the given, this opens the power of representation to be mediated 
through an analytic proposition. But intuition is also a power of synthesis prior unfolding the 
concept. This, says Kant, is something that no sceptic can take issue with, since this is not a 
debate about space or time as such, but is derived from something against which the manifold 
takes its determining position.
329
 
 
The Critique of Pure Reason relates that such pure concepts of understanding are enabled by the 
categories which define the objectivity of possible experiences.
330
 In the Transcendental Doctrine 
of Judgement, these are the positive categories that give valid relations to objectivity as such, 
while equally their origins are grounded in the subjective aspects of experience.
331
 Because the 
subjective aspect of experience gives unity to the stems of sensibility and understanding, its 
positive categories determine the root concept whose legitimacy comes from what a subject 
apprehends as its „real‟ relations.332  
 
The Opus Postumum understands that there is only one space and time. But this is no longer 
formally given, rather it is given by a sensible progression that follows from an affectivity in the 
manifold of intuition. It necessitates something subjectively posited as temporal notions of an 
unconditional unity of space and time, which transcendental philosophy takes as the concept to 
be progressively grasped.-
333
  
“space is a quantum, which must always be represented as part of a greater quantum – 
hence infinite, and given as such. Progress in this quantum is not to be regarded as given; 
the progression, however, is.”334  
The concept of the quantum becoming determinable through principles of a composition 
(axioms, anticipations, etc) is the logical function that Kant is developing on the basis of the 
                                                          
329
 Ibid p170-172 [22:11] 
330
 CPR A111, „Transcendental Deduction‟  
331
 Ibid A124, See Heidegger (1997) p272  
332
 Ibid B197  
333
 Kant (1993a) p171-172 22:28-29 
334
 Ibid p170 [22:12] 
104 
 
existence of an ultimate reality which he defers to “certain laws.”335 In Critique of Pure Reason 
this transcendental concept was held with respect to what an inner faculty related to a noumenal 
world and ascribed through relations to be discovered through a “marvellous faculty which the 
moral law first reveals to me.” 336 Here the emphasis was on the subject „possessed of freedom.‟ 
The Critiques embodied the positive power of intellectual principles as the capacity to conform 
to the negative laws of nature; but the Opus Postumum took the root concept as retaining a 
determinable aspect, through its capacity to synthesise possible domains for the theoretical 
world. This followed from the power to represent space and time objectively and, according to 
Kant, requires a concept of experience as “infinitely positive,” and “not merely a thinkable 
whole.”337 Because this thinkable whole derives from the totality experienced, the objectively 
given remains the secondary act of empirical determination, which accords with the a priori 
positive categories (quantity/quality, etc) - Opus Postumum left a further difficulty as to the 
nature of such a root concept, since it appears posited in the domain with “thoroughgoing 
relation of means to ends,” which is ascribed within the very possibilities of outer experiences.338   
 
This shows how Kant was distinguishing a logical domain of possible predicates under the 
concepti subjecti. The wider doctrine of scientia natura necessitated the transcendental 
perspective on a domain for inner relations to experience in general. But while Critique of 
Judgement limited this to symbolic content under a capacity of purposiveness, Opus Postumum 
held the thinkable totality as drawn from a sum of possibilities experienced. A purely 
theoretically concept could be posited and this leads to the question of what theoretical 
foundations Kant was drawing on?  
 
Opus Postumum offers repeated references to the various organic theories looking to encompass 
inner experience of symptoms and desires as well as what is evident externally as purposiveness 
in forces of the phenomenal world.
339
 These are a parallel to the sum of possibilities that Kant 
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proposes to distinguish by following two modes of what the concept of nature could hope to 
apprehend;-  
- Firstly, the concept being attributed to the phenomenal forces evident in the study of animal 
instincts and self-preservation,  
- Secondly, the concept of totality of a domain of possible experience by animal and vegetable 
life.
340
  
The thought of such concepts precedes the possibility of any categorical thinking of life‟s 
activity. The parallel is with the origins posited of categorical intuition and its unity understood a 
prior legitimate grounds. From this theoretical unity, the Opus Postumum can state that an 
intuition must follow the twin aspects of a production; a transcendental systematic of symbolic 
connections following positive analogies of experience, and a temporal systematisation which is 
empirically derived from a progressive or cumulative aspect of a world-experience.  
 
The Opus Postumum therefore addresses both the possibilities derived of reflective judgment as 
well as the perspective that moves from this empirical capacity towards a transcendental 
perspective on a world-experience. By extending the concept of world-system, formed of the 
sum of different modes of lived experience, a transcendental perspective describes “a third 
element...the foundation of appearances as if established in immovable solid ground. A justified 
possession.” But this „justified possession‟ is a positive domain which Opus Postumum follows 
progressively from its metaphysical function towards its possibilities for a transcendental 
philosophy. Conversely it is also constitutive of the concept through which the subject binds 
itself a priori to an objective horizon.
341
  
 
Technical Concepts and Moral Power 
 
Michel Foucault identified the Opus Postumum as exploring a function by which man defined his 
concrete world through degrees of the “changing powers of sensation.”342 Such a function 
determines the possible ways in which a subject appeared to itself as an object among objects but 
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which also required the originary concept grounding representational identity in the self, along 
with extending the possible transcendental freedoms. The earlier contention was that Foucault 
saw this as lending the historical perspective that served the representing subject by extending its 
future possibilities for transcendence; the significance of Opus Postumum was seen as this 
transition from the historical problem of a rational physics, to the transcendental problem 
necessitated of constituting a grounded subjectivity. 
 
In this respect, the parallel is with what the Transcendental Dialectic worked through as given to 
the subject as “the mere idea,” namely as predicates that need to be conditioned.343 Against the 
idea, Kant‟s polemical places emphasis on our present mode of knowledge: he took the sceptical 
position held in relation to the source within ourselves which followed the scholastic maxim of 
unity, as the fundamental property to which any logical principles are subordinated. The logical 
modes of a transcendental principle are a “mere idea” that has been at “all times eagerly 
sought.”344 The Critique of Pure Reason therefore looked to modern science as a disciplinary 
practice in which a concept of nature, delimited under identity and difference, could be 
legislative for certain regions of knowledge and from which the concept that gave a true 
representational function in general should proceed.  
 
The problematic relation, with respect to a Science of Man, appears since the transcendental 
notion of „true function‟ was excluded from reason within itself. This left the question of 
legitimacy as a principle of function, which was neither strictly logical nor hypothetical, but as 
what appeared to experience itself as the legitimate claim to a reality. What appears through the 
„manifold of effects,‟ as the self-grounding maxims of reason and as an empirical concept, 
already functions to give the possible experience of difference in nature. Critique of Pure Reason 
emphasised subordinating these experiences to logical concepts, as a regulatory function, since 
empirical concepts have a fundamental lack from the transcendental perspective.
345
 The necessity 
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for the analogue was as an orientating rule or principle, ultimately serving to give empirical 
reality the “harmony” with itself.346  
 
The ambiguity arises in Critique of Pure Reason because Kant also takes reason in-itself as a 
metaphysical faculty for analysing concepts of experience while empirical concepts are also 
synthetic and constitutive expressions of experience. This is attributed to a positive source 
“beyond the limits of experience.”347 It is because these are beyond limits that transcendental 
reason takes its practical function from the power of knowledge as necessary for achieving 
practical ends. On the other hand, this also attributes to an empirical function of the will, the 
power of co-ordinating sensuous experience against which the transcendental reason implements 
a necessary prudence with respect to natural law. This serves a purpose of maintaining its own 
freedom.
348
 Ultimately this is a concept of freedom that allows Kant to extend ethical laws of 
conduct to the world. But this is the moral „equipment‟ enabled by the desire for freedom to 
accord with its transcendental concept, and was pursued as synthetic reason. It is the 
transcendental concept that serves the necessary synthesis of empirical concepts from a practical 
perspective on how the understanding „ought‟ to function. This therefore that gave the difficulty 
of the transcendental concept since it was bound up with the very “ground or consequence” of 
subjective conditions in the practical sphere.
349
   
 
This leaves the moral „paradox‟ of animal reason for Critical thought.350 How such a 
transcendental function could inform rules of conduct as extended to an empirical world was the 
moral problem that Kant explored in Critique of Practical Reason through its relation to the 
historical concept of the summum bonum. But this equivocated between a „concept of the good‟ 
and the concept of well-being as the intrinsic conflict of the sensible world. When the parallel 
appears in the symbolic modes of understanding in Critique of Judgement, the transcendental 
perspective is removed from any immediate experience, in order to account for its directing 
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towards particular ends.
351
 Likewise, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone gave the 
subjective ground as objective only though a predisposition of reforming man‟s sensuous nature: 
this account of man‟s propensity behind any symbolic representation to positive doctrines served 
only “in potential.” 352 The moral philosophy derived from this its unique principle, “so far as 
this disposition displays a vitality in actions,” which was the theoretical notion premised on 
harmony within the concept of the world‟s highest good.353 
 
The ambitions of Opus Postumum are justified under the domain of a scientia natura. This now 
differentiates the transcendental concept as derived from a technical-practical capacity given 
through a theoretical approach to a transcendental schema. By following the synthetic principles 
for the production of concepts, Kant was looking to express an objective capacity for world-
being as the concept that follows from the phenomenological progression that converges on a 
moral-practical domain with its concept of freedom.
354
 Opus Postumum therefore diverged from 
what the Critiques maintained as opposed powers of nature and freedom. It follows a transition 
from an empirical capacity for the concept, to the transcendental perspective, which starts from 
the speculative ambition to apprehend conceptual determinations in causal conditions. The 
parallel is with the maxims of conduct which are discursively held a priori to sensuous intuitions 
for the practical reason to which moral thought upheld a concept of freedom.
355
  
 
In Opus Postumum, the world-concept is theoretically extended through both perceiving and 
thinking the grounds of experience. The transcendental ambition for the perspective from which 
a concept of freedom could distinguish itself from the divisions of the negative, follows from the 
presupposed unified world. In this sense, transcendental reason constitutes an equivalent of what 
the will syntheses from “real opposition.”356 Although in Critique, the transcendental perspective 
was given to individuals as “a mere idea,” an objective freedom is expressed in Opus Postumum 
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as a technical capacity to apprehend the world. It is the extension to the moral-practical 
reasoning which Kant‟s positive ambitions open to the transcendental philosophy in relation to 
empirical experience of the transcendental system as it encloses a domain of synthetic 
knowledge. 
 
The synthetic knowledge constitutes the transcendental concept through a domain that follows 
from practical aspects of the self-steering subject. A phenomenal will acts through its 
moral/technical systematic which carries “the noumenal point of view” as it appears prior to acts 
of consciousness.
357
 By making the world objective through the copula or link between a 
universal idea and its concept of world, the concept is given to experience through the axiomatic 
principle by which consciousness extends its natural capacity for constituting the system of 
ideas. It therefore presents a constitutive picture of organic being as it draws on the super-
sensible idea, theoretically upheld – only as long as it accords with its own synthesis of the 
architectonic of the world. 
 
In theorising the organisms „virtual‟ primary activities, Kant gives the technical-practical 
imperatives of a drive which is parallel to a transcendental principle by which the concept can 
conform to demonstrable experiences of the world.
358
 The practical concept appears as an 
organism‟s higher perspective on the reality of its natura bruta, but Kant‟s real motivation here 
was to determine whether “another will is thinkable in place of this one.” This is the 
transcendental theme that draws on an ethical perspective evident with his demand for the “ideal 
archetype of man adequate to duty.”359 In looking to such an inner capacity, as the theoretical 
constitutive for a transcendental systematic of ideas, the transcendental function means a 
synthetic capacity for constituting the moral concept. A transcendental systematic of nature now 
becomes the perspective from which the concept imposes on man his empirical world of 
experience, but whose inner capacity gives transcendental possibilities in constituting the 
                                                          
357
 „Transcendental Philosophies Highest Standpoint, God, the World and the Thinking Being in the World‟ Ibid 
p235, 21:32 
358
 Ibid p218-219, 21:11.Kant distances himself from the Spinozists who are “swärmerische.” God is therefore to be 
distinguished from a world-soul. p225, 21:19 
359
 Ibid p239-240, 21:37  
110 
 
positive concept of the world. Here was the theoretical perspective which Foucault took as 
informing the anthropological research into what man actually produces out of himself.
360
 
 
The World-Concept and the Science of Man 
  
It is only by implication that Foucault related Opus Postumum to Anthropology from a 
Pragmatic Point of View. In terms of an 18th century debate on a Science of Man, Kant‟s late 
Anthropology states its ambition to be the investigation of how man pragmatically makes his 
world as revealed through activities of life. What is notable is that this no longer aspires to a 
scientia natura delimited under a unified logic: anthropology was seen as a difficult practice in 
relation to the doctrine of nature. The difficulty was the synthetic reasons behind the 
anthropological domain, as faculties that describe a „self-steering‟ in man that an empirical 
survey could only tangentially approach. Kant does, however, refer to anthropology‟s ideal 
archetype, as framed as the citizen of the world, and commentators have related this to what Kant 
was redefining through his anthropology lectures during 1780-1790.
361
 These became 
increasingly concerned with social and cultural, political and historical elements, as the 
empirically productive aspects of a “second nature.” It was this that displaced notions of natural 
„psychology‟ which gave a Science of Man its earlier orientation from the beginning of the 18th 
century.
362
  
 
In this respect, Anthropology opens with a Didactic which describes an extended field of possible 
practices encroaching on a traditional „concept of the good.‟ It is a survey of possible 
dispositions and drives for a moral law in as far as they are legitimated by observations in an 
empirical world.
363
 Such practices are no longer specified in relation to the negative conditioning 
of freedom and nature as Critique of Judgement where aesthetic play was through an equivocal 
„liveliness.‟ Rather Anthropology takes as „pragmatic‟ what it observes as the empirical 
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perspective on the phenomenal and necessarily synthetic interpretation of its world.
364
 The sum 
of synthetic interpretations constitutes Anthropology’s second part, a Characterisation, which is a 
typology categorising sensible beings as they accord to an activity under the cosmopolitan law.  
 
Since this empirical domain is limited to the pragmatic perspective, any citizens of this world are 
given only through this concept of the world. This concept is a measure, distinct from the 
polemical rational physics, but also from the wider terms of a rational physiology, so important 
for Opus Postumum. Like a historical scientia, this concept will now ground what extends both 
to physics and psychology as an idea of natural reason. However, as a relation between the 
corporeal nature and thinking nature this is now self-contained under principles a priori of the 
knowledge of the world.
365
  
 
Kant‟s task was giving an inner perspective on what he “can or should” make of himself, as the 
object of this world that characterises the rational elements of man.
366
 But this leaves a 
cosmopolitan perspective to be derived only from the distribution of anthropological types as 
what actually constitutes this domain. It downplays the strict division of Critique precisely 
because of the difficulties of inner sense and the problems associated with an empirical 
psychology in its legitimacy as distinct reason. This was the problematic domain that Critique of 
Pure Reason sought to “banished from the domain of metaphysics” on the grounds that it is 
excluded by the very idea of science. This is what reappears, after a fashion, as an 
anthropological domain behind the survey of a fragmented reason, as the evident nature of the 
empirical world.
367
  
 
What does the anthropological domain show? Kant had dislodged any empirical perspective on 
rational metaphysics through finitude in knowledge. Equally he characterised as a transcendental 
problem what was made evident in the need for practical principles in the world. In this sense, 
anthropology returns to an admixture of desire and prudence for the exploration of negotiating 
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natural impulses which were historically associated with ethical techniques following 
transcendental goals.
368
 Observations in this domain inform of how citizens in the world relates 
their powers of representation to modes of empirical sensibility: this power characterises a 
mind‟s ways of thinking in relation to the knowledge derived from the empirical counterpart, the 
modes of perception of the world. Such a binary gives a different perspective from the dualism 
between nature and freedom. It makes apparent a substitution for the concept of freedom when 
there are only practical principles to attribute to an inner sense.
369
 Against the problematic 
relation between the intuition and its understanding, the anthropological domain makes 
intelligible events that “embarrasses understanding” - Anthropology’s didactic finds that 
sensibility and common sense introduces a sensus communis as a productive judgement “not 
formally brought to the tribunal [but are rather] proceeding directly from inner sense.”370 The 
anthropological concept of world makes this intelligible through necessitating a concept of man‟s 
anthropological existence which is neither the concept of good nor a concept of nature.  
 
What Kant observes as the constitutive qualities of a cognitive theory, elsewhere associated with 
a sensibility, is now an empirical fact. It is also a capacity for the world-system of man justified 
“because he is his own ultimate purpose.”371 The transcendental perspective of the Opus 
Postumum described this „world concept‟ as the sensu cosmic, the knowledge giving unity of the 
ends of reason. Critique of Pure Reason drew on a scholastic concept of unity for this 
knowledge.
372
 But the world-concept which is differentiated in the later Logic notes (Jäsche) is 
the system of reasoning which now appears under an anthropological domain. This is the world-
concept distinguishes itself from a cosmic concept, since any systematic unity is sustained only 
under an empirically common world.
373
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In the Logic, Kant framed the task for philosophy itself through the idea that it can show this as 
an ultimate end. On the one hand, the world-concept stood for the “highest maxim of the use of 
reason” which unifies his cosmopolitan philosophy, but the Logic limits this through the question 
of man. This is the question of man that points to Anthropology and the binary of being/thinking 
whose domain put the pragmatic maxim in place of transcendental reflection. It is constituted 
from an „unthought‟ hybrid in the world-concept.374 Because this is inherently problematic for 
any pure discipline, Kant‟s empirical research into what man makes of himself leaves this as the 
perspective on man‟s self-knowledge which is parallel to his capacity for world-being.  
 
Although it was only by implication that Anthropology points to the discussion of world-being 
from the systematic perspective of Opus Postumum, this text describes the world-concept as the 
complex of sensible beings “insofar as they are at least conscious of themselves” and constitute a 
people acting, making, producing over time and giving rights and duties to each other.
375
 But the 
significant difference in Opus Postumum’s world is that it extends the source of ideas to a 
determination of the totality. In the heterogeneous domain of Anthropology this capacity is 
reversed, as what the person only „by rights‟ ought to become conscious of in the whole. This 
delimits the subjective ground as a productive domain for the objective world, a domain of 
world-beings whose empirical ground cannot fully be extended beyond a description of an 
anthropology existence.  
 
An empirical understanding is limited to a systematic of rules that converge on an admixture of 
habituated activities. Precisely such uncertainty within all conscious activities gives the problem 
to which all positive solutions are ultimately „pragmatic.‟ When Kant balances this uncertainty 
with the philosophical task, accounted for by “intentionality,” it serves to sustain when apparent 
nature “refuses to help a freewill.”376 Anthropology is only an evaluation of human activities 
contained under the concept of purposes within themselves, and evidence of these diverse modes 
of empirical understanding which become differentiated into moral and technical logics within a 
world-system. A systematic task therefore draws on the wider conflict within positive knowledge 
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as an individual activity, and differentiates a philosophical task under such empirical conditions. 
Where Anthropology converges on the world dominated by history and culture, the 
transcendental problems of the rational animal becomes characterised by the „capability of 
reason.‟ Elemental repetitions in a transcendental history show themselves only through self-
awareness of its situation at the phenomenal level, while the pragmatic perspective means that 
such phenomenal existence draws on a world-concept, whose progressive organisation indicates 
Kant‟s cosmopolitical world.377  
  
Anthropology can only implicate such processes in the appearance of a „mere idea.‟ The 
transformation of human nature by social and historical forces is equally equivocal. Kant‟s 
position is that, - 
“nature has planted in the species the seeds of discord, and that nature has willed that the 
human species, through its reason, to turn discord into concord, or at least create a constant 
approximation of it.”378  
The world-concept cannot therefore be a transcendental given, but a concept within which the 
possible world is a domain under the evaluation of a reason. Both technical and moral reasons 
compete in this admixture, challenging any transcendental illusions through empirical necessity. 
The importance of the world-concept is in offering the challenge to any transcendentally given 
concepts. In this domain, despite the fact that man “errs,” Kant identifies a productive play 
between multiple understandings and the act of exchange which draws on the moral/technical 
admixture. But these are “neither natural nor artificial” but something we become forced to 
accept as real.
379
  
 
Precisely what legitimates this concept as reciprocated under this illusion beomes the question of 
how man acquires his world from values freely communicated in a formal exchange.
380
 The 
order of the world is paradoxical, seemingly lacking in reason. Anthropology ascribes 
temperament to such inner values beyond any apparent nature of man, which it supports only 
through a „Characterisation‟ of how the will accords its prudence to the faculty of desire as „ways 
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of thinking‟ its ends.381 While this lacks a philosophical perspective, it does differentiate moral 
and technical reasons that cannot fully know their world, as values characterising man‟s modes 
being which offers Kant the means to judge a „strength of soul.‟382 Such strength is the power 
which gives man his place in the system of world and the purposiveness of character taken that 
indicates the modes of rational being. In the coalition of a cosmopolitan society, the domain of 
synthesising activity under the world system conditions the succession of human activities 
through the cohesive entity established under the world-concept. But as a natural disposition, this 
can only be presupposed according to a principle of the future.
383
 
 
From the perspective of the earlier ambitions for a Science of Man which a systematic 
philosophy developed as an „indispensible service,‟ it now departs from the demands of a 
Transcendental Methodology where a philosophical task was of producing transcendental 
coherence. Anthropology leaves this as a tension in this natural relation between corporeal 
existence and a thinking nature as activity of the world. But it is conceived of as a necessarily 
positive form of what the critical form could only express negatively – which is necessary 
because the pre-critical form, an analytic of finitude, initiated the dissolution of unified 
ambitions in an Enlightenment Science of Man.  
 
Conclusion  
 
This chapter has given an account of Kant‟s engagement with a contemporary Science of Man 
from the 1760‟s. Firstly, it explained why a critical front was developed against extending 
aesthetic criteria within a domain of rigorous enquiry. Secondly, this defined the transcendental 
ambitions for a Science of Man as the conditions of a general metaphysics. This chapter then 
showed how such a question of inner sense was being systematically laid out by the Opus 
Postumum as theoretical possibilities for a logical system of concepts. The implication was that 
Anthropology gave this the measure of the world. It world concept offered a perspective on a 
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unified moral and theoretical world as the logic of man, but had its parallel in the 
epistemological problems that were emerging through the natural sciences.  
 
But Kant‟s cosmopolitan ideal of the citizen of the world was the engagement with social, 
political and historical elements evident in Anthropology. It highlighted conflicting moral and 
theoretical aspects of the world which this concept expressed. Rather than a universal concept, 
this suggests that Kant‟s later ambitions for a Science of Man looked to the formal exchange of 
values to justify an idea of reason, as a world-concept whose modes of rational being were now 
brought into play historically, and to be judged by a „principle of the future.‟ This related to 
Foucault‟s perspective on ideological thinking and the medical Positivism as pre-critical 
practices informing political theories in the era of the French revolution which is the subject of 
the next chapter.  
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Chapter 3: The Science of Man and the Medical Revolution 
 
Introduction  
 
In the last chapter, Kant‟s categorical thinking was associated with the epistemological debates at 
the Berlin academy after 1740. This chapter will focus on the Science of Man developed in 18
th
 
century France as a general science characterised by the ambition to unify individual sciences 
under new considerations of the human species in an emerging relation to the study of nature. 
Inspired by wider Enlightenment themes, the Science of Man will now be associated with the 
reform of French medicine and the explicit task behind a transformation in the medical sciences. 
The renowned animal and human anatomist and physician Felix Vicq d‟Azyr has been credited 
with motivating medical reforms by broadening the scope of their investigations to include 
environmental factors, such as meteorology, water quality, public sanitation. But medical theory 
also represented a „certain method‟ from which a proper pedagogical method would naturally 
follow which was attractive to the politically minded physicians in Paris. 
 
During the late 18
th
 century, a progressive anatomical practice presented a challenge to the 
historical role of physiology in medicine. Physiology determined relations of man and his world, 
and a physiological debate struggled between mechanistic and spiritualistic ideas. However, both 
approaches shared the Cartesian ambition of overcoming Scholastic and Galenic notions 
embedded in medical history. In French medical circles an expanded knowledge of man was 
developed through a neo-Hippocratic dynamism. Equally successful for revolutionary era 
sciences was Condillac‟s Logic seen as the positive approach to approximating the threshold of 
sensible origins for a possible „naturalism.‟ This semiotic practice aimed at formalising 
experience but Condillac‟s sign was also understood as an intellectual tool for an individual to 
mark discourse with the strength of memory and power of imagination. Condillac‟s Logic will be 
shown to have historic links to earlier debates at the Berlin Academy and the chapter will make 
this the starting point before exploring how this influenced the medical disciplines in overcoming 
a historical physiology and inform a revolutionary era Science of Man.  
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Condillac‟s semiotic stood as a post-Cartesian practice that could serve the medical discipline in 
evaluating a physiological vitalism understood as the activity of life that accorded to a concept of 
norms. The Ideologist Jean Pierre Cabanis saw this as the new frontier for a Science of Man and 
for interpretation of relations of the physical and moral. But the specific medical problem of the 
era was how a progressively localising anatomy could inform the new rational physiology. Here 
it is Xavier Bichat who represents a physiology that delimits relations between anatomical 
practice and the medical discipline through attributing vital properties to a taxonomy of tissues. 
Vital properties and the Hippocratic dynamism gave the twin perspectives to which Condillac‟s 
sign was used to evaluate a new rational physiology serving a knowledge of life.  
 
The chapter shows how this knowledge pictured habituated bodily actions under the fluctuations 
of vital powers and delimited such a concept of life through physical powers that „preside over 
exterior bodies.‟ Bichat exemplified the relation between investigating anatomist and 
synthesizing physiologist for his era, and also embodied a progressive idea that modern society 
could „call forth‟ certain new functions as a result of the „state of civilisation.‟ This shows what a 
rational physiology meant for an ambition for a Science of Man.  Bichat gave a general concept 
of life an image of a constant struggle for a mean. In the revolutionary era, physiology was 
delimiting such a concept with a significance that relates to early French Positivism which is 
explored in the next chapter. 
 
Condillac and the Idea-Sign 
 
In late 18
th
 century France, the progressive thinker Etienne Bonnot de Condillac‟s Logic stood as 
a hugely successful method for producing an analytic theory of signs. As a tool of ideas this had 
little value to a narrow physics, however it lent itself readily to what was pursued under a 
Science of Man. Condillac died in 1780, the year his Logic was published, but this text had a 
legacy of particular importance for the years of the Directoire (1795-1799). When the 
revolutionary government established the Ecole Normale in 1795, Condillac‟s Logic was widely 
distributed and extensively influential despite diffuse interpretations.
384
 Even beyond the 
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immediate Ideologue circles of Destutt de Tracy, Pierre Joseph Cabanis and Maine de Biran, the 
Logic influenced major works as the theoretical basis for those looking for a more positive 
approach through a science of sensation and these formed many precursors for the positive 
sciences of the 19
th
 century.
385
 
 
Condillac developed his Sensationalism on the basis of the source of sense data being 
inseparable from abstract pure thought and considered this in its capacity for transformation. 
While Kant followed a categorical approach, Condillac‟s emphasis was on the transition from a 
speculative „natural‟ will put under a pragmatic function of reason; a „language of action‟ was 
open to a higher understanding articulated as a new language. Its focus was on empirical values 
attained through „modern‟ observational sciences and its ambition was overcoming the 
shortcomings of older analytic practices.  
 
Condillac is often associated with a Locke-Newtonian position, fore-grounding sense data 
produced through fundamental operations of the mind and its system of thought. This view is 
notably associated with Treatise on Sensation which considered the perspective of the perceiving 
mind in its relation to various modifications to senses/organs as transforming a series of data into 
the richer and more differentiated forms. But this text was underpinned by affective dynamic 
principles, such unease and need, notably described in Treatise on Animals. Broadly speaking, 
this lent itself to „a natural history of the soul‟ reflected as a theory of the mind. But its theory of 
signs also gave the theoretical background which developed as the influential textbook on 
method in the form of a Logic. 
 
A dilemma surrounds Condillac‟s early assertion in the 1746 Essai sur l'Origine des 
Connaissance Humaines: these signs were arbitrary, merely expressing the prejudices of the 
community, and were the shorthand for perceptions and a remedy for memory. This was taken to 
imply that using signs for a practice of analysis of perceptions had an inherent potential for 
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confusing the order of judgment hence disruptive of an order of „true‟ science.386 This was a 
problem of frivolity, inherited from Locke
 
and Leibniz, and was a central concern for the early 
1746 Essai sur l'Origine des Connaissance Humaines. In this text, Condillac takes the 
conjectural origins of language to explore what could function as a logical principle,
387
 and here 
is a surprising parallel with an essay that he submitted in favour of the doctrine of Monads to the 
Berlin Academy competitions in 1747. Condillac‟s submission was called Les Monades, 388 and 
the second part of this Berlin essay, after clearing the way of anachronistic metaphysical notions, 
attempted a positive monadic schema of his own. It has been noted that this stands in close 
comparison to the psychological forms found in various of Condillac‟s other works although this 
is often not explicit in the later texts.
389
 
 
The continuity between the early Monad debates and what should be attributed to Condillac‟s 
signs is a puzzle in Condillac legacy. The relatively recent discovery of this entry to the Berlin 
debates seems at odds with much of his later work and would represent an anachronism for the 
avant-garde of Paris intellectual circles since they sought to challenge such 17
th
 century systems 
with the new anti-metaphysical Newtonian approach. Here the emphasis was on the 
psychological or epistemological modes of explanation, but Les Monades offers an image of 
Condillac actually working against Lockean dualism and gives a new perspective on the role of 
his signs. The possibility was of prelinguistic thought and the unlikely symbolic aspect in Les 
Monades sees Condillac upholds a metaphor of Proteus, the sea-god, appearing in the many 
forms of an all pervading logic behind the reality of a mind whose faculties ultimately can only 
be reduced to sensations.
390
 Such a pan-logism behind both psychological or epistemological 
modes of explanation, appears to predicate appearances given to sensation as the condensation of 
an idea of primary material difference under forms of identity in the sign.
391
 Seen from this 
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perspective, the discussion in Treatise on Sensation sees the idea-sign as displacing 
„metaphysical phantoms‟ of substance, infinity, space and duration while condensing all 
predicates into simple ideas as elements of a wider psychological reality. Here is the 
epistemological importance behind Condillac taking a position that sensations cannot be 
inherently „wrong.‟ The legacy of discovery and invention is reducible only to process of 
organising our ideas and this is fundamental to his later works The Art of Thinking (1775), Logic 
(1780), Language of Calculus (1798).  
 
The Logic: How Signs Function as Second Nature  
 
This produces an analytic driven by a decomposition of successive physical orders of sensibility 
prior to recomposition as a psychologically simultaneous schema.
392
 Condillac presents this as a 
naturalism in the sense of a practice that aims at a natural judgment in the face of practical 
necessity. This distinduishes itself from from Kant, who holds there is „no conception without a 
concept:‟393 Condillac foregrounds through sensation, a “figurative expression”394 whose 
potential is for a new relational order beyond the „natural‟ order of need. But a dispersive 
tendency in sensible expressions means a higher „need‟ counterbalances arbitrary, absurd and 
“strange abuses of the general idea.” The figurative regularity of bodily movement gives the 
ground for this need,
395
 and this regulates the analysis of sensible experiences; the Logic takes 
this repetitive value as preserved by the brain. For Condillac, the brain is, -   
“continually agitated by the sense organs, responds not only to the impressions that it 
receives immediately, but to all the movements which this first impression must 
produce…going by habit from movement to movement” 396 
The figurative therefore expresses the language of action as derived from the series of 
impressions of the senses: measured against the series of ideas this is a „dual source‟ of 
impression and habituated thought. Because these are ultimately divorced from any first 
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principles, it is therefore “very imperfect,” which is why a primary concern for Condillac is in 
the techniques of knowledge that function against frivolous metaphysical speculation.
397
 
 
Ultimately, the Logic takes the elements of its analytic as orientating the “conformation of the 
organs.”398 These impressions, along with its habits, are fused into a „natural order of need‟. 
„Natural‟ order may be ambiguous but should be understood to contrast with “all the vices of an 
unregulated imagination.”399 These produce „natural‟ values expressed as functional signs. - 
“if we have made our observations well, the use of which we make of things, confirms 
them right away…if they have been badly made then the same destroys them just as 
quickly”400  
Confirmation produces habit and stands as a “second nature.” But because most people are 
subject to the “whims of custom” - the social reality of the sensus communis - to which the 
frivolous appears as a negativity. Therefore sensibility requires a disciplined second nature that 
subsumes values of good and bad habits through the differential analysis of the „language of 
action.‟ The „language of action‟ has its relation to the corporeal body with particular 
significance to expressing rudimentary practical principles that precede ideas; since „second 
nature‟ substitutes, not for an idea of nature, but for a „language of action‟ it indicates the 
productive capacity to which analysis specifically acts in the reciprocation of the impression.
401
 
Ideas internalise a problematic status encapsulated by a differential relation between the 
„language of action‟ and a „second nature.‟ The power of analysis extracts that value held of the 
representative sign.  
 
The „language of action‟ is open to a phenomenal problem which loses relevance for formal 
sciences, such as physics and chemistry which can be maintained through mathematical 
precision. As this precision does not extend to a project of a general science, Condillac‟s idea-
sign was developed at the threshold of the domain of ideas, the „unrefined languages‟ whose 
threshold had questionable values which could appear as the deployment of arbitrary, frivolous 
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or negative thought. This context took the idea-sign as proposing proximity to sensible origins 
through the value subjected to the primary needs. Thus man becomes what he already is “purely 
by nature,” as affirmed in the „language of action:‟ such naturalism put under the test of 
experience is paradoxically intended to exclude the frivolity of language, since it is from within 
instituted discourse that frivolity can proliferate.
402
  
 
The proliferation of language diverges in two directions for Condillac; firstly, an organic 
coexistence given through a “co-mingling” within economies that merely risk empirical 
arbitrariness.
403
 Secondly, the other direction that appears intellectually as the “mania for 
definitions,” extending false signs as accorded with inherent values. This was what Condillac 
associated with the “celebrated writers” of the Port-Royale Logic (1662) whose epistemological 
legacy was both of analysis and synthesis, considered as different but equivalent methods of 
unfolding epiphenomenal representation.
404
 By contrast, Condillac‟s Logic insists that analysis is 
retained both under a „language of action‟ and for its habituation as second nature.405 The central 
problem therefore was frivolous synthesis at the root of unregulated recombination.  
 
This dispersion relates back to the earlier Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge (1746) and 
its discussion of the successive transformations of signs by which knowledge passes into 
understanding.
406
 Condillac grounds human understanding through a single principle which rests 
on his argument derived from the origin and progress of language. Language is an empirical but 
pragmatic knowledge, limited by its positive functional success over time. This is the movement 
that distinguishes itself from a Kantian form of rule based dialectic. 
 
What Constitutes the „Well Made Language‟ 
 
The later Logic derives from the earlyb Essay this model of linear development of speech as 
figurative images decomposed into unitary signs. Signs reflect the „language of action‟ both as 
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an epistemological construct and as an aesthetic figure (even an apperception); this notion of the 
„language of action‟ stands a prior a determining will.407 By differentiating such man-made signs 
from an „animality,‟ Condillac distinguishes a productive aspect of human existence under a 
principle which implies a higher technical capacity and constitutes the general grammar that can 
lend itself to a Science of Man.  
 
The Essay describes the practical aspects of language as “operations of the soul;” but a natural 
history of signs shows it to be an „economy‟ divided as under a tripartite division of natural, 
accidental or conventional.
408
 Conventional signs are instituted in accordance with the higher 
qualities of man to present ideas clearly and distinctly so as to be extended to a judgment.
409
 The 
conventional sign has a simple repetitious function, through its power of recall reinforcing 
memory and its reminiscence. Here is a primary function that needs protecting from the frivolous 
syntheses that appear as heightened forms of an excessive imagination. The idea-sign serves a 
problem of balance while avoiding rigid and schematising universals such as the „scaffolding of 
principles‟ that can equally conceal the way to a true discovery.410 
 
Condillac theorises that a positive language developed from the mutual ground of “cries of 
passion to perception” carries this implicate necessity into the sign as second nature. This can be 
recalled to mind at will and extends operation of the soul. Language, therefore, links differences 
of temperaments under a generalised second nature developed through habituated signs, it 
transforms relation between the mental and physical through a substitution effected under a 
power of recombination. However, variations in discourse, in style and the reflective „force‟ of 
language gives a vivacity as power of an idea that make the signs function in practice. This is not 
a power of imagination but a “power over the imagination;” making signs function is therefore 
ambiguously attributed to an insensible link that substitutes for a formal understanding in the 
empirical domain of a „language of action.‟ 411 
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The Essay describes the domain of language as moving in two directions; firstly the natural drift 
attributed to geography, climate, the socio-political, or an anthropology. But language is also 
conditioned by the gifted individuals who can effectively mark language through a strength of 
memory and the power over imagination. The latter is the characteristic of genius; individuals 
both limited by language yet to whom, reciprocally, language owes a debt for its particularity,  
“...being bound by rules which restrain them, their imagination strives with increased 
effort, thus of necessity create new expression. Indeed sudden progress of a language 
always occurs in the age of a great poet, philosophers carry it to perfection only much 
later.”412 
Here is the movement between imagination and its analysis, as polarities acting as two distinct 
languages; firstly the „natural‟ synthesizing function of imagination and secondly, a function 
which “practices analysis fiercely” against any frivolity. An inherent problem of language is its 
proliferation into mediocrity, triviality, and bad metaphysics contaminating any true art and 
science.
413
 This defines the task for Condillac‟s „well made language‟ for his era and explains 
why a primarily analytical task is emphasised.
414
  
 
The Speechless Statue: What Distinguishes Sensation and Idea 
 
What distinguishes the two texts, the early Essay and the late Logic, sees Condillac clarifying 
this analytic task around development of the mental life. Treatise on Sensation (1754) initiates 
the break from the Essay by introducing the famous image of the speechless statue in order to 
explore a capacity of „need‟ as self-preservation in the individual.415 By relating memory to 
present impressions, Treatise on Sensation develops an important distinction is between 
“sensation-actuelle” and “idée-intellectuelle.”416 This difference is between the passive 
mechanism of a sensualism, and the active impressions which mental phenomena willfully 
compare signs.  
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However, this distinction also leads to two readings of Condillac‟s thought depending on 
whether his conjectured statue is understood as a receptor of natural sensations or represents a 
psychological past to which the present thought, through memory and its heightened form of 
imagination, must actively compare. This leaves a further ambiguity that extends to whether the 
idea-sign relate to successions of nature or successions of language. Condillac seems to have 
been aware of this interpretive point around the 1754 edition of Treatise on Sensation since he 
modified the later edition included in his Oeuvres which was published posthumously in 1798.
417
 
This clarified the original argument in a section, „Of ideas which the human being can acquire 
when limited to a sense of touch‟ with the later emphasis on the distinction from sensual 
impressions offering to knowledge a “light which guides it‟s merely instinct.” The function of 
idea-sign was to abstract that which existed „naturally,‟ but taken up by a measure of language;  
“It‟s [the statue] method in acquisition is to observe in succession, one after the other 
the qualities that it attributes to objects: it analyses naturally but it has no language. But 
an analysis without signs can only give a limited knowledge….and since it has not been 
possible to put them in order the collection must be very confused. Thus when I treat 
what the statue acquires, I do not mean to say that it has knowledge of which it can 
render an exact account of itself, it only has a practical knowledge [...] To acquire a 
knowledge it is necessary to have a language: for the ideas must be classified and 
determined which presupposes signs employed according to measure. See the first part 
of my Grammar or my Logic”418 
This distinction between purely instinctual knowledge and a theoretical knowledge, clarifies the 
values of language explored in the earlier Essay. When this is taken up in the Treatise on 
Animals (1756) it demonstrates how qualitative differences in signs divide man from animals. 
This distinction effectively divides the specifically human psychology into two modes; the „self‟ 
of habit and a „self‟ of reflection - this re-opens a domain beyond the statue and the animal by 
virtue of the artifice of the instituted signs of language of man. Therefore both texts, the Treatise 
on Sensation and the Treatise on Animals refers back to the Essay and both pursue distinct 
aspects of a fundamental problem that Condillac attributes to modes of synthesis of knowledge - 
human nature and the artifice of  language. The qualitative differentiation that appears as the 
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idea-sign supports the thesis of the earlier Essay and defines a methodological basis for the 
legacy that reached the revolutionary era through the Logic. 
 
The Idea-Sign Retains the Twin Disciplines of Thought 
 
Condillac‟s legacy for a Science of Man was notably emphasised during the 19th century through 
the speechless statue of Treatise on Sensation rather than looking back to the Essay. This 
lobsided view reflects the way Condillac‟s work was taken up in the post-revolutionary period, 
an era associated with the intellectuals of the Directoire, amongst them Destutt de Tracy and 
Jean-Pierre Cabanis.
419
 There was a political dimension to publishing Condillac‟s Oeuvre 
Complete in 1798 whose ambition was for founding a radical educational program allied to the 
project of a Science of Man. Later, the reaction against the Ideologues after the demise of the 
Directoire and the revolutionary legacy during the early years of the 19
th
 century, served to focus 
on the perceived intellectual problems often attributed to dangerous ambitions of 18
th
 century 
thought. Condillac‟s case served a condemnation that focused on the specific understanding of 
Sensationalism as a materialism which had left a particularly negative impression on the 19
th
 
century mind. To see Sensationalism as a system of logical signs pursued through a rule based 
method downplayed the debate on the dynamics of language and its expressive qualities in active 
life. In the 19
th
 century, an emerging Positivism was struggling to define an idea of history 
through its ambition for a more precise knowledge, but this was contending with a romantic 
reaction. Both had a tendency to dismiss the subtleties of a conjectural method of thinking 
practiced by 18
th
 century thought in which the debate over origins of language was pivotal.  
 
In this respect, the subtitle of Logic, „the art of thinking‟ reflects both its historical relation to the 
Port Royal Logic, and also marks out its ambition in giving the new disciplinary matrix as an 
ambition of conceptually extending a general knowledge, an ambition motivated specifically by 
a Science of Man. The nature of this discipline was not something simply engaged with by the 
uninitiated. It was an „art‟ whose status, like any specific discipline, was to be understood in 
relation to this core identity. The aims and subject matter to which it was employed, conveyed a 
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complicated legacy of a discourse on a Science of Man at the root of Condillac‟s oeuvre. It can 
be argued, that what was taken up by its practitioners engaged with Condillac‟s suppressed 
Protean vision. Sensationalism‟s pan-logical possibility was a legacy not always expressly 
written down; yet this carried over into various practices and contemporary disciplines what was 
historically understood of a Science of Man in Condillac‟s era.  
 
Despite these specific relations being blurred over time, Condillac‟s Logic offered a disciplinary 
practice - rather than a specific doctrine of thought – whose emphasis was derived from the core 
aims of an earlier debate over the values of language. The example of Les Monades shows how 
this internalised a thought which was promoted in revolutionary era as a Science of Man, 
connecting Condillac‟s sign to the wider ambitions of Enlightenment thought. Premised on 
something like the empirical „existant‟ that was symbolised by Condillac‟s early essay, the wider 
disciplinary objective for the diverse practices around a Science of Man derived conjectural 
possibilities that extended beyond associative or functional forms of knowledge. To understand 
how the idea-sign influenced the wider field of disciplinary practices of the day, one can 
specifically examine how this interacted with the historical doctrine of physiology.  
 
Physiology as the Discipline of the Body 
 
Prior to 1800, what was understood as the natural science of the body drew on two distinct 
disciplines, anatomy and physiology. At the start of the 19th century these converged. The two 
disciplines were earlier considered to be separate branches of knowledge, differentiated between 
a science and an art, and pursuing their own systems of practices and activities. There was a 
hierarchical relation between them with the higher status given to physiology which was 
considered the scientific discipline pursued in a philosophical fashion; anatomy stood as the 
manual art and held the lower status.
420
 During the political, social and intellectual upheavals of 
the revolutionary era, anatomy, and its allied surgical practice, challenged for the status of a 
science. In a contemporary sense, the term physiology brings together the theoretical and the 
manual aspects of the experimental science of physiology, but until the early 19
th
 century the 
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physiologist was closely allied to the natural philosopher through a shared enquiry into the order 
of nature.
421
 Both retained historical links with Aristotle‟s science in its extended general 
knowledge responsible for defining an „animal economy‟ and the functioning of soul. 
 
The historical practice of physiology gave a sense implied of its status as a disciplina. This was 
what a discipulus followed as the branch of knowledge to be learnt and pursued by a system of 
rules for its active practice. In this sense, the discipline means the counterpart to a doctrine 
upheld as what one should think. The discipline describes what one should do or how one should 
behave, and is necessarily connected for the discipulus through the disciplinary matrix; this 
embodies the knowledge practice handed down through history which it extends as reproducible 
discourse. The specific relationship between a discipline and its doctrine gives the status of its 
knowledge which can be modified over time. In the case of physiology, the status of its 
knowledge had to function as a nature of man, his place in the world, which had historically 
aimed to carry a divinatio.
422
 What was condensed therefore into the physiological discourse had 
a confluence with the debate on origins to which Condillac engaged with through language, the 
original problem of the body that was driving both a scientific study and medical practice. The 
idea-sign lent itself to a central branch of this a project to which a „new language‟ gave the 
specific context under which the third meaning of the discipline becomes apparent, namely „to 
discipline.‟ This indicates the corrective accorded to the rules of practice that extends to 
theological and political spheres of thought. This was important for the ambition for the Science 
of Man. 
 
The new context emerges in parallel to what an early modern era physiology has as its core 
identity. Jean Fernel (1497-1558) is credited with defining a modern physiologists discipline,
423
 
and it is worth looking at an example from his Seven Books on the Natural Part of Medicine 
(1542). It sets out a data of the body acquired from an anatomical practice and dissection and 
gives a perspective for a physiology whose work looks beyond its structural anatomy to the 
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discourse on the nature of man. This is a philosophical discourse, a scientia, that lays out a 
schema of knowledge beyond what could be observed through evident empirical phenomena. 
The discipline of the body served a higher task that the manual based anatomy which was limited 
to an art. Physiology carried an abstract ideal; “the nature of the healthy man, of all his forces 
and all his functions,” and this necessitated a schema for the universal science of human 
nature.
424
 The physiologist, drawing on limited anatomical data, presented primarily a theoretical 
discourse and needed a philosophical base. Jean Fernel took philosophy as “the mother of all the 
arts,” and it is worth quoting in some length what he programmatically understood by a 
philosophical analytic on which a modern physiology relied, and by implication what it excludes.   
“The truth of that reason is the light of the mind. Those who disdain it can neither grasp 
the causes of things, nor investigate what is true in anything, nor distinguish truth from 
falsehood. Deprived of that special illumination all their life is wasted in useless effort, 
they are dragged back and forth in and rash blind effort. - […] By contrast are those 
who, animated for philosophy by an admirable ardour enter into the path where so 
many men of genius have left their footprints. Having first received the knowledge of 
the thing which fall under the senses, they are little detained by the basic contemplation 
of those things but having advanced beyond them by an effort of mind, they then reach 
the point from which, as from preceding causes, the things of sense themselves appear 
to have taken their own origin. From this point they will gradually ascend higher, and 
finally they will attain by thought the regions where the mind, fulfilled, reposes in the 
ultimate. Since the human body has now broken down then anatomy into parts 
accessible to the senses, from these we now need to pass on to those things which are 
learnt by thinking alone [namely a physiology] and we need to investigate, at a higher 
level, from what elements each part is made, what is the mixture of the elements, what 
is their temperament, which virtues lie within the parts, by what spirit and heat they are 
maintained. When all this has been discovered and understood by analysis, then, by the 
method of composition, it will become clear what are the causes that bring everything 
about, which humours are produced by these causes, what functions are of the 
particular parts, and what is the natural office of everything. This is the way of doing 
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physiology which establishes the natural account of man by the power of 
demonstration.”425 
Physiology‟s systematic doctrine for illumination of the ground of a natural account of man 
looked to the anatomical analytic to expand a philosophical understanding of natural man. When 
Fernel moves from an anatomy to a physiology by the extension of the lower analytic to its 
higher synthesis, it is justified from the perspective of this task of the higher discipline which is a 
truth for the natural philosophy.  
 
From this core ambition, other notably „good practitioners‟ were René Descartes and Albrect von 
Haller, both of whom followed a similar method to establish units of the body delimiting sources 
of motion (of soul, spirit) from which to compose the schema of explanation of the nature of 
man. In René Descartes Treatise on Man (1662) his discourse draws on the sub-visible structures 
of the body in its workings beyond the mechanics of the body in looking to the functions of 
bodies in general. But it is Albrect von Haller who is held to have introduced to physiology the 
specialised training that could distinguish it from a general medical practice. By repeatedly 
insisting that good physiological practice was grounded in anatomical experiments, he intended 
to determine the „fabric‟ of the body.426 He gave the innovative perspective to which his 
anatomical program took the cadaver as limited in use and looked instead to experiment on live 
animals. Significantly, this divided the opinions of contemporaries; in Haller‟s view, 
experimentation through vivisection meant that, - 
“a single experiment has refuted the laborious figment of many years [of work]. This 
cruelty benefits true physiology more than almost all other arts by the joint harmony of 
which this, our science, thrives.” 
427
  
Hence experimentation was given a unique status, and Haller called it his “unique oracle.”428 
Recourse to studying the living body meant that an anatomical art of intervention could support a 
wider physiological discipline in its production of the general physiological discourse on man. 
Haller maintained this discourse in its separate and synthetic aspect. - 
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“The whole of physiology is a narration of the motions by which the animated machine 
is moved.”
 429
   
Haller‟s was a modern analytic which he characterised as an „animated anatomy.‟ This impressed 
many contemporaries including a young „associé anatomiste‟ of the Académie Royale des 
Sciences in 1780‟s called Felix Vicq d‟Azyr who reflected on this ambition for a progressive 
science associated with the disciplinary task. Later he wrote, - 
“At the beginning of this [18th] century, Physiology was no more than a vain 
assemblage of systems; it is Haller who dispelled these; he has laid the foundations for 
a science which has no more in common with the old science than the name. Let us 
offer to the great man the homage of our recognition, and let us show him our respect 
by following in his footsteps…”430  
Seen as the foundations of a new science, the central importance was felt in grounding the 
disciplinary matrix that physiology aspired to. Historical physiological models looked to various 
sources, chemistry in Paracelsus or mechanism in Friedrich Hoffman or hydrostatics in Stephen 
Hales, but what was important was establishing from known anatomical facts the physiological 
discourse which could stand as a nature of the body and its extension to a Science of Man. No 
doubt this discipline “remained ideological”431 until the advent of experimental physiology in the 
19th century, but during this time the aims and goals of physiology‟s socio-political uses was 
also undergoing a radical shift parallel to what was earlier envisioned as the extended horizon of 
the the physiological disciplina. 
 
The Physiological basis of the Medical Debate  
 
The physiological disciplina was closely tied to a medical discourse on the status of what kind of 
knowledge was appropriate for the study of the living body. This was defined around the basic 
arguments of the mechanist-vitalist debate which emerged in the mid 17
th
 century. Georges 
Canguilhem succinctly summed up its fundamental distinctions in, “to act it is necessary to 
localise;”432 he meant that pursuing an effective medicine was dependent on a localisation that 
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could defines an effective hierarchy of disease. Canguilhem describes how until contemporary 
germ theory appeared in the 19th century, early modern physicians of the 17th and 18th centuries 
employed diverse ontological models as the basis for exploring the nature of sickness from the 
physiological point of view. For early modern medicine, it needed to contrast itself with a legacy 
left of Greek medicine, which was not localised as such, but used the dynamic or holistic nature 
of man judged through an evident equilibrium whose nature grounded a general theory of health 
and disease. This dynamism was common to Aristotle‟s predecessors, and gave the image of the 
body composed of complex of elemental powers being opposed to “another by reason of being 
what it is.”433 The balance of the four humours was an equilibrium that could sustain variation up 
to a point, oscillating around a mean. Ancient medical theory looked towards the mean as the 
threshold where disease appeared as a reaction to the disequilibrium in the economy of the body 
through its relation to nature; medicines basic aim was the techniques of restoring this balance as 
far as possible. Like language, medical knowledge was an artifice, but one which specifically 
aimed at imitate natural forces and, therefore, required an understanding of nature. Medical 
representations of disease, whether as foreign substance or the opposition of forces, require an 
acquaintance with this natural state which normal life looked to regain. The functional role of 
physiology was to give this grounding; in turn physiology extended its knowledge to a theory of 
disease only by delimiting it to a field of difference prior to engaging in effective medical action.  
 
What distinguished modern medicine by the start of the 18th century was that both mechanists 
and vitalists could relate to Descartes dualism, since all approaches shared the struggle to 
overcome the scholastic and Galenic notions embedded in medicines history. Both Descartes 
philosophy and the mechanics of Galileo informed the rise in iatromechanism even prior to 
Newton‟s publishing of Principia (1687).434 Iatromechanism ascribed movements of the machine 
to a soul or psyche much as Aristotle or Galen held a spiritual, vital or rational principle; it 
considered all matter to be passive. By the 18
th
 century the Cartesian physician Friedrich 
Hoffman (1660-1742) could describe a modern nature of the body as a mechanism but with God 
as the supreme mechanic, the prime mover who accounted for its equilibrium. Motion in the 
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machine was explained through the fluids of the body, blood, lymph; while „animal spirits‟ and 
the „subtle fluids‟ were the power by which the sensitive soul impressed itself. From this model, 
health is given to fluent and well ordered movements and death ensues when corporeal motions 
become terminated and Hoffman‟s Fundamenta Medicina (1695) exemplifies a dilemma of 
iatromechanism by reducing to an intermediary substance the interface between matter and spirit; 
this was a mechanism that appeared as a contained animism.
435
 Herman Boerhaave‟s (1668-
1738) iatromechanism described a nature of bodily functions through the concepts of pipes, 
sieves and presses, deliberately avoiding any speculation on mind/body relations beyond the 
pragmatic needs of a medicine. By refusing to be drawn into metaphysical speculation on 
primary causes,
436
 iatromechanics could effectively give explanations for a pragmatic need of 
localising organic functions; at the limits of this knowledge they deferred any questions of 
purposeful activity in whole organisms. 
 
An organicist-vitalist thinking arose to prominence through Jan Baptist van Helmont (1577-
1644) opposed a mechanistic reduction through an organicism ascribed to a dormant archaeus, a 
form of sensitive soul which both exercised dynamic control over the body and accounting for its 
„special character.‟ As the “governor of generation” this principle of transformation in matter 
explained through an iatrochemistry that grounded observable phenomena though vital concepts 
and was strongly influential for later physiological thought.
437
 A similar perspective saw Georg 
Ernst Stahl (1659-1734) rejecting mechanism as inadequate for addressing the organism as a 
whole and described instead the living body as a dynamic and reactive complex. By taking the 
holistic perspective to explain purposive activity, Stahl accorded the very qualities defining 
living bodies with the form of Newtonism that took an existence of forces as in some way 
immanent in matter. Living force had to explain “the conservation of an eminently corruptible 
body, the faculty of force with whose aid the body is sheltered from the act of corruption;”438 
once this force was withdrawn, death ensues. But this also needed a concept of conservation that 
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a „soul‟ could direct through the activities of the living body and would also explained motions 
given to unconscious and automatic functions that were evident in habituated actions. 
 
Stahl exemplified the epistemological aspects emerging at a time when the delimitations between 
a physiology and a physics were less clear. Taking mechanical description as inadequate to the 
task of establishing a physiological synthesis, Stahl‟s approach drew on dynamic physiological 
models integrating an epistemological model from physics. An important justification for this 
strategy came from Francis Glisson (1597-1677) who defined a „life of matter‟ though the 
properties of irritability; this general property of the constitutive fibres of the body self-subsisted 
through an immanent energetics. The life of this matter was primal force, a „biarchia‟, or 
„biousia‟439 possessing properties that offered the useful potential for explaining latency in 
functional faculties of perceptions and reactions, pleasure and pain, and general bodily motions. 
The concept of irritability accounted for a power of spontaneity to act and react,
440
 and 
substituted for the terms of actio and passio, classical terms of life and motion in all nature, 
redeployed to accord with the more contemporary anatomical ground.
441
 The irreducibility of 
matter and its properties lent Glisson to a theory of „animal fibres‟ that were disposed to micro-
movements: as an account for the latency evident in physiological responses this could be 
associated with memory. When Principia was published it fell to post-Newtonian theorists, such 
as Stahl, to suggest an obvious parallel in the link between concepts of inherent irritability and a 
universal gravity. 
 
Glisson‟s irritability was also taken up by Albrect von Haller in The Sensible and Irritable Parts 
of the Body (1749). What was significant here was that Haller specifically emphasised 
differences between locally visible irritability and universal attributable force to which a 
historical concept of the vital could attribute predispositions of contraction and predisposition to 
feeling. Hence his anatomical and experimental work analysed the nature of these forces 
although in a consciously limited way,  
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“The theory as to why some parts of the body are endowed with these properties and 
some are not I shall not meddle with...for I am persuaded that the sources of both lie 
beyond the reaches of the knife and the microscope, beyond which I do not chuse to 
hazard any conjecture, and have no desire to each what I am ignorant of myself.”442 
His ensuing localisation was to an „animal fabric‟ that retained certain conceptual and historical 
precedents, although in a limited way. Starting from a historically problematic concept attributed 
to life, Haller‟s experimentation moved towards the vital parts of the body through a 
methodology that established, on the basis of his observations, what could be localised by 
systematic analysis which then offered explanation thorugh these vital properties. On the other 
hand, Stahl‟s dynamic vitalism lent itself to a different methodology; he analysed phenomena in 
the whole as they were apprehended around an idea of what vitalism attributed to life. This 
shifted the problem to the level of the concept. 
 
While the former localised the properties of the body through the analytic approach, the latter‟s 
wholism retained what was attributed to the vital idea of the whole as the problem of the 
synthetic element. In this way the disciplina of physiology operated on two levels and were the 
intellectual traditions which French medical circles of the Enlightenment were immersed. Later 
these informed the Science of Man that culminated around the revolutionary era.  
 
Montpellier Medicine and the Hippocratic Revival 
 
In addition to the contemporary medical debates, French physicians also drew on the 
philosophical debates of the era including those of Maupertuis and Condillac. The famed 
Montpellier School of Medicine was established in 1220 and already had an illustrious history 
which it maintained through the late Enlightenment period. Individual physicians had contributed 
to the Encyclopaedia project, as Montpellier medicine gained a reputation of driving a 
Hippocratic revival.
443
 From a contemporary physiological context this stood against mechanistic 
reduction of medical thought through the strong influence of Stahl‟s vitalism. Moving between 
                                                          
442
 The Sensible and Irritable Parts of the Body London (1755) p2, cf Thomas S. Hall (1968) p14. 
443
 Denis Diderot was already drawing on the idea of a medically inspired anthropology for his Elements of 
Physiology (1773-1774) This extended through the coterie D‟Holbach, which played a significant role in the French 
conception of a Science of Man. 
137 
 
Stahl‟s neo-Hippocratic dynamism and the doctrine of sensibility, Montpellier medicine offered 
two things; firstly, the physician‟s sensitivity as the disciplinary particularity that was practiced 
in the new doctrine in sensibility. Secondly, through a conceptual emphasis on human experience 
in general, this could be extended in its possibilities to an expanded human knowledge. It was the 
commitment to a wider discipline of knowledge, despite any specific interrelations not being 
clearly defined, that gave the ambition for contributing to a future science which fed into the 
general Enlightenment thinking; one example appears in the project for the encyclopaedia.
444
  
 
This gave the context for an inter-disciplinary perspective on a Science of Man looking for new 
approaches to physical and social observations. For example, by accounting for the distribution 
of human types through a medical demographic or anthropology, the controversial practice 
pursued through interpretations of physical features such as gender, constitution and race, was 
seen from the medical perspective as the sensitivity to difference. Paradoxically such a new 
approach was intended to resist an idea of universals as a feature of the mechanistic/Cartesian 
notions of the body, through the concern with the function of living organisms in a general sense. 
The dynamic approach was opposed to static studies of structure, holding the idea of function in 
relation to the wider environment which was only metaphysically grounded and therefore subject 
to dispute. But the neo-Hippocratic dynamism had an epistemological commitment to Newton 
which, like for Haller and Stahl, meant only the promise of a modern grounded science. - 
“One sees however mathematicians who use the letters X and Y to designate unknown 
quantities, and with so much greater success that they discover by such means truths 
inaccessible to other philosophers.”445 
This was an epistemological value given by the exemplary Montpellier theoretician Boissier de 
Sauvage (1706-1767), a trained botanist who brought to medical theory its rules of classification, 
as well as being a confirmed Newtonian who drew together principles of George Ernst Stahl‟s 
vital soul. This related the use of an abstract principle for an unknown vital force, while aiming 
to inform observations of the pulse, of respiration and other involuntary movements that required 
moderating in an intelligent way with a new theoretical basis.  
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Following from this, the medical circles of Montpellier gave various formulations of neo-
Hippocratism; for some it followed close to the classical tripartite scheme encompassing the 
„physical‟ „mental‟ and „passionate‟, for others it could be reduced to bipolar relation of the 
„physical‟ and the „moral.‟ There was, however, never a simple relation since the emphasis was 
on the reciprocity which was a question of balance, of economy and norms, that could compose 
the wider physiological synthesis. And this followed the prominent awareness of medicines 
historical relation to a Science of Man, to which the idea of a holistic medicine gave it relation to 
society. However, it is a mistake to see this as a narrow ideological program; what this social 
aspect of medicine drew from a particular reading of the Hippocratic tradition, gave an 
understanding of health not as an individual affair but one dependant on the social practices and 
milieu to which one must practice an environmental thinking.
446
 
 
An influential Montpellier physician was Theophile de Bordeu (1722-1776). He made distinct 
impression on philosophical circles to the extent that he appears as the principle character in 
Denis Diderot‟s Le Réve d’Alembert (1769). Bordeu held that the equilibrium of two inversely 
proportional forces, sensibility and muscle mobility (irritability) was controlled by the properties 
of a primary structure, such as the nervous system.
447
 Like Haller, this divided properties into 
sensations and motions through which Bordeu aimed to isolate the limits of observable 
movements. The limit was interpreted as defining where movements produced from 
unobservable sensations, are balanced by involuntary movements produced by the phenomena 
given to sensations. Like Stahl, the living matter, the actio and passio, was distinguished by this 
functional expression of movement; against this, certain feelings and sensibilities could remain 
latent and unexpressed. Through thinking this latency as the „federative‟ concept of the body, 
with centres of sensitivity subordinated to the brain, individual characteristics could be attributed 
to the function of the equilibrium between the centres of sensitivity; the activity in the whole was 
thereby a tension subsumed and distributed it through the nerve network.
448
 This gave a view of 
the body that had no absolute unitary being, but was a decentralized, semi-autonomous 
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composite of organs to be interpreted through a complex phenomenology which in no way could 
be deduced a priori from known laws of a mechanical physics. Bordeu‟s famous metaphor of 
this dynamic image was the swarm of bees,- 
“A swarm of bees gathered in clusters and suspended from a tree as a vine, each part is, 
so to speak, not an animal, but a kind of self-contained machine which in its fashion 
concurs in the general life of the body.”449  
Transforming an idea of a Hippocratic unbroken circle into an active image of distributed 
sensitivity through living matter, this followed a combination of neo-Hippocratic empiricism 
with Stahl‟s form of holistic vitalism. The vital concept of the living body was an impulsive and 
dynamic sensitivity. Through this innovative account of the inner functioning of the body, the 
potential was for a higher activity of human life. This was widely influential. 
 
Another strategy appears in the influential Montpellier physician Paul Joseph Barthez (1734-
1806). The title that cemented his reputation explicitly announced its ambition for a Science of 
Man. Nouvaux elements de la Science de L’Homme was first published in 1773 but was 
augmented and republished in 1806.
450
 Barthez, perhaps the most famous of the Montpellier 
physicians, produced the most influential synthesis of vitalist thought. He arrived in Paris in 
1754, moved in D‟Alemberts circles and wrote for the Encyclopédie. The significance of 
Nouvaux Elements de la Science de L’Homme is in Barthez explaining an epistemological value 
ascribed through a „vital principle‟ that was neither a metaphysical or occult force. - 
“I never used the term vital principal to explain any of the phenomena of life but 
[employed it] to make comprehensible certain new conclusions in respect to the effects 
of these phenomena….”451  
The term was understood as a complete unknown, in the Newtonian sense. With no „essential 
nature,‟ it stood for a power of explanation and represents his attempt is to depart from the 
obscurity of terms dominating preceding metaphysical disputes.
452
 The vital principal was the 
“necessary abstraction” required to make certain statements about observed phenomena of 
experience. Barthez did not assume a vital principal that “orders or regulates its acts,” rather it 
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proposed a “faculty attached to the combinations of movements and matter of which the living 
body is formed.” In this way, he makes a significant distinction from Stahl‟s thinking of the 
single principle of „soul,‟ while also distinguishing the vital from simply attributing separate 
living forces to different properties such as irritability and sensibility. It was considered more a 
“natural and philosophical” principle according to Barthez, to attribute the unknown entity for 
the single principal that expressed its effects in different ways. The proposition was that,- 
“good philosophical method in the science of man requires that one attribute to a single 
principle of life in the human body, the living forces that reside in each organ and are 
responsible for its function.” 
453
 
Barthez is careful to refer to the „vital principal‟ as an abstraction employed only to facilitate and 
ground discussions in conceiving of living activities whose inner dynamics were not understood 
yet produced the singular effects observed.
 
The justification for this strategy is the method of 
induction taken from Baconian enquiry into a natural science which assumes that empiricism 
“could not teach what these causes were in essence,” rather the central aim was to abandon 
looking for „essences‟ and „final causes,‟ and focus on a phenomenology of experience.454 But 
Barthez also read David Hume‟s Treatise on Human Nature and agreed that we imagine 
succession to mean cause and that this imagination was all that we could hope to achieve in the 
way of certainty. The element justified an abstract idea to substitute for derived causes attributed 
to the variety of principles, forces, and faculties, all of which were unimportant if they were in 
their nature unknowable. In this sense, Newton is the real inspiration; Nouveaux Elements aims 
to extend this line through a privileged relation by which medicine can determine phenomena of 
human experience. The latter is its philosophical privilege which he attributed to Hippocrates.- 
“Hippocrates in his genius saw that human nature cannot be fully understood by 
anyone who does not possess an entire system of knowledge of the healing arts.”455 
The relation given to this neo-Hippocratic practice with the status of a new form of empiricism 
for modern practitioners of medicine, Barthez framed as offering a new scientific language. But 
this depended on a new physiological synthesis. The new language followed from taking the 
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abstract element of knowledge as substitute for the evident vital element in observation; an 
ambition that clearly puts physicians in the precarious position.
456
 
 
At the heart of this method was the observational practice of functional aspects of life 
phenomena. For the Montpellier physician of the 18
th
 century, observing meant displaying a 
sensitivity to the differences in these living phenomena, and integrating their significances in an 
image of life. From the medical perspective this meant the organic body displaying symptoms 
and qualities indicative of the sympathies and synergies of the organic whole. The holistic 
methodology proceeded by the progressive analysis to the limit of the observable; but since the 
limit of observation was an epistemological barrier that necessarily withheld phenomenal 
complexity, the organic phenomena could not be reduced to determinable laws.
457
 The physician 
had therefore to account for both internal and environmental influences on the organism under 
the terms of vital sensibility. For Barthez, this abstracted vital principal was intended to give an 
open variable by which living phenomena could express significance without being directly 
epiphenomenal. Observed difference was interpreted as the modification under the vital principal 
whose transformation indexed the varying circumstance of the organism. The significance of the 
vital principle was in substituting for direct causal thinking while retaining the set of possible 
relations to describe what was becoming evident in a living economy. 
 
As a concept of observable differences, this also stood as an expression of forces. These were the 
organic forces that demand various regimes of management which require further hypothesising. 
In fact, Barthez was famously careful in the use of this method, but the paradoxical nature which 
his vital principle tried to embody readily lent itself to anthropological speculation. By opening 
to the importance of natural diversity, as an order of difference that could also imply a „natural 
order‟ as dynamic interplay of „vital force‟ and physical states, this could be conceived as a 
social typology that extended to ideas of race and class.
458
 Montpellier vitalism, however, 
remained relatively apolitical although the vital principal implied to many a dangerous atheistic 
materialism. It also opened the ambition for an autonomous knowledge which promised to 
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extend towards a wider Science of Man. In this way Montpellier physicians gave the medical 
context for a new empiricism by which a true method should hypothesise with the promised of 
breaking out of dogmatic systems of the past, although the method was clearly fragile and prone 
to reciprocity. 
 
Revolutionary Influences on Paris Medicine 
 
From 1770 onwards, Parisian physicians already initiated the task of the reform of French 
medicine inspired by wider Enlightenment themes and the idea for transforming medicine in 
accordance with a general Science of Man. This is characterised by its ambition to unify the 
sciences under new considerations of the human species in its relation to nature. In France this 
project took up the reform of national institutions by focussing on the hospitals and follows 
advancements in the medical sciences. Renowned animal and human anatomist and physician 
Felix Vicq d‟Azyr has been credited with being the motivation behind medical reforms and 
broadening the scope of their investigations to include environmental factors, such as 
meteorology, water quality, public sanitation. During 1770‟s Vicq D‟Azyr gave free lectures at 
the College Royale; here it was medical theory that represented a „certain method‟ from which a 
proper pedagogical method would naturally follow and which was attractive to the politically 
minded physicians in Paris. 
 
Reforms meant a broader perspective on the medical task which aimed to account for disease 
across the nation. In 1776 Felix Vicq D‟Azyr took up a post as the Commissioner-General of 
Epidemics at the newly formed Société Royale de Médecine et Epidemics, a rival scientific and 
administrative body to the older College Royale. The new Société was commissioned to explore 
the causes of epidemics and compile a medical topography of France and was also given 
responsibilities for distribution and sale of the mineral and medicinal waters and the licensing 
and sale of patent medicines.
459
 This provision of medical services led the institution to have a 
powerful national profile through its handling of epidemics, and assessing the abilities of local 
physicians. Paris also had a reputation during this time as the home of scientific charlatanry in 
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the medical field and producing fashionable medicines as new forms of medical knowledge. 
Bordeu had noted of Paris that “money, rouge, braggadocio, and ladies favours are all that is 
required of a physician,”460 and it was perhaps against this standard of practice that the figure of 
Hippocrates stood for a method of self-criticism by which, along with the proper application of a 
method, a popular and humoral medicine could be debunked. But Felix Vicq d‟Azyr was also a 
follower of Condillac and wrote a Nouveau Plan de Constitution pour la Medicine en France to 
be submitted to the constitutional assembly in 1790 to initiate a new clinical approach that 
stressed the need for a new language to fix fleeting corporeal phenomena and supersede an „old 
bookish‟ approach to medicine. However, by 1793 this project was overtaken by the conditions 
of the revolution.
461
  
 
The turning point for the reform of medicine in France came in 1794. In the wake of the 
revolution, significant institutional changes saw old regime medical establishments which had 
previously dominated the dissemination of a theoretical practice replaced by clinical training in 
three hospitals, the Ecole de Santé, in Paris, Montpellier and Strasbourg. It is the Paris school 
which has gained a reputation following the revolutionary changes and which marks the start 
of a medical practice whose legacy has remained the subject of debate. A number of points can 
be made to indicate broadly the outcome of a well documented shift from 18
th
 century medical 
theory to clinically based medicine at the start of the 19th.
462
 Firstly, the practice of clinical 
observation meant surveying large numbers of patients aimed at a „living encyclopaedia‟ that 
drew on the wider reaches of medical experience described above.
463
 Secondly, along with the 
importance accorded to a “nosological field,” was the use of statistics in relate to case histories 
of individual patients.
464
 Thirdly, this also came under an extension through various new 
techniques and technologies that affected practice and diagnosis; this is exemplified by Rene 
Laennec‟s stethoscope, the new surgery of Pierre Desault and Xavier Bichat, and Jean 
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Corvisart‟s new method of diagnostics.465 Finally, in addition to new techniques and mass 
observation, came an emphasis on the study of pathological anatomy as the new method of 
localising the study of diseases. In this way the clinics became transformed into places of 
research into what constituted states of sickness and health.
466
  
 
It is from this broad basis that the 18th century ambition for a Science of Man drove new 
standards dominated by French medical thinking during the first half of the 19
th
 century until it 
was displaced by a laboratory based practice.
467
 Along with the clinical shift in the wake of the 
Revolution, it was the mental disposition of medical practitioners that was being transformed; 
as one commentator notes, “they looked no longer backwards, but forwards,”468 although 
others have noted that Paris Medicine had a reputation as a polemical medicine,469 but these are 
elements which should not be taken as exclusive in the context of a nascent Positivism. 
 
Concept and Method in a New Science of Man 
 
The early lectures of Vicq d‟Azyr's at the College Royale were attended by a young physician 
Pierre Jean Georges Cabanis. He exemplified these empiricist influences in an early essay of 
1788 which described unsatisfied needs as nature manifesting “her desires in the most positive 
manner,” as suffering transformed through instinct into the cause of autonomous movements.470 
Instinct was seen as the “secret guide” by which primitive peoples observe the healing force of 
nature, instinctively resting and eating less during illness, which was a positive tendency. Yet 
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this declines as intellectual faculties developed. But this tendency could be reinforced through a 
true systematisation of memory and, in medical terms, would include the classification of disease 
symptoms. By noting durations of crises, of regimens and temperaments, the basis of his practice 
was to bring to full maturity a process of rationalising the empirical practices.  
 
Cabanis was looking to supplement an empirical practice with the statistical theory of Marquis 
de Condorcet for approximating relationships that hold true by „degrees of belief and assurance.‟ 
The possibilities in the new medical disciplines were an example of the „indefinite perfectibility‟ 
of man;
471
 this is Rousseau‟s term in his Second Discourse (1754), but Condorcet had used this 
as a justifying principle in the posthumously published Sketch for a Historical Picture of the 
Progress of the Human Mind (1793).
472
 Condorcet took this as the principle accounting for the 
twin tasks necessitated of historical progression: firstly, the transmission of collective 
experience, and secondly maintaining the possibility of overcoming dogmatic thought. But by 
foregrounding the observational method, Cabanis was following Condillac in this quest for a new 
language to be translated into the medical framework which was now looking to localise elusive 
pathological phenomena.  
 
Cabanis‟ exemplified the image of the physician in his mission as „consoler of the sick‟ beyond 
wealth and fame, driven by a social conscience and patriotic duty to emancipate the public from 
superstition, which accords closely with Enlightenment thinking and understood as a task that 
was promoted as a true Science of Man. But the revolutionary turbulence gave this project an 
institutionalising turn by questioning the role of the state in medicine and education. Addressing 
the urgent need of the ignorance of the people led to an emphasis on intervention and the 
ambition to restore a natural equilibrium required, paradoxically, implementing a legislative 
intervention against false claims to knowledge. The necessity was for grounding knowledge in 
the face of an immanent need, not only against spurious medical practice, but extended to an 
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active regulation of other trades as where the public needed protection from the “swarms of 
impostors” and quackery.473  
 
This was the background to the Science of Man as Cabanis approached it through the plan of 
learning described in Coup d'oeil sur les révolutions et sur la réforme de la médecine (1804). He 
drew together different scientific disciplines for the purposes of effective intellectual revolution 
in the new socialised state. Because medical power was the direct source of utility for 
constituting a basis of good rational philosophy unfolding as “the laws of the living machine,” 
the need was for „persons conversant with the animal economy‟ to implement the task of a 
purification of great cities where great numbers of people were crowded together. Beyond 
advancing health and avoiding disease, these extended as physical-moral relations into ethico-
political possibilities as Cabanis pictured an image of physical man struggling with the dynamic 
forces of the world of which the basis of future sciences are the indispensable tool for 
„naturalising‟ society.474  
 
Such physical-moral relations gave two principle branches envisaged behind the systematic 
union of knowledge by which an anthropological history could be transformed into a general 
science of human nature, - 
“from the indications of the numerous points in which they are connected and related to 
one another, results what may be called the Science of Man or the Anthropology of the 
Germans.” 475 
The object of such an anthropological medical science was to determine the rules of a regimen, 
as a moralist striving to offer maxims of conduct and the legislator increasing prosperity for 
society generally. Here the physiological model formed the groundwork of the discipline whose 
knowledge extended as the important branch of natural history understood through an animal 
economy under the acute observation of the healthy and the diseased states of the system.
476
 In 
the widest sense this integration looked for physiological roots for general psychological 
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phenomena which proceeded according to a principle that placed value on sensibility drawn from 
a certain application of Condillac‟s thought.477  
 
Sensibility and Ideology in the Medical Project  
 
The physiological synthesis drew on Condillac‟s Logic and the idea-sign as the modern 
philosophical practice to be taken up from the physiological perspective. Cabanis understood 
philosophy and physiology to always have informed each other through informing the relation 
between the physical and the moral: a rational analysis of the animal economy and its organic 
functions would delimit the intermediary space for designating how moral sympathy was the 
field in which the power of signs could distinguish impressions that communicated „sensible 
being.‟  
 
This was a domain of moral hygiene that could inform Cabanis‟ mature vision for a Science of 
Man which not only reflected man‟s mastery of self but its extension and transformation around 
social being and even the species. Transforming physical habits, strengthening certain bodily 
organs, could extend the faculties and the senses of the soul to produce a new form of man. - 
“a man susceptible to improvement is two modes, his physical education and regimen, 
in the most enlarged sense of these words, serve to develop the actions of different 
organs, rouse his dormant faculties, and in some measure create new sensitive powers. 
And when these instruments have acted upon several successive generations, cæteris 
paribus, men are no longer the same, no longer the same race.”478  
The extension of this medico-philosophical project into a political task found its widest reaches 
around the ambitions for interdisciplinary revolutionary sciences converging in the practice of 
Ideology.
479
 But the object for analysis and possible science was fundamentally a problem of 
physiology which, from which the medical perspective, gave a composite object expressing 
symptoms over a duration and needed further differentiating into their fundamental 
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phenomena.
480
 To Cabanis mind, since Condillac‟s era, practical progress had been made against 
that which “presented itself as obscure.”481 - 
“The new question that presents itself is to know whether it is true, as Condillac and the 
others have established, that ideas and moral determinations are wholly formed and 
depend uniquely on what they call sensation…and whether, consequently, ideas come to 
us from our senses and exterior objects; or whether internal impressions contribute 
equally to the production of moral determinations and ideas following certain 
laws…whose constancy is revealed to us by the study of the healthy and the sick, and 
whether…observation  directed by this new point of view will not allow us to recognise 
here too the laws of nature and state them with exactitude and clarity.”482  
A new perspective on vital phenomena, digestion, circulation, secretions depended on a principle 
of action whose determinations were „confounded‟ in their effects. Following a localising of 
inner impressions, it presented the new frontier which a new medical language took up the 
ambition for an expanded general Science of Man. 
 
The term Ideology, introduced in 1796 by Destutt de Tracy to the newly formed Class of Moral 
and Political sciences, distinguished between a physiological and a rational ideology. When 
Destutt focussed on the science of ideas it drew heavily on the perfecting of language, while 
Cabanis looked to the physiological synthesis grounding a knowledge to be refined for social and 
political action.
483
 Destutt told the institute that physiology required a, - 
“vast knowledge, but in the present state of our enlightenment [can only hope] for the 
destruction of many errors, and the establishment of some precious, but still scattered and 
incoherent truths.”484  
By these twin approaches, a rational Ideology was the provisional knowledge for direct 
application to be extended through an emerging physiological knowledge, as “rational 
philosophy and physiology have always advanced together.”485  
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Reform of a theoretical knowledge of the soul followed in the footsteps of Condillac and Diderot 
but extended with new and significant differences in post-revolutionary France. Addressing the 
newly founded Institut National, Cabanis looked forward to the establishment of a Science of 
Man as an autonomous science of human behaviour on the verge of its ambition of extending the 
human faculties necessary for the conservation of life.486 - 
“Are we now in a state to make dependant certain properties communicated in all living 
beings...and tied in to the fundamental laws of sensibility?.... intelligent judgement and 
the will‟s desires, executes its functions, more or less necessary in the conservation of 
life. [...] The diverse states which affect one another are different considerations of the 
physical and the moral...the operations of the intelligence and the will confounded at 
their origin, with the other movements of life: this is the principle of the moral sciences 
that goes back to the physical domain: a branch of the natural history of man.”487 
Taking its practical approach from the historical knowledge of man had a double significance; 
firstly, physiological Ideologues relying on the principle given to sensitivity which 
philosophically follows the Sensationalist epigram “from the moment we feel, we are aware of 
our existence.”488 In turn this equated processes of the intellect with the processes of life, and in 
which all sciences could ultimately be considered “branches of a single stem.” However, since 
sensibility was “the last end of the phenomena we call life,” what was apprehended by the idea-
sign was an original difference appearing behind impressions informing about the organic source 
and nature of their causes. This was never understood as a simple relation and Cabanis reflected 
that it was “at least relative to ourselves, that is, relative to the general manner of feeling of 
human nature,” noting these cannot always be the same.489 Cabanis, therefore, took the doctrine 
of sensibility as informing both specific local phenomena experienced of life and the general 
concept of living nature; both followed a historical development. Secondly, a gap between what 
is physiologically observed and its subsequent philosophical analysis could become 
progressively filled if both the source of ideas and observed vital movements, which emerge 
from this same source, could be maintained according to the method of a „true science.‟ It is this 
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science that needed balance. However, since rational philosophy fell short and physiology was as 
yet provisional, Cabanis‟ task for the future science was to bridge this gap and uphold as twin 
positions the rational and physiological. To do this Cabanis conceptually conflated what others 
observed as differences; irritabilities became the consequence of general sensibility, and vital 
activity the consequences of life. While this may seem like an intellectual „slight of hand,‟ it is 
worth emphasizing what Cabanis was aiming to mediate: between internal and external 
impressions on the one hand, and moral ideas and inclinations on the other, was the drive to a 
more positive knowledge of human life. This ambition related the monism of the individual to an 
image of man in general.
490
  
 
This future science was the vision behind De Tracy‟s address to the Institute in 1802. It stood as 
a general judgment passed on the prejudices of old schools-based doctrines, while he saw 
German philosophy as also retaining the old doctrines since they did not practice the new 
techniques of the French model. This should be understood to mean not regarding the human 
mind as an abstract thing, but taken for an evaluation that distinguished itself by progressive 
practices to be refined around the differential methods derived from calculus and a conjectural 
origin of languages and the idea-sign.
491
 
 
Cabanis: Rapports and the Future Science 
 
The broad picture of this Science of Man was presented by Cabanis in the first volumes of 
Rapports du physique et du morale de l’homme in 1796 before the „Classe des Sciences Morals 
et Politiques.‟ It stood as his contribution to the wider analysis of physical and mental experience 
in its relation to acquired temperaments although covering much of the same ground as earlier 
Philosophes. But Cabanis had a different relation to the philosophical and medical traditions 
through an interdisciplinary approach drawing on the wave of scientific development around the 
revolutionary period (Pinel, Lavoisier, Volta, Malpighi, Bichat, Lamarck). More than the 
Enlightenment Philosophes, Cabanis could be encouraged in what future disciplines could offer a 
Science of Man. Despite an awareness of the contemporary limitations in anatomical research 
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looking to deeper accounts of physiological principles, the elements now being theorised 
methodically through the physiological unknown of vitalism retained certain possibilities for the 
emerging sciences.
492
  
 
Cabanis was not alone in holding with this form of vitalism that extended as a principle of law 
behind forms of natural measure. But he held a physiological unknown as the new technical 
approach by which the „strange inverted Newtonism‟ could distinguish itself from general 
historical principles attributed to an unfolding sequence of phenomena in the body. Attractions, 
directly determined in the laws of the primary combination, became the mediate cause of “the 
sequence of subsequent phenomena proper to each circumstance:” this grounded a domain to be 
developed around what the Sensationalist method looked to differentiate in bodies in general. 
The ambition was to differentiate stages of organization through the limits of knowledge, 
although these limits were themselves shifting within the new sciences. Cabanis‟ was a question 
of possibility, - 
“will the other attractions be explained by sensitivity or will the sensitivity and the 
intermediaries between the two terms explain gravity?....by the present state of our 
knowledge it is impossible to foresee...but a possibility for future experiment and 
research.” 493 
In the observations of Harvey, Malpighi, Haller, Cabanis looked for analogy between animal 
sensibility, instincts, affinities of simple attractions such as gravity, exerted between all parts of 
matter. In three orders of phenomena; variable laws, states of elements and circumstances under 
which they interface, were the possibilities of explanation that appeared through discovering 
properties manifest of different combinations. What remained for a future positive physiological 
knowledge was to ultimately „lift the veil‟ covering the mystery of sensitivity.494  
 
One must consider the context for the Hippocratically inspired medical writer from the  
perspective of the significant conceptual shift that occurring around the meaning of the term 
„animate‟ as it occurred in the late 18th century.495 This overlapped with the term „organic‟ and 
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indicated a vital status that contrasted with the inert. In discussions on life, this meant what was 
evident behind the goal oriented activities in the organised body. Such organic activities were 
understood around the complex functioning of the inter-relationship of material parts into which 
was brought conceptual discussions on the nature of life indicated by the relations of organs 
serving a soul. In this context, the concern with organisation and its properties, substituted for 
discussions of an organising element itself.
496
 The nature of „organisation,‟ which was the central 
aspect of the physiological debate, was an explanation given through a concept attributed to 
general properties of life. But in this era, organic phenomena were also being localised in the 
body. This followed a distinction between „unorganised bodies,‟ mere „aggregates‟ of chemical 
elements and dead matter - which, while governed by the law of affinity (as Lavoisier had 
shown) which stood in contrast to „organised bodies.‟ The latter were conceived as governed by 
unknown laws of the whole while delimiting living properties in the face of the unknown was a 
limit against which Condillac‟s Sensationalist methodology was retained. But when Rapports 
took these organic properties as “a general fact of living nature” and sensitivity “the ultimate 
term one arrives at when studying „vital‟ phenomena,”497 Cabanis was looking beyond 
Condillac‟s idea of sensitivity to develop the “analysis of intellectual faculties and affections of 
the soul.”498 The assertion was that Condillac had touched on an idea of instinctive 
determinations which could now be systemised through physiological facts. Yet, one must 
assume that Cabanis was aware of the central physiological difficulty of taking the observational 
method inherited from the philosophically oriented Montpellier medicine. 
 
Condillac did not develop this as a physiological principle and the sensation that informed Essay 
on the Origins of Human Knowledge depended on a principle of relation between „language of 
action‟ and intellectual ideas; - “all that pertains to the human understanding is reduced to a 
single principle.”499 This principle rested on the argument for the origin and progress of language 
as a process to explain the social interrelation developed over time by a repetition of the 
formation of habits. This philosophical problem Condillac had found in Locke‟s essay as the 
problem of treating ideas as preceding relations to words when following a strict Cartesian 
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method; he then went on to imply that words took an active role in forming ideas.
500
 Because 
Locke, like Descartes, held understanding as the private endowment to be expressed in words, 
what Condillac intended was to see understanding and knowledge as more socially conditioned, 
with emotion and passion as necessary residual accessories to such communication.
501
 These 
were irreducible „accessory ideas‟ evident in voice, facial expressions, gestures, and were the 
natural signs that inform the core problem for Condillac‟s thought. He addressed these in 
consecutive texts and sums up the problem as follows, - 
“my entire system comes down to this matter; social intercourse gives occasion (1) to 
change the natural cries into signs; (2) to invent other signs which we call arbitrary, and 
that these signs (both the natural and the arbitrary) are the first principles of 
development and progress of the development of the mind”502  
Idea-signs intended to explain invention and transformation of a second nature, while avoiding 
explanations of mental life as speculation about what goes on in the mind of the isolated 
individual. As has been shown above, the heart of Condillac‟s work lies in the Essay, preceding 
Treatise on Sensation and Logic, which follows an anti-Cartesian notion of the sign as generated 
within, and as a result of, a wider social integration given to the conceptual practice attributed to 
human life. 
 
For Cabanis, the physiological extension of this argument unfolded through an unknown 
particularity ascribed to a concept of life in general. This concept held as significant the aspect 
made evident as the physical-moral link to socio-political life. But the ambiguity of the future 
physiological synthesis was the ambition for discovery of the localised element whose specificity 
informed his ambitions for a Science of Man.-  
“Physical sensibility is the last term at which we arrive in the study of the phenomena of 
life and in the methodical work of their real limit. It is also the last result, or seen 
differently, the general principle which furnishes the intellectual faculties of the soul. As 
such the physical and the moral are confounded at their source, or, the moral is nothing 
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but the physical considered from another point of view. This proposition demands to be 
developed.”503  
Cabanis proposition was that a physiological concept upheld the possible determinations of an 
economy of the body, but whose widest perspective was also a psycho-physical idea of life. This 
was an ambiguity that looked to a reciprocity between animal sensibility, evident organisation in 
the instincts, and the elective affinities of chemistry as simple as the attraction of gravity as the 
properties of matter which, in this era, followed possibilities that appeared more definite with 
new anatomical observations.
504
 
 
In Rapports, he categorised three orders of phenomena; i) The tendencies of affinity according to 
open and variable laws of the vital; ii) states given through the local elements and the 
circumstances in which they interface; and iii) new surplus properties that result from new and 
different combinations. Hence the perspective taken from Condillac‟s Essay as the „language of 
action‟ saw the notion of sensibility gain an enveloping concept appearing as an extended order. 
Cabanis delimited this unified monistic domain in which primordial elements displayed evident 
effects understood through a capacity for transformation. The speculative physiology offered this 
as a domain of conjectural knowledge of the body according to three orders of sensibility; i) 
external sense, ii) a corporeal sense, and iii) the internal sense. These orders constitute the 
material physical objects, the sensitive bodies and mental images, whose general domain 
describes the language of actions, the reactions and their latencies necessary in the order of life. 
It is a concept that explains the,- 
“...activities of the memory or the imagination, whose original impressions belong to 
one organ, whereas determinations appear to react to it in passing, in order to direct 
themselves entirely towards another organ.”505  
From original impressions, as the physical impressions whose sensibility is transformed through 
the idea-sign, the dynamic image of mental life could be mapped against a general sensibility. 
The concept of the body therefore contained the differential relations as centres of activity whose 
potential was of coordination through the „centre of reaction.‟ From this Cabanis can write, - 
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“whether these impressions have been received by the external or internal sentient 
extremities or whether their cause has acted within the cerebral mass, they always end in 
the centre of reaction that reflects them, in tendencies, movements and functions in 
regard to the parts to which each of these generations are assigned. This action and 
reaction can often take place without individual having any consciousness of it.”506 
This last sentence indicates the importance of the image of the body, rather than mind. Its general 
role is mediating action and reaction according to a mean. Cabanis uses physiological sensibility, 
like the language of action, to explain the circulation of an order of impressions, with their 
possible synthesis and transformation, into the organised concept of body. Perhaps Cabanis saw 
this objectivity as aiming at „an exhaustive totality,‟ but the theory of sensitivity necessarily 
assumed a positive element for knowledge and its the method of analysis, and offered techniques 
capable of transformation into a positive concept.
507
 Despite this „rarification‟ of the sign that 
carried its empirical reciprocity well beyond Condillac‟s principle of the idea-sign, by following 
the physiological discipline Cabanis placed the concept of the body before any difficulty 
associated with a Cogito. In this way physiological ideology was poised between a historical 
concept of man as the rational animal, and the new element of the composite to be anatomically 
determined.
508
 
 
The New Anatomy  
 
The anatomically determined body was recognized as extending medical knowledge to present a 
local perspective on the physiological concept of body. This was what Cabanis understood of 
physical anatomical description giving “the basis and ground-work for all physiological 
illustrations, the necessary branch of the science of animal economy.”509 In the context of the 
future science, at the end of the 18th century anatomy was allied to the expanding practical 
discipline of surgery developed as the active discipline for giving the account of the body and 
informing physiology‟s discussions on life. A complete physiology followed a complex 
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functionings of an inter-relationship of parts which gave the conceptual description of the living 
body. This „exhaustive totality‟ of function still deferred, for historical reasons, to the 
physiologist to explain both the „sub-visible‟ constitution of organic matter and the means by 
which the soul carried out its actions through the body as a whole. But significant developments 
in the „art‟ of anatomy during this era meant that physicians were looking to “new light thrown 
upon the animal economy:”510 anatomy was the active discipline for apprehending the new 
material knowledge of the body.  
 
This is exemplified by William Harvey and his discovery of the circulation of the blood. With 
important implications for a wider, more philosophically oriented, physiological theory, it was 
strong experimental evidence that indicated to Harvey that all knowledge originated as „events of 
the senses.‟511 To examine meant, “you must bring them to the senses and confirm them by 
judgment of the senses.”512 In this way Harvey distinguishes a modern practice through the event 
of the experiment and its integration into a physiological schema of explanation and set a 
precedent for the anatomically oriented work that followed. Albrect von Haller, for example, 
whose Dissertation on the Sensible and the Irritable Parts of the Animals (1755) preceded his 
Elements of Physiology (1757-1766), fore-grounded an experimental practice prior to unfolding 
his physiology. This was in contrast to Georg Ernst Stahl, so influential for the Montpellier 
physicians, for whom the „good physiologist‟ meant understanding the limits of relation between 
the anatomical practice and the aims of the physiological discipline.
513
  
 
During the 1780‟s, anatomical practices was extending itself through new techniques of 
surgery.
514
 There remained, however, a division between producing anatomical data and 
unfolding the physiological interpretation of the functions of the soul; this was not yet an 
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experimental physiology in any contemporary sense. Since the principle object of this 
physiology was a systematic view over the different functions of the body which could be called 
„natural,‟ which for Cabanis meant the one “best adapted to the association of our ideas,”515 this 
followed the observational method proceeding by degrees from the known to the unknown. 
Cabanis‟ Science of Man was grounded in a concept of the human constitution to which a 
rational physiology elaborated the relation of our “ideas, our passions, our virtues and our 
vices.”516 Such was its concept handed down through the older universities based physiology, as 
the disciplines higher calling traditionally associated with the mysteries of the soul. However, at 
the turn of the 19
th
 century, this physiological overview of its function confronted new practices 
in the hospital theaters where surgeons dissecting bodies brought anatomical data together 
deducing function by a process of syllogistic reasoning tp give new perspectives on the natural 
account of man. Often these were in conflict with accounts traditionally associated with the 
university based physiological knowledge. An ensuing confrontation appeared around what 
reasoning could be attributed to the „natural,‟ which had been philosophically taken up under the 
higher task. This was understood even by the more anatomically oriented physiologists of the 
era, such as Xavier Bichat. 
 
Xavier Bichat arrived at Paris in July 1794 to follow a course at the hospice Hôtel-Dieu.
517
 There 
Piérre Joseph Desault ran a surgical clinic aimed at producing practicing surgeons by immersion 
in clinical observation and through daily exposure to surgical techniques. This practice had 
developed through the 18
th
 century and was carried over virtually unchanged in the new post-
revolutionary era of the Ecole de Santé.
518
 Desault died unexpectedly in 1795 but within a few 
years Bichat himself was holding courses in anatomy, surgery and physiology, expanding his 
own ideas beyond those of Desault. Bichat was also a fellow of the Société Médicale 
d'Emulation and was following similar themes to Cabanis and appears to have shared the 
ambitions for a Science of Man. In an early outline for his physiology, Discourse sur l'étude de 
physiologique (1799) he describes both a historical and a practical approach; since the “ancients 
knew only how to observe,” he upheld the Hippocratic legacy of an observational physiology 
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while following modern methods of amassing data needed to establish the new language of 
physiology.
519
 In this respect, Bichat was influenced both by the philosophical approach of the 
Montpellier physicians and its neo-Hippocratic tradition, but also by Haller‟s approach of 
developing an effective anatomical practice to give the practical perspective that ancient 
medicine lacked.
520
  
 
Bichat‟s physiology aimed at a synthesis directed at overcoming a specific problem. In Bichat‟s 
opinion, Haller‟s experimentation had certain advantages for the study of particular functions of 
the body, such as digestion, respiration, secretions etc, if certain precautions could be upheld.
521
 
These precautions followed from what the Montpellier doctrine took as the limits of what an 
anatomically informed physiology could offer to a sensible doctrine of the body. It was a limit 
based on the idea that experimentation on live animals could never give a „natural‟ impression 
since it induced fear and stress which distorted observed results and rendering invalid its 
evaluation for a general physiology. Bichat saw this as the interpretive difficulty associated with 
the „natural‟ state. It necessitated a third perspective as aid to delimit natural knowledge and this 
was the observation of the diseased state. However, this strategy introduced a further problem for 
the ambition of a modern medicine; as ancient medicine formulated its general pathology 
through the humoral doctrine, a task remained for modern medicine to develop its anatomical 
study of diseases to its advantage. Therefore, the third perspective meant Bichat also took up the 
task of separating out, on a simple anatomical basis, the modern analytic that informed evident 
limits of „organic disturbance,‟ from the complex historical admixture of „general fevers.‟522  
 
Xavier Bichat and a Rational Physiology 
 
The anatomical basis informed an organic ground delimiting comparative structures and serving 
the ambition of Bichat‟s method to extend observational practices to phenomena of the higher 
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and more complex level of the animal economy. The complex levels were reserved for the 
physiological discipline in its role of physiologist-metaphysician and this followed the rational 
discourse on sensibilities in its extension linked to the ideological project, - 
“…I showed the foundations on which physiology must be based and from which the 
history of the phenomena, or observational physiology, must be drawn.  But the 
phenomena must be coordinated, their totality must be sought out. The mind of man, 
naturally curious seeks, causes thus rational physiology soon came into being.”523 
Beyond the practical limits of observation, Bichat deferred to the physiological task connected 
with metaphysics; in his notes he wrote “speak here of Cabanis.” The practical limit related to 
methodical difficulties of apprehending observable natural impressions, while the physiological 
discipline was concerned with the problem of their variable composition which Bichat retained. 
In the physiological sense, the necessity of a perspective on the physical and the moral could 
form a rational physiological synthesis which could stand as a nature of man.
524
 
 
This was the early program of the Discourse, which saw Bichat promote the broad values of the 
physiology of his day, namely an awareness that it supplements a general Science of Man at the 
avant-garde of what could constitute a modern knowledge. The historical knowledge was being 
encroached upon both by modern physico-chemical sciences and natural history; Bichat 
understood this as grounded in the Newtonian revolution, who had added the “crowning touch” 
to what was considered secure science. The stated task was to “examine the degree to which 
these sciences can advance the Science of Man,” that meant bringing elements together into the 
new concept within the tradition that could extend itself to a Science of Man.
525
 
 
Grounding the doctrine of sensibility was taken up in his early work on synovial membranes. 
Bichat delimited and localised anatomical features through observing the inflammation of fluids 
contained within the synovial membranes. This was developed as visible evidence for an 
elementary theory that could demonstrate a natural unity of particular tissues in themselves.
526
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The method described in Traité des membranes (1800) gave a classificatory schema for the 
observational analysis as the modern technique superseding less sophisticated techniques of 
tissue analysis, namely physical methods such as boiling, distilling, desiccation etc. Bichat 
developed the method by which elements could become visible through observation of a natural 
inflammation as it spread first through the tissues before advancing to affect organs then to the 
whole: the „natural‟ method of division of organism into its parts, uncovered „hidden‟ operations 
by which its nature could subsequently be revealed.  
 
This organic level informed from Traité des Membranes (1800) was a theoretical base later 
expanded to the influential text Anatomie générale (1801). It took the regional method as the 
axiomatic for its ambition of the scientific approach to organic laws as advancing on the 
historical limits of physiology.
527
 The philosophical method of analysis had scientific credentials 
as demonstrated in Lavoisier‟s chemistry and by following Condillac‟s analytic the idea-sign 
gave a central concern to the „natural‟ necessity by which the observed organic properties in the 
tissues could give the analogically delimited space for grounding the physiological synthesis. He 
did this with some caution, noting an, - 
“...essential differences between the physics and physiological laws....physics is 
constant, vital properties are at every instant undergoing some change in degree and in 
kind...baffle all calculation and would require as many formulae as cases which 
occur....in their phenomena nothing can be foreseen, foretold or calculated, we judge 
only of them by their analogies and these are in the vast proportion of instances 
extremely uncertain.”528 
The sign therefore functioned to delimit an ordered space only to the extent that it „spoke‟ the 
new organic language. The rational synthesis was reflected as a physiological discourse which 
appears in the first section of Reserche physiologique sur la vie et la mort (1801). Bichat 
separated out different hierarchical levels of complex organisation, around degrees of certainty, 
the demarcation that mirrors the relation between the investigating anatomist and the 
synthesizing physiologist at the confluence of two hierarchical disciplines. This intersection 
gives physiological discourse its organic structures, considered in their simple organic functions; 
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while on another level it followed the recomposition that aimed at rationalising higher animal 
functions. 
 
 
The Organic and the Critical: The Homoeomerous Parts and Bichat‟s Tissue theory 
 
The organic ground of Bichat‟s tissues was in principle similar to Aristotle‟s „homoeomerous‟ 
parts, standing as constituent units of the body. Aristotle's common substratum was a „matter‟ 
transformed under the „power of heating.‟529 This power could induce material bodies to interact 
through their inherent qualities to form a third substance, “flesh, bone and the like.”530 The 
composite was therefore held together under a physiological principle that accounted for a 
process of becoming a „mean.‟ This principle grounded the unity of the homoeomerous parts, 
and in turn, combined to give the organs (non-homoeomerous) parts and finally the 
organisational harmony in the body displayed in the higher phenomena of life. 
 
Bichat‟s tissue theory was therefore, not the neutral anatomical description, but a „taxonomy of 
vital properties,‟ where distinct properties functioned with an ontological sense of genesis behind 
the structural relations of higher phenomena.
531
 In this respect, Bichat‟s „tissue‟ drew upon the 
Latin word „tela‟ (a web) referring to areolar or connective tissue running between many organs 
of the body. This already carried the historically value appearing to Galen as “fibre branches 
finer than spiders webs,”532 and to Vesalius‟s De humanicorporis fabrica as its woven “fabrica.” 
When Francis Glisson was scraping tissue away from the liver in 1664 he described a „feltwork‟ 
of fibres, the cellular tissue read as a structural material by which the whole body appeared to be 
connected.
533
 In the original Encyclopedie (1751) the notion of the fabric of the body was 
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understood as „tissu cellulaire,‟ the system of fibres that implied a „structure,‟534 a basic 
constituent component of a human body.
535
  
 
The significance for Bichat‟s physiology came from the parallel to the cell as described by 
Robert Hooke in Micrographia (1665). This related minute structures of plants, later found by 
Marcello Malpighi to be universally present in botany, where the cell signified a fundamental 
unit, perhaps common to animals and plants.
536
 The membranes formed fundamental elements of 
„animal fabric‟ running throughout the whole, were paralleled with this unity prior to 
differentiation into organs. But it was the precise nature of the cellular tissue became the subject 
of controversy. Towards the ends of the 18
th
 century, Théophile Bordeu, the Montpellier 
physician, looked to tissue as the “first materials” of the embryo which gave the substratum from 
which all other materials are derived. But, for Bordeu, it was less elemental tissue that was 
important, but rather that this contained the particular internal „environment‟ as the continuity in 
the midst of which all the organs were immersed. Organs were evidently insulated from each 
other, giving the autonomy “thus ensuring an existence peculiar to itself.”537 Bichat drew heavily 
on this essential autonomy of the parts in Anatomie Genéralé and described fibrous nature of 
cellular tissue as,- 
“placed around the organs, the different parts of this system which act at the same time 
as a bond to connect, and as an intermediate body to separate them. Carried into the 
interior of these same organs, they essentially contribute to their structure”538  
Here was the interface between environment and the „existence peculiar to itself,‟ as it extended 
through the organs. Tissues were fundamental to living structure and had the significance for 
Enlightenment physiology as the basis for organic laws; these were fundamental in an 
ontological sense, - 
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“…the mechanisms by which the parenchyma of nutrition appropriate to themselves 
nutritive substances is not an insulated phenomena…but a consequence of general laws 
of the organic.”539  
This primitive undifferentiated material offers to every part a common and a uniform base, as the 
„matter‟ susceptible to transformative development of a generative system. Open spaces of 
cellular tissue, grounded „simple functional folds‟ by which organs appear to extend into the 
three dimensional structures of the body.
540
  
 
On this organic level, tissues marked the material limit to anatomy but did not limit physiological 
discourse. The rationalising discourse of Anatomie Génerale took tissues as an interface and 
point of exchange where fluids were assimilated and transformed into the solid materials and 
equally becoming its residues. - 
“There are thus fluids corresponding to the composition, and others being used for the 
decomposition. The solids are the terms of the first which come from the outside, and 
the starting point of the seconds who go back there…All the phenomena of the living 
economy show us the fluids in an almost passive state, the solids on the contrary, 
always primarily active. In fact the solids receive the excitation and which react under 
the terms of this excitation. Everywhere, the fluids are only exciting them.” 541 
Because tissues are the seat of an action and reaction, they have a capacity to be active and vital 
in relation to the fluids, which are essentially passive. Such a differentiation leaves fluids 
constituting an undifferentiated substance with the tissue interface representing a new frontier 
between the limits of a biological vitalism and a positive physio-chemical science. The 
Enlightenment perspective understood undifferentiated force as standing beyond organised limit. 
“Chaos,” as Bichat wrote in Anatomie générale,- 
“was only matter without properties; to create the universe, God endowed [all 
matter]…with gravity, elasticity and affinity…and to part he gave sensibility and 
contractility.”542 
Properties were an active differentiation: fluids were passive but they were not inert, they were 
necessary for processes of life and activity of the tissues, as both the nutritive and the carriers of 
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foreign and harmful substances. Bichat mapped this frontier into a taxonomy of twenty one 
primary tissues for Anatomie générale, as the organic structural base. In turn these could 
sometimes appear as disease, hence retained the potential for pathological eruption.  
 
Vital Force and the Idea-Sign in Reserches Physiologiques 
 
The description of organic structural base attained its functional value as explanatory power for 
the medical practice approaching unknowable properties of the body. Following the Hippocratic 
notion of balance, or Aristotle‟s concept of the „mean‟, the living economy needed to explain a 
phenomenal continuity under particular conditions. Here Bichat‟s vitalism retained its continuity 
with the Hippocratic medical legacy, grounding ontologically, immanent properties of living 
bodies such as a vis medicatrix, in the composite or „blend‟ that Aristotelian physiology gave as 
a doctrine of the mean in explaining the concept of normal function.
543
 Extended to the body as 
the notion of an essence (ousia) of the faculties, this left a historical legacy as master strategy for 
explaining physiological function. The exhaustive decomposition of the sensible activities of the 
body prior to a recomposition, explained insensible activities, as vital movements in general. 
 
What was specifically intended to be explained as vital movement differed during the 
development of medical thought. For example, when insensible micro-movements were 
attributed to a more fundamental property, the power such as a vis medicatrix, the latter stood as 
an interpretive tool for a dynamic explanation of a functioning whole. But, during the 
Renaissance, this notion was to be avoided as a general explanation of the body; for Jean Fernel, 
an ultimate unknown was to be displaced by a local knowledge of the body for the purposes of 
establishing the specific function of the parts.
544
 This legacy was taken up in iatromechanic 
medicine by displacing the notion of soul to a transcendent position, as an ultimate unknown and 
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the last term displaced from the analytic series and substituted for localised and explicable 
repetitious mechanisms observable in life.
545
 On the other hand, Francis Glisson focused on the 
„matter of life,‟ where irritability was the property visibly localised in fibres of the body and 
implied an immanent property latent in the organic matter itself. Such a property could explain 
micro-motions which also held the energetic reserve attributed to the evident differences in 
bodies that gave them a predispositions for change. An ontologically primal matter maintained 
the fundamental status between a physics and a physiology, where active and reactive properties 
should account for a latency of function in the faculties (biousia or biarchia). It served 
strategically to explain the disposition in the faculties for absorbing micro-movement into an 
economy of the body as irritability or sensibility which then expressed evident differences under 
a general concept of life.  
 
The Sensationalist strategy of reducing the world to elemental properties, saw Cabanis retain this 
property as internally „confounded at the source.‟ But Bichat grounded the „properties of living 
matter‟ in his tissue theory while retaining a power to explain life‟s phenomenal capacity, now 
given as an index of its latent force, to be rationalised in Recherches physiologique sur la vie et 
la mort as the measure of life,-
546
  
“The measure of life in general is the difference which exists between the effort of 
exterior power, and that of exterior resistance. The excess of the former is an indication 
of its weakness; the predominance of the later an index of its force.”547 
A concept of living force subordinate to exterior resistance comes in the wake of the 
epistemological success of Newton‟s Principia and what was originally intended to displace 
ontological questions from their occult qualities for a more scientific one. In this context what 
presented itself as the „sum of forces‟ of the body, was a „strategy‟ for accounting for existing 
forces universally observable in all bodies, to which a natural and distinct language could be 
developed by the modern physiology. Therefore the idea-sign was now serving the progressive 
and positive stage of attributing relations to evident reactive properties of organisms in general, 
which, despite limited data, followed a necessary synthesis driven by the practical ideas of a 
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medicine. The rationale was in giving the provisional groundwork that did not exclude the 
promise of future explication as long as it could retain its necessary intensions in what was 
implemented. 
548
  
 
This a comprehensive synthesis for rational physiology proposed in the Discourse appears in the 
first part of Reserches physiologiques sur la vie et la Mort (1800). Here Bichat described two 
distinct lives of the body brought together from a broad doctrine of tissue properties as a 
localisation of vital properties extended from anatomical structures through the rational 
physiology synthesis. Vital properties give the potential for a reaction to the physical world; the 
historical terms of sensibility and contractility have an importance within this totality of relating 
forces, latent or explicit, to the rational account of a phenomenal life unfolding over time. A 
force in general is retained as the index of a vital presence in the whole.  
 
The physiological concept of human life distributed this as a presence between organic and 
animal levels. Simple internal parts showed evident practical functions and gave,-  
“habitual succession of assimilation and excretion…it lives within itself, transforms into 
its proper substance the particles of other bodies, and afterwards rejects them when they 
have become heterogeneous to its nature”549  
This gave a groundwork for the complex higher animal life that related to an explanation of the 
whole at different levels of its existence. On a higher level the animal, - 
“lives externally, is an inhabitant of the world…feels, perceives, reflects on its 
sensations, moves according to their influence, and frequently enabled to communicate 
by its voice, desires and its fears, it‟s pleasures and pains.”550 
Hence a primary dualism between organic and animal explained, firstly the internal, continuous 
ground of basic associative or dissociative processes of body functions in composing structure. 
Secondly, the intermittent and externally oriented activities that extend progressively beyond 
organs as affective habits, and develop at the level of the body as a whole. The body integrates 
the organic function into the dynamic bonds between the vital organs; brain, lungs and heart; 
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these constitute “the three centres, in which are terminated all the secondary phenomena of the 
two lives.” 551 The dynamic whole expresses the relation in its essential and necessary vital 
function that is mediating contrasting activities of animal and organic lives. 
 
From the dynamic view follows the classical distinction between a life of the soul and a 
vegetable life, a high and low in the physiological structure. But the body‟s direct relation to an 
external physical world (milieu) is tempered by a double dynamic whose tension is between 
animal life and organic life; as an account of the will and passion, this puts organic needs under a 
„natural‟ relation to a „mean.‟ The internal dynamic works against an immersion in the external 
milieu that exposes the organism as a whole to the conditions of existence.
552
 Bichat explains 
physiological variability through an increased habituation of certain „organic‟ functions against 
the relaxing of „animal‟ functions, or vice versa, accounting for differences in individuated 
bodies, both from each other, and for its changes over time, evident in a capacity to materially 
redistribute vitality organically. -  
“there is a superabundance of life in the child; in the child the reaction of the system is 
superior to the action, which is made upon it from without. In the adult, action and 
reaction are in balance; the turgesance of life is gone. In the old man, the reaction of the 
inward principle is lessened, the action from without remaining unaltered; it is then that 
life languishes, and insensibly advances towards its natural term, which ensues when all 
proportion ceases.”553  
The explanatory benefit in this tension between the two systems is to displace a Cartesian 
mind/body dualism for a composite of active and reactive forces distributed between the lives 
within the body. Rather than an internal/external division, it means Bichat distinguishes the 
body‟s activity from any simple monism, while retaining the classical image of three centres, the 
lungs, brain and heart, with the physiological interiority now radically separated from an 
exteriority of purely physical conditions. 
 
The term vital can be now be seen to relate on the organic level to a constitutive idea in the seats 
of the properties, but on the animal level it explains the “triple focus” which historical 
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configurations attributed to a living mean. In Recherches physiologique the vital as mean was a 
theory behind what is observed in the symmetry of organs of animal life, its pairs of lobes, or 
organs divided along a meridian, by which Bichat “supposes a perfect balance of forces and 
action,” between their similar parts as visual aspect of the higher ideal order followed by the 
body,- 
“...harmony is the character of the animal, discordance that of the organic functions.”554  
However, vital organic function also marked the absolute limit between living and dead matter. 
Yet organic function remained distributed throughout the body as the ground which could never 
be interrupted. It explains what animal life, under cerebral effects for regulating the economy of 
force, had to bring under a „mean‟ by its disciplinary efforts of habituation. The process of 
reducing pleasure or pain over time was allied to the physiological docrine which was to improve 
disciplined judgement.
555
 From this perspective, a second dynamic appears from an interior 
organic perspective, “the seat of the inward tract,” where elementary natures of the tissues and 
mucous membranes are the seat of an irritability. The organic perspective reacts to “bodies 
foreign to our nature,” as stimulations to an organic life produces effects needing to be 
subordinated or assimilated by the animal life.
556
 However the inward tract or „passionate‟ 
organic life can also intervenes in a way antagonistic into the animal life in its subordination to 
the brain. This oppositions gave a picture of the animal life competing with an organic life for 
mastery of the higher moral domain.  
 
Finally, such the concept of the body accommodates the division of formal versus the expressive 
by describing temperamental habituations as relations of brain, of muscles and senses. The effort 
of the will needs to practice its capacity for modification of the body and its possibilities of 
specialisation or improvement in function. This is the vital capacity that is retained by the 
necessity for balance from the broader perspective which Cabanis schema absorbed as evidence 
of imbalances, not entirely “natural” in the secondary effects of socialised habits. Modern society 
“calls forth” certain new functions as a result of the “state of civilisation;” these are actualised 
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through habituations of the body, however any excessive discordance in basic organic functions 
would appear as fluctuations of vital power in the whole. „Excitations‟ run through the body both 
as strengths or weakness, hence a constancy which animal life displays in the face of physical 
powers which “preside over exterior bodies” gives the concept of human life “allied at one time 
with the brute, at another time with spiritual nature.” Here was Bichat‟s concept of the body as 
the modern conditions of life as the constant struggle for a mean.
557
  
 
Conclusion  
 
This chapter situated the legacy for a French Science of Man with the emerging medical sciences 
and explained how Condillac‟s Logic defined the disciplinary practice that could further the 
ambitions of a rational physiology. This practice extended to an emerging Science of Man 
leading up to the revolutionary period. At the end of the 18
th
 century, Xavier Bichat gave a new 
rational physiology its relation between living body and powers that preside over it. The new 
rational physiology served to constitute a French Science of Man and displace older doctrines by 
attributing intrinsic values both as positive and vital. This practice Bichat extended through the 
medical sign in the observation of disease to inform the limit of what could be considered natural 
physiological knowledge. This is the limit of a rational physiology which is the subject of the 
next chapter which looks at Bichat‟s importance for French Positivism in the early 19th century.   
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Chapter 4: Radical Positivisms 
 
Introduction 
 
A Science of Man after the French Enlightenment looked to a rational physiology to account for 
life‟s capacity for organization and the last chapter showed how Xavier Bichat gave a paradigm 
for distinguishing vital beings from „mere‟ objects. The sum of the function of resistance 
distinguished temporal biological beings but this also left Reserches physiologique with its 
central problem of establishing the nature and limit of its vital function and delimiting the higher 
manifestation of its capacity for organisation. Bichat retained a link to the legacy of Condillac‟s 
idea-sign in determing natural relations between an economy of life and the „hidden operations 
of nature.‟ This chapter looks at how new biological concepts of life displace this physiological 
limit. 
 
The last chapter also indicated that pathology was used to isolate an intermediary state between 
life and death which served to determine the dynamic image of the concept of life. In this context 
the idea-sign was not an analogue of life‟s forces, but the observational measure that serves the 
interpretation of the historical idea of life. It was an index to “the sum of functions by which 
death is resisted.” It will be shown that this sign served Bichat with heuristic values of medicine, 
and not an apodictic science. Bichat attributed a psychological awareness of medicines practical 
relation to physiology. Bichat‟s method was therefore predicated on delimiting the historical idea 
of the vital rather than questioning representational values as Kant did.  
 
In the ambition to rationalise physiology, pathological anatomy delimited the historical concept 
of life, but as an index to function. At the start of the 19
th
 century an emerging Positivism 
retained the ambition for a Science of Man which will be clear through the works of Saint 
Simon. His 1813 text Memoire sur la science de l’homme explicitly states this through an 
understanding of Vicq D‟Azyr, Cabanis, Bichat and Condorcet. But it no longer grounded in a 
concept of life as in the era of revolutions which lost its status in the early 19
th
 century. The 
chapter shows therefore how Saint Simon looked to wider sources to mediate similar concerns 
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and that his Positivism retained certain values held of a socio-political discourse. But what 
becomes clear is that Saint Simon‟s primary concern after 1814 now becomes legitimated 
through the turn to „industrial values‟. Here is a marked shift away from grounding a Science of 
Man through physiology: what now becomes expressed as man‟s inner drives, of human will, 
and the struggle between modes of being, has now become a class struggle. Physiology‟s loss of 
a vitalistic base, and a shift to the paradigm of biological function in the early 19
th
 century, saw 
Saint Simon turn to a „concept of labour‟ to ground an excessive material force, something 
psychic that now necessitated a practical knowledge to uphold values that were identified with 
the older Science of Man. 
 
This was a dilemma in the legacy left by Bichat‟s physiology for early 19th century debates 
surrounding the possibility of a Science of Man. Bichat could be criticised by Maine de Biran as 
introducing the psycho-physical parallelism that assumed natural function as positive knowledge 
of man. But the Positivism of Auguste Comte saw an epistemological project moving explicitly 
against philosophical defenders of an idea of man. The chapter explains in what sense a „truly 
philosophical‟ revolution was ascribed to Bichat. Cours de philosophie positive contended this as 
constraining biological objects to regions „proper to living bodies.‟ But Comte rejected Bichat‟s 
concept of life as the „sum of functions that resist death,‟ and accepted a contemporary idea of 
biological existence premised on a function of integration. Cours has therefore a paradoxical 
relation to Bichat; he is exemplary in method but incomplete as a Positivism. What this shows 
that while Comte‟s Positivism stood against a regressive metaphysics, it substituted 
contemporary biological concepts to represent the differential order that gave the philosophical 
possibilities delimited by a modern knowledge. Comte „mapped‟ vital concepts which 
demonstrates the extent to which structural thinking overtook his Positivism. Comte‟s 
subordined the broader historical physiology to anatomical studies of his era and the new 
biology. This served a critical epistemology but abandoned the pathological perspective in 
driving the ambitions for a socio-political Positivist project. It displaced an 18
th
 century debate 
over the Science of Man while furthering the spirit of an idea.  
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Life and Death in the New Physiology 
 
At the turn of the 19
th
 century, Xavier Bichat‟s developmental histories between the two lives, an 
organic ground and the assemblage of „animal‟ functions, offered a basis for expanding the new 
Science of Man in France. Life seen as a double series, opening a hierarchical relation between 
discord and order, to produce individuation of the body. This represented the transition from 
determinable physico-chemical laws to the temporal stability in the vital sphere; conversely 
higher functions truly begin when the senses are exercised. Although Bichat‟s physiology 
retained something of the Hippocratic image of life‟s power, it now represented the power to 
resist the disorder of physico-chemical forces threatening to overwhelm it. There are three 
consequences of this shift. 
 
Firstly, from the early 1800‟s, Georg Stahl offered a perspective on death appearing as the 
reversion to a physico-chemical sphere and subject to laws of ordinary matter. Vital phenomena 
differentiated themselves from these laws and appeared exceptional rather than a fulfilment of 
the potential of nature. Bichat‟s concept of life distinguished this as an „island of vitality;‟ the 
opening lines of Reserches physiologique sur la vie et la mort controversially formulated this as, 
“life consists of the sum of functions by which death is resisted.”558 It was a distinction that 
retained something evident in life‟s capacity for organization, now pictured as the sum of 
functions to be maintained only for a limited time as the resistance against dispersion was 
ultimately only temporary. This sum of this function of resistance distinguished temporal 
biological beings from „mere‟ objects, but left Reserches physiologique with its central problem 
of establishing the nature and limit of the vital function delimited as the higher manifestation of 
the capacity for organisation.
559
  
 
The second half of Reserches physiologiques sur la vie et la Mort sets out to establish the 
thresholds and limit to this concept of the body; in turn, this needed the temporal concept of the 
organisational capacity that the awakening animal function must learn to coordinate. This was a 
                                                          
558
 Bichat (1827b) translation of the 1822 edition of Reserches physiologique sur la vie et la mort with notes by 
Francoise Magendie. p10 
559
 Jacob (1993) p88-92 
173 
 
vital concept in the sense that it had potential to a correct balance, to progress by extending the 
organic life through the differentiation of functions characterised by natural capacities of the 
body, and to be maintained for maximum period until death. Then as the animal functions fade, 
imagination and memory dims and visible life retreats back to the organic ground, which 
continues for a time before also reverting to the laws of ordinary matter.560  
 
Secondly, it was from observations of the „natural‟ life that Bichat gave his rational physiology 
against these progressive „double‟ deaths‟ of organic and animal. Ultimately these delimit the 
dynamic relations between organs, and a natural economy of life that stood as „hidden operations 
of nature.‟ In Reserches physiologique Bichat focussed on the intermediary states between life 
and death, as opening a new frontier for investigation of vital limits whose threshold was the 
immanent return of physico-chemical laws. These were the intermediary phenomena that could 
equally appear in the guise of the pathological and therefore overlap with the concept of a natural 
death. In reality, in this era, death from mere old age remained elusive; as Haller commented, 
“very many people were carried off before this time by disease.”561 Bichat highlighted the lack in 
the concept of disease in its relation to the phenomena of dying,-  
“very seldom can we depart from the known phenomena of the living animal, when we 
undertake to inquire into those which it exhibits in its dying moments; it would be 
necessary to know the intermediary state between health and disease….but where shall 
we find the physician who will assert from that actual data of his art, he understands in 
such an intermediary state, the profoundly hidden operations of nature?”562 
As aid to observation of this intermediary state, the zone of differentiation between life and 
death, Bichat distinguished a new category of pathological phenomena. Distinct from the 
historical pathology, this was incommensurate with the general practice of the physiological 
discipline serving the historical task of theorising the natural way to thinking about the body. But 
the expanding anatomical practices implemented a shift through its investigations as to the status 
of pathological relations within a physiological domain. Since anatomy now underpinned the 
physiological discipline, the pathological view demanded a systematic localisation of diseases to 
be excluded from the „natural‟ body. A modern pathological tradition also aimed to differentiate 
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itself from the historical concepts such as humoralisms, and its source for producing explanations 
of disease was the dissection of corpses. Bichat, who was grounded in tissue theory and surgical 
training, also took this as the basis from which to expand a new pathology as the perspective for 
advancing into this intermediary zone. Hence phenomena which were an admixture of life and 
death followed the extension that Greek medicine always “identified with their semiotics.”563 
 
At the turn of the century Bichat was working to isolate a new phenomenal class of organic 
diseases, categorically distinguished from historical „diseases in general.‟ Organic phenomena 
could localise external symptoms and be identified with internal lesions as revealed through 
post-mortem examinations. Bichat noted that before the 18
th
 century medicine “very seldom had 
recourse to the post-mortem examination;” by contrast he identified post-mortem as the modern 
practice that could distinguish categories of dying, and by extension be related to natural modes 
of life.
564
 Bichat‟s pathological anatomy distinguished three temporal forms of death; i) a sudden 
death (asphyxia, syncope, poisoning, etc), the subject of Reserches physiologique, ii) death from 
acute disease (pestilential, fever) covered by historical pathologies, and iii) a „third kind of death‟ 
resulting from chronic organic disease. It was the latter which he identified with protracted 
deaths which appeared as reversing the order of natural death as described towards the end of the 
first part of Recherches physiologique. Chronic disease advances from discord in the organic 
order as the seat of morbid affections appearing as “tetters, syphilitic eruptions, and 
inflammatory pustules.”565 From the level of the tissues this expressed itself upwards against the 
organisational modes of life, the visible form of an undifferentiated external force. Hence the 
ambition of grounding a new systematic pathology followed from the form of future science 
whose extension lent itself to the study of animal functions in Anatomie Génerale. Here Bichat 
had attributed originary phenomena of diseases as axiomatic for a new physiology in the ambiton 
to finally overcome the legacy of the past,   
“We have I think reached an epoch where morbid anatomy is about to receive a new an 
unexpected impulse.....With the exception of certain types of fever and nevous 
affections, everything in pathology is in the reach and the grasp of this science. How 
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idle and insignificant do we find the opinions of physicians, and many two high 
endowments and great repute, when we examine them not in their books but in the dead 
body.”566 
This shows how the new category was intended to supplement an older pathological theory. 
Bichat‟s study appeared posthumously as Cours de d'anatomie pathologique (1825) and this was 
compiled from lecture notes following the model of Anatomie Générale. By mirroring its 
method, starting from the seats of disease and moving towards higher animal pathology through 
a phenomenology of disease, this text appears to outline the controversial practice of the 
anatomo-clinical experience.
567
 This is the context in which Bichat has been seen to follow the 
practices of his epoch in aiming to contribute to the new positive order of classification by 
delimiting the historically vague notion of living being, along with others such as Jean Corvisart 
and Rene Läennec.  
 
Thirdly, it is this latter position which is complicated by the consideration of the values that were 
attributed to this pathological view. In this sense, Bichat retained something of the Hippocratic 
image of life‟s power, as power to resist physico-chemical forces threatening to overwhelm it, 
and that a living economy looked to animal phenomena to distinguish its modes of existence. But 
on this level, it was accounted for by observed bonds existing between brain, lungs and heart, 
and this physiological concept took these dynamic relations as the terminus of the secondary 
phenomena of the two lives resolving into the historical triple focus which “physiologists have at 
all times been acquainted with.”568 From this perspective, what Bichat historically retained was a 
concept of normal variation not essentially different from an Aristotelian idea of μεσότης (or the 
mean). This was the state between extremes and seen as the limit of oscillations around a point. 
The mean is not fixed but indicates the normal degrees of variations by which distributed 
sensibilities can be maintained in a dynamical equilibrium. For Aristotle, the “genuine physicist” 
determines these limits by considering both the psychic and physical aspects of sensation or 
emotion.
569
 While the term μεσότης570 does not suggests simple mathematical abstraction, it does 
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indicate the dynamic equilibrium of opposing physical parts or powers which is informed or 
activated by a soul. From an objective perspective, the μεσότης is maintained by a virtual 
concept existing for an organised body, this serves to constitute the dynamic of „health‟ in the 
animal. Both a physiology and a psychology refer to this dynamic aspect through the explanation 
of distinctive powers or sensibilities to which the body reacts or responds proportionately; either 
to particular stimuli or within general conditions of existence. Conversely, pathological variation 
points to excess or deficiency beyond this concept of the mean, indicating a threshold or limit 
beyond which its distortion produces a change in nature or a difference in kind. In an absolute 
sense, these are exclusive. Bichat reflected on a general pathology in his early Discourse as 
difference in kind,-  
“...impossible to relate them [general diseases] to known laws of sensibility....they are 
all different, and are diversely modified in diverse parts and in diverse affections.”571  
But an attention to the dynamic threshold would reflect a fundamental relation between 
physical and physiological phenomena; a difference between a constancy and a normal 
variation that is echoed later in Anatomie Générale,- 
“physics is constant, vital properties are at every instant undergoing some change in 
degree  and in kind...(...)...we judge them only by their analogies and these are in the 
vast proportion of instances extremely uncertain.”572  
Absolute forces of nature have a relation to the organic order conceived of as through the 
dynamical relation to the animal order, whose concept is the virtual sum of force. This virtual 
sum gives its vital limits by opposition to a physical concept of nature. And this distinction is 
made evident in differentiating a vital order, in its constancy, from the physico-chemical laws. 
 
The new pathology starts at the organic level. It takes the sign of difference as indicating a 
physical constancy whose natural relation is to exterior forces. A threshold is observed in the 
fluids and solids as the practical limit of observation; fluids are understood to be more physical, 
more passive than the solids which are more active and dynamic in their resistance. The 
difficulty for an observational method was the practice of natural comparison which Bichat 
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pursued by considering three perspectives; first was the observation attributed to vital properties 
(concept of sensibility), secondly pathological observation (concept of the pathology view), and 
thirdly the observation of dynamical „bonds‟ or sympathies between organs of the body (the 
physiological concept of the body). It is the latter whose limits Bichat determined by animal 
experiments on the functional whole in the second part of Reserches physiologiques sur la vie et 
la Mort.
573
  
 
Although Anatomie Pathologique grounded itself in the significance of alterations of bodily 
fluids and the inflammation of tissues, what is also significant is that Bichat urges caution in 
interpreting the status of such alterations because of the difficulties associated with the 
observation of different modes of life. These are the relative values that mark the historically 
distinct disciplines of the anatomist and the physiologist as a separation of observation and 
interpretation, - 
“...The manner to proceed in autopsic examinations, must differ according to the 
different kinds of disease we have established; commonly it is prosecuted in an 
anatomical order, but it is not the best method to give precise ideas on the subject; in 
general diseases, it is a great deal better to follow the order of functions: in this manner 
we arrive at a knowledge of those which are injured.”574 
Hence „precise ideas‟ required of an empirical sense of measure are incommensurable with 
simple observation.
575
 The reason why Bichat is understood not to have used a microscope is for 
the simple fact that this was a technique understood as having inherent practical problems for 
interpretation. A pathological method also held difficulties for comparative analysis when 
looking for evidence of life‟s capacity for organization at the level of the body.576 The 
interpretation of dynamic relations in observable anatomical elements of an organic body was 
where the idea-sign confronted a difference in kind and where the empiricists discipline must 
proceed with caution towards a physiological view.  
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In The Birth of the Clinic, Michel Foucault writes of how, removed from the interface of the 
tissues, extending temporal consideration of pathological phenomena through space becomes 
ever more complicated.
577
 This difficulty was attributed to the interpretation of Condillac‟s Logic 
as the analogical model amplifying the elemental doctrine of signs in confronting cerebral 
afflictions, convulsions, and mental maladies etc. These were diseases associated with function. 
The temptation of a pathological anatomy of organic elements was to reciprocally explain the 
sum of functions which resist death; but at this dynamic level, symptoms were distanced from 
intermediary states between health and disease. The claim is that Anatomie Pathologique 
inherited an ordinal value for the sign of life from the elemental tissue properties. When this 
informed Anatomie Générale these were attributed to a corpse rather than localising symptom 
within life. By making this pathological seat a fundamental fact and extending this by reference 
to animal function, the new pathology served to fixed an idea of constant relations in the body, 
which became both a technical and imaginary mastery of the concept of the body.
578
  
 
However, it can also be shown that what Bichat intended of his physiology differed through a 
basic physiological concept of living function that he attributed to the higher strata of 
organisational capacity. The idea-sign served to distinguish the three different approaches to 
observational measure, i) the ideally stable forms of physically analogous forces, ii) the stability 
of an organic system, given in relation to evident physical constancies observed as natural 
relations, and iii) functional stabilities representing conceptually mean rhythms attributed to 
notional physiological bonds, such as heart beat and respirations. At the physiological level the 
sign upheld this threshold of difference that could demonstrate a mean concept and its periodic 
returns within apparent parameters of a necessary concept of the physiological body. The idea-
sign served the ambition of the rationalising discipline looking to describes life‟s functional 
capacity. It was understood that the Sensational method offered inherently provisional solutions 
to this idea.  
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Observation of the Normal and the Pathological 
 
In observing vital phenomena in the whole the sign discerns thresholds of difference. Bichat is 
therefore following the concerns of the Montpellier physicians for whom sensitivity to 
differences in a dynamic equilibrium was informed by their caution over vivisection. A concern 
with surgical intervention into the living body was that it produces a pathological type alteration 
leading to a qualitative alteration that distorts the functional capacity of the body. This aspect of 
the Montpellier doctrine marks the practical indeterminism which Bichat will be shown to 
uphold. It distinguishes his approach from that of Haller, who prioritised the anatomical 
approach to isolating physiological properties historically given as sensibility and irritability. His 
aim was defining more clearly how particular vital properties actually appeared in the body as 
visible evidence that served the purpose of systemising a progressive general physiology.
579
 
Bichat understood himself as doing something distinct from Haller, but nor did not see himself 
upholding the vitalism in the sense that made Stahl so influential for Montpellier physicians. 
Bichat distinguished a method from both these predecessors, whom he thought had not properly 
analysed vital properties: in Anatomie Générale he indicates the danger to,- 
“....apply the science of natural philosophy to physiology would be to explain the 
phenomena of living bodies by the laws of inert bodies. Here then is a false 
principle...In this respect my work differs in its general tenor from those of physiology, 
and even from those of the celebrated Haller. The works of Stahl have powerfully 
inculcated the inestimable advantage of laying aside all these collateral aids, which 
overwhelm the science that they purport to support. This eminent physician, had not 
analysed the vital properties, and, therefore, was inadequate to explain the phenomena 
in their real aspect. Nothing is more vague, and satisfactory than these words, vitality, 
vital action, vital influx, etc when their sense is not adequately defined.”
 580
  
This problem of the vital necessitated explaining phenomena in their „real aspect,‟ which meant 
it needed a positive approach. Bichat saw the discipline of observation, and specifically the idea-
sign, as developing a new language in moving between the anatomical approach of Haller and 
the conceptual point of view of Stahl. Observation of “the sum of the functions which resists 
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death” was a point of view that delimited physical differences at the level of animal function. 
Recherches physiologique integrates this perspective into the rational physiology by confronting 
the indeterminate animal concept through tests by an experimental method as recounted in the 
second part of the book. 
 
Because observation was an analytical discipline with its own norms of practices, Bichat 
understood himself as doing something distinct from the “animated anatomy” of Haller. This 
disciplinary practice took the perspective of empirical sensitivity as the limit of anatomical 
intervention in its useful relation to a general physiology. The method follows 
Condillac/Montpellier in two things; firstly, prioritising a natural method of division meaning 
restricting itself to visible alterations as contained in comparable regions. Bichat‟s perspective of 
pathological observation to delimit tissues into the workable language was to be integrated into a 
general physiology; his awareness was that natural comparison was theoretically contained only 
within a stable system of observations. Secondly, the extension of this practice through a 
pathological method introduced a shift in focus within epistemological problems of observation. 
Because observational analysis carries within it the disciplinary techniques of natural 
composition, it relied on the correct distribution of phenomena prior to an interpretation. 
Therefore the problem was to define a regional awareness prior to that which could contain 
phenomenal alterations that were significant.581  
 
In the logic of Traité des Membranes this followed organic units which naturally isolated tissues 
informing a ground or matrix for interpreting observable relations to the organs. Anatomie 
Générale then interprets this against the level of the body as the matrix for developing a future 
science. The central thinking of Traité des Membranes and Anatomie Générale was to inform a 
certain legacy of Bichat‟s thinking which gives the sense of positivistic optimism extended to the 
future medical sciences. Anatomie Générale carried this over into the provisional aims of 
Bichat‟s Cours d'Anatomie pathologique; this text promises the synthetic „détournement‟ of 
humoralism in moving towards an exhaustive concept of the body, -
582
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“All is thus indicated...that diseases relate to us in the solids and fluids; to claim the 
opposite would no longer admit the conscensus unis, conscientia omnia which binds the 
whole machine, and joins together all the forces of the life for concerted resistance to 
death”583  
This sense of purpose has a polemical value consistent with a later Positivism, but elsewhere 
Bichat makes a more cautious claims of the extent to which his tissue methodology should 
actually relate to a general pathology and its consequent significance for physiology. 
 
It has been suggested that focussing on this legacy neglects the perspective on Bichat‟s method 
which extends from Reserche Physiologique (experimenting on the whole) to Cours d’Anatomie 
Pathologique (observation of the limit).
584
 But in fact, this approach was already 
programmatically outlined in Bichat‟s early Discourse through the disciplinary method by which 
observational physiology should proceed. Bichat was sensitive that pathological observation 
presented increasing difficulties for the analytic method in its ambition to displace humoral 
medicine. This reflects on the wider ambitions for implementing the synthesis of the rational 
physiology. The historical background to the pathology text indicates how Bichat may have 
reflected on the use of the observational method by suggesting that the discipline should restrain 
itself to the more heuristic values of a medicine.  
 
Textual Considerations of Anatomie Pathologique 
 
Bichat‟s pathological anatomy course started in September 1801 and comprised of 80 lessons 
given over a six month period. The period immediately preceding this saw him prepare the 
Anatomie Générale text which was produced on the basis of an intense flourish of work of 
clinical observation following his appointment on the 26th January 1801 at the Grand Hospice 
d‟Humanité. According to Bichat‟s accomplice Matthieu François Régis Buisson, this involved 
over 600 autopsies over the few months that the work took to produce.
585
 The enthusiastic work 
of the Anatomie Générale period left little chance to consult with texts of those who preceded 
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him in the field;
586
 this changed as he had more time to reflect on the implications of his findings 
during the period of the pathology course. For the new pathological anatomy course Bichat 
adopted a different approach. 
  
The edition of Cours de Anatomie pathologique published in 1825 by François Gabriel Boisseau 
was collated from a manuscript edited by Pierre Auguste Béclard. Even at the time this was a 
contested document by other followers of Bichat, notably Jean Cruveilhier, another of Bichat‟s 
students, who thought that text did not accurately reflect Bichat‟s disciplinary intentions; this 
was of developing a symptomatology.
587
 In this context, an alternative perspective appeared in a 
manuscript of notes for the course recovered by the Grenoble Medical School in 1902. The 
medical historian Jean Monteil, writing in 1964, saw it as significant that the Anatomie 
pathologique notes come after Bichat‟s major achievements and could therefore be seen as a 
recapitulation of his oeuvre, despite the fact that this production was compressed into only two 
years. More importantly perhaps, the Grenoble notes complement other individual accounts of 
Bichat‟s pathological anatomy course, including those of Jean Cruveilhier, in its reflections on 
the schematic form and limits describing the anatomical project. In this respect Jean Monteil 
considers the Grenoble text to particularly highlight some of the difficulties that get effaced from 
Anatomie générale.
588
  
 
As Bichat scrutinized his data from the overall concerns of a didactic, reflecting on the hasty 
syntheses which appeared “from the amphitheatre,” a different emphasis appears as to the status 
of pathological anatomy. Primarily this is framed as a medical practice rather than a grounded 
science. In emphasising the necessity of being a provisional knowledge, this concurs with what 
Cruveilhier, who attended the pathological anatomy course, understood as Bichat‟s intention. In 
the notes from the 1902 text, Monteil quotes,- 
“It is here, especially, where one has seen the weakness of medicine and the need for 
following it with the torch of the pathological anatomy, the torch which one shines with 
that of observations which precedes and which guides. Thus open corpses, see the 
                                                          
586
 Ibid p12 
587
 cf Monteil (1964) p25,  
588
 Monteil (1964)  
183 
 
patients. In the rooms of private clinics and amphitheatres, here are the books which you 
must consult, the authors according to whom you must act. It is by seeing the diseases in 
the living, the devastations after death that we will be able to know them, to prevent 
them and cure them, fortunately.”589  
The method therefore emphasises only that by seeing and experiencing diseases in living bodies 
can symptoms be related to a pathological perspective. This interpretive threshold of living 
experience reflects a consistency that follows what one may identify as Bichat‟s vitalism. From 
the earlier Discourse, the pathological emphasises the constant confusion of temporal separations 
between phenomena and symptoms, inherently disruptive of any unified point of view. 
Awareness of the symptom is an index to difference in kind, the domain which the physician 
approaches at the level of the „torch which one shines,‟ the pathological view. This context could 
be seen as Bichat maintaining a fidelity to the disciplinary techniques defined by holding the 
idea-sign is the guide to the fringes of the physiological concept of the living.  
 
The problem of the idea-sign was in defining a region for interpretation that excluded all 
instances less understood, the uncommon phenomena likely to lead to hasty conclusions for an 
analogical method. Bichat seems to accept that the pathological was truly an unknown without 
denying or reducing these as phenomena.- 
“It is necessary to banish this disease of the nosological frame, not because it doesn‟t 
interest, but because it is unknown for us.”590 
This indicates how the pathological view intended to offers a functional evaluation for medicine 
to be taken up in a task against a „therapeutic anarchy.‟591 As with Cabanis, the study of 
physiology represented a future of science, but Bichat gave it the awareness of a threshold at 
which the present science overreaches itself. Here he retained his physician values through 
interpreting symptoms according to an idea of life. 
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The Threshold of a Physiological Concept of Life 
 
The interpretation of the intermediary state between health and disease gave a specific problem 
which Anatomie pathologique appeared to equivocate in its hopes of a unified knowledge.- 
“if, for each sympathy, it were necessary to imagine an explanation, thousands would 
hardly be enough. There is one of the laws of the whole, which one should not seek to 
reason in the series of parts.
592
  
But the task of the inquiring physiologist was a perspective on the function of the living body. 
Notably the second part of Recherches physiologique saw Bichat turn his attention to this 
physiological function and its limits. He approached this through violent intervention into the 
conceptual bond between heart, lungs and brain as a form of experimental analysis on the 
functional concept of the body. It has been noted that it would merely requires an inversion of 
conceptual priorities - from observed sensibilities in the whole to observing functional relations 
of parts - to open the breach to what later becomes understood as experimental physiology.
593
  
 
This was an inversion, however, that Bichat seemed reluctant to make. The reason may be given 
as the perspective from which he insisted on retaining a vitalistic concept of the whole. The 
subordination of parts maintained a relation to the observation of this concept of the whole may 
be the core value in Bichat‟s vitalism. This should perhaps not to be understood in the sense of 
an idea held a priori to informing his observations, but rather in a conceptual awareness that 
aligned with the disciplinary function of a knowledge to be obtained. The principle of knowledge 
and its strategies expressed behind Bichat‟s three levels of observation; a sensibility, a 
pathological view, and the concept of „bonds‟ or sympathies that the body expresses as a 
functioning of the whole, leaves the last concept standing over the accumulation of data ensuring 
the productive reasoning of the contemplating physiologist composing the new knowledge. This 
may also explain Bichat‟s reluctance to abandon a doctrine of sensibility since it retained this 
awareness of the physiologist‟s earlier role.   
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Bichat appears to maintain a commitment to such wider practices of a physiology in his day. 
Unlike surgeons such as Pierre Desault, who had a negative opinion of the discipline of 
physiology, Bichat took tissue theory as serving as a guarantee of the scientific status for a wider 
physiological discipline, grounding its fundamental kinship with other sciences. Yet beyond this, 
he also reserved commitments to the historical physiological discipline as Cabanis did explicitly 
in  his ambitions for a wider Science of Man. Following the Ideologues conception of human 
knowledge as an interdisciplinary system, open to positive extension. This was the sense used by 
Destutt and Cabanis for whom the history of the means of knowing paralleled the systematic 
integration of new knowledge which they was methodically related to the activities of 
psychological awareness of the sign. In this sense physiology retained its primary objective 
relation to the knowledge of man in the functional sense, rather than as strictly producing the 
representational value criticised by Rousseau or Kant.  
 
What was pursued under a positive physiology was therefore the functional concept of the 
physical and the moral in its broad sense. Commentators noted that Bichat, the physiologist, 
“hangs as a wraithlike intellect over institutions and attitudinal changes of his day”594 often 
meant in relation to subsequent medical history. But this was a legacy also of the radical 
ambition that extends through a certain idea for a Science of Man, namely for those who sort to 
unify the disciplinary modes under the ambition for developing a new language adequate to 
man‟s world. Paradoxically this is characterised by producing a new scientific discourse, 
positively dissociated from an old knowledge. However if an 18
th
 century vitalism represented 
this as a reciprocity between two modes of knowledge, in the wake of the revolution and its 
dispersive social politics, these became conflicting tasks that left the mark on French 19
th
 century 
Positivism.  
 
The Science of Man in Crisis  
 
In the early decades of the 19
th
 century there was a loss of belief that a Science of Man could 
deliver the unified ambitions of a future science. However, the impact of its legacy, as an 
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unfulfilled task, also left its mark. For example, Bichat also impressed as an orator in conveying 
the need to take up a „special reasoning‟ as is evident amongst his students. Philibert Roux 
commented,- 
“Bichat has metamorphose my youth through inspiring me with the taste of science and 
the love of work”595  
This is perhaps one example of why the idea of a Science of Man reached well beyond the 
medical program. The significance as conveyed by Cabanis and Bichat is notably felt by Henri 
de Saint-Simon who expressed his sentiments in 1813, in a handcopied Memoire sur la Science 
sur l’homme. He had concretely understood this as a task following,- 
“the next most important step which would follow on directly from those taken by Vicq 
d‟Azyr, Cabanis, Bichat and Condorcet, was to deal with the whole of this science in 
one single work by completing the material of these four great men.”
596
 
By 1813 Saint-Simon had already established that these were methods of Positivism. It meant a 
composition of biology, medicine, and history while he sharply attacked those who tried to 
subordinate a Science of Man to mathematics, calling them the brutieres and “…sorry 
calculators who hide behind their ramparts of X and Z.”597 Broadly speaking, Condorcet‟s 
statistics were seen as the technical tool by which to multiply the powers of the human mind, 
displacing superstition and error, democratizing and liberating but importantly by 1813 Saint-
Simon already saw himself as distanced from many aspects of Philosophe thought.
598
 What could 
appear to Condorcet as epochs of history described as incrementally progressive, was described 
by Saint-Simon in Introduction aux travaux scientifiques de xix siecle (1807-8) as an active 
struggle between forces, organic and critical, which were expressed in the overlapping systems 
of knowledge, each growing out of the contradictions of the other.  
 
Internal tensions necessitated the overturning of the old order so that the „new‟ could be brought 
into being. There was an undercurrent of historical force that informed Saint-Simon‟s concept of 
progress, he saw forces that needed negotiating as ultimately they dominate history. This was 
what all modern knowledge ultimately has to contend with; to „become positive‟ in knowledge 
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was a task undertaken in the face of this dynamic crisis of change, against which knowledge 
could never be absolute but always provisional. The future science was displaced by knowledge, 
now functional and relative only to a phase of history. The historical meant what was 
fundamentally understood of a general organic movement, and this saw Saint-Simon reflecting 
on these physiological influences, as something conditioned by modes of synthetic or analytical 
knowledge. Historical oscillations between synthetic and analytical modes were described as 
“systole and diastole,” appearing as the a priori/a posteriori dichotomy,  a “breathing in and out,” 
whose origins were in the “very fibres of the nervous system.”599 In this context, the nature of 
science itself was now described as perspectival,- 
“our eyes grow tired when we look at things for a long time from the same point of 
view. We then stop discovering among them new relationships. We even stop 
perceiving clearly those relationships we had once seen.”
 600
 
It is also notable that Saint-Simon‟s concept of knowledge was an active struggle in which 
Descartes was the first synthesiser of the modern era, composing from particular discoveries of 
Galileo, Copernicus and Kepler, but that this mode of knowledge was historically relative to its 
epoch. Relativity was Saint-Simon‟s strong idea. Approaching historical movement required an 
activity of „seeing,‟ the new epochal task of the 19th century. This may be seen as inherited from 
the Science of Man now in the need for a synthetic knowledge of the world. 
 
Saint Simon: The Physico-Political Task 
 
It has been claimed that Saint-Simon was the first modern thinker to see a dynamic concept to 
which history was that change itself, sweeping human society along.
601
 It may seem 
anachronistic to propose he followed ambitions in an Enlightenment Science of Man, but by 
inverting its „tendencies‟ and seeing it as divergent forces, prone to distortion, he distinguished 
himself from Condorcet‟s rational political action, ultimately under the possibility of „scientific‟ 
control. In contrast Saint-Simon reflected a historical force that acted from „without,‟ imposing 
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change upon man and that these were conditions of history. A radical modern response took up a 
task of confronting and absorbing its changes in maintaining a mean, by putting into effect an 
autonomous modern knowledge.  
 
Saint-Simon‟s early development gives some indication as what he took a Science of Man to be. 
Prior to 1813, Saint Simon was engaged in a self styled political project following in the wake of 
the scattering of the „troops of the Enlightenment.‟ After the dissolution of the Classe des 
Science Morales et Politique in 1803, and the denigration of its intellectual circles by Napoleon 
Bonaparte, Saint Simon‟s reflected on Ideologue ideas during the Consulate period. He 
proceeded to develop an ambition for a new encyclopedia project during the early Empire, 
drawing on the wider reaches of a serious study of science taken up in 1798.
602
 Saint Simon was 
attending lectures during this time, firstly at the Ecole Polytechnique and then three years later at 
the Ecole de Medicine, where he became familiar with the works of Xavier Bichat and Pierre-
Jean Georges Cabanis, and personally acquainted with a number of the physicians, notably Jean 
Burdin who went on to exert a great influence on him.
603
 Memoire sur La Science de L’homme 
formulated these ideas as a basis for Saint-Simon‟s „physico-political career.‟604  
 
From Cabanis legacy, Saint Simon appears to have absorbed the possibilities of future sciences 
that were still defining their limits, and of which a contemporary Science of Man was drawing on 
indiscriminately. It differentiated itself from the „mechanical‟ distributions the 17th century, and 
looked forward to more „organic‟ concept of human knowledge. „Organic‟ appears to have been 
understood by Saint Simon as reflecting the holistic thinking of the Hippocratic medical writers, 
and their integration of a broad vitalism into a Science of Man.
605
 However, in the new era, a 
crisis followed the fragmentation of scientific knowledge, sciences appeared to propel 
themselves as narrowly specializations which no longer gave a perspective on an interdependent 
world. 
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The web of knowledge defined differing intellectual regions, perhaps in the manner of Bichat‟s 
tissues; he was conversant with tissue theory through his friend Dr Burdin from the Directory 
period, as recalled in the Memoire. Saint Simon had absorbed an idea that “all sciences began by 
being conjectural, their destiny is to become positive”.606 In this text, Dr Burdin outlined a 
physiological vision for the Science of Man, being as yet conjectural but embodying the promise 
to emerge as positive during the 19
th
 century. When Saint Simon writes of important questions of 
physiology dealt with by Vicq d‟Azyr, Cabanis, Bichat and Condorcet, there are certain 
reservations developed in the image of the human mind inherited from Condorcet‟s Equisse. 
Perhaps as a consequence of the later crisis in the post revolutionary period, Saint Simon now 
identifies a bifurcation at the heart of a general knowledge.
607
  
“There are two kinds of scientific study: the search for facts and the reasoning based on 
those facts, that is the improvement of general theory….Locke and Newton assumed a 
new appoach: they found new facts in abundance. One found the force of gravitation the 
other the fact of the human minds perfectibility. The school became the Newtonian-
Lockean. For almost a century it has utilised the approach bequeathed to them by these 
two men. It has been preoccupied by facts and has neglected theory.”608 
The neglected theory was Saint-Simon‟s core problem. This meant the synthetic function 
understood to be lacking from sciences of the 18
th
 century. These made striking analytic 
progress, yet failed in their central task of transforming the world of man. In the wake of 
Descartes, positive philosophy branched into physics of the inorganic and the physics of the 
organic, while failing to find a unifying law.
609
 Saint-Simon now reflects the mood of his own 
epoch. By invoking a return to the spirit of Descartes, he meant finding a suitable distributive 
principle to substitute for the deficiency in the idea of God,-  
“The idea of God lacks unity...the idea of God being defective, all the uses of this idea 
are thus equally defect....physicism has none of the drawbacks of deism.....The universe 
is a limitless space filled with matter in motion....matter exists in two forms: solid and 
fluid, phenomena called physical are called phenomena of solid matter. Phenomena 
that are mental are the phenomena of fluids.”610 
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This „solid and fluid‟ dualism is identified with another transformation, the historical movement 
of ideas from polytheism through deism which “lasted from Socrates to Paul,” to a modern 
„physicism‟ which maps a dispersion given to an abstract “sole cause of all physical and moral 
phenomena.”611 The significance is that by 1813 Saint Simon was moving beyond a 
physiological debate and was now looking to integrating wider sources to mediate similar basic 
concerns as an earlier Science of Man. 
 
One source was De L’Origine de Tous Cultes (1798) written by Charles Dupuis which had been 
popular amongst liberal readers through its debunking of Catholicism. Dupuis held that science 
should displace religion which was a tool of repression and that the common people should 
abandon it for reason. This impressed Saint-Simon, although he took the opposite view. He 
thought religion should adapt itself to the new sciences becoming “a set of applications of 
general science by means of which enlightened man could govern the ignorant.”612 This is both 
an extension of Ideologue thought but also a difference since it equated religion with being a 
political tool. Saint Simon was integrating ideas drawn from the Counter-Revolutionaries,
613
 and 
displayed an admiration for the way that Chateaubriand had portrayed Catholicism in the middle 
ages in Le Genie de Christianisme (1802). Chateaubriand particularly emphasised the aesthetic 
nature of medieval religion in its affect it on political and social unity and this aesthetic nature of 
the socio-political domain indicated a significant shift.
614
 It also partly reflects the context in 
which the writing of Louis de Bonald resonated with Saint-Simon. De Bonald blamed anarchy in 
French society on aesthetic individualism of the Enlightenment making its effect on the 
destruction of a social order. 
615
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Ideology, Language, Nature  
 
Louis De Bonald has often been associated with the reaction against the legacy of an 18
th
 century 
concept of „nature.‟ In this context it meant the principle that lent itself to the popular 
sovereignty through for example Rousseau‟s social contract. But equally he held Philosophes to 
be in error for example in the legacy of Condillac who accounted for an intellectual artifice 
introduced as a false concept of man.
616
 Both Rousseau‟s natural man and Condillac‟s statue 
were an illusory human nature that attributed society to being a mere convention. De Bonald 
thought that this displaced another principle which understood the social contract in terms of a 
religious principle and any idea of radical intervention only prevented society from naturally 
constituting itself and achieving a natural stability.  
 
De Bonald thought that a concept of society existed under the union of two aspects, the political 
and the religious, to which civil society was a principle of mediation. The associative principle 
foregrounds the „just order,‟ is „necessary‟ only to the extent that history has demonstrated that it 
could not be otherwise. The distortion of natural composition of a society demonstrates the error 
in the Philosophes doctrine on human nature; they gave the Republic an idea of man as an 
abstract intellectual construction.
617
 The principle which De Bonald attributed to history follows 
the language argument as Condillac had earlier. Language is seen as the exemplary medium of 
social cohesion but a domain of discourse is neither arbitrary nor mere conventional; this was 
what De Bonald seems to have understood Condillac to be proposing. Rather, the emphasis is on 
the notion that the linguistic sign implies an a priori socialised thought - social convention 
necessarily presupposed speech. This was a necessary relation between signs and speech that 
gave a natural expression of exchange of values. From this perspective, the idea-sign was an 
arbitrary construction, not an essence attributable to human nature. Essence grounds the premise 
for the argument that intervention, in the manner aspired to by Condillac‟s „new language,‟ puts 
„ends before the means.‟618 Examining this as a question of priority reveals that there can be no 
such thing as a „new language‟ since truth always appears excluded at the level of the individual. 
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Individual „truth‟ would therefore be discounted as a moral impossibility since the moral can 
only be expressed at the level of the social through a collective conscience.
619
 Collective 
knowledge is understood as the capacity, the gift of history, handed down in the face of the 
dangers of a frivolous individualism. Against this history an inherent lack in any „new language‟ 
is embodied by the central problem of error by which the modern world dangerously extends 
destructive risk in material technologies that penetrate the very fibres of the social body.
620
  
 
When Saint-Simon argues for the organic unity of the middle ages, he draws on De Bonald at 
source. But he differs in reversing any unity attributed to the middle ages for a grounding of the 
coming scientific revolution. Galileo, Bacon, Descartes, Newton, Locke and the Encyclopaedists 
all contributed to a critical overturning of such a medieval society with the new knowledge 
initiating the dynamic modern world based on the new physicism. It is this world that his 
scientific integration intends to envelop as a Science of Man.
621
 
 
From Memoire sur La Science De L’homme to a New Anthropology  
 
In 1813 Saint Simon was still outlining such an integration in relation to the discipline of 
physiology. The discussion with physician Jean Burdin in Memoire sur La Science De L’homme 
explores the idea that a general knowledge became less conjectural with experience as an organic 
development moving from the simple to the complex. A science of ideas developed from a future 
science.- 
“Psychology is beginning to be based on physiology and to rid itself of the prejudices 
on which it was founded…Physiology does not yet deserve to be classed among the 
positive sciences but it only has to take one more step in order completely to rise above 
the conjectural sciences.
622 
In this respect, physiology was seen as the primary domain of knowledge that the educated man 
should explore as it was understood to embody the general idea by which an elite could guide 
society. Such an informed Science of Man differentiated between modes of being “by the 
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combined intellectual power of the physiologist and the philosopher…” which implicates the 
programmatic task for the physiologist/philosopher. Memoire sur la science de l’homme 
approached this as the “series of progress of the human mind,” a future science that appears 
consequential of its past and Saint-Simon gave this as a historical account of emerging modes of 
knowledge from his alleged discussion with Jean Burdin. What he expounds is a theory of 
knowledge by which the new society can mediate its own transformation, by the differentiation 
of social class like an organic body where intelligence was taken as proportionate to the degree 
of development evident in their phenomenal existence.
 623
  
 
This lead to an ambition that the clergy be reconstituted as a scientific corps upheld through the 
strength of a specialised knowledge and its mediators, “as long as the principles that it knows are 
unknown to the common people.”624 Significantly Saint-Simon objects to Condorcet upholding 
Rousseau‟s conjectural idea of the „noble Savage.‟ By equating a universal history with a human 
life cycle, Memoire sur la science de l’homme also drew on the new anthropology experience 
seen as informing the stages of a development of man. The basis for this was that he thought that 
recent anthropological evidence of explorers such as James Cook, Louis Antoine de Bougainville 
and Jean-François Le Perouse had positively superseded speculative historicism.
625
 Because it 
could now be demonstrated that “a non interrupted series of observed facts” followed from 
primitive man to European societies, Saint-Simon extended the physiological idea of man into 
the field of cultural anthropology.
626
 His euro-centrism gave a progressive vision that took its 
twin aspects from societies ability to civilise the individual through a collective language, and 
the fact that European societies were seen as scientifically advanced.  
 
However, a notably darker vision appears in the text Travail sur la gravitation universelle,
 
written in the same year but with the urgency of a program for civil reconstruction. This was now 
a response to the crisis of the Napoleonic wars which left Saint Simon seeing a society faced 
with forces that could “plunge the human species back into the state of nature which is 
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continuous war.”627 This demonstrated his conviction that progress was only periodic, 
transitional and even cataclysmic; Travail sur la gravitation universelle describes an apocalyptic 
vision of the gradual desiccation of the globe as mankind falls backwards through a series of 
stages until regressing into the brute with an imaginative vision of the last man having drunk the 
final drop of water before reflecting on the pathologically morbid realisation of mankind finally 
disappearing from the face of the earth.
628
 At the limit of the old physiological debate, this shift 
can be illustrated by pointing to the new anthropology that was emerging during the early 19
th
 
century. Already when Le Societè des Observateurs de l’homme was founded in 1799, a debate 
was unfolding that called for “profound metaphysicians and practicing physicians, the historian 
and the voyager” to join in with the comparative study of man.629 Those who stood forward 
included biologists Cuvier, Jussieu, Geoffrey Saint Hillaire, Lamarck, physicians Cabanis and 
Pinel, chemist Foucroy, explorers Bougainville and François Le Vaillant and Linguists Destutt 
de Tracy and Roch-Ambroise Sicard; this was an interdisciplinary group who met for twice 
weekly lectures on the natural history of man. But a notable event occurred in 1800 when two 
ships, Le Géographe and Le Naturaliste, embarked on an expedition to map the coast of 
Australia. One of the tasks taken up by the Société had been to prepare instructions for „studying 
savages‟ for the accompanying nine zoologists and botanists.630  
 
The „observateurs‟ that rose to this occasion to “perfect anthroplogy” were Joseph Marie 
Degérando and George Cuvier with marked differences in their approach.
 
Degérando brought 
with him the tradition of the Classe des Science Morales et Politique and the Ideologue method 
of comparative analysis aiming at a Science of Man. He proposed learning locals languages as 
crucial to becoming like their „fellow citizen‟ and open an exploration through Ideologists 
psychology. Savage articulation was “no doubt composed of symbols as arbitrary and 
conventional as our own” yet they equally could present the insight into a “beginning from the 
language of action.” Degérando was therefore seeking a bridge from body to mind on the basis 
of sensationalist theory. Observations of social interaction informed the important problems of 
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questions of liberty and the status of organised religion.
631
 The image of the „voyageur-
philosophe‟ travelling into the past, accords with Saint Simon earlier ambition of resolving the 
querelle des anciens et moderne through a progressive politics. By contrast, Cuvier represented 
the emerging life sciences position developed under his comparative anatomy, the new 
taxonomia. His approach displaced the language debate and emphasised bodies and their 
structure. Cuvier‟s interests suggested that the voyagers should make sure to visit the places 
where the dead were buried to obtain skeletons, and marked the significant difference in 
approach emphasising the epochal shift that happened during these years.
632
 In the event, it was 
François Peron who joined the expedition. He noted how racial differences in the combined 
geological and zoological data indicated that Tasmania and Australia had split geographically 
before they became populated. This led to a radical interpretation through the view that races 
were „aboriginally‟ distinct thereby foregrounding the racial difference that marked the end of 
the myth of the noble savage as the seat of a „mysterious history.‟633 The advent of a new 
anthropology and can be associated with the reaction against the egalitarian optimism of the 
Revolution.  
 
This gave the new anthropological basis grounded in theories of animality and informed by 
visions of degradation or „aboriginal difference,‟ and were new theoretical choices that appeared 
to the early 19
th
 century earlier sustained by the Ideologues approach. The possibility that 
suggested itself through the new anthropology was polygenism and a theory of innate difference 
that took its evidence from the study of skeletal structures equating visual cranial differences 
with mental differences opening a central problem for anthropology until redirected under 
Darwinian theory.
634
 However Cabanis physio-psychological approach was primarily a cultural 
concern and this distinction was precisely why Degérando was content to leave questions of 
polygenism („lumpers‟ and „splitters‟) unanswered. Such motivations were evident of the 
tradition of a Science of Man, to which cultural anthropology retained its function as a reformers 
science against the cultural legacy of the past.
635
 What the new anthropology explains is the loss 
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of a way of thinking, which is what Saint Simon confronted with an apocalyptic vision; after this 
he took up Positivism in a modified form. 
 
Taxonomic Biology and Vitalist Physiology 
 
A similar motivational shift followed in questions of biological organisation when confronting 
the heritage of Maupertuis, Buffon and Linnaeus. In debates on natural history at the Muséum 
d‟Histoire Naturelle in Paris from around 1795, Étienne Geoffroy St Hilaire, Henri Ducrotay de 
Blainville and Georges Cuvier convinced fellow naturalists to take the model of organisation in-
itself, as distinct from the specific configurations of living bodies, to be the central notion of a 
zoological taxonomy.
636
 In the 1793, Cuvier brought this concept of organisation to a 
classification in natural history by emphasising how specific configuration of living bodies 
obeyed principles evident as necessary combinations of organs. Necessity now appears as a 
structural limit evidently imposed externally and was read against an internal purposiveness; the 
general logic of the organisms activity was therefore inscribed on its material form. For the 
nascent biological sciences, these organic forms were read as the „vocations of living beings‟ in 
an order of nature, the innate integration of function into biological structures that indicated a 
coordination or subordination of life‟s activity. This demanded naturalists revise older concepts 
of life.  
 
A revision of natural history through an image of anatomical structure gave the new biological 
domain its classification in terms of „assemblages of functions‟ to be integrated into the concept 
of the organism. Rather than interpreting the whole as a juxtaposition of organs, the organised 
whole prioritised function over any other direct relations of visual anatomical structures. What 
Cuvier prioritised in his analysis of structure now substituted for the discipline that relied on a 
visible resemblance in the parts; this effected an inversion that prioritised functional differences,- 
“differences between organs of the same kind are precisely the object of comparative 
anatomy...we are going to take each one of the functions which we have discussed and 
examine...the particular means by which are effected in different animals.”637  
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However, this classification according to functional difference was not unique to Cuvier; it was 
an emerging paradigm of the day. In fact, Bichat also lectured on how one organ alone does not 
carry out a function, and that function was the result of the labour of several organs.- 
“In the animal economy there are a great number of organs which appertain to several 
apparatuses.”638  
Bichat also indicated that a purely topographical anatomy was primarily for the use of surgeons 
and artists, implying that advanced physiology of higher animal function fore-grounded a 
„composite function.‟ This distinction paralleled the Museum debate which found its ascendancy 
from the turn of the 19
th
 century where composite function served to confront the theoretical 
problems associated with the doctrine of vital properties in organic matter.  
 
Composite function was the new theoretical paradigm, but this embodied further conceptual 
choices well illustrated from the perspective of the museum debate. Jean-Baptiste Lamarck 
joined Muséum national d'Histoire naturelle as a professor of zoology in 1793. Writing in 
Hydrogéologie (1802) he used the term biology following the Greek βίος refering to a mode of 
life (a fulfilled life) and indicated a status of the living through its actions or vocation. But the 
early biologists were still contending with the heritage of Greek science which derived ideas of 
life from the sign of life common to man and animals; υστή, as illustrated by what Homeric 
heroes risked in their struggles.
639
 This latter term lent a richness of meaning beyond any 
individual presence. But with the emergence of more positive Greek sciences needing greater 
precision after BC 550, they gave the term ζώη to distinguish life as soul. This was meant as 
evidence of activity that distinguished it from the opposite, inanimate passivity.
640
 It was a 
distinction that helped explain the dynamic idea of the transformation of matter in the world 
from an activity standing behind appearances. For Aristotle, the more positive paradigm was to 
see the animal as a machine possessing a soul and, drawing on his medical knowledge, as 
something possessing vitality, meaning “a thing can nourish itself and grow and decay.”641 In the 
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modern era, biology that aimed at expanding its scientific language beyond the legacy of the 
Greeks, returned to the problem through an intensified study of natural history towards the end of 
the 18
th
 century.
642
 The problem of classification was a conceptual problem around the difficulty 
of attributing function to the activities of life. The physiological discipline already confronted 
this from the mid 18
th
 century as Georg Stahl, looking to ground physiology‟s elemental notions, 
proposed a concept of life appearing as a power to suspend its destiny of corruptibility. In this 
way Stahl‟s vitalism proposed seeing organs as being tools with specific ends but in which 
organic function was the unknown mechanism that attained these ends.
643
 An idea of function 
already looked beyond the simple oppositions of presence and absence of υστή; modern vitalism 
looked to index functions that relate to activities defined through a concept of natural being. 
When Kant drew on this he saw the organised body as both machine and organism, but 
distinguished an organic machine further through its need to possess a formative energy on the 
grounds that an organised body was not just organised but self-organising.
644
  
 
In the Muséum d‟Histoire Naturelle, the nascent biology looked to matrix of the body for a 
concept of natural life. Lamarck outlined his exemplary study of form in Philosophie Zoologique 
(1809) as derived from the distension or coagulation associated with cellular tissue. In an 
accumulation and assimilation in this structureless gel, Lamarck saw here the origins of organic 
structure that extended as to a discourse on man whose transcendent nature explained why 
dominant races spreads out “into all the habitable places suitable for them.”645 From this 
anthropological basis, Philosophie zoologique imagined the naturalist as the voyager moving into 
the past, between the natural and the artificial, and beyond the restrictions of language on a 
conjectural basis.646  
 
Lamarck was answering the question of the observable order of nature, from the point where 
nature sets life in motion and how it is organically mediated. Lamarck does not appear unclear 
about the limits of such a conjectural method; “if science neglects philosophy, its progress will 
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not be real.” The zoological object remains provisionally situated between a productive source 
and the knowledge which mediates this. He confronts this as a specific problem, evident in a 
proliferations of secondary characteristics in animals, through a decomposition of the animal 
series in which he looks for two opposite factors working together to produce the animal forms. 
But one must understand Lamarck‟s problem as not explaining a simple spontaneity of animal 
appearance but the historical evidence of events that have disturbed a regular unfolding of the 
organism.
647
  What was to be attributed to the observable difference that indexed unknown 
„circumstances‟ between milieu and organism? In this, Lamarck‟s thought retained the potential 
for instability in the equilibrium of living forms which philosophically was a problem of 
representing animal development in relation to the concept of world. This necessitates a 
differential concept, or open variable, rather than a principle that informs the simple rational 
order of a productive of resemblance.
648
 
 
There is therefore, a „hybrid concept‟ that informs Philosophie zoologique.649 This may be seen 
as following from the task of formulating a new language from a perspective of an 
anthropocentric biology whose value precedes the observation of form.
650
 But like Cabanis, 
Lamarck also takes habits as transformed through reactions as moral values, although he takes an 
inverted approach to its value in relation to physical forms, - 
“at their source, the physical and the moral are no doubt the same thing. By studying 
the organic structures of the different orders of known animals we can provide the most 
impressive evidence for this truth…The influence of the physical on the moral has 
already been recognized. But it seems to me that we have not yet given sufficient 
attention to the moral on the physical itself.”651  
The question that Lamarck appears to be explaining is how physical actions, “habitual and 
energetic,” can coordinate a power to transform - to “stand in opposition to herself.” In this 
sense, it would be false to attribute to Lamarck‟s biology an explanation of transmission of 
acquired characteristics, this was a new biological problem that appears for Darwin with 
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biological hereditary.
652
 By contrast, Lamarck is answering the question of transmission of traits 
which remains tied to a moral question, and never becomes fully divorced from the question of 
history. Lamarck‟s Transformism confronts the historical problem of an archetypal Original Sin, 
as well as the inherited experiences of Greek thinking, rather than the future scientific problem 
derived from Darwinian hereditary.  
 
Lamarck therefore shares with the writings of Condillac a sense of science confronting the 
weight of the past. This means both a critique and extension of Cartesian rationalism whose 
ambition is to extend a querelle des anciens et des moderne through the radicalism in positive 
knowledge. From this perspective Lamarck‟s adaptation is preceded by an evidence of a „need,‟ 
and cannot be restricted to what we would now consider a biological or physiological concept. 
Rather it is tied to an idea of a task or project that relates to a wider social idea against which 
modern science had to make its stand. The nascent biology was still characterised through an 
idea of nature associated with the debate of Adam Smith‟s thinking of supply and demand. In the 
wake of the Revolution and before industrialism took root on a large scale, the rhythm of 
workers and the function of money was, in France, preceded by an idea of a natural order in the 
political and economic sphere, this was upheld by the Physiocrats under a doctrine of the land.
653
 
Adam Smith had been known in France since 1777, and four translations of The Wealth of 
Nations had been published between 1779 and 1802. Such ideas were further spread in France by 
Jean-Baptiste Say through Traité d’économique Politique of 1803 and this shared the cultural 
background in which Lamarck‟s biology was a developing discourse. This discourse confronted 
the problem compacted into a debate over what constituted „natural‟ being. As the Science of 
Man was already fragmenting into the new positivities during the first quarter on the 19
th
 
century, it left an inherent conflict in the grounding of a wider socio-political knowledge and this 
appears parallel to what was taken up by Saint Simon after 1814. 
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Saint Simon, Socialism and Nouveau Christianisme 
 
The context of 1814 was that Saint Simon met Augustin Thierry and began working together on 
their industrial system. The problem was how to submit a political system to an autonomous 
knowledge which could act independently of national governments. Saint-Simon now came to 
see the economy as dynamically transforming societies and relegating governments to secondary 
importance, a radicality he associated with the dynamism of emerging industry, autonomously 
establishing new divisions in opposition to old feudal structures. The principle idea behind this 
was that human productivity links the world through a power of spontaneous organisation.
654
 In 
the wake of the Napoleonic crisis, with a political necessity in the face of looming catastrophe, 
Saint-Simon no longer took liberty as an individual quality. At issue was the force by which the 
group could represent themselves, the quality that expressed the „assemblage of forces‟ in the 
collective group. On this level, the question of mediation became an important moral question of 
representation. 
 
Saint-Simon is a moralist but one framed by the relativity in human knowledge. Moral actions 
are social activities rooted to specific historical situations. While there was no classless society 
for Saint-Simon, nor strictly any „natural‟ modes of division in relations between individual, 
society and environment, there was the moral man. To be in tune with the forces of history, not 
merely a speculator of ideas, but rather someone who acts with the correctness of a historical 
consciousness, like an intra-organic function within the social body. Social classes were not 
static, but followed life cycles related to their epoch and passed from birth through to death 
under a dominant class. A dominant class represents the mode of being for the whole of society 
through their ideas and desires, expressed through their powers of organisation. This marks a 
break with Ideologue thinking as Saint-Simon focuses on the struggle of ideas now become a 
class struggle. It is a distinction that reflects how dynamic modes of modern industrial society 
become stripped of scientific specificity for Saint-Simon. The modern individual appears 
dissolute in the flow of history. His Positivism finds its task of realising an assemblage of 
knowledge of the world which can measure up to the forces of history. In the crisis society Saint 
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Simon saw class membership as driven by a variety of unnatural, random and extraneous 
circumstances, derived from inherited wealth or spurious birth rights. Under these conditions, the 
value of a synthetic philosophy acts against the dispersion of history. Society run through with 
diverging, yet „natural‟ forces, are something to which all are exposed.655 
 
On this basis, industrial values were championed as the expression of man‟s inner drives seeking 
an outlet through an exploration of the world and the transformation into non-human objects 
subjected to an imposition of the human will. In 1819, Saint Simon was working on 
L’Organisateur with Auguste Comte as his secretary. The struggle between modes of being was 
the class struggle and a concept of labour now appears as an excess of material force, as 
something psychic, against which the idler seems destined to enfeeblement and death.
656
 This is 
not, however, to be taken in any narrow sense since L’Organisateur also discovers that these 
industrial values extend to the poets, musicians and painters. Such aesthetic roles are 
complementary, even necessary, as a supplement to scientific knowledge which has a dangerous 
tendency to particularise. The artist upholds an aesthetic power which Saint Simon understood as 
a capacity distinct from the analytical power of mathematics and the physical sciences. Perhaps 
this reflects his seeming disappointment in scientists lack of vision as commented on in Memoire 
sur la science de l’homme and Travail sur la gravitation universelle. Equally a generation of 
romantic poets, not blind to an encroaching crisis of modern times, articulated the capacity that 
was crucially sensitive to man‟s moral health and the looming dangers of history. Saint-Simon‟s 
response to this quest for the problematic knowledge to confront the modern situation, like much 
of 19
th
 century French thought, was the search for mediation between synthetic and analytic 
modes of history. Saint Simon represents this as the residual task under a legacy of the Science 
of Man.
657
 
 
Saint Simon‟s earlier secretary and collaborator, Auguste Comte later emphasised his own 
version of Positivism, delimited to the transformation of metaphysics through the promise of a 
more autonomous knowledge. This was a later divergence from the interest in the industrial 
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system. Saint-Simon, however, does not ultimately appeal to logic but to a faith, at least as an 
aesthetic principle of unity.
658
 What Saint-Simon turned to industry to provide became, toward 
the end of his life, achieved only through an imaginative „quasi‟ mythical form of a new religion. 
An empirical precedent can be identified here. In the wake of the revolution Saint Simon had 
seen the proliferation of various religious cults, indeed many leaders of such revolutionary cults 
were known to him personally. He had observed first hand how synthetic religions swept into the 
void left by the Catholic church. From this observation, an anthropological principle which 
needed something more suitable than the haphazard ideas of the cults, a Science of Man 
recognised the provisional and functional tool, like a universal gravity, of representing the 
suitable psychological structure for human consciousness.  
 
In his final years Nouveau Christianisme (1825) took up a concept of the greatest universality 
“which man have ever put into practice.” Following a dialogue between a conservative and a 
reformer, this was understood as something of which the 18
th
 centuries had an “exalted 
conception,” something demanded of the human race which “is not confined to imitation.”659 
The social physiology of Memoire sur la science de L’homme addressed a unity as a scientific 
project, but abandoned this in his later career in favour of a more explicitly aesthetic principle. It 
was a shift that looked necessarily to techniques extended as a political tool and this grounds the 
continuity in Saint Simon‟s thinking. 
 
The Two Cultures: The Critique of Bichat‟s Physiology 
 
A further shift beyond the physiological tradition came from François-Pierre Maine de Biran, 
however he still discussed the possibility of a Science of Man now seen as an experience of 
will.
660
 Although Maine de Biran died in 1824, this legacy was also the source of dispute with 
particular significance for Comte‟s Positivism during the period of the July Monarchy (1830-
1848). By experience of will meant the production of evident actions and reactions expressed as 
laws of the body, these were to be presented as a psychology which some understood to be a 
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science of the soul. De Biran had earlier concluded that an “immense gap that subsists always 
between two sciences,” namely those concerning the physical and those of the moral.661 As an 
early ideologue, he had exchanged ideas with the medical circles frequented by Cabanis, Destutt 
de Tracy and Bichat in the years around 1800, and in 1803 and was even awarded a prize by the 
„Classe des Sciences Morals et Politiques‟ for hihs text L’influence de l‘habitude sur le faculté 
de penser.
662
 But by the 1820‟s De Biran rejected the contemporary medical discourse seen as 
dominated by “certain physiologists” who derived a method of division from Bichat‟s 
classifications. This was because such methods were seen to efface internal realities of functions 
of the will; the physiological method of division led to arbitrary distinctions of an increasingly 
abstract character.  
 
Maine de Biran therefore prioritised autonomous states of experience in relation to what he geld 
as a unique source of knowledge. Such a source, in his 1812 text Essai sur les Fondements de la 
Psychologie, appeared influenced by Hume‟s problem of causation, yet De Biran was also 
following a vitalist tradition after Montpellier medicine.
663
 From the latter‟s legacy, he held as a 
physiological unknown, as an element of which explanation always falls short, which grounded 
his empirical priorities by fore-grounding a „fait primitive.‟ This reflects the special 
epistemology that describes a physical causation, but also understood as an internal experience at 
the level of the body. What De Biran approached as a Science of Man was therefore a „new 
language‟ given to relations of exterior impressions to internal experience and which was set out 
as a criticism of Ideology.
 
He moves within a broader empirical tradition with values attributed 
to the „fait primitive‟ at the origins of intellectual operations, consequently holds the particular 
status in relation to the question of the moral and the physical. De Biran implies that the „fait 
primitive‟ can be the real basis for scepticism in relation to knowledge of physical organisation 
of the animal sensitivity as evident life beyond the particular. This was given to Descartes as a 
point of faith, and posed by Condillac from the point of view of the receptive subject. But the 
status of a „fait primitif‟ in human knowledge was the object of an understanding for his Science 
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of Man despite ultimately remaining inaccessible to a formalised knowledge.
664
 The „fait 
primitive‟ was therefore initially introduced negatively by demonstrating against Cabanis a limit 
to the experience of the physical through intellectual relations to phenomena, and for criticising 
Bichat as confusing the terms of sensibility and contractility in relations to a subjective 
functioning of an ego. This critique focused on the question of what is attributed to physical 
properties in their equivalence to psychological phenomena. Hence, De Biran takes Bichat‟s 
classifications as purely nominal, emphasising the confusion around the use of the sign in 
designating vital properties.
665
  
 
This marks a distinction between a simple affectation, widely associated with the legacy of 
Condillac‟s statue, and the perception as a power for action. De Biran saw this as a question over 
the use of Condillac‟s sign and a general confusion specifically associated with the legacy of 
Bichat‟s classifications of habituated functions. Recherches physiologique sur la vie et la mort 
described the awakening animal maintained through degrees of sensible difference derived from 
a continuous organic base as two different states of sensibility.
666
  De Biran looks to explains 
what an ego perceives as a distinct experiences of two orders of perception, voluntary and 
involuntary. 
 
Bichat premised experience as originating either in organic sensibility as an exterior force 
relation, or with the possibility of a judgement derived from within an animal sensibility. This 
was complicated, however, by the classification which further divides into two reactive orders of 
organic contractility and animal contractility; the latter is identified with voluntary muscular 
movement, although left as a generic term intended to explain the seat of sensory-motor action as 
understood to be produced under cerebral influences.
667
 De Biran‟s point is that Bichat‟s 
classification splits any systematic unity behind a single principle of action among the various 
functional differences apportioned to the parts of the body by his anatomy. By contrast, the „fait 
primitive‟ represents a power that can initiate and continue autonomous movements, and behind 
this assertion he foregrounds the free potential of the anticipations of the consciousness of the 
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mind which is necessarily attributed to broader facts of the organism in general. De Biran is 
suggesting that Bichat‟s general method of division subordinates perceptions in the human 
consciousness as potentially analogical to physical properties in the material body. From this he 
asserts that the physiological method is limited in relation to general forms of human knowledge. 
It is a limit that is material and the physiological discourse is simply unable to span it.
668
 De 
Biran defines, as a distinct domain, an „empire of the soul‟ transcending Bichat‟s classifications 
of properties in Recherches physiologique which imply the psycho-physical parallelism between 
two essentially different natures. 
 
De Biran points out in Nouvelles considerations sur les rapports du physique et du moral de 
l'homme, an essay from around 1920, that in the early 19
th
 century physiologists were attributing 
to muscular organs properties understood as „special modes‟ of sensibility and taken as evidence 
of universal facts of natural life. Physiologist used these facts to explain transmission and 
continuation of impressions and offered them as ontological notions unfolded from a concept of 
the organic life of sensation. The „fait primitive‟ upheld a limit against such a notion of 
sensation, but Maine de Biran‟s legacy was to open a domain which could stand as a modern 
doctrine of the spirit.
669
 
 
Radical Positivism: Auguste Comte 
 
Maine de Biran‟s critique was therefore seen to open the domain for a psychology of the „human 
spirit.‟ This was understood as a particular notion of freedom taken up against physiological 
reasoning. The philosophical legacy was taken up during the period of the July Monarchy (1830-
1848) by Auguste Comte‟s notable adversary, Victor Cousin who associated this with a true 
Science of Man,-  
“any sound philosophy is the study of human nature….the Science of Man, 
psychology, is certainly not all there is to philosophy but it is the foundation.”670  
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As Cousin understood it, this was a Science of Man that had been obscured by the successes of 
the physical sciences as the scientific spirit had overstretched its authority. But by examining 
reflections of phenomena from the perspective of the human mind, Cousin frames the practice of 
„psychology‟ as the preliminary study mental processes in the discipline of observation. This 
emphasised the distinction between soul and body. There was, however, also a cultural 
significance during the period of the July Monarchy as Cousin was a liberal defender of 
constitutional monarchy which he approached in the spirit of compromise between absolutism 
and democracy. Cousin became a symbol of the educational establishment to which he took up 
the task of the “rescuing of the youth” of France from precisely from the excesses of abstract 
scientific reasoning.
671
  
 
Auguste Comte specifically took up an antagonistic relation to such psychologist-philosopher 
defenders of a Science of Man. His basis for this was an epistemological practice to which all 
individual liberty appeared as something of a mirage. In this respect Comte also followed a 
Cartesian strategy, one which understood science as a universalising form of praxis moving 
beyond what he saw as an outmoded practice of contemplation. Comte‟s primary struggle can be 
characterised as this transformation of his perceived pre-scientific legacy, to which his Positive 
philosophy meant taking a historical relation to social thinking; “we always labour for our 
descendants,” says Comte, “but under the impetus of our ancestors.”672 Comte‟s problem was 
primarily historical, and he was suspicious of Cousin‟s psychology as subduing the radical 
implications of modern scientific knowledge on the basis of spurious ontological claims.  
 
Comte was particularly contentious over claims made for observational experience and the value 
attributed to a practice of observation. In this respect, Cousin reserved certain privileges for 
philosophising, namely prioritising the study of experience over a strictly theoretical approach to 
physical laws which should be understood in relation to the values outlined by Descartes 
Meditations.673 But Comte saw this as „symptomatic‟ of a deeper commitment to a privileged 
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metaphysical notion of man. Against this, the radical aspect of modern thought was understood 
as scientific method, the tool for pursuing another task, namely that aspect of Descartes whose 
praxis seeks elimination of a residual and outmoded metaphysics. Descartes invested critical 
powers in the standards of a praxis and, from this perspective, Comte found Cousin‟s psychology 
to be a regressive „manoeuvre‟ deliberately opposed to the tools of science which he thought 
were employed against the “groundwork of gross and mischievous quackery.”  The true 
implications were of a radical Positivism.
674
   
 
The radical dimension was an epistemological strategy that aimed for a more autonomous 
„organic approach‟.675 After 1822 Saint Simon and Auguste Comte started working together on 
Du systéme industriel and were focussed on the contemporary social debates of the day. Saint 
Simon‟s approach to De Bonald, the Counter Revolutionaries and a laissez faire criticism 
limiting intervention of the state has been discussed above. By way of contrast, Comte wrote that 
“there is no liberty of conscience in astronomy, physics, chemistry and physiology…”676 He was 
certainly familiar with Saint Simon‟s earlier Memoire essay, and Burdin‟s theory of the sciences 
going through a conjectural phase; Comte‟s perspective in Du systéme industriel was to ground 
positive ideas in what later became famous as the law of three stages.-  
“Because of the nature of the human mind, each branch of human knowledge is 
necessarily obliged in its advancement to pass successively through three different 
theoretical stages: the theological or the fictive stage; the metaphysical or the abstract 
stage, and finally the scientific or the positive stage.”677  
It is the law of the three stages which is intended as a dynamic perspective on the distinct regions 
of knowledge which in themselves can only be described from a static point of view.
678
 Comte‟s 
dynamism therefore maps a history through the “famous theological and metaphysical dogmas of 
optimism” which had earlier offered “very useful ways of reasoning.” Without explicitly 
identifying a value to „use,‟ Comte‟s defined the battleground for this Positive reasoning. 679  
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Comte was a more accomplished reader of science than Saint Simon and also well versed in the 
Montpellier tradition of medicine. What constituted an organic approach divided them during the 
writing of Du systéme industriel as Comte favoured stricter scientific grounds for overcoming 
diverse intellectual and ideological political reasoning. In this respect, his epistemological 
approach can be seen as aimed against individual political manoeuvring, but with a practical 
aspect that retained an ethical value attributed to a living whole. Such ethical necessity appears to 
require a certain resistance to effect a full development towards a „natural outcome,‟ which 
meant Comte‟s concept of a mean seen as a „regularisation of spontaneous evolution‟ in the 
series of oscillations around a middle line.
680
 In this way, Comte was straddling contemporary 
theories from the life sciences and mediating different models for an approach that aimed at 
delimiting a multiplicity of unknown variables which appeared as philosophical problems.  
 
As a philosophical strategy, this sums up an ambition to substitute a scientific relation for a 
metaphysical relation. Like Saint Simon, Comte also understood philosophy as a synthesis that 
presided over a human point of view and in this respect he similarly follows the legacy of an 18
th
 
century project for a Science of Man. But Comte‟s tools are primarily drawn from the new life 
sciences with the aim of producing a philosophy of superior concepts, against philosophies 
attributing readymade concepts to an innate source in the human mind. But it is specifically 
taken up against the contemporary philosophies of consciousness (Cousin) and Comte follows 
this with a particular line of post-Cartesian epistemology, as differential theories of science as 
mirror of an approach rooted in mind. Both approaches are therefore look beyond pure sciences 
that offer non-historical, logical or strictly universal principles. Comte‟s distinction notably 
focuses on the new bio-medical sciences, identified as radically distinct domains progressive 
overturning any strictly mathematical physics.
681
 On this basis, it has been suggested that 
Comte‟s differential theory inaugurates an epistemological tradition in French thought and can 
be seen as replacing a search for ontological ground with problems attributed to the processes 
that inform concept formation.
682
 Comte tried to define this both historically and regionally 
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through taking sciences as a privileged mode of production of knowledge both for development 
of mind and extending to wider social political discourses. 
 
Cours and the Project for a Positive Philosophy 
 
Comte‟s Cours de philosophie positive is premised on the radicalism of Descartes because 
historically this marks an epistemological shift away from ancient thought towards the „real.‟ 
Comte also follows the historicism of Condorcet in his claim that “the human minds progress is 
the progress of the individual mind…a direct evidence of that of a general mind.”683 Abstract 
epistemology, unified as a collective mind, promises a transform intellectual life against an 
“intellectual anarchy” of his time.684 This radical shift marks a difference “between us and them” 
(meaning ancients and moderns) where “new analytical views” resulted in the symbolic practice 
of modern science which marks the transformation of representation and the sign.
685
  
 
Cours takes this primary distinction from the modern concept of force, as abstracted from an idea 
of motion itself, which is its effect. The modern concept gives the understanding of “compound 
movements,” distinguished from the ancient idea of supernatural agency: modern science 
understood virtual velocities through a mathematical sign that grounds a different cosmological 
view. But the modern problem is complexity at the limit of what mechanics could establish as 
abstract laws, the problem of modern mechanics was therefore lack of knowledge. What Comte 
was tackling therefore was a need for special knowledge to displace this lack which an older idea 
attributed an „actual‟ inertia. Modern mechanics lacked through its failure to define other 
“inherent forces” evident in the spontaneous activities of “a range of substances up to those at the 
highest organisation.”686 Such thinking distinguished the belief that these would be displaced 
through the future sciences and Cours retained this belief as the principle driving its central 
problematic. With inertia, modern dynamics had the implicit recognition that the principle of 
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inertia marked the shift to the „new language‟ of motion,687 but this is intimately tied in with a 
principle of relativity, despite being is expressed in Newton‟s Principia as a law.688  
 
The cosmological science described by Galileo incorporates the observer within the „essentially‟ 
mathematical approach. For simple observations, inertia appeals to actual concrete phenomena, 
yet as a law, it presents its profound philosophical problems. While Newton‟s third law of 
dynamics describes a limited reciprocity observable as equal action and reaction, the first law 
(inertia) is the conceptual tool, whose abstraction is given in its symbolic aspect.
689
 Kant took 
this principle to ground any observational statement but this meant that, approached empirically, 
it should be taken as a psychological fact rather than a physical one, a purely inductive principle 
whose value was that of an interpretation. This was what Galileo interpreted of „the great book 
which lies before our eyes,‟ which was written in mathematics.690 In Comte‟s era, inertia was 
understood as the relativity that needed a „special epistemology.‟ To define an inertial frame, or 
frame of reference, relied on a perspective, idealised in some way, on the aggregate of bodies 
from which to derive a position of rest. This ideal gave the axiom of knowledge in the relation to 
the system. Comte‟s epistemology aspired to extend a more physiological principle as a form of 
praxis. 
 
From the Inertial Frame to Re-linking a Series  
 
Cours addressed this as a problem of organic phenomena that followed from the historical 
dispute between metaphysics and physics. At the start of the 19
th
 century these entered a new 
positive phase; this meant becoming freed from their relation to the medical arts through a 
delimited concept of life freed from “metaphysical abstractions.”691 Following the success of 
modern dynamics, the new threshold was between inorganic/organic phenomena. But this was 
merely seen as a regional difference, dependent on domain; as the inorganic sciences were less 
inter-dependant, simple organic properties of tissues were seen as complexly linked to their 
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milieu. This indicates a relation that varies as one ascends “the ranks of the organic bodies,” 
meaning in proportion to the diversity of their functions. Reciprocally, this indicated the power 
of the organism in modifying its medium which also rose in proportion.
692
  
 
Cours took the concept of reciprocity as axiomatic for a “truly philosophical” revolution. He 
credited Bichat with defining how the physiological object can be constrained to regions “proper 
to living bodies” as made evident through organic functions. However Comte saw Bichat‟s 
concept of life - the „sum of functions that resist death‟ - as conceptually problematic and 
potentially irrational.
693
 Rather he accepted biological existence was premised on an integration, 
rather than a resistance, and to this end noted that Bichat‟s definition suppressed certain elements 
“necessary to the general idea of life.” Here is the general idea by which Cours demonstrates a 
curious relation to Bichat; he was seen as exemplary in the field of method, but described his 
definition of life as an incomplete positivism.
694
  
 
This curious split reflects an assessment of the day. It is significant that Comte readily adopted as 
a more complete definition, one derived from Saint Simon‟s friend, the zoologist and naturalist 
Henri Marie Ducrotay de Blainville. Comte had attended his course in comparative physiology 
from 1829-1830
695
 and was influenced by de Blainville‟s description of life as a „double interior 
movement, general and continuous, of composition and decomposition.‟696 In his 1822 text De 
l'organisation des animaux: ou Principes d'anatomie comparée, De Blainville described his 
views on the principle constituents of a science of organised bodies to be studied from the twin 
perspectives of the static and dynamic. This Comte interpreted as a biology that combined 
anatomy and physiology by distinguishing organic forms from other inorganic objects; the static 
observes matter in its combinations, i.e. its structure and the exterior form as the effects of its 
matter, while the dynamic looks to describe processes of composition and accumulations, 
decompositions and destruction.
697
 De Blainville‟s biology was therefore describing a concept of 
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bodies existing in nature whose differences in duration resulted from a composition of elements 
which could resist decomposition.  
 
This followed an original idea of the animal series derived the anatomy of Vicq d‟Azyr, an idea 
that took organised bodies as displaying properties of binary associations which represented their 
essential differences from inorganic bodies. What emerged in the series was the display of 
harmony in the continuity of its existence. From cellular tissue, modified at base, to production 
of organs as the structures existing in themselves, these were the compositions attributed to a 
norm of life. Notably, De Blainville was an anatomist and taxonomist and also followed Cuvier 
in seeing exterior forms as distinct and visible evidence of dynamic results of forces of nature. 
The combinatory state was a possible state, structurally visible even after the organism‟s 
death.
698
  
 
Blainville‟s resulting synthesis of ideas strongly influenced Comte. The a priori concept of 
harmony between organism and medium indicated the conditions of existence that meant 
continuity with an environment and understood as a possible state amongst states,- 
“necessary harmony…whose unity of subject is one of the chief philosophical beauties 
of biology.” 699 
This was an aesthetic value that related a strategic value derived from the contemporary natural 
history as extended to an organic hierarchy. Comte understood the sign to index some undefined 
principle of unity behind the “combinations within the great diversity of actual modifications.”700 
In Cours, the organic series gives this value to the biological concept, “very like mathematical 
analysis of the indefinite series.” Biological concepts find their isomorphism with developmental 
of complexity, to represent its idea in the abstract.
701
 
 
As a philosophical position, Comte related this principle in life to a principle of knowledge. His 
ambition was to define the limits of what human knowledge could attain in a cosmological sense 
which was his transcendental aspect. He equated this with a double interior series, mirroring two 
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principle branches of natural philosophy - astronomy and biology - because these represented 
two types of motion, which delimited the virtual trajectories within knowledge against which a 
creative mind could expect to develop its praxis. The philosophical justification for this 
reasoning was the historical evidence of force behind ancient theological notions that related the 
vital to the celestial. Comte upheld this as a rudimentary „method‟ yet he followed it as a 
productive relation in considering it as „positive force‟ “at the source of knowledge.”702 It was a 
positive source driving modern knowledge which gained power through more positive concepts 
extended as intellectual habits.   
 
Comte‟s real theoretical problem is the mediation of different epistemological strategies dealing 
with the difficulty of the biological object. This is exemplified in his relations to the biology of 
Lamarck and its organic series that traces movements between identity and difference. Lamarck 
followed a strategy of recomposition, of re-linking a series of ideas in the continuous image of its 
transformation, a strategy that drew on a general concept of nature, which was metaphysical, but 
understood as a necessary „fabulation‟ for extending conceptual unity to an evident whole. 
Comte, in turn, saw the strategy justified although outmoded as a metaphysics of nature. 
Lamarck‟s metaphysics was no longer relevant for the start of the 19th century as the 
metaphysical struggles within later biology and a general theory of classifications which 
Positivism adopts was the “last battleground” between the old philosophies and the new. But the 
organic series was the concept by which Lamarck succeeded in the terms of his day; it was a 
zone of fabulation and conceptual synthesis that Positivism would subject to a transcendental 
mediation.  
 
Likewise, Comte also recognised as premature any definitive shift from a general anatomy given 
through a modern taxonomy. Here, he was also following the Museum debates which was the 
reason why in Cours, a taxonomic biology was seen as a source of ideas of relations between 
organs and functions. But Comte saw this under a tendency “to fall into a state of antiscientific 
admiration when they find that the conditions and the fulfillment coincide.”703 It was the relapse 
into crude empiricism, open to barren and irrational reaction, evidence of older theological 
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influences, which the Positivist project moved against. However the evaluation of a true 
synthesis of biological concepts harnessing a productive source upheld a necessity of “scientific 
fictions” for imagining organisms and the ideas of organisation which were “incontestably 
superior.” This latter aspect reflects the prerequisite of Comte‟s transformism as a legacy of the 
sciences of the revolutionary era.
704
  
 
The legacy was of productive recombination and synthesis of transcendental ideas. The value 
Comte ascribed to his positive method indicates why Bichat‟s triumph was seen as his general 
anatomy, the exemplary success identified as “rationally reconnecting the normal condition with 
a notion derived from the pathological.”705 Bichat delimited on evidence the tissues and re-linked 
them to the distinct functions in the organs of the body. Comte took its success as the production 
of a dynamic concept which can penetrate “the essential web of every organism.”706 Bichat‟s 
regional approach to phenomena was an exemplary analysis of indistinctness, “the sole basis of 
vegetable and perhaps lower animal organisation.” The decomposition into distinct and separate 
units Comte calls a „biotaxy‟ which precedes a general coordination of the series and its 
extensions towards synthesising a logic of life. It therefore stood as a suitable method of „natural‟ 
division for Positive philosophy.
707
 Comte‟s identified this as an exemplary method but had a 
selective appreciation of Bichat which avoided the lingering problematic in his concept of life. 
 
Biotaxic Philosophy: Anatomical Events and Biological Norms 
 
The organic paradigm was derived from an objective application of thought following the 
perpetually increasing complexity; this expressed an inherent logic implied of a biological series. 
It was a conceptual source of the „figures‟ of action, its philosophical value extended beyond any 
strictly scientific knowledge since the latter was susceptible to perpetual modification. But 
conceptual justification for the biological analogue was idealistic in a similar way to a 
physiological norm. This was why Comte was looking for a figure or sign of a norm which is,- 
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“perfectly analogous to the development of the individual, at least in its ascending 
period,”708  
This is the reason why, compared to Lamarck, Comte discussed how Cuvier could uphold the 
idea of an organic hierarchy only in an “imperfect way.” Since for Lamarck, the primary 
problem was the representation of the whole, envisaging the „idea of the series‟ preceding the 
„idea of species.‟ Although both were dependant on observations of identity and difference, the 
universal series for Lamarck was premised on a continuity of function in the thought of the 
whole – the series is itself an image of ascendancy. Comte imagined a long determinate 
succession of organic states, as the visibly productive aspect that facilitates a limited 
transcendental thought for a general discourse. As visible ground of “real natural law,” this was 
what Comte was looking to regulate from a particular philosophical perspective.
709
 
 
When Comte claimed that Lamarck showed “by far the profounder conception of the organic 
hierarchy,” and that Cuvier misconceived it,710 it is a comment that is instructive of Comte‟s 
ambition. This is quite independent of the specific opinions on permanence or variation of living 
species which divide Lamarck and Cuvier. Comte‟s argument was that reading the series in 
relation to a general knowledge, rather than its particularity as a science, supported a form of 
knowledge to which Comte has a philosophical commitment. However he was scientifically 
dismissive of Lamarck‟s transformism, objecting to the division by anatomical elements rather 
than its particular functions, and equally the “immeasurable” time aspired to by biological 
transformism was a problem on the grounds that even an initial disparity would be corrected by a 
“laws of the fundamental equilibrium.” Although Comte grounded himself through De 
Blainville‟ organic stability,711 scientifically it was Cuvier who he saw following the method 
premised on the equivalence between species in the abstract, namely the „biotaxic unit‟which 
was an idea that conformed to Comte‟s idea of the biological analogue whose abstract 
characteristics embodied the criticality of a modern science. However, it is Lamarck‟s method 
that carries the speculative idea of nature and which lends its philosophical commitment for 
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Comte in that it necessitates governing “the passage from the abstract to the concrete.” Here is a 
practical aspect of implementing the significance that reciprocally could maintain the stability of 
modern discourse in the face of a regressive metaphysics. Both Lamarck and Comte shared the 
fight to which strategically biological concepts support a broader task. This also explains why it 
is the ascending differential orders of organic and animal functions that give the modality its 
philosophical potential which Comte wanted to extend as conceptual possibility.
712
  
  
Modes of Action: Vital Science and Biological History  
 
Comte‟s philosophy followed this bio-dualism as an idea-sign with a dialectical history. The 
analytic and synthetic traced out as a struggle between vitalism and mechanism gave his 
philosophy its strategy of integrating possibilities of mapping the vital state in general. It 
followed an analytic, “from the impulse given by Descartes,” to school of Boerhave, against a 
synthetic activity evident in the school of Stahl, which Comte considered the most scientific 
formulation of a metaphysical dimension to a general physiology. The emerging idea 
apprehended in the transformation from Van Helmont‟s „archeus‟, to Stahl‟s „soul‟, to Barthez 
„vital principle,‟ represents “sound philosophising;” it lacked only “for want of the requisite 
practice” which what Bichat‟s substitution of properties for forces introduced. This is the event 
where a physiological heritage intersects with modern anatomical studies, opening the „mapping‟ 
of the vital to the Positivist enterprise.
713
 
 
Comte was following the ambition of transforming a spurious psychology through a 
confrontation that focused on a positive “theory of sensations” traced back to the brain. This was 
a domain as yet in the grip of the „metaphysicians.‟714 To extend positively a positive concept of 
vital „modes of action‟ meant, for Comte, a relation between animal function to intellectual and 
moral phenomena, the higher functions of the „human.‟ In this context, „human‟ distinguished 
itself from the animal order, which constituted Comte‟s strategy of convergence with the older 
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Science of Man which he dubbed „the noblest scientific notion.‟ This was a philosophical 
alignment with certain socio-political ambitions, an ambition to effect a,- 
“…a transformation which can safely be considered as possible only by transferring to 
the whole species, or at least society, the primitive end which in most cases of animals, 
is limited to the individual or at the utmost the family.”715 
This idea represents a capacity, between an intellectual ideal and evident animality, which 
Positivism looked to integrate a metaphysics of morals. A recurrent theme for Comte was a 
perspective on human life as a dormant intelligence which appears intermittently evident against 
its animal disposition. The latter had spontaneous, impulsive and energetic qualities that needed 
directing, less the rational animal than an affective animal, whose positive aspects had a power to 
synthesis higher functions if formally realised. The disciplinary task was of transcending the 
brute; this meant the transformation of the ego. Comte‟s strategy to realise this capacity could 
now be attributed to biological existence.  
 
What is clear is that Comte‟s biological capacity always retained a certain cosmological 
perspective in its conception. Biological being was both cosmic and vital. Immersed in history, it 
emerged between the principle of inertia and a universal affinity which aimed to displace 
animality over a biological horizon. As the transcendental horizon of an ego, it had moral 
attributes that radically departed from the „innate‟ Scholastic categories attributed to faculties of 
memory, imagination and their norms of judgement. Comte was looking for functions that 
appear only as degrees of the wider notion of organic phenomenon. These were “necessarily 
variable,” and a “proportionate activity” that Comte was following in the search for a modern 
episteme with a particular historical departure from Cartesian thought.
716
  
 
This history that retained a notion of artifice and modal separation which can be seen as derived 
from certain extension of Condillac‟s sign.717 On the one hand, the sign was the tool from which 
to formalise a transformation of the ego and its frivolity; on the other, it was to introduces a 
radical scepticism which is the ethic that transforms the moral aspects of Positivism. This 
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Positivism, following Comte‟s ambition, embodies a „paradox‟ derived from Descartes; of 
science formalised against the „old philosophy‟ in which Comte invested certain values derived 
from the limited physiological knowledge of his era, which was inherently tied to the legacy of a 
Science of Man. When Comte took these up as scientific values against those who, in his 
opinion, intended to maintain the older doctrine as a particular form of metaphysics, the positive 
spirit meant a long philosophical struggle from Plato onwards; in his own time, this was 
identifies against the latest manifestations of „interior observation.‟718 Against this thinking, a 
certain scepticism operated to effect the separation prior to a transformation opening a new and 
more positive domain.  
 
Comte attributed to Bichat the possibilities of such a domain from the science of the body 
substituting for a metaphysics man. Bichat offered an exemplary transformation through his 
„special reasoning,‟ an epistemological shift positively unfolding the organic source. When 
Comte looked to such „special reasoning‟ it was to transcend an intermittent or discontinuous 
character in animal life. The body displayed activities made into repetitious habits which can be 
“sufficiently prolonged at suitable intervals.”719 This intermittent character contrasted with the 
continuous nature of the organic phenomena. But animality was also seen as progressively 
absorbing discontinuous sensations to effect the continuous organic functions of living being and 
this gave an image of habituated repetition that grounded an organic base. Comte took the 
concept of organic transformation of voluntary acts into involuntary tendencies as animal habits 
brought into the “remarkable regularity” of the inorganic world. The body becomes like them, 
„periodical‟ from the cosmological perspective - “the theory of habit is a sort of appendix to the 
that of intermittence, and like it, due to Bichat.” This comment indicates the relevance of 
Bichat‟s anatomy for Comte as a promise of mapping the wider domain of vital phenomena.720  
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Positivism‟s New Axiom 
 
The Science of Man left the legacy that Comte was looking to substitute with a social physics or 
sociology. The epistemological model was based in Descartes but Comte saw that as an 
incomplete system of positive philosophy.
721
 It no longer followed a Codillac‟s Logic in the 
relation of synthetic character of a „special reasoning,‟ and downplayed Bichat‟s radical 
opposition, „the sum of forces that oppose death,‟ in favour of de Blainville‟s biological 
equilibrium, a „double continuous movement‟ of composition and decomposition. Comte needed 
a model of continuity, of extending a harmonious whole, and the grand historical survey of 
science in Cours could further identify Joseph Victor Broussais seen as uncovering a scientific 
medicine,- 
“The luminous maxim of M Broussais which lies at the foundation of medical 
philosophy – that the pathological state is merely the prolongation of the phenomena 
of the normal state, beyond the ordinary limits of variation – has never been duly 
applied to intellectual and moral phenomena: yet it is impossible to understand 
anything of the different kinds of madness if they are not examined on this 
principle.”722  
However, this prolongation was already something of a compromise for Comte. The particular 
circumstances of this comment should be framed by his aim of mediating between the 
„metaphysicians‟ (i.e the psychologists) and Franz Joseph Gall, (the “illustrious Gall”). It is 
significant that this section appears in Cours towards the end of the section on biological science, 
and immediately prior Comte introduces the discussion of social sciences. Broussais appears in 
the text as introducing a degree of theoretical purposiveness to Comte‟s thinking.  
 
By the 1820‟s Broussais was making an impact as the reformer of medicine with a new doctrine 
that presented a „physiological medicine.‟ Commentators have noted how this made a tabula 
rasa of what preceded him, but some took this doctrine as the future of science and Comte was 
among them.
723
 Broussais was proposing a new physiology liberated from a subservience to 
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visible anatomy; the specific aim was to avoid the pathological point of view favoured by Bichat 
and the necessity of individual interpretation. Broussais developed a „systematic physiology‟ to 
downplay aspects of visibility in favour of a new theoretical base. Of this new doctrine he could 
declare, “the moment has come where we must tear away the veil…”724 This intended to separate 
physiology from the “abstraction of words” around vital properties, the vis medicatrix, which he 
claimed „painted‟ abstractions of the human intellect. Broussais also claimed that “such a method 
of philosophising may succeed in politics or diplomacy, is not always applicable to medicine.” 
His task was therefore to “protect medicine from the dangers that threaten her by means of the 
philosophical sect.”725 In this way, Broussais saw himself definitively breaking with the line of 
figurative philosophy from Condillac, Cabanis, Destutt, whom he considered belonged with the 
„reveries of the ontologist‟ who,- 
“proclaim that the Science of Man, such as they conceive it to be, alone has any 
pretensions to certainty; without having passed even ten years of their life in studying 
man as a physicians, or knowing him, considered in his organs, living and dead, they 
think that the external observations of the grown man, is sufficient to explain all the 
phenomena of the embryo, the infant and the diseased, the deformed and the dead, 
submitted to anatomical analysis.”726 
To this end, Broussais delimited his new physiological domain by a method where vital signs 
were interpreted as excitations and irritations indexing external or internal stimuli. Such an 
excitatory domain no longer regarded disease as a foreign element, it was a deliberately anti-
ontological theory now giving significance to changes in function, as lack or excess. He 
succeeded in displacing a concept of disease as an independent entity, giving physiological 
specificity to change in function which was recognised as a significant event in the appreciation 
of disease and the new basis from which to attribute the possibility of founding modern scientific 
medicine. This was notably recognised by the famed French neurologist and professor of 
anatomical pathology, Jean-Martin Charcot.
727
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Broussais has also been described as holding this doctrine as an “instrument of warfare.”728 In 
this respect, the similarity of Broussais to Comte is instructive; Broussais‟s polemic was aimed at 
the ontologists of the medical world as Comte was fighting the ontologists of the philosophical 
world. This appears to have suited Comte as Broussais systematic physiology was introduced in 
opposition to a physiology of observation. From this followed certain consequences, notably 
those outlined by Georges Canguilhem.
729
 But it was not the medical consequences of Broussais 
theory that seemed to have struck Comte but his sound positive method that produced the model 
he was looking to extend,- 
“The only eminent example known to me of sound hypothesis in biology is M. 
Broussais in proposing the mucous membrane or the alimentary canal as the seat of the 
so called essential fevers. Whether he was mistaken or not is not the question. His 
hypothesising being open to unquestionable confirmation or subversion, it gave a great 
impulse to the study of pathology in a positive manner and it will stand in the history of 
the human mind, as the first example of a spontaneous introduction of a sound 
hypothetical method into the positive study of living beings, a method derived from the 
regions of astronomy.”730  
This cosmological aspect follows an axiom that can be traced to what Broussais lacked in basic 
conceptions of thresholds of biological systems. He conceived as directly correlating in a 
continuous domain of excitations, the twin influences of environment and brain. The ensuing 
difficulty was in distinguishing qualitative effects from quantitative differences. The 
consequence was that this distinguished itself from the earlier therapeutic medicines that relied 
on interpretations through doctrines of pleasure and pain. Canguilhem has described this as 
embedded in Broussais‟ doctrinaire motivation against Bichat. It can primarily traced to the 
reception of Reserches physiologiques sur la vie et la Mort which distinguishes relations 
between physics and physiology as continuous and discontinuous phenomena.
731
 But, as 
Canguilhem points out, this was succeeded by Bichat‟s Anatomie Générale which he saw as 
setting „a trap‟ it offering the systematic possibility of extending qualitative variations in tissue 
activity from the zero degree of intensity towards a whole organism. To see Bichat as an attempt 
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to coordinate physiology as a physics, motivated by delimiting pathological variation in tissues, 
suggests the idea that all physical alteration should be considered phenomenal and significant.
732
  
 
The weight of his doctrine gave Comte‟s later perspective in System of Positive Politics where a 
discourse on man has been withdrawn from the „metaphysicians‟ of inner sensation,733 There are 
two curious points that Comte carried forward into social thinking; firstly, that he should 
formalise a systematic from the doctrine of Broussais who specifically differentiates his practice 
as physiological in a narrow sense. And secondly, that he retains the concept of milieu, taken as a 
space for differentiating structure and composition, whose parallels is with Lamarck‟s image of 
nature despite Comte already identifying this as metaphysical. But without these two aspects, 
Comte‟s Positivism and its possibilities of a progressive transformation, would not be possible. It 
points to the fact that Comte had recognised biology as preserving something of a metaphysical 
spirit over the inorganic sciences since that each living being always emanates from another 
living being.
734
 This suppressed perspective makes clear why Comte seems to have been no 
difficulty in taking ideas attributed to concrete biological structures, to inform a structural realm 
of a social and political task. It was an era of transcendental thinking which lacked prior 
separation in constructing its domains of knowledge. 
 
Comte‟s historical perspective followed his strategic aims of mediating a future between crude 
mechanisms and a scientific practice. Against metaphysical notions, he extended a notion of the 
„conditions of existence‟ from biological being and the highest expression of this bio-dualism 
extended to a new discipline of sociology.
735
 This opposed both an extension of strict logic and 
simple reflections of phenomena in a mind grasping at essences. What is significant, however, is 
that Comte had rejected Bichat‟s theory of death: this followed De Blainville in thinking that 
death did not seem to be a necessity for explaining the structures produced by living entities. He 
wrote in his System of Positive Politics that a theory of death “although founded on a theory of 
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life is entirely distinct from it,” demonstrating the extent to which a structural thinking penetrates 
Comte‟s ideas.736 Comte‟s transcendentalism broaches a totality of experience through a 
historical mind projecting conditions of experience over historical time. His sociology retains 
this strategically to explain why „becoming conscious‟ of intellectual properties gave him a 
history of the „human‟ as a „rarefication‟.737  
 
This took a perspective from the old project of a Science of Man which Comte implemented with 
a radicality self-consciously drawn from the new biological sciences. The paradox that this 
embodied a shift from „absolute knowledge‟ to a relative one, as Cours had indicated, and meant 
that its transcendental knowledge was to be displaced progressively as the legacy of a 
metaphysics. But Comte actually extends a particular model of intelligibility (characterised by 
the „Broussais effect,‟) in which science was seen as a practice and knowledge “still in its 
infancy.”738 It had a polemical dimension that stood as future promise which merely fed an inner 
logic driving an emerging technological society in the 19
th
 century. 
 
Conclusion  
 
This chapter showed the limits of Bichat‟s ambition for a rational physiology. Within its limit, 
Bichat retained heuristic values of medical vitalism as the practical application of the idea-sign. 
Physiology was not an apodictic science but linked to a practical task of extending the idea of 
life as a practical concept. Bichat‟s vitalism equivocated the status of physiology as an extended 
doctrine on the nature of man and left a devalued Science of Man described here through Saint 
Simon‟s pragmatic response; his Positivism was a synthesis supporting the socio-political crisis 
ensuing in the wake of Empire. By contrast, Auguste Comte pursued an ambition to extend 
biological discourses as driving a historical process in the transformation of the metaphysics of 
nature.  
 
Comte‟s ethico-moral project had the transcendental ambition for a domain coextensive with an 
idea of nature. But the chapter showed the unresolved metaphysics carried over into the early 
                                                          
736
 Comte (1851) vol. 1, p584 cf Lévy-Bruhl (1903) 
737
 Comte (1893) p354-8, Lévy-Bruhl (1903) p 347 
738
 Lévy-Bruhl comments on Comte thought of the future sciences. Lévy-Bruhl (1903)p355 
225 
 
19
th
 century furthered the spirit of the idea as a philosophical concept of life. In a way 
fundamentally distinct from Kant, this extended biological sciences over a discourse on man. 
Comte‟s was the reforming project driven by science that eclipsed the practices of Bichat‟s 
generation. This chapter showed how the discipline of the idea-sign served to limit equivocal 
relations between the vital and the positive. After the mid 19
th
 century, the experimental 
medicine of Claude Bernard defined an independent domain for physiological science separated 
from a philosophical concept of life. The last chapter will look at how Bernard‟s epistemology 
re-orientated the perspective on a historical Science of Man in France at the turn of the 20
th
 
century.  
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Chapter 5: The Concept of the Positive: Organic and Critical 
 
Introduction 
 
The early decades of 19th century saw a dissolution of the unified project for a Science of Man 
of the revolutionary era. Bichat represented the limit of ideological use of physiology in this 
project. But after 1870, French philosophy of the Third Republic recognised Claude Bernard‟s 
experimentalism as introducing a new paradigm for physiology, clearly distinguishing between 
determinable scientific knowledge and what constituted a medical practice. It represents the 
break in apprehending „true function‟ in the study of the living. But there is also a paradoxical 
link between this new experimentalism and Bichat‟s observational practice. This chapter 
examines how François Magendie approached the delicate nature of experimental procedures by 
constituting a new phenomenology of living function. Subsequently Bernard‟s experimental 
medicine gave this as the paradigm for an autonomous physiology, separated from philosophical 
ideas of life.  
 
The link is paradoxical because physiology‟s autonomous domain suppressed ideal notions of 
normal and pathological states, re-orienting these from within. It distinguished only certain 
functions of life, namely those upheld under controlled „conditions of existence.‟ Laboratory 
medicine was the radical science that distinguished functions of the living from historical ideas 
of life, such as an ambiguous legacy in Bichat‟s vitalism. But this radical separation was also 
understood as following in a line of empiricism from Aristotle: a phenomenology that describes a 
dynamic categorical schema as a concept of nature; this retains a link in Bichat‟s 
experimentalism. From this perspective that the chapter shows how Henri Bergson could claim 
that the significance of Bernard was to integrate values held of nature as an activity of the 
intellect, in his estimation a vital orientating function of the intellect. In a late essay he described 
Bernard‟s „anticipative idea‟ as the experimentalist‟s disposition which was a necessary 
counterpart to a „suppression‟ of vitalism. Both Bergson and Bernard looked to follow precise 
methods. This chapter shows how Bergson‟s delimits a new vitalism in a distinction between a 
„norm‟ and a „real‟ through a temporal order. But this was precisely to confront contemporary 
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Positivists in the wider context of an evolutionary paradigm where the problem of normal and 
pathological took on the perspective of true or false divergence. Bergson carried deeper 
implications of the physical and the moral behind this extended critique of Positivist historical 
formations which pointed back to disputes within a Science of Man. 
 
The question of whether Bernard‟s physiological domain could serve a „new way to a Science of 
Man‟ also appears behind the rationalising model of Emile Durkheim‟s sociology. Having 
demonstrated a paradoxical link between Bichat‟s experimentalism and Bernard‟s interior 
milieu, the chapter looks at how Durkheim broke with historical ideas of man by substituting 
„conditions of existence‟ of modern life on the evidence of loosening of rigid metaphysics of the 
past. This indicates the alterity within social logic. But social formations historically showed an 
evident lack of objectivity although supporting a collective order of things. Conversely, social 
logic remained open to the intervention by a „special reasoning,‟ a possibility of substitution that 
presupposes a potential for autonomy. This grounds Durkheim‟s account of a capacity to invest 
with positively grounded norms. He equally presupposes an individual‟s capacity for fluid forms 
of intelligibility studied through deregulation or anomie. Did Durkheim‟s neo-positivism follow 
Bernard‟s break with vitalism? 
 
This informs a reading of what Durkheim relates to a social system of signs. Earlier epochs 
protected this as a theological idea and later expanded into a philosophical project, this chapter 
shows Durkheim associated this with the project for Science of Man at the start of the 19th 
century. Its ambition was to re-evaluate a socio-political domain according to a special 
physiology of sensation. But Durkheim‟s real dilemma can be identified in following this as a 
vital problem of „norms‟ in modern societies. What concept sustains the socio-political world in 
the absence of any knowledge of the normal type? Durkheim‟s perspective on an Enlightenment 
Science of Man follows its ambition of apprehending organic laws, which if properly interpreted, 
“can tell us the secret of the future.” It demonstrates that in the early years of the 20th century the 
positive and the vital remained open fields of study, open to a rarefication. 
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Positivism‟s New Models of Thought  
 
During the 19
th
 century, Positivism diversified through various models of intelligibility. In the 
preceding genealogy, the systematic legacy of Broussais was one model that was identified as 
the doctrine offered a physiological tabula rasa shown to have particular consequences for the 
Positivism of Comte. Epistemological studies of George Canguilhem and Michel Foucault saw 
Broussais represent an inversion of the observational practices of medical ideologues and its 
idea-sign. By subordinating its empirical principle to the axiomatic of localisation there unfolded 
a positivist domain of the sign. Foucault has described the medical consequences of such a 
practice as delimiting a physiology of ideas; by circumnavigating the methodical vitalism, which 
Bichat engaged with around normal and pathological anatomy, this reduced the body to a 
continuous domain in which “disease exists in space before it exists for sight.” The wider 
significance was for the “structure of experience which dominated the 19th century, and to a 
certain extent the twentieth…”739 By systematising a „way to see‟ a priori such Positivism gave 
the medical gaze a status as new transcendental domain. When medical discourse substituted for 
a Science of Man, it was through displacing the use of idea-sign in the sense used in Bichat‟s 
generation.
740
 Georges Canguilhem goes further to describing this as offering a return to an older 
philosophy, “almost as old as life itself,” where a transcendental ideal of the Positivist 
eschatology was extended through Comte‟s Sociology.741 
 
Secondly, a quite different Positivism appeared with Saint Simon. August Comte called him a 
“depraved juggler.”742 Starting from the practices associated with the life sciences, this form of 
Positivism effected its departure from the Ideological project under an awareness of the shifting 
process of representation during the epoch. The divergence within scientific knowledge, 
particularly the life sciences during this era, meant a Science of Man could no longer ground 
itself therein. It therefore adopted a modified form of practice necessary to maintain what was 
understood as inhenrent values. What Emile Durkheim credits Saint-Simon with is the pursuit of 
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a synthetic knowledge in the face of an unrealisable scientific project.
743
 It meant a crucial break 
with Encyclopaedia writers of the 18
th
 century, as well as Cabanis‟ generation of Ideologues who 
sustained their project by the possibilities of a new science. What Saint-Simon realised was a 
Science of Man had dissipated as a project under the diverging nature of positive science; but 
this left an equivocation at the avant-garde of knowledge.
744
 From the perspective of a Science of 
Man, he read this a looming crisis. This is where Durkheim finds Saint-Simon‟s strongest 
invocation of what the task and vision is for a Positive philosophy; it is no longer limited to the 
systematisation of existing sciences but was redirected into developing a synthetic knowledge to 
be implemented from a practical perspective. Whereas Comte prioritised theory, Saint-Simon 
substituted the functional concept for a theoretical Science of Man. Functional extended to 
conflicting discourses over moral, religious and political belief. According to Durkheim, this was 
the aim to “liberate the body of ideas on which the social structure should rest,” namely liberated 
from the limits of science.
745
 He saw Saint Simon‟s form of Positivism as grounding itself in this 
practical necessity prior to unfolding a synthetic knowledge at this limit. 
 
Thirdly, following the dispersion of the unified physiological basis for the Science of Man, a 
new possibililty emerges through the contemporary experiences of the life sciences. Henri 
Bergson described this as a „certain idea of nature‟ and gave its interpretive operation as the 
central problem for his Creative Evolution. But it centred on a discussion of modern scientific 
intelligibility and he criticised contemporary Positivism for having failed to truly apprehend its 
„scientific object.‟746 Bergson‟s text aimed to make evident as an essential activity of science the 
condensation from a theory of life into a theory of knowledge.
747
 A few years, later Bergson 
could express this in a more compact way in an essay called „The philosophy of Claude 
Bernard.‟ Here he related that “nothing is more false than the conception of how synthesis 
works.”748 Synthesis was always “something problematic,” yet Claude Bernard was credited with 
retaining this problem through his stand against vitalism. Bergson‟s own focus on the life 
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sciences was seen through the productive aspect of a „certain idea of order‟ attained between two 
ideas, the logic of man and a logic of nature. He made a weighty claim of Bernard; only twice in 
the history of modern science has “the spirit of invention retired within itself, to analyse itself 
and thus to determine the general conditions of scientific discovery.”749 According to Bergson, 
these conditions produce two distinct formalisations; firstly the abstract science of Descartes, and 
secondly, the advent of a method associated in experimental medicine. In both cases there was a 
confluence of two orders of problems which he characterises an intersection of „a certain idea.‟ 
He identified Bernard‟s form of Positivism with its precursor, François Magendie. Yet Bergson‟s 
fidelity appears to come from a completely opposite perspective, namely one he associated with 
a particular idea of vitalism. What constitutes the positive and the vital in the new context? To 
explore this, the chapter will focus on the methological shift which accompanies the emergence 
of experimental medicine that occurs in the years between Xavier Bichat and François Magendie.  
 
Physiology itself saw little actually change during these years, neither in techniques nor in vital 
concepts. There was, however, a marked shift in the approach to problems of observation and 
their interpretations which was subsumed under the central problem characterised as the 
pathological perspective of Bichat. Previous chapters described this as central to the 
differentiation which limits visible knowledge of physiological objects. It was also characterised 
in Bichat‟s self-awareness in focusing on coordinating observations and interpretations which 
was seen as central to a methodology derived from his idea of vitalism. A subsequent shift led to 
the distinction between medical practice and scientific knowledge but by focussing on this 
methodology, the chapter demonstrates the paradoxical continuity within the status of its 
discourse.
750
  
 
Ideology, Vitalism and Function in Bichat and Magendie 
 
Following the years of Xavier Bichat‟s frenetic work, François Magendie‟s physiology 
represents both a break and a shift that further separated physiology from the Enlightenment 
understanding of the discipline. Yet Magendie‟s physiology emerges precisely from the circles in 
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which Bichat taught. He began training in 1799 in surgery under Alexis Boyer, a student of 
Pierre Desault and his formal medical studies were completed in 1801 at the Ecole de Médecine 
de Paris. This meant that Magendie was one of the first generation to emerge from the reformed 
institutions in the wake of revolution and, as a consequence, he had both clinical and practical 
experience. Magendie‟s attention during this time was focussed on similar concerns to earlier 
physiological projects. His earliest text, from around 1809, was Quelque idées generals sur les 
phénomenes particuliers aux corps vivans, expressed the opinion that physiology did not yet 
deserve to be classed with the positive sciences. This follows in the long line of physiologists 
looking for a principle which could organise movements by which bodies decompose and 
recompose, or explain their actions and reactions. Such a principle intended to account for the 
means by which living parts coordinated function through the disparate phenomena of vital 
bodies.  
 
Following from Bichat‟s tissue theory, Magendie was looking to the nutritive exchanges that 
could ground such vital phenomena, ideally achieved at a molecular level.
751
 Crucially, 
Magendie was unimpressed by the elaboration of tissue properties, particularly for their 
implications at the animal level; “it is a great mistake to admit vital properties which are 
particular to certain parts of organised bodies.” He identified that this relied overly on a historical 
doctrine, and was not actually based on observation and offered this new suggestion, - 
“Suppressing the two vital properties known as animal sensibility and animal 
contractility, and consider them functions instead, would be a most advantageous 
reform to accomplish in physiology; then there would be a single manner of 
explaining the phenomena of life and the study of science would be much 
easier.”752 
This, in fact, overlaps with the later reflections of Bichat who was also considering the 
difficulties of observing functional relations at animal level. Observing expressions of vital force 
in the organised body depended on apprehending something directly. To this end, Magendie 
focussed on an assemblage of organic parts, to be delimited as the apparatus of particular 
function. For example, sensation was the function of nerve assemblage, digestion the result of 
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digestive organs. This he understood to be following the new way of classification in the living 
machine.
753
 It also reflected his primary concern for the discipline of observation; Magendie 
wrote that, “it would perhaps be advantageous to begin the study of physiology at the instant 
when the phenomena of living things become appreciable to our senses.” But in this respect, he 
was also following Bichat‟s ambition to foreground an „event of the senses,‟ in line with Harvey, 
down through Haller. The primary difference was from the limited anatomical data that Bichat 
was analysing, and his approach to interpreting a dynamical schema to be integrated as a rational 
synthesis into a functioning whole.
754
  
 
In 1816 Magendie, wrote a textbook Précis élémentaire de physiologie in which he laid out the 
principles for the new physiological discipline. This reads like a well trodden path of positivist 
thinking; physiology had to dispense with its metaphysical tendencies with which it had “a long 
and tiresome romance” and like chemistry and physics, needed to be “reduced entirely to 
experiment.”755 This may have been a radical call among those of positivist disposition in 1816, 
but it was not at all clearly defined what this meant. Comte had not yet met Saint Simon, and the 
clinics only just starting to reverberate under Broussais‟ polemics. At this time, the notable rival 
to Bichat‟s physiology was Anthelme Richerand whose Elémens de Physiologie, first published 
in 1801, explicitly followed along the lines of Haller‟s physiological model, rather than his 
anatomy. It is instructive that Richerand‟s textbook appeared in successive publications into the 
1820‟s to become influential for Comte despite Comte‟s ambition for the metaphysical aspects of 
science to be expelled.
756
  
 
Magendie also retained an idea of the physiological model set forth by “modern 
metaphysicians.” This meant the idea that phenomena constituting a human intellect were only 
modifications of the faculty of perception and man‟s instincts could be related to his condition of 
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existence. Primarily this meant an animal function, but secondly it was also a function of a “state 
of civil society.” Magendie‟s early interest was therefore to delimit the sign of these empirical 
tendencies. This was the, -  
“desire to have a very vivid consciousness of our existence; a feeling which the more it is 
indulged in the more difficult it is to satisfy because our sensations become weakened by 
habit.....shall we say with Bichat that the passions reside in the organic life.” 
757
  
Magendie‟s Précis therefore, echoes the particular commitments which he relates to the 
discussions of sensibility, memory, judgment. Magendie proceeds, - 
“however this may be, the study of understanding does not at present constitute an 
essential part of physiology. The science especially devoted to this, is called Ideology. 
Those who wish to study this interesting subject, in extensio, must consult with the works 
of Bacon, Locke, Condillac, Cabanis, and especially the excellent works of M. Destutt de 
Tracy, entitled „Elements of Ideology.‟ We shall at present confine ourselves to some of 
the fundamental principles of that science. The innumerable phenomena that constitute the 
human intellect are only modifications of the faculty of perception [sensibilité]. If they are 
attentively examined, this truth will be easily acknowledged, which is fully set forth by 
modern metaphysicians.”758 
The point is that, although Magendie expresses doubt over the doctrine of vital properties, he had 
not yet drawn fully apart from the physiology committed to a „scientific‟ concept of ideology.  
 
While condemning phrenology as a pseudo science, Magendie was specifically focusing on a 
relation between sensations and motions. This relation preceded the distinction between the “cry 
or native voice” and “the acquired voice, or voice properly called so.” The acquired voice, 
comments Magendie, is a learned habit whose higher development presupposes a state of social 
existence. This marked a direct continuity with the subject of his doctoral thesis which explored 
the physiology of the tongue, a study derived from his ongoing interest in the relations between 
the physical and the moral. To this end, Magendie was also considering movements of 
expressive gestures („gestes‟) as an intimate connection to the corporeal organisation of habit. 
Habit was “to motions, what cry is to the voice;” and seen to appear either as acquired habits or 
as social gestures. Magendie was still following Cabanis‟ anthropological thinking, even to the 
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extent of limiting Bichat‟s notion of passion to internal sensations which he proposed was seated 
exclusively in the organic life.
759
  
 
There was, perhaps, the methological legacy of Condillac‟s idea-sign, an analytical tradition 
inherently opposed to systematic thinking but which the Directoire years lent, as an idea, to 
philosophy, physiology, medicine and politics to be built anew on a reliable positive edifice of a 
rational analytic knowledge. One can say that Magendie retained this as a relation to an open 
tradition and his Précis seemingly had no need to define a definite seat to expressive „gestes,‟ 
since phenomena of internal sensation could be attributed either to the combined actions of the 
nervous system or to the brain by the analogy of an acquired voice.
760
 Such a task would come 
with the future science. 
 
After 1816, in the wake of the Empire with its ensuing social chaos, a systematising turn appears 
to have favoured a certain aspect of Bichat‟s legacy. This aspect lent itself to a systematic 
approach rather than the provisional approach that depended on experimentation. From 
Magendie‟s copious notes to the edition of Recherches physiologique that he edited, one must 
conclude that Bichat appeared to him as a systematiser. Magendie‟s Positivism, by contrast, 
aimed at remaining strictly with the analytic tradition, intended to maintain a particular 
commitment to the discipline under the observational approach and its method for „natural‟ 
synthesis. But notably this was departing from the Ideologue legacy which gave the terms of a 
future general science, a unified reason to which the provisional knowledge was subordinate. In 
this sense, Magendie was also influenced by the generation who, like Saint Simon, increasingly 
saw such an ambition as lacking in credibility. When he abandoned this specific aspect of the 
revolutionary sciences, however, it opened a path to a new and limited form of medical 
positivism.  
 
Following 1830 and the July Revolution, Broussais came to represent the new medical point of 
view, while Cabanis and Bichat were receding into historical memory. From the perspective of a 
Science of Man, Magendie appears as both the link and break with the thought derived from the 
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physiological project which informed his youth. This project has been characterised by an 
analytic method which prioritised a „certain idea.‟ But it has also been shown to derive from a 
particular interpretation of vitalism in its relation to the physiological object. While Magendie 
properly represents a shift in explanation from vitalism of properties towards force of function, 
function meant an expalntion of the power of combined organic activities similar to what Bichat 
earlier attributed to a resistance. By analogy, Magendie was looking to account for this power in 
an organisms nutritive activity,- 
“If it were possible at this time to prove that all phenomena of living bodies can be 
related to nutrition or action, these phenomena can be regarded as produced by the 
same force.”761 
By a continuity in the idea of force, Magendie could move away from the status which vital 
properties held for the 18th century and the age of the Montpellier. This had served a medical 
doctrine of sensibility and sensation aiming to account for qualitative differences in the whole. A 
study of function prioritised distinct anatomical divisions as equivalence of function which 
related to distinct demonstrable activities, evident observable relations of force, between internal 
parts. This gave the basis on which the new physiology was being reconfigured.  
 
This also represents a „paradoxical link‟ between Magendie and Cuvier‟s comparative anatomy 
which belies Cuvier‟s opposition to vivisection.762 Both shared an approach to classification 
based on function intended to displace an older analogical thinking by which the old anatomy 
equivocated the visible evidence with a vital idea of properties.
763
 Like Cuvier and his 
comparative anatomy, as early as 1809 Magendie was looking for a „true function.‟ - 
“If, for preceding reasons, we do not classify animal sensibility among the vital 
properties, how shall we consider it? As a true function. A function is the common 
end of the action of a certain number of organs.”764 
The question is whether this was significantly different from Bichat at this time. In a series of 
influential lectures of 1801-1802 he also informed his listeners that “one organ alone does not 
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carry out a function; a function is the result of the labour of several organs.”765 Bichat it seems 
was also concerned how in the past, descriptive anatomy served as a topography for use by both 
surgeons and artists. He acknowledged as progressive the study of the assemblage of several 
organs that contributed to function; he noted that “Citizens Cuvier and Dumeril” were now 
classifying according to function,
766
 and even announced that “I shall follow by the same 
procedure, it is the only one which can be adopted in our present state of knowledge.”767 This 
served as an advance on theoretical problems inherited from the Montpellier doctrine as 
transmitted perhaps via the anatomist Felix Vicq d‟Azyr or from physician Theophile Bordeu. 
The latter, for example, emphasised that autonomous elementary parts of the living body were a, 
“...kind of separate machine, which contributes in its fashion to the general life of the body.”768 
Bichat‟s analytic physiology took organs as composites of tissues in which certain properties 
gave a practical system of descriptive anatomy. It had implied a basis from which the study of 
physiological function could proceed.  
 
The historical ambiguity is whether this was offering an axiomatic for methodological 
recomposition of properties, or merely stood as a pragmatic guide to more general interpretation 
of function. In this respect, one can take it that when Bichat wrote that tissue composites were 
“the first steps in the study of the functions,” it was understood as a contribution towards a new 
general physiology.
769
 Without abandoning this ambition, Magendie moved beyond the doctrine 
of sensibility and took this as the starting point for an analysis. In deferring properties to the 
more abstract notion of nutritive activity, he subsumed the notion of function to a concept in 
itself.
770
  
 
A general concept of function was dependent was on the „conditions of existence‟ and displaced 
sensibility from the physiological base. But left to general circumstances, what a priori could put 
the function into play. A more general idea, therefore, precedes a description of organs, and 
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substitutes for a sensational field of actions and reactions. By a more abstract notion of function, 
the „conditions of existence‟ lent themselves to be delimited for experimentation, which is 
represented by the 19th century move away from the hospital and into the laboratory. The 
experimental approach is characterised by establishing function through delimiting conditions 
and which no longer relied on the observable properties derived from the vitalistic idea held of 
the general property of life. Functions attributed to a restricted field of observation, became 
separated from anatomical deductions attributed to historically given physiological models. With 
the primacy of function in Magendie and Cuvier, the physiological model of sensation, which 
was also the source of observational problems, was displaced. Magendie‟s particular credit was 
to have opened up new possibilities for a limited experimental field as consequences of 
withdrawing the physiology of sensation which was also axiomatic for the contemporary Science 
of Man. 
 
Experimental or Physiological Medicine 
 
François Magendie has a curious relation to Bichat. He both praises him as an „experimental 
genius‟ while working to overcome a doctrinal acceptance of his ideas.771 For example, when 
Magendie edited the 4
th
 edition of Reserche Physiologique sur la vie et la mort of 1822, he added 
an introduction which warned against an uncritical approach to Bichat; the accompanying notes 
criticized Bichat directly from the basis of his own work. From the early 1820‟s Magendie‟s 
publications increasingly make clear that the study of consciousness and ideology was to be 
separated from his physiology, in favour of the objective study of the nervous system through 
anatomical, pathological and experimental methods. In the notes to Reserche Physiologique, 
Magendie offered a commentary based his experimental work which he considered to be the 
more contemporary physiology. Exemplary of what he intends are the comments on Bichat‟s 
exploration of the relation between the brain and lungs. When Bichat set out the premise that a 
reaction of the brain is either made up of sensations or they are influenced by emotion, passion 
and affection, Magendie intervened in the notes with his own sharp distinction, - 
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“These words passion, emotion, affection etc have, I know, real differences in the 
language of metaphysicians; but as a general effect of the sensations which they 
express is always the same on organic life; and this general effect is what concerns 
me, and the secondary phenomena are of no importance, I use these words 
indifferently for one another.”772  
This distinction between general concepts and evident primary phenomena coincides with 
Magendie‟s 1822 publishing of his experiments to support the conclusion that dorsal roots of 
spinal nerves are primarily associated with sensation, and the ventral roots associated with 
reaction. But in 1823 his work was still following a method of experimental observation that 
used pathological phenomena identified in the spinal cord prior to delimiting its relation to the 
brain. In Magendie‟s memoires from 1825, he notes that the observation of cerebro-spinal fluid 
between the spinal cord and surrounding membranes (the pia mater and the arachnoid) could be 
an index to new discoveries, even a new axiomatic, if observed in its normal state. Two years 
later, in 1827, Magendie edited Bichat‟s Traite des Membranes and held his own findings to 
contradict those of Bichat who had identified the arachnoid as the serous membrane of the brain 
and spinal cord. But despite this, Magendie‟s methods of delimiting relations through clinical 
observation and pathological findings were not essentially different from those of Bichat at this 
point. Even by 1838, when returning to this same problem to further his work on the nervous 
system, Magendie returned to a clinical pathological method that aimed at delimiting normal 
variation by using a pathological model to support ideas of excess and deficiency. The model 
was still the method intended to visibly delimit quantitative variation through pathological 
alterations, as guide to natural classification, since observational pathology still taught doctors 
what to see.
773
 
 
A marked shift in method comes when Magendie returned in 1839 to repeat the original 1822 
dorsal root experiments. These results had since been disputed and, upon returning to re-examine 
the problem, he introduced a different perspective into his observational procedure. What had 
been thrown into dispute was the value derived of his vivisection; this led Magendie along with 
his assistant, a young Claude Bernard, to rethink the value of experimental data through the 
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difficulty of repeating their own experiments.
774
 This marks the moment that forced him to 
rethink the delicate nature of experimental procedures and moved experimentation towards being 
an unambiguous source of facts. Magendie thereby affirmed a new procedure following a careful 
experimental control of physical conditions in their relation to complex and unpredictable 
organic phenomena.  
 
A new restricted experimentalism abandoned the pathological view for a limited phenomenology 
exclusively given to observing living function. The future experimental medicine took 
affirmation of a function attributed to the living as its new priority and this displaced a general 
idea of life. This represents a reversal of priority that led Claude Bernard to define a limited 
domain for a physiology in which to practice „experimental determinism.‟  
 
Claude Bernard: Defining the New Domain 
 
The new domain of life, that Claude Bernard studied was the inner environment, now distinct 
from a cosmic environment. It is this distinction of interior milieu led to a new model of 
intelligibility for the life sciences and separated it from the pathological view. It is significant 
that Bernard‟s An Introduction to Experimental Medicine, first published in 1865, proposed to be 
both following in the tradition of the anatomists while having fully abandoning their 
presuppositions, namely their concept of life now substituted by a concept of living function, - 
“after dissecting cadavers, we must necessarily dissect living beings, to uncover the inner 
or hidden parts of the organism at work….and without this physiology and indeed a true 
scientific medicine will remain limited.”775  
The significance appears in what he distinguished his work from: in this respect, Bernard names 
Galen as the originator of vivisection but reserves for Magendie the role of making a modern 
physiology possible as a method of study. He makes no mention of Xavier Bichat.
776
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Bernard intended to distinguish the modern form in opposition to philosophical physiology on 
the basis that the latter could only represent ideas of science, but was not a truly scientific 
practice. Representation could not produce „real‟ knowledge of nature. Bernard‟s distinction 
opposed philosophical systematising by a reduction and limitation of what could be considered 
autonomous scientific practice, a distinction made between the limit of a concept and the 
scientific limit of practice.
777
 The latter prioritised the practical over a formal conceptual limit. 
Such practical priority intended eliminating delusional effects that became systematised through 
the empirical reciprocity that followed pseudo-scientific practices. While opening the domain for 
practice, Bernard had to guard against the empirical delusions extended methodically, and this 
was done by establishing what scientific facts could be taken as „real.‟ A determinable domain 
was therefore defined as the limited space of production within which concepts could be 
considered scientific.
778
   
 
According to the Introduction, the inversion to practical priority had certain consequence for 
defining a scientific production. Science could be seen as „successive‟ without being progressive 
in the way which Auguste Comte‟s Positivism aspired to be. Experimental practice guarded 
against adverse effects of habituated concepts subordinated by a systematic thinking, and 
Bernard concretely distinguished this from Comte‟s philosophy. A philosophical system 
produces formal limits, held to have an ossifying effect on any experimental practice. 
Consequently Bernard‟s science was deliberately anti-systematic and worked against what he 
describes as an „encysting‟ of knowledge.779 Bernard‟s therefore can be seen as a form of 
Positivism whose central task was to break with a philosophy of ideas, which he saw extended 
through Comte‟s system. Comte introduced formal conceptual elements (for example prioritising 
a concept of „integration‟ rather than „resistance‟) which had a negative effects on the space of 
scientific production. Bernard condemned such formal elements as delusional, at worst leading to 
ideologically encroachment but certainly it was an imposition on the autonomy of scientific 
thought.  
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Although wary of such formal elements, a Cartesian element in Bernard‟s thought is also evident 
in its anti-dogmatic sentiment held against problems of empiricism. This follows a rejection of 
the older physiological legacy, to which the new determinism stood for overcoming the „querelle 
des anciens et des moderns‟ and symbolised in the move from library to laboratory. It serves the 
distinction from that which Comte was still integrating from historical knowledge but which 
Bernard understood as other than science. Comte offered a history of the transcendental mind but 
failed to distinguish between the history of man and a true domain of scientific production. 
Conversely, the separation also recognises a deeply impersonal aspect of scientific practice - 
similar to the anti-humanist stance that Comte appears to follow – but Bernard‟s epistemology 
now gives this as a confrontation with the formalising obstacle that is the history of the human 
mind. If the laboratory stands for the tribunal of the „real,‟ Bernard now differentiates this from a 
continuous history of knowledge which is not scientific. A history of knowledge is understood as 
formalised common sense which Bernard saw as a history of opinion.
780
  
 
In this respect, Bernard put forward his experimental method as the “negation of all systems.” 
Negating individual opinions means substituting them with impersonal and general theories and 
promises an escape from „a way of thinking.‟ This „way of thinking‟ pointed to a fatalism,-  
“We never act on an essence of natural phenomena but only on the acting 
cause…this differs from the fatalism on which we cannot act…fatalism assumes 
that the manifestation of any phenomena is necessary and independent of its 
conditions, while determinism is the condition necessary to the phenomenon whose 
manifestation is free.” 
781
 
In the opposition of determinism to fatalism appears Bernard‟s ambitions for a new scientific 
language, alhough one pursued in the strictly limited way. If there was a distant relation to 
Condillac‟s ambitions for a new language, then Bernard‟s scientific determinism restricted it 
phenomenally to a domain controlled by laboratory conditions. Of this domain, Bernard can 
write “there are only words beyond.”782 The determinable domain was separated from a zone of 
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undifferentiated opinions, a sharp distinction which now promised only a limited science but one 
finally turned towards universality.  
 
What this method rejected in relation to Comte‟s Positivism was its intention to retain ambitions 
for a universalising project such as a Science of Man. Bernard dispenses with such a 
philosophical project for the sake of gaining an autonomous scientific practice. - 
“Positivism, like all philosophical systems which it rejects in the name of 
science…has the fault of being a system. Now to find a truth…men of science 
needs only to stand face to face with nature and in following experimental 
medicine, question her with the help of more and more perfect means of 
investigation. In this case I think that the best philosophical systems consist in not 
having any.” 783  
Philosophically separated from the wider ambitions for a Science of Man, Bernard‟s autonomy 
now took, as a principle of scientific necessity, standing face to face with „nature.‟ He described 
this as “the sacred fire” of the unknown which accounted for a principle of autonomy upheld as 
the drive behind experimental practice. It is this drive that moves knowledge towards a new 
value in the diversity of nature‟s phenomena.784 
 
Separating Experimental Practice Through a Differential Reason 
 
Faced with the diversity of natural phenomena, an autonomous scientific drive produces a 
dynamic knowledge which Bernard defines around three further points; i) a mental disposition, 
ii) the recognition of real difference and iii) the separation into a knowledge according to an 
internalised reason. - 
i) Firstly, through this disposition, Bernard accounts for a form of positive measure; it 
differentiates mental attitudes according to categories of thinking; rationalist, empiricist, 
experimentalist (characterised by Plato, Aristotle, Magendie). Although this appears not unlike 
Comte‟s law of the three stages (the theological, metaphysical and the scientific), Bernard does 
not present these models as progressive. They are rather different modes of knowledge. In this 
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they are trans-historical, appearing in the patterns of human thought, as modes of thinking which 
lend themselves to conflictual ways of being. It is the difference that Bernard attributed to a 
necessary driving motor for history.
785
  
 
This modality reinforced Bernard‟s notion that a historical approach to philosophising was the 
way of the „litterateur.‟ Consequently, he proposed a polemical perspective in approaching 
history in the active and militant way. This meant the disposition to write history on the selective 
basis, drawing together elements to make history the springboard for the future science. The 
emphasis on selective history was an activity distinct from science itself which functioned 
against an accumulative knowledge. Selective history took scientific „material‟ for a 
conditioning; conditioning was to accord with a “hidden phenomenal form,” whose real value 
was in its task of opposing an unfolded logic rooted only in individual sentiment and opinion.
786
 
Scientific „material‟ gives history which negates any individual state of mind. To this extent, it 
differentiated itself both from feeling and reason, which were both negative elements from the 
perspective of science. Science is inherently fragmentary and its task is contrasted with Comte‟s 
project for the science proceeding by an integration of knowledge and serving to ground a 
Science of Man. 
 
ii) This negative aspect gives the divergent model of knowledge that produces differences in 
states of mind. But since a general knowledge can no longer be maintained under a unity of 
privileged reason, Bernard saw his positive ambitions for the restricted form of knowledge 
retained according to the movement of an “anticipative idea.”787 The anticipative idea was 
understood as giving the a priori attitude for new practice. It was neither spontaneity nor 
innateness, but rather accounted for the active production of concepts in the observation of 
objective phenomena. Bernard pictured this activity as „injecting‟ an anticipative idea into the 
chain of reasoning.  
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The difficulty is the status of Bernard‟s „anticipative idea‟; it is not „purely imaginary‟ but rather 
a disposition given to positive measure through necessary relations in a phenomenal reality held 
of the concept of nature. He uses it to characterise a particular and limited form of empiricism 
through the disposition that precedes a conceptual formalisation. In this respect, the experimental 
method was understood to extract and transform a particular reason given only through an 
attitude of mind which correctly defines the parameters of a „reality‟ prior to a scientific 
experience. The concept is open in the face of the experimental event, and functions for the 
experimenter as a suspension of philosophical judgements: it can constitute the „real‟ conditions 
by positively grounding possibilities for a new determinable concept.
788
 But the determinable 
concept remains relative to the internal relations of knowledge, as retained as measure against 
the wider possibilities of their own determination. This is the sense in which the experimentally 
„real‟ was held to exist as “unconscious and relative.” By suspending philosophical judgement 
and being open to a „special‟ empiricism, Bernard aims to displace the rationalism that extends 
into speculative universals (such as essence of matter and spirit, or even inertia). Bernard‟s 
special empiricism gave meaning to what he described as the „sacred fire of research‟ which can 
be read as a power of its disposition and attributed to the „anticipative idea‟.789  
 
iii) Finally, this process defines the separation which saw experimental determinism opposed to 
fatalism. While the latter described a discourse conditioned by an internalised reasoning, the 
former activity was productive of a new formal language whose status is an „objective synthesis.‟ 
But it has a limited perspective that necessarily distinguishes itself from extended 
determinations, such as historical and philosophical problems like the contingency of the will 
(Bernard associates these with the problematics in the philosophy of Leibniz).
790
 Experimental 
determinism distinguished an „objective synthesis‟ as that which could not produce negative 
results in the restricted domain. This was seen by Bernard as the positive „triumph of the 
laboratory,‟ a sharp distinction of a domain free from the unmanageable teleological statements 
or discussions of freewill. Within the physiological domain, a laboratory practice simply 
dispensed with any wider argument to give repeatable results under limited condition. 
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Conversely it could also be considered positive in its effect of separating what constituted 
transcendental judgements from concepts emerging in their functional positivity.  
 
The Positive and Vital in Experimental Reasoning: The Internal Limits 
 
Experimental medicine therefore distinguished an internalised domain from what Sensationalist 
or observational medicine represented through a „pure‟ Hippocratic medicine. Although the 
latter, acts “essentially blind,” he understood it to display „certain tendencies‟ towards 
experimentalism.
791
 Experimental practice aimed at separating out the productive aspects for a 
physiological knowledge whose domain remained open to enquiry, self-criticism and 
modification.- 
“True science suppresses nothing, but goes on searching and is undisturbed in 
looking straight at things that it does not understand....In my opinion the true 
scientific spirit is that whose high aspirations fertilize them and draw them on in 
search of truths which are still beyond them, but which must not be suppressed, 
because they have been attacked by a stronger and more delicate philosophical 
minds. Has this aspiration of the human spirit any end, - will it find its limit? That I 
cannot know; but meantime as said above, men of science can do no better than to 
push steadily forward....”792  
Medical science, therefore, suppressed a „pure‟ medicine whose necessity was for giving 
explanations. The task of science was a „push‟ to extract from empiricism the elements that could 
stand a priori to verbalisms. Examples of such verbalism could be „vital force‟ or explanations 
given to „life‟ itself, which stood as obstacles or prohibitions to doubt. Scientific knowledge 
successively penetrates the nature of the living machine and science was itself now meant as this 
dynamism.  
 
This suppression has a specific target highlighted by the move against the notions of the normal 
and pathological states. Medicine retains an empirical tendency for discourse rooted in feelings 
of compassion and morality, an admixture that lent itself both to the vis medicatrix of the body 
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and extended to religious sentiments. Bernard describes the discourse on normal and 
pathological states as diverging tendencies that set up the internal dynamics for experimental 
medicine which marked a departure from a purely empirical form. He identified Hippocrates 
with initiating the scientific approach through the disposition that stands for an „original doubt‟ 
and preceded the medical understanding whose necessity was to dominate and combat nature.  
 
Conversely, Bernard upheld the example of Paracelsus‟ as symbolising medicine‟s ambition for 
a universal panacea which was characteristic of an empirical reaction against transcendental 
dogmas held of expectorant medicine.
793
 This gave two perspectives that characterised what 
experimental medicine internalised as a dialectic; this disposition was grounded by the scientific 
concept which internalised this difference. A differential between states of knowledge was 
therefore a difference internalised by a mental attitude, now abstracted and removed from an 
externalised frame by the „anticipative idea‟. 
 
The Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine depicts an idea of vitalism as standing 
for „the cheat of words‟ which Bernard was looking to overcome this in the name of a radical 
science promising the open domain of the functional concept.
794
 But living being was also a 
concept reduced to the „organising idea‟ of its own nature. This concept drew on the 
experimental disposition to displace „words‟ through what its „anticipative‟ idea could uphold. 
The „anticipative‟ idea was therefore a strategy widely recognised as the true „leitmotif‟ for 
Bernard‟s physiological practice even outside the discipline of physiology. Diverse 
contemporaries, such as for example philosopher/psychologist Paul Janet and 
philosopher/historian Felix Ravaisson, understood the „anticipative idea‟ in terms of that which 
escaped perceptual experience, yet retained what could stand as potentially „real‟ conditions.795 
Such a virtual concept was understood to have given physiology its new approach, now 
definitively disentangled from a Newtonian epistemology. A new concept of physiology could 
ultimately defer its own knowledge with respect to an experimental outcome and, as a life 
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science, and this meant relating knowledge to the goal oriented activity whose historical 
difficulty was specifically in formulating an adequate expression for a determinable science.
796
  
 
While the „anticipative idea‟ internalised a virtual limit within a conceptual schema of its domain 
of knowledge, the significance for the physiologist was this limit that focussed on the knowledge 
the body, rather than of ideas. The conception of the „anticipative idea‟ was therefore not quite a 
disinterested physics. It retains a form of apperception in its necessity of producing a more 
effective scientific practice, although separated from an older medical practice, which was 
understood to retain a positively „anthropological‟ nature. As the negative element, it is 
dispersive of particular ideas of order upheld as physiological norms, but serves a historical 
separation as a method of production of positive concepts.
797
 
 
The „anticipative idea‟ therefore retained the necessity that serves a judgement in the domain of 
knowledge. Although this was implicitly compacted into a „vital principle‟ in the earlier 
physiological discourses, Bernard internalised this as an epistemologically limit by a reversal of 
priorities. This introduced the point where all a priori thinking remains suspect, and from this, 
Bernard defended the physiological autonomy against any a priori subordination to externally 
conferred ideas on its object. In this sense, his central concern was understood as the delicate 
nature of producing the positive concept. Bernard was seen primarily as internalising a line of 
thinking which, like Aristotle, meant privileging relations to the phenomenal aspects of life prior 
to any discourse. This was Henri Bergson‟s understanding of Bernard‟s „anticipative idea.‟ 
 
According to Bergson, Bernard had achieved a suppression of ideal relations between a theory of 
knowledge and the theory of nature.
798
 For Bergson, he adopted a perspective on physiology‟s 
privileged object that could enabled him to act as if a „certain idea‟ stepped in; “this idea is not a 
force, simply a principle of explanation.” When Bergson wrote an essay, „The philosophy of 
Claude Bernard‟ following a conference at the College de France of 1913, he described this 
perspective as exemplary of how “nothing is more false than the conception of how synthesis 
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works.”799 The underlying message in Bergson‟s reading was that synthesis was “something 
problematic.” The perspective that Bernard adopted in his stand against vitalism was aimed at 
determining a „certain idea of order,‟ and the internalised limit indicated to Bergson precisely the 
idea of internalising the positive and the vital aspects as a form of measure, and moving beyond a 
simple separation of the logic of man and a logic of nature.  
 
Henri Bergson: The Problem of Synthesis  
 
Bergson‟s own concerns are also such values connected with the positive and the vital. As an 
ongoing exploration into how synthesis works, he followed this in the relation between the 
theory of knowledge and a theory of life and saw this as the philosophical problem characteristic 
of „certain idea of order‟ that followed. In his era, this was already identified with Bergson when 
he was proposed for the chair of modern philosophy at the Collège de France in 1899. The 
psychologist Théodule Ribot commented that the question of synthesis “would substitute for the 
classical method of the history of systems with a history of problems.”800 This seems confirmed 
when looking at Bergson‟s course titles from the years leading up to his Creative Evolution of 
1908; „Sketch for the history of a notion of time in relation to systems‟ (1902-1903), „Evolution 
of the theories of memory‟ (1903-1904) „Study of the evolution of the problems of 
freedom.‟(1904-1905)801 The question of synthesis reflected Bergson‟s reading of a model of 
intelligibility he was developing alongside the contemporary life sciences. It reflected on a 
history of concepts which Bergson approached from a psychological perspective and targeted 
with a positive metaphysics.  
 
The question of concepts is posed initially around what affective sensations assimilate into 
positive magnitudes. Time and Freewill: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness 
gives this as a relation between an intensive sensation, “impregnated with the idea of necessity,” 
and its extensive thought, and introduced synthesis through an order of succession as duration.
802
 
Matter and Memory then focused on the sensory-motor problem of habituated actions as 
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extended into fictitious conceptual problems.
803
 In the first chapter of Creative Evolution, he 
articulates concerns specifically as a relation between a theory of life and a theory of knowledge. 
Crucially this took a physiological expression questioned in its extension to a wider application. 
The following extended passage indicates how Bergson was considering the problem of 
synthesis through terms of a physiological idea of decomposition/recomposition. But his 
emphasis was on the activity of decomposition as described in terms of the bio-energetics of the 
day, -  
“the opposition of two orders of phenomena observed in living tissue, anagenesis 
and katagenesis….the role of anagensis is to raise inferior energies to their own 
level by assimilating inorganic substances. They construct the tissues. On the other 
hand, the functioning of actual life (excepting, of course assimilation, growth and 
reproduction) is of the katagenetic order, exhibiting the fall, not the rise, in energy. 
It is only with these facts of a katagenetic order that physico-chemistry deals – that 
is, in short, with the dead and not the living. The other kind of facts certainly seem 
to physico-chemical analysis, even if they are not anagenetic in the proper sense of 
the word.…..To sum up, those who are concerned only with the functional activity 
of the living being are inclined to believe that physics and chemistry will give us 
the key to biological processes. They have chiefly to do so as a fact, with 
phenomena that are repeated continually in the living being, as in a chemical retort. 
This explains in some measure the mechanistic tendencies of physiology. On the 
contrary, those whose attention is concentrated on the minute structure of living 
tissues, on their genesis and evolution, the histologists and embryogenists on the 
one hand, naturalists on the other, are interested in the retort itself, not merely its 
contents. They find that this retort creates its own form through a unique series of 
acts, that really constitutes a history. Thus the histologists, embryogenists, and 
naturalists believe far less readily than physiologists in the physico-chemical 
character of vital actions.” 804 
This passage shows how Bergson was separating active and passive aspects of a determinable 
knowledge to illustrate a relation to its synthetic production. This division gives two perspectives 
on living function, as two orders of fact; one order given in conceptual terms of the sciences of 
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the day (physico-chemical analysis), the other which necessitates an adequate knowledge to be 
developed (the synthesis explaining biological form). Bergson focused on the latter. 
 
The significance behind this passage becomes apparent when one reads Bergson as reacting to 
his contemporary, the physiologist Albert Dastre, a well known editor of Claude Bernard‟s 
Leçon sur les phenoménes de la vie communs aux animaux at aux vegetaux. In Dastre‟s own 
writings, La vie et la mort, he passed on a rather mechanistic interpretation of Bernard. Despite 
the many bio-sciences being discussed Creative Evolution makes no mention of Bernard‟s 
work.
805
 In contrast, Bergson‟s later essay „The philosophy of Claude Bernard‟ emphasised that 
Bernard introduced a method of analysis which understood a dialogue between mind and nature 
that could also conceptualise the general conditions of scientific discovery.
806
 The significance 
can be understood as Creative Evolution being critical intervention against a positivist concept of 
nature. In doing this, it both upheld and extended the differences between the wider 
physiological ambitions, and with a specific theory he intended to establish, namely a serious 
domain of enquiry beyond a strictly deterministic science. Bergson pursued this by suggesting an 
unexplored reciprocity between experimenting and meditating. He also identified this with the 
particularity of physiological reasoning given in the “qualities of a disposition of mind” as they 
appear in the distinction between the physiologist and the chemist/physicist in the passage cited 
above. Only later did he state that it was Bernard who had condensed such a distinction into the 
conclusion to Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine. It is precisely the reciprocity 
between scientific problems and their solutions that Bergson‟s later essay characterised as a 
suppressed vitalism.
807
   
 
In the essay he described the vital as a disposition which did not separate observations from their 
theoretical synthesis by intellectual construct. This was a disposition towards knowledge that 
followed a continuous integration of emerging significance through a method of upholding a 
dynamic schema, the „dialogue between mind and nature.‟ Both he and Bernard were facing 
similar empirical problems, although in different contexts; Bernard aimed at delimiting a precise 
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practice for a positive science, Bergson took this disposition as proposing a new philosophy of 
nature.
808
 The concept of nature is central to Bergson‟s philosophy through the values carried by 
the immediacy of experience, and this is similar to that retained through an autonomous principle 
that Bernard prioritised in his „anticipative idea.‟ Bergson, however, thought intuition could be 
given a positive and functional meaning without being deterministic. He characterised his 
ambition for studying intuition as “the science that claims to dispense with symbols,” although 
this is not scientific in Bernard‟s terms.809 His intuition preceded the effort of interpretive 
operations in advance of an intellectual separation and therefore retained its necessarily pre-
scientific status, yet Bergson could still insist that this was „real.‟ The status of this „reality‟ 
converged with the possibilities which, even within Bernard‟s parameters, appear as problem of 
synthesis for particular relations that could be considered as natural or positive expressions.  
 
Bergson noted in his essay that Magendie was specified in Bernard‟s Leçons sur les phenomenes 
de la vie as the one who „opened a breach.‟810 This „breach‟ was established by bringing an order 
of physiology and pathology onto the same determinable terrain, making them coextensive. The 
practice which ensued gave a new physiology. Bergson took this as retrospectively justifying an 
experimental approach for the new positive science through the knowledge that internalised what 
the earlier physiology held as a medical necessity, that is, it problematised the vital element. In 
his critique of psychophysics in Time and Freewill, Bergson‟s argument centred on a relation 
between two different orders of fact, qualitative and quantitative, and the process preceding their 
expression. His sharp distinction between these processes saw Bergson value to what Claude 
Bernard was methodically refusing in his dispute between vitalism and positive function. The 
continuity with the passage in Creative Evolution and the later essay on Bernard is that these 
texts are looking to examine how oppositions between determinable physiological phenomena 
and their associated phenomenal equivalence bring into focuses the difficult problem of 
synthesis. Bringing these together as positive and the vital aspects of the problem of life allowed 
Bergson to follow his wider ambitions through the biology of Creative Evolution. 
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The Lessons of Darwinism  
 
Bergson‟s ambitions for the problem of synthesis follow the wider production of scientific 
knowledge in particular the developments of contemporary biology in Creative Evolution. In 
chapter one the central problems of biological order are presented as problems of conceptual 
difference to which Bergson‟s argument followed the wide arc introduced by the question of 
synthesis. The strategic division between a deterministic mechanism and a priori finalism within 
the biological domain has a parallel to Bernard‟s division made between determinism and 
fatalism. But the strategic importance becomes clear in the final chapter of the book where the 
argument opens to the wider problems of a knowledge in general. The final chapter of Creative 
Evolution follows a configuration of thought taken up from within contemporary evolutionary 
debates to address a philosophical question posed of how conclusively a Positivistic science can 
be seen to be separated from its Aristotelian heritage hence there is a critical aspect to this. 
 
Initially the evolutionary argument centres on repetitive adaptations that produce living forms as 
the response to conditions of existence. But the problem of synthesis now focusses on the 
production of unexpected forms of living beings that embody an apparent teleological 
mechanism which bring about an “evolution of future species” which seemingly converge, or 
become coextensive with, the wider conditions of existence. But Creative Evolution does not 
frame this problem of form in strict terms of a repetition, but of „replying.‟ Replying indicates a 
synthetic activity that equivocates between accident and inner cause, to the dynamic schema of a 
dialogue. It equates ambiguities of the discussion of active and passive adaptation to 
interpretations of natural phenomena that account for a convergence of form.
811
 On the one hand, 
a passive interpretation was attributed to the Darwinian concept of chance. But another 
perspective sees a neo-Lamarckism ascribed to an apparently active power attributed to living 
being.
812
  
 
The latter is a power understood only through a psychological register. In the widest sense, this 
meant the interpretive value given to an autonomous principle behind evident natural 
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development. But Bergson also draws attention to the shortcomings of such an active principle 
when ascribing it to a „somatic envelope‟ or given of a „germ plasm.‟ Such a power was equally 
characteristic of a much broader notion which he identified with „habit,‟ and Bergson understood 
habit as something „given.‟ The given could therefore stand as a „natural disposition‟ since it was 
necessarily contained under a principle of continuity.
813
 The unity of continuity was a priori for 
somatic cells seen as natural relation to what was given. But in this sense, unity was a vital 
principle that meant “finds its aptitude,” which can equally be taken as the potential attributed to 
germ plasm in general. In turn, this can also be held as the explanation for what is formally 
expressed through the germ.  
 
Here was the difficult concept of synthesis for describing terms of natural disposition. It 
followed from what Bergson characterised as the idea that a theory of knowledge and a theory of 
life are inseparable. The concept of natural relation is also meant as a necessary relation and, like 
the limited vitalism, can be understood through its relation to the „anticipative idea.‟ Bergson‟s 
idea focused on what became excluded from concepts of intellectual equivalence (biological 
mechanism, predestination, Radical finalism, etc) but encapsulated what constituted conceptual 
and logical thought as a “vague nebulosity.” These are notions that precede what is actively 
conceptualised by the intellect. While the examples from biology see Bergson illustrate his thesis 
of the orientation in ideas is associated through living effort, it is effort which explains life 
extending “certain powers” as what precedes an understanding.814 This idea serves the basis for 
the general theory of synthesis and which stood positively for intuition in his theory of the mind 
beyond its deterministic aspect.  
 
Bergson‟s limited vitalism was therefore approached through this idea of the confluence of 
positive knowledge with a concept of life. This avoided restrictions attributed to Darwinian 
biology of passive tendencies to material variation, but nor did he uphold a neo-Lamarckism 
theory of psychological cause, attributable to a conscious power of an ego.
815
 What Bergson was 
describing as the “depth of effort” was not simply given to „will,‟ but was something to be 
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accounted for at the level of function. As a biological function, this was conceptualised as that 
which “progresses and endures” by which Bergson gave it the sense of the vital. But this was not 
limited to individuals or single responses, but rather seen on the general level of the conditions of 
understanding attributed to organised bodies. Function in vital bodies a priori presupposes an 
organising work in their existence. But the presupposition followed the earlier example in 
Creative Evolution of a katagenetic schema to which an understanding necessarily attributed its 
evidence of higher positive function behind organised existence.  
 
In that passage, the anagenetic schema raises energy levels by construction. On the other hand, a 
functioning of actual life is attributed to a katagenetic order which exhibits a fall, not the rise, in 
energy. If the former constitutes the functional sum of organisation itself, it is only as an index to 
knowledge of organisation, the reality of the organism in itself was not given though this 
associative principle, but was premised on the dissociative activity a priori. Bergson took this as 
his central thesis; “life does not proceed by association and addition of elements, but by 
dissociation and division.”816 He qualified this precisely by describing perception as such an 
activity that serves to determine objects upon which it can act, by discrimination from those it 
cannot act on. This is now taken as evidence of the categories of objects whose necessity is 
indicated by an a priori dissociative base developed by a „canalising‟ vision of the world. 
Categories are attributed to a sum of “objects avoided;” when Creative Evolution puts forward 
the famous example describing the eye as organ effecting this canalisation, it is seen as material 
evidence of a mediation between determinable exterior objects and their relation extended to 
higher animal functions. Ultimately what defines the positive categories is grounded in the 
concept of organised life.  
 
The central argument in Creative Evolution follows this relation between an order of knowledge 
and a theory of life. Positive values precede an evident synthetic function on the basis of an 
earlier physiological dissociation, but Bergson had departed from an account of associative 
functions earlier attributed a sensible soul. By extending his thesis through the modern 
evolutionary paradigm, and retaining the necessity of selection between a true and a false 
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dissociation, he intended to demonstrate how an anticipative temporal intuition gave selection its 
wider biological function. Function meant differentiating qualitative relations around the „fringe‟ 
of the mental activity through attention to which Bergson had already introduced a notion of 
duration.  
 
The evidence of the dispersion of living forms through the evolutionary paradigm embodies what 
is held of duration. It accounts for the dispositional function of an anticipative idea which 
Creative Evolution gave as intuition. One must assume that it was for philosophical reasons that 
the power attributed to this constitutive principle took the discursive form of the élan vital. On 
one level, the problem of synthesis attributed to something similar to Bernard‟s anticipative 
notion of an experimental idea, but extended through a discussion of evolutionary tendency to 
dispersion, meant the élan vital extended well beyond any determinable biological domain. But 
the relevance rather, does extend to an ambition for a perspective on the Science of Man through 
its discourse on the physical and the moral. To this end, there is a parallel between a biological 
perspective of a true or false divergence and what Bergson reintroduced as a psychological 
problem of the normal and the pathological. 
 
The Normal and the Pathological  
 
Bergson‟s theory of the normal and the pathological appeared already in the earlier text of 1896, 
Matter and Memory which focussed on the psychological distinction made between extremes of 
mental states. It drew heavily  on the pathological psychology of Pierre Janet who represented a 
positivistic approach to the psychology associated with the French Spiritual tradition and the 
legacy of Maine de Biran. Biran‟s approach to the ego was as culmination of, rather as 
foundational to, a theory of consciousness. But a positivistic theory of self was more directly in 
debt to Théodule Ribot who had developed a theory of partial memories from within an 
evolutionary framework to distinguish a hierarchy of mental functions. The hierarchy reflected a 
psychic order against which adaptive responses could be qualitatively developed.
817
 Janet 
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followed this approach to avoid physiological explanations of psychological phenomena on the 
basis that a physiology of mental apparatus should be deferred as the task of a future science.
818
  
 
It was an approach to consciousness premised on the idea that languages and intelligent action, 
including organic habit and instincts, were signs of a domain of an extended consciousness. The 
psychic domain indexed a sum of undifferentiated physiological functions as synthesis of 
sensation in the body that gave elements from which a sense of self was drawn. Consciousness 
was extensive but not uniform and the psychic domain reflected the multiple states of its 
composition; from simple sensations, through to composite perceptions, to higher levels of 
consciousness required for intelligent judgement. Janet‟s approach to a field of subconscious 
activity was through a domain of synthetic activity, activity not itself positivitically defined by a 
deterministic physiological form, but premised on synthetic activity which “unites more or less 
numerously given phenomena into new phenomena differing from the elements.”819 What 
distinguished psychological functions in Janet‟s theory was an assimilation of elements that 
required a certain amount of „psychological force‟ for an associative synthesis. Drawing on a 
multiplicity of sensations, this synthesis indicated higher levels of function, while a lack of 
psychic force resulted in dysfunction and mental illness.  
 
Normal function for Janet was conceived as the balance of interpenetrating diverse psychic states 
held in an equilibrium to avoid extremes. By an unexplained mental apparatus of association, he 
made possible a move beyond the problems of simple associationism, since the psychic domain 
supposed that memory was the function of unconscious partial recollections. When Matter and 
Memory examines Janet‟s theoretical apparatus it focusses on the selection process of this 
association seen from the perspective of Bergson‟s problem of synthesis; “we need to discover 
how the choice is effected...”820 In this respect, Bergson was delimiting synthesis from its 
extreme states; dreaming instead of living activity (psychosis), and of immediate acting instead 
of representing (autonomism).
821
 Bergson saw these primary facts of synthesis giving the 
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undifferentiated ground of past perceptions, to which an active dissociation necessarily preceded 
any theory of recognition. 
 
Matter and Memory proposes the synthesis of perception not be seen though simple relations to 
elements attributed to memory, but given through the effort applied to the dissociation, or a 
power to differentiate, the “nebulous mass” of past experience,- 
“If this perception evokes in turn different memories, it is not by a mechanical 
adjunction of more and more numerous elements which, while remaining unmoved, 
it attracts around it, but rather by an expansion of an entire consciousness, which 
spreading out over a larger area, discovers the fuller detail of its wealth.”822 
This „spreading out‟ of an undivided order of psychic facts ensures that association can proceed 
from the perspective of two interpenetrating modes at the extremes of perceptual function; a 
primary associations of simplicity that retrieves direct relations, and a secondary associations of 
contiguity which bring the myriad of coordinate actions along with the first. Dissociation 
functionally separates these prior to grounding a dynamic schema of possible sensory-motor 
states which represent the functional distribution within the dynamic limits of degrees of 
association. Bergson attributes such a distribution to the theory of mental dispositions, or to 
diverse „tones‟ of a mental life and its tensions. This indicates a distribution of states of mental 
vitality but Bergson also identified this with the potential for a much wider domain offering a 
“whole psychology as yet unmapped,” through an extended proper study of the pathology of 
associated mental states.
823
  
 
In the dynamic work of normal memory, which drew on a historical concept of the mean to 
explain different shades of mental life, Pathological states defined a difference in kind at the 
threshold of dysfunction. But since what constituted normal function in the mind was attributed 
to a concept of “attention to life.” The function of sensory-motor equilibrium followed 
conditions of existence as mediated by the body and this constitutes Bergson‟s dynamic dialogue 
with the world as adaptive capacity of balancing future and past perceptions. It is this adaptive 
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equilibrium of states that indexes a wider sense of reality extending beyond any determinable 
questions of material or social world.  
 
Bergson in this mapping of „reality‟ through mental pathologies, therefore proposes something 
different from Pierre Janet. For Bergson, it implicated a function directed towards the „real,‟ was 
indicated at the “pointed end of mental life.” This placed the central difficulty of the body and its 
relation to a norm within the living assemblage of sensation and its movements. A positive 
cerebral pathology aimed to delimit a schema by which brain functioned to banished excess or 
deficiency of memory. But this was also a schema that correlated with states to be avoided and 
extended to biological success through its extension to a theory of knowledge of the world. 
Hence the concept of world appears as the functional result of states avoided, and which the 
power of life dissociates as the ground of recognition. When Matter and Memory developed this 
as an ontological basis for the nature of duration, a psychic domain complicated the relation of 
„norm‟ and „real.‟ From the perspective of the positive source, „norm‟ and „real‟ comingle or 
appear coextensive. But these are differentiated in the „fringe‟ of pathology of extremes, where a 
failure of actualised states, which is a failure of knowledge, ultimately is indistinguishable from a 
death of the body and its world.  
 
The Positive Metaphysics  
 
The reason why Bergson introduced the élan vital in Creative Evolution can perhaps be seen to 
follow from what was retrospectively implicated by the essay, „The philosophy of Claude 
Bernard.‟ This states that Bernard does not exclude the „organising idea‟ through elaborating an 
experimental method and Bergson interpreted this as “restoring under another form a vitalism 
that he was combating.”824 As a conceptual tool, Creative Evolution condensed this wider 
philosophical argument into the élan vital which demonstrates Bergson‟s differring needs to 
those established by the various theoretical models of life given of contemporary scientific 
concepts. Bernard, not mentioned in Creative Evolution, was later credited with successfully 
avoiding an opposition between the „mechanist illusion‟ and the „vitalist illusion‟ at the level of 
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method. He substituted this problem for a different distinction between a „determinism‟ and a 
„fatalism‟ which Bergson did not dispute was the method demanded of a modern science. In fact, 
he adopted its ambition to pursue a precise field of knowledge.  
 
However, in grounding his intuitive approach through a synthesis of memory, Bergson 
reintroduced the „fringe‟ between such determinism and fatalism. He took these as different 
modes of knowledge, distinguished between an analytic part of intelligibility and another “more 
empirical than „thoughtful.”825 In this way, synthesis appeared both compatible with, and even 
essential to, a scientific concept of life. In the wake of Matter and Memory, Bergson articulated 
his critique of contemporary life sciences through his understanding of Descartes criterion of 
intelligibility. Descartes intention, he said, was the deepening of human experience rather than 
following the dream of universal maths which Bergson subsequently took this up through the 
discussions of Creative Evolution. The new biological sciences in the 19
th
 century came in the 
wake of both laboratory medicine and the impact of Darwinism.  
 
Bergson thesis was that there was no incompatibility between a problematic synthesis and 
Descartes‟ method since the problem was merely one of priority in the execution of method.826 
Both Bergson and Bernard aimed at a method of precision by demanding a certain attitude of 
mind before the object, but Bergson focussed on the adaptation between experience and 
intelligibility. Following his ambition to develop a wider theory of psychological states was, in 
his day, associated with the traits to which the spiritualist tradition in the wake of Maine de Biran 
pursued under a question of the superior faculties of the mind. But in delimiting a positive 
metaphysics, Bergson was moving towards the convergance of a positivist tradition with the 
spiritual one around an the extended question of the physical and the moral.
827
  
 
To this end, Bergson was deliberately distancing his theory of synthesis from a psychological 
concept of the unconscious, as well as a fully determined material domain.
828
 Rather than 
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describing an unconscious, Bergson delimited a virtual „milieu‟ through an inversion of a 
spiritualist dualism between personal experience and higher thought. This followed his 
philosophical ambition to exploit the strategic possibilities for thought in correlation with the 
suppressed element in Bernard. The virtual milieu inserts itself at the extremes of experience 
where primacy was given to the force of dissociation like a power of the anticipative idea. From 
Bergson‟s perspective, this served the problem of synthesis when advancing into the wider 
domain of the physical and the moral. The psycho-physiological perspective described a 
necessity of determinism by invoking the positive possibilities of analogical thought for the 
wider necessities of action: but the virtual milieu upholds the vitalist problematic for an 
expanded knowledge in the face of new experiences that bear down on consciousness of beings. 
Two separate doctrines to be reconciled and accorded proper measure. Matter and Memory took 
this as the starting point for an accommodation of interpenetrating psychological states which 
equally necessitated an indetermination prior to an active constitution of consciousness. 
Bergson‟s axiomatic was that both monism and dualism were sterile in themselves, they only 
become productive at the limits where these two intellectual tendencies touched.  
 
This was Bergson‟s perspective for a positive metaphysics in which he saw the parallel of a 
modern struggle for the psycho-biologist looking to distinguish between consciousness and its 
organic support. Beyond psycho-physical parallelism, positively determinable activities held of 
actual „matter‟ brushes against a vital activities of the mind. Matter and Memory circumscribed 
to the workings of a „sensory motor schema,‟ where thinking difference ultimately becomes 
subordinated to the clarity of a perception. However, Creative Evolution took a more general 
view to confront what he perceived in contemporary Positivists as self styled successors to 
Descartes.
 
This explains why he followed an extended critique of Positivist historical formations 
around the project of modern science to confront what Bergson understood as deeper 
implications around the physical and the moral. 
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Élan Vital and History as Dissociation 
 
Bergson‟s positive metaphysics lent itself to a confrontation with Positivism‟s perspective on the 
earlier Science of Man. Chapter four of Creative Evolution differentiates modes of associative 
thinking from the perspective of a history of dissociation by which a positive metaphysics relates 
a life of knowledge to the concept of life, implicitly through the élan vital. His history 
characterises Greek thought as dominated by a “philosophy of ideas,” the mode of thought that 
confounds „essences‟ with intentions, but it does describe how effects of thought itself are like an 
„animal instinct‟ moving directly from impressions to „mental designs‟ through simple 
recompositions. But the central criticism of this „direct mode‟ of thinking was that it was evident 
“even today” in what Bergson famously described as the “cinematographical instinct.”829  
 
Bergson is therefore formulating a critique of contemporary science as being inadequate with 
respect to its own positive ambitions. Having invented a modern sign of relation, science retains 
the tendency to unfold a parallelism which a positive metaphysics intends to oppose. Such 
inadequacy relates perhaps more to what Auguste Comte characterised in a modern science 
through the shift from observable genera to determined physical laws. Claude Bernard, in his 
conceptually limited way, moves from vital functions to physical law which remained significant 
for Bergson since it inverts the problem of science‟s practical activity, and restricts its vital 
interests in relation to the limits of knowledge. But Bernard was not mentioned in Creative 
Evolution. Modern science represents only the break with a simple Aristotelian physics and its 
inherent concepts of high and low, described in philosophical terms closer to Comte‟s 
Positivism.
830
 Kant‟s Critique represents the solution of a modern philosophy but Bergson‟s 
ambition extends beyond a conditional threshold by abstracting from temporal instants the 
positive signs for a more vital science.  
 
In this context, Bergson describes how it was the medico-philosophical project of the 18
th
 
century that carried over into his era an “incomplete Spinozism or Leibnizism,” or a “cramped 
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Cartesianism.”831 If this refers to various manifestations of Positivism and their problematic 
legacy appearing ideologically trapped, this may be because they fail to move beyond the 
ambitions of Cabanis‟ era on the question of the physical and the moral,-  
“What is the physiology and the pathology actually assigned to the ancient question of the 
relation of the physical and the moral, to a spirit without action, prior the speculations 
which deliver it to this point, and neglected, in the affirmations of the savants, all this that 
is not held purely and simply as fact.”832  
This neglected question on the physical and the moral now reappears as Bergson real target. This 
is what he revisited this through his thesis on duration, his terms of the normal and the 
pathological, which are associated with a positive metaphysics.  
 
Despite the difficulties attributed to a principle of intuition, and more explicitly the élan vital, the 
wider discussion behind Creative Evolution follows this as a strategic „science against 
scientism.‟ Intuition, for Bergson did not present dissolution as a negative thesis since it served a 
modern ambition for offering concepts susceptible to positive verification within an expanded 
schematic of knowledge. But the wider implications of the synthetic element driving a modern 
project of the physical and the moral, and expanded the framework of the new order, had 
particular difficulties extending to a social milieu. Bergson did not directly engage with this for 
twenty five years after Creative Evolution till his last book on The Two Sources of Morality and 
Religion.
833
 
 
However, in the typology of psychological states and its theory of synthesis, he did propose a 
vital attribute in relation to signs. In accounting for the separation of different modes of 
knowledge, and grounding his critique against a calculated unfolding of a „higher reason,‟ 
duration grounded the earlier divergence between the theory of knowledge and a theory of life.
834
 
Here Bergson argued that living experience of succession appeared as a “kind of force” of 
consciousness, like a theory of force tied to an idea of motion, - 
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“…the universe unfolds its successive states with a velocity which in regard to my 
consciousness, is a veritable absolute…why with this particular velocity rather than 
another?” 835 
This perspective appears in terms of an internal perspective on what was occluded from the 
wider dynamic range implicitly existing of other forms of sensibility. The wider difficulties of 
Bergson‟s intuitional knowledge converged under a unified temporal perspective proposed by 
duration. It was his confrontation with the „would be successors to Descartes,‟ which for 
Bergson, meant an artificial and barren unity of the res cogitans. Beyond the res cogitans, a 
possible unity of objective experience promised as future science gave its real problem as 
shortcomings of any present science. Dissociation as an active a priori principle, made history 
appear as “a kind force” pushing intellectual unity into a psychic multiplicity and, one could say, 
gives the real target in retaining the vitalist method of intelligibility as Bergson‟s perspective on 
the older Science of Man. 
  
Durkheim: The Politics of the Norm 
 
Emile Durkheim also framed his sociology around the „ancient question of the relation of the 
physical and the moral‟ assigned to a future science. His starting point was the „social 
physiology‟ derived from Auguste Comte and Saint Simon to be grounded as a form of neo-
Positivism. But Durkheim identified Saint Simon as the modern response to the fragmentation of 
the Enlightenment Science of Man and the influential link undertood as providing a general 
synthesis in the face of „dispersion.‟ When he wrote about Saint Simon during the 1890‟s he 
described his strategy as the ambition to “liberate the body of ideas on which the social structure 
should rest;” Durkheim‟s own project took this as a problem of symbolic order.836 It gave a 
perspective on a double articulation; that of an immanent principle of continuity, but also one 
which could be constituted as a social world. Against the tendency to dispersion, the symbolic 
order emerged between a „way to function‟ and a „way of being.‟ This shares with the earlier 
social physiology the aim of conceptualising “a certain state of the collective mind,”837 which 
                                                          
835
 Ibid p369 
836
 Durkheim (1959) p134 
837
 Durkheim (1982) p55,  
264 
 
now meant an account of the social world as an interpenetration of both a real and a rational 
order of things. It was important that this be determinable for a socio-political formations; to do 
this Durkheim looked to reconfigure the mediation of the vital and positive aspects of a modern 
knowledge in the wake of the new models of intelligibility.  
 
The positive sense that Saint-Simon demanded of a general physiology was to give a special 
epistemology which promised to ground an order of things. But in his era this demanded a 
necessary synthesis at the avant-garde of any positive knowledge. Durkheim also drew on the 
life sciences for an epistemology and also found it paradigmatic that there were multiple 
simultaneous orders of „natural‟ knowledge which modern man was faced with and accounted 
for a dissolution of a transcendental unity.
838
 Durkheim‟s sociology promised knowledge of a 
new domain.- 
“Up to the present thinkers were placed before this double alternative; either 
explain the superior and specific faculties by connecting them to inferior forms of 
his being, the reason to the senses, or the mind to matter, which is equivalent of 
denying their specificity; or to attach them to some supra-experiential reality that 
was postulated but whose existence no observation could establish….beyond the 
individual as „finis naturae‟ is the system of active forces, not nominally or 
rationally created, a new field opens up.”839  
Looking beyond the „finis naturae,‟ Durkheim avoided a psychology of the soul by emphasising 
the alterity of social logic from the individual consciousness. This would “…open a new way to 
the Science of Man,” through the claim that Sociology would bring to consciousness, a 
conceptual domain of human relations, between the logic of man and a logic of nature.
840
  
 
The main difficulty faced by Durkheim was for delimiting the order of phenomena that could 
express such a domain and Bernard‟s physiological epistemology gave the paradigm of the day. 
This was the experimental method but Durkheim‟s social field was not open to experimentation 
and verification in the same way. Laboratory practice gave theoretical control to 19th century 
physiology where the organic limit of life determined functions of the body in relation to 
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conditions of living existence. This determined relations between inner and outer milieu; it 
grounded an experimental science by delimited laboratory conditions. When Durkheim 
developed his conceptual practice through the attempt to delimit a domain of social facts, it was 
despite lacking any means of externally determining the limits to a social concept of life. The 
question is, in what sense could this be seen as scientific?
841
 Like Saint Simon, Durkheim was 
aiming for something closer to a therapeutic ideal rather than a fully determined approach of 
Bernard. He was moving in an opposite direction to Bernard by a practice of delimiting a domain 
for interpretation rather than a determination. 
 
Durkheim‟s Positive Domain  
  
Durkheim had identified in the Ideologist‟s method the ambition of escaping a purely socio-
political problem through a higher intellectual synthesis of a „way of being.‟842 While the aim 
was elevating human activities beyond a reflective thought, Durkheim saw this only upheld 
according to “some overriding concept” with no concrete justification.843 The method did 
differentiate values derived of empirical knowledge and did little to reveal inherent problems of a 
rationalism fed by an analysis of finite knowledge. This, Durkheim understood, as the empirical 
problems which were inherent in delimiting a social domain. He took this as the central problem 
which was to be given a new perspective. His new ambition was identifying criterion to be used 
to distinguish a determinable practice from an ideology. To this end he looked to define what 
constitutes social facts for an integration into a modern functional approach, -  
“Indeed the facts which have provided us with its basis are all ways of functioning; 
they are physiological in nature. But there are also collective ways of being namely 
social facts of an anatomical or morphological nature.” 844 
The physiological parallel in these facts is significant since Durkheim was delimiting his social 
domain through relations between a „way of being‟ and a „way of functioning.‟ The importance 
of the double articulation is the principle that underpinned both his sociological science in its 
specificity, but also opened its relations to wider conditions of life in general. This gave the 
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modality that appears initially through two approaches to thinking social structures proposed in 
The Division of Labour.  
 
In this text, Durkheim describes two modes of life, the mechanical and organic. These 
distinguish different expressions of elementary social connections; the simple reflective relations 
of a mechanical solidarity, and a differentiated multiplicity of complex organic solidarity.- 
845
 
 
- A disposition to simple realism is limited by the social principles accorded to the overriding 
collective consciousness. This gives the apparent „ways of being‟ that both orders a world a 
priori but is also experienced as the „fabric‟ of a socialised nature. This model of knowledge 
grounds a functionally replicable and conceptually external order of things.
846
 This is the 
rationalist model which follows from the classical systematising models, where social structures 
and health of societies historically given through socio-political formations whose values had the 
criteria of the mean and limited to an average.  
- Beyond this perspective, Durkheim looks to „ways of functioning‟ given in terms of the 
interpretative model beyond a simple normative model. When Durkheim assesses social function 
it is though social effects which could not be exclusively accounted for under a historically 
given. Since functions “cannot tell us what ends are to be pursued,” a functionalist reading could 
be related to perceived „states of being‟ only in a limited way.847 Here was the difficulty of the 
interpretation which necessitated the grounding criteria of a science. In a grounded and 
coextensive domain of science, “good and evil do not exist;” therefore the question of function 
must serve both to displace individual opinions, while equally grounding an originating 
empirical element, for a new language for the sociologist to interpret.   
 
It is the difficulty of this functional element that was developed through Durkheim‟s model of 
organic solidarity. From the organic perspective, the empirical element is beyond direct relations 
to determined knowledge and social facts are fore-grounded by socially determined formation 
which both mediate elemental differences while alson delimiting the zone that exhibits a 
functional differentiation. This mediating zone drew together the wider intelligible social 
                                                          
845
 Durkheim (1984) p84-85  
846
 Ibid p40, p64 
847
 Durkheim (1982)p85 
267 
 
phenomena into the domain of facts under an overriding principle. The question is how did 
Durkheim address this principle? He looked to Comte who took an underlying notion of 
„impulsion‟ to improve conditions, which Durkheim saw as inherently confusing function with 
“something ascribed as source or essence,” which appeared fundamentally problematic - both 
philosophically and ideologically. As the basis for Comte‟s Positivism in analysing human 
formations through the historical method, Durkheim described this as maintaining a “truly 
metaphysical entity.”848 He meant a concept of humanity seen to be impelled to surpass an 
animality, which appears to Durkheim as an inverted „psychology‟ of the spirit.‟849 By distancing 
his own method from Comte‟s transcendentalism, Durkheim took as the central problem how to 
delimit an explanation of teleological elements within a realist framework. These were the 
difficult parameters which he summarises only under a „persistence of life;‟ which is something 
regulated through „social living.‟ In this way, a social domain can distinguished from an 
individual „will‟ and make a clear distinction between an individual and general logic.850  
 
Durkheim‟s ambition for such a positive and determinable domain looked to Bernard‟s interior 
milieu as carrying the new model of intelligibility. The question is whether Durkheim follows 
the break which Bernard effected with vitalism? An older concept of life could only conceive of 
the relation between an outer environment and the body through the idea that mediated under a 
notion of „vitality.‟ Bernard‟s inner milieu instilled a new physiological concept by which the 
most constant interior environment belonged to the higher forms of life.
851
 Bernard‟s model took 
the inner milieu and its homeostasis as distinctive of higher organisms and in offering a freedom 
to life through more determined inner environments. - 
“The constancy of an inner environment is the conditions for a free and independent 
life...all the vital mechanisms, however varied they may be, have only one purpose, 
that of maintaining the integrity of the conditions of life within the internal 
environment.” 852  
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Bernard‟s homeostatic function was his overriding concept in defining life: Durkheim looked for 
a parallel concept at the threshold of free and independent life. Within this, social phenomena 
were both expressive of function and intelligible as the social facts “in the relation it bears with 
to some social end.” Equally, the causality behind these social facts could be restricted to 
“antecedent social facts” as criterion demonstrable by social repetition.853 What is made evident 
by these social formations is strictly neither individual nor general psychology, but something 
that Durkheim equates with a zone of free and independent life. Such a zone made evident a 
loosening of the rigid metaphysics and was to substitute for ideological or metaphysical entities 
that sustained a conceptual „way of being.‟ 
 
Powers of Association  
 
Social formations internalise values attributed to the independence of life and Durkheim 
describes these as subsumed under „power of association.‟854 This power explains how a social 
milieu stands under a constitutive principle and defines its substratum; it is the network of 
communication that extends through a „dynamic density‟ with a potential to communicate across 
a wide horizon that profoundly modifies the conditions of the collective life.  
 
By following the new model of intelligebility, Durkheim was delimiting this morphology to its 
own terms. Conscious of avoiding empirical problems (such as Comte‟s law of the three stages 
which Durkheim thought “cannot but be empirical.”855) he demarcated social life as a domain of 
analysis that aimed to parallel Bernard‟s rejection of vitalism. What Durkheim was rejecting was 
any historically given causal notions attributed to nature to be substituted by the social model, -  
“if historical evolution is envisaged as being moved by a vis a tergo (vital urge) 
which impels it forward, since a dynamic tendency can only have a single goal, 
there can only exist one reference point from which to calculate utility or 
harmfulness of social phenomena”
856
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However, having displaced the tendency attributed to the individual and the general will, as an 
obstacle to thinking a social field, Durkheim accounted for his reference point through the 
aggregate of functions that conditioned the domain. To this end, he surveys the diverse 
discourses as functions already identified with two opposing traditions of socio-philosophical 
theory. - 
- Firstly, there is those given to theories which placed a „nature of man‟ prior to the social. This 
he associated with Hobbes and Rousseau which saw the concept of the social as a mechanical 
artifice which should be subordinated to the idea of man‟s will; “a machine wholly constructed 
by the hands of man and which, like all the products of this kind, is only what it is because man 
wills it, and so an act of volition created it another one transforms it.”857  
- Secondly are theories of natural being which stood against giving primacy to the will. 
Durkheim considered that these gave the idea ascribed to social life as immanent and 
spontaneous higher elements of the „natural language,‟ whose concept extended to a Science of 
Man through informing his politics, morality and religious being. This would be closer to the 
legacy of Condillac and Cabanis.  
In such theories were condensed the natural and the artificial concepts of the social, like a 
dualism and monism, but within a domain restricted by a principle of association, suis generis. 
Durkheim‟s method aimed at subsuming both the imaginary/mythical idea attributed to 
humanity, but also notions attributed to a determining will. This was an anti-humanist stance in 
the sense that described functional activities in the social domain by accordance with the 
physiological model of function; but was delimited through what were taken as wider needs of 
an actual social organism. These were attributed to „real‟ relations indexed by laws of 
association. Durkheim defended a functional approach to social structure through attributing 
these relations to the „persistance of life;‟ this stood as the necessary axiom for his social science 
yet remains dependant on how it was ascribed to the whole. It was therefore caught between a 
philosophical concept of nature and a scientific domain. 
 
Since the whole was not given, and since he rejected vitalism as explanation, the concept of the 
life of the whole could never be given in itself. Durkheim reached this difficulty by interpreting 
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his central problem as a sociological organism and following Bernard‟s strategy. Where the 
physiological object could be given between two forms of existence, an exterior world and the 
interior milieu developed against conditions of existence, the sociological whole - which was 
also a living whole – was confronted with the problem of having no exterior conditions for 
experimental control. An inner milieu, therefore, also had to stand for its own conditions of 
existence. Consequently, Durkheim looked within this milieu for a principle of association, 
something that could fuse both genetic and ontological elements, accounting for both constitutive 
properties of the whole but also that by which the whole was evidently transformed. Further to 
this, a principle of association would account both for absorption of differences, while also 
expressing wider conditions of existence.  
 
However Durkheim‟s social structures, as described through organic or mechanical solidarities, 
did presuppose a dynamism in social potential, as force against which its forms could appear. 
Although excluded from the social domain as elemental phenomena, this principle conditioned 
evident transformations behind a social fabric by giving a relation to „nature,‟ or the „real‟. 
Hence the theory of association relied upon this principle as something a priori, which was 
neither psychology nor physicality as such, but was, to a degree, expressive of both. This 
principle accounts for differences socially mediated, while elements in the inner milieu 
reconstitute this difference through what individuals negotiate through social formations which 
are given on the basis of past conditions.  
 
To account for what this dynamic expressed in social formations was the real difficulty behind 
the associative principle. Durkheim explored this in his later texts, Primitive Classification and 
Elementary Forms of Religious Life, in the form of a neo-positivist project of mapping out 
possible origins of associative functions. The aim was to account for an order of classification by 
comparison of what primitives modes distinguished from the modern, according to an absence. 
Durkheim took this absence as his perspective on an „objective synthesis‟ that grounded 
historical order. 
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Science, Social Function and the Positive Cult 
 
Historical order was a priori because Durkheim attributes associative function with the positivity 
of historical practice. He identified a historical realisation of specific differences with the 
emergence of positive knowledge such as becomes evident with Aristotle‟s science. This means 
that positive practice meant, for Durkheim, what determines separate causal relations within 
general ideas, as made evident by primitive forms of knowledge. Primarily such ideas are 
characterised by categorisation of the world and is evident behind sympathetic actions or cosmic 
influences that constitute a primitive knowledge. Primitive Classification of 1903, therefore 
pivots around Aristotle‟s categorical knowledge; “Aristotle was the first to proclaim the 
existence and reality of specific difference” and the study of primitive cultures serves to 
demonstrate how such logical categories have extra-logical origins.
858
 It describes the principle 
of association operating under fluid relations between heterogeneous intelligible phenomena in 
giving the hierarchical order of things. But it relates neither strictly to a model of the world nor 
to the individual minds rather to a “special religious principle.” Durkheim and Maus defined this 
as suis generis, the affective values within a concept of the world, which serve to differentiate 
the social domain.
859
  
 
Social reality was this categorical objectification which Primitive Classification tried to 
demonstrate had originally internalised its positive elements. This was taken as made evident in 
pre-abstracted analogies appearing in kinship groups. Since kinship confers unified 
„intelligibility‟ seen as a rudimentary canalising of a schematising structure of society, the study 
of moeities, clans and marriage groups made evident the reciprocating structures of the world 
that served a collective intelligibility as distributed through an understanding of species and 
genre. Durkheim and Maus claimed this was an original form of an idea which has a relation to 
contemporary determinable scientific concepts. Their study differentiates states of knowledge 
through a „history of association‟ where the historical perspective looks beyond strictly contained 
logical horizons of modern science. Outside these horizons, it aimed to explain a wider function 
under which concepts of the world could become organised according to „totemic‟ centres. This 
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was a wider perspective on an emerging function that became the mind/matter problem, an 
ordering principle of the world, now primarily a moral order but also by implication, a socio-
political order.  
 
In 1912 Elementary Forms of Religious Life grounded a „history of association‟ through an 
unstated emphasis on this wider field. This domain overlapped with the fragmented older 
Science of Man and took a historical perspective on the emerging epistemology that was the link 
between Elementary Forms and The Rules, the advancement described of the „positive cult.‟860 
The positive cult specifically operates through a sympathetic magic that could produce its own 
„ways of being.‟ Durkheim‟s claim was that useful effects appeared through ritualistic or social 
ceremonies which acted as the equivalent of “experimental justification” through demonstrating 
effects of particular practices. The „reality‟ of such practices was not linked to any concrete 
effects since the specific practices could simply be substituted without having any direct effect 
on the outcome; but the visible demonstration created the predisposition for belief. Durkheim 
described this as the channelling of positive expressions, not simply an intellectual process, but 
of following a predisposition for overcoming inadequacies of human reason through collectively 
reinforcing propositions that individuals were being asked to accept.-   
“The moral efficacy of the rite which is real, creates the belief in its physical 
efficacy, which is imaginary, the efficacy of the whole leads to the efficacy of each 
part, taken separately.”861  
Durkheim further claimed that there was only a difference in degree between this and the 
experimental practice of the modern scientist. Laws of science become endowed with the 
authority of the repeatable experiment, but equally were renounced as soon as evidence to the 
contrary appears. In this way, by following the theory of association, the mimetic cult describes 
the positive expression of the law of causality in its pre-scientific manifestation made evident in 
animism.
862
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Here was the power of explanation that could account for cosmic forces in conflict with the 
individual will. This primary duality gave the concept of causality to express collectively certain 
forces as objectified feelings. These were necessarily externalised and diffused through space as 
„natural‟ powers that opposed those constituted by a subject; in turn, the subject stood as a power 
with potential of a determining force through the subject‟s own physical body. In this way, the 
power of the individual, as given the potential of soul, was necessarily constituted through the 
mind/matter opposition. Yet, this was also dependant on a collective understanding of the 
distribution of force through the concept. In this way, “man feels that he is a soul and 
consequently a force because he is a social being.”863 The concept of causality is the necessary 
link made between moments of a force in negotiating the unfolding of events. Extended through 
the positive cult, this becomes the social concept that offers a wider potential for judgement.  
 
Positive knowledge means mediating „naturally.‟ It means in the sense evident of collective 
experience, binding an understanding in advance of any proof, a priori. But this principal is not 
simply a tendency in the individual but is a collectively conditioned norm. The norm is the 
concept of the mean that stands both as transcendent and external to individual representations. It 
also stands as a rule to which the subject is subordinated. Durkheim does not intend this to be 
understood as a mental creation in the sense of an imagination, but as the associative effect, 
positively developed through participatory rites, which serves a general matrix of social 
existence. It relates particular activities to actual outcomes at the level of community.- 
“The framework goes beyond the material and dominates it...it goes beyond the 
individual memory; it is above all created to answer the needs of the community.” 
864
 
On the perceptual level, community mediates to individual disposition, but on the categorical 
level this regulates an understanding through the collective ready-made. In the pre-scientific 
community an „order of things‟ was open to intervention by the “will of the gods,” a supernatural 
force that offered a higher potential presupposed of a special reasoning that was distinct from the 
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individual‟s logic.865 Such a special epistemology is what is retained for a positive knowledge of 
nature to be abstracted by scientific law and appearing to be determined from beyond.  
 
Durkheim‟s thesis on the pre-scientific forms of positive knowledge is that it operates through 
primary categorisations of the sacred and the profane. The sacred and profane is grounded as a 
religious principle but defines a qualitative relationship to the world as it extends through the 
binary order to predicates a classificatory order. This dualism offers primary judgements on 
differences in kind. Durkheim saw this judgement as radically exclusive and giving significance 
that extends throughout the social order through how a principle of force accorded to the 
„sacred.‟866 Equally it acts as a real force for the explanation of the natural world. What becomes 
evident from Durkheim‟s study of the totemic principle is that religious origins inform both 
philosophy and science in their explanations of force distributed throughout the world through 
physical, moral and material entities.
867
 These distributions, 
“both resides in men and is the vital principle of things…they stimulate and 
discipline consciousness but they also make plants grow and animals reproduce.”  
The distribution of force informs a matrix from which the “seeds of human civilization were 
developed.”868 An individual accords with it as if this law was grounded in nature: social 
harmony is premised on the equilibrium of forces which accords with a higher moral power. This 
is experienced as a social realism appearing objectified through relations with external objects 
sacred to that society. However, Durkheim was also developing the account of socialising logic 
that operates to explain a dynamic reconfiguration of social formations on the basis of the social 
function given to a new reality.
869
  
  
Social function was categorically understood to overrule the impressions of the senses while 
Durkheim‟s sociology was also looking for an original „new language.‟ Behind the historical 
symbolic languages which Elementary Forms gave a perspective on, new types of positive 
knowledge emerge as social function through what was compacted into the idea of individuated 
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force. Force was no longer seen as a singular subject but as the function with the potential for 
autonomy.
870
 Durkheim held autonomy to be internalised or enclosed, like a monadic being, 
within social formations. Through activities such as the mimetic ritual or scientific experiments, 
the principle of force could be invested with the norm and positively grounded. Ultimately this 
serves to regulating relations between the individual and collective survival, but this is now 
given through the aesthetic side of representation which is subsumed under any rationalisation. 
When evident new functions appeared, it was through „satisfying‟ a feeling that negotiates the 
profane life.
871
  
 
In Elementary Forms it is the aesthetic question that illustrates Durkheim‟s extended theoretical 
aspect behind social functions. The historical subtext for Elementary Forms was a necessity for 
social transition which was acknowledged as the difficulty of an investment, whether through 
mimetic ritual or a scientific demonstration, and needs a leap of logic. What informed a theory of 
knowledge prior to that which both “binds the mind and goes beyond it?” It attributed as a 
question of aesthetics what could tentatively be revaluated according to individualised 
interpretation.
872
 
 
Dérèglement and Anomie 
 
For Durkheim, the sacred and the profane carry values of the positive and the vital through terms 
given as an interpretative capacity. He understood this capacity as a „natural‟ appetite to be 
satisfied and, as such, is ultimately located within the individual. If the task of the The Rules was 
to restrict a domain to which the sociologist could derive discursive authority, Elementary Forms 
looked to speculative origins of representation for a theory of knowledge that emphasised non-
determined power relations for a general knowledge. Its historical image was an extended zone 
of transformation, of wider, diffuse and vague associations, experienced under an aesthetic 
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quality, follows a distribution of sensation into which social forms could intervene with a power 
of constitution.
873
   
 
What constitutes such a power? It is dominated by the force by which man thinks of himself as 
master of a body, from the perspective of a soul which divides causes from effects as two 
moments of force. According to Durkheim, here is the problem which is attributed to 
empiricism. This could not explain why anticipations in the moments of force could be upheld as 
a norm with authority over the mind. Durkheim‟s concept of social force engenders this power of 
association for imperatives of thought through „ways of thinking and being‟ as a concept of 
social values. This idea embodies categories of causality, both of individual and the body (vital) 
and the collective ready-made understanding (positive) as the concept extends power to 
communal life. It expresses positive categories of objects for the wider activities which the 
intellect must follow, and cannot suppress. For Durkheim, this would be where imperatives of 
thought and imperative of the will converge in a concept of the mean, attributed to man‟s 
world.
874
  
 
As a capacity this drew on more factual studies of Durkheims‟s earlier works. In Suicide, a 
disposition associated with social dissolution was evident as a loosening norms of modern 
society, encroaching on man‟s „ways of being,‟ through a „longing for infinity.‟- 
“It is everlastingly repeated that it is in man‟s nature to be eternally dissatisfied, 
constantly to advance, without relief or rest, towards an indefinite goal. The longing 
for infinity is daily represented as a mark of moral distinction, whereas it can only 
appear within unregulated consciences which elevate to a rule the lack of rule from 
which they suffer.”875  
The significance of finitude and lack of rule is given to the „unregulated conscience‟ and is the 
index to changing conditions of life under a social concept that no longer retains consistancy. An 
aesthetic capacity means an individual appetite awakened through less disciplined passions in the 
state of deregulation or anomie. 
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However, less disciplined passions meant both the divergent and convergent effect within the 
wider aesthetic capacity; -  
- Firstly, from the perspective of the mechanical solidarity such unregulated desire would appear 
as a lack of rule, dérèglement,‟ or the threat of difference to a symbolising order. An alterity 
within the order of representation which signifies the looming conditions from which anomie 
ensues.  
-Secondly, from the perspective of the pre-scientific order depicted in Elementary Forms the 
orders of ritual life appeared through the mimetic cult of the totem and stand only for a „way of 
interpretation.‟ Since structures of intelligibility are mediated by the sign, an order of things is 
only its secondary structure. Symbolic structure supports the aesthetic capacity at the origins of 
understanding, but is open to the fluid relations from within a collective order.  
 
Fluid forms of intelligibility necessitate the totem to stand for a condensed order of difference 
and substitute for the distributed order of the world. Indeed, this is the sacred order characterised 
by a particular epistemological model at the heart of the positive cult. The positive mimetic order 
functions to reinforce associations between the sign and referent - the idea and its understanding 
-but this conversely also condenses the potential to profane that order. Since Durkheim held pre-
scientific forms of such associations as open relations, fixed to the world only through 
interpretation, it was this interpretation that was open to experimentation and demonstrable 
difference: the aesthetic form as dissociated form, open to a transformation.  
 
This implies that such order is a social-epistemological order and ultimately is not determined 
but merely deterministic. The social concept therefore only „gives grounds‟ for an understanding. 
In this sense, the relation between determinable and determined lends its particular meaning to 
anomie as a „way of being‟ drawn from a specific concept of the world. A Christian theology of 
anomia finds the significance in its translation as sin, not necessarily the willful transgression of 
norms, but one that indicates mental attitudes which lead to a profaning of the sacred.
876
 In this 
context, biblical anomia meant lawlessness and extended as a moral disposition intended to 
indicate certain actions which consequentially follow. For example, old Testament gentiles were 
                                                          
876
 Mestrovic & Brown (1987) 
278 
 
anomic since they did not have mosaic law; equally for Christians, the antichrist was the lawless 
one since he is outside the law of God.
877
 This shows how anomie carries a sense of hostility 
against conceptions of God which clearly has difficulty finding a positivistic equivalent. Another 
perspective appears through the ancient Greek άνομία, meaning „lawless‟ or „impious,‟ which 
opens a more ambiguous notion for the status of the sign of anomia.
878
 In this sense, νόμος is 
linked to μοῖρα (moira), a fatalistic notion held of “that which is right.” Its relation to νόμος 
appears less determined, rather more as the „dispensation‟ in the sense that Zeus dispensed land 
to a people for their use. Later this became the dispensation of law accorded to the sovereign. 
Against such order, a fatalism was retained behind the teleological tension of νόμος where the 
dispensations to rule was derived from a right to represents collective values and to preside over 
their distribution.  
 
The relation between dispensation of land, of law and the modes of reason was drawn together 
under a sacred task, and embodies this idea that its mismanagement could be held as 
sacrilegious. By using anomie in the sense of „dérèglement,‟ the opposite of régle, Durkheim 
maintained an opposition that gives this tension of a teleological thought of „ought.‟ This was 
grounded by the fatalism behind the moral sense of a prescriptive or regimen for a collective 
general health according to a wider concept of nature.
879
 The suggestion is that Durkheim took 
anomie as describing the dispersal of collective life and its concept of the world. A modern 
dérèglement in the regime of signs and its moral norms would be indicated by treating society‟s 
sacred representations as profane and vice versa.  
 
While in an earlier epoch these signs had fallen under the protection of the theological, later this 
was taken up as a philosophical project and became, by the beginning of the 19
th
 century, a 
regime of signs associated with the pursuit of a Science of Man. These were ambitions followed 
by the special physiology of sensation and its ambigous values attributed to the body. When the 
problem of anomie appears in The Division of Labour it still carried some of this physiological 
legacy with it,- 
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“the study of deviant forms will allow us to determine better the conditions for the 
existence of the normal state…here as elsewhere pathology is the precious ancillary 
to physiology.” 880 
According to The Rules we learn that “physiologist studies the functions of the average 
organism, so does the sociologist,” but unlike the physiological model the neo-positivistic 
distinction through function was inherently problematic for sociological model. It could not be a 
categorical value in any absolute sense of a determined limit to life such as in physiology. It was 
the central problem for Durkheim‟s sociology.881  
 
Modern societies exhibit only differences of degree rather than pathological difference of kind 
(i.e. living or not living). Functional diversity contained under an apparent unity which The Rules 
called the „persistance of life,‟ is scrutinised in The Division of Labour through functional and 
moral diversity of collective sentiment. Durkheim contended that modern dynamic societies 
become more powerless by degrees to contain their “centrifugal tendencies.” Durkheim drew the 
socio-political parallel in the equivalent of a philosophy incapable of maintaining the unity in its 
relation to modern sciences. Modernity was this dynamic of knowledge being always in 
motion.
882
 Scientific specialisations were occurring at such a speed that “the great syntheses” are 
always untimely. This problem was of the impossibility for a human intellect to sufficiently 
grasp any knowledge through its potential to fully develop and deliver the régle that Durkheim 
equated with the project for a Science of Man. Dérèglement was dissolution into mere 
coexistence under the blur of determinable and fatalistic knowledge at the individual level.
883
  
 
The Concept of the Positive as Science of Co-Existence  
 
Such a dynamism in knowledge has its particular significance which Durkheim registered as a 
difference between Auguste Comte and Saint Simon. While Comte held that the future unity of 
the sciences could be assumed, it was Saint Simon who came to doubt this. Disunity appeared as 
an irreconcilable whole, disruptive of any modern anthropology of collective consciousness. It 
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recedes rapidly as labour and social functions differentiate modern experience, which appeared 
to Durkheim as a morbidity.  
 
He also understands that this cannot be pathological in itself since apparently different „ways of 
being‟ are only dispersed forms of life that could coexist as „normal‟ phenomena. „Ways of 
being‟ appear as repetitions, as “channels that life has dug for itself...”884 The specific difficulty 
was to distinguish these norms from the potential forms awaiting social expression. He read 
social tensions as the phenomenal events whose problem was in relation to general functions of 
society. In contrast with the systematic model of Comte‟s delimited norms, the general „fact‟ for 
Durkheim was that “something suspends hostilities for a while.” However, in the industrial 
society such general function was the solidarity that appeared only discontinuous or intermittent, 
ultimately grounded by the state of anomie. Anomie indicates a fatalistic empiricism, which 
could equally appear as new conditions of existence, part of a process of being realised. 
 
The dilemma for Durkheim‟s ambitions of a Science of Man was the links to an ideological 
method itself attempting to escape from an empirical crisis. However, Durkheim considered 
ideological judgment as „pre-functional,‟ meaning that it deferred its own measure to “some 
overriding concept.”885 In contrast, Durkheim was looking forward to a method that would avoid 
„backsliding‟ into such ideology, while retaining its ambition for a positive approach. This meant 
the return to its primary problem of establishing objective criteria for an interpretation of health 
from disease as values in the world.
886
 From an individual perspective, an organic society was 
such an admixture with no discrete concept of its world to view „mentally;‟ individuals could “no 
longer figure out its limits…since it is so to speak unlimited.”887 But the modern dispersion was 
both the perspective on a crisis of social function but also the evidence of the transformative 
events whose elements lent themselves to becoming a determinable science.
888
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Distinguishing determinable signs of the normal and the pathological was the dilemma of the a 
priori given to such vital „norms.‟ Durkheim‟s strategy deferred this question through the 
assemblages of sociological „entities,‟ distinguished from those anomalous to such repetition.889 
An underlying assumption, from the biological point of view, was that norms were able to be 
generalised throughout the species. Simple repetition was the phenomenal fact explained by 
causal thinking. But through social formations, Durkheim justified individual persistence as 
repetitious forms resistant to destructive historical forces,-  
“how would they have been able to sustain themselves in a variety of circumstances 
if they did not enable the individual to better resist the causes of destruction.”890  
Repetition was the normality where frequency indicates superiority; but this could explain only 
static relations to the conditions of existence. On the contrary, in the circumstances of transition 
that characterise modern social forms, the evolving process was sustained without any stabilised 
and definite form of the normal type. What distinguished the modern world for Durkheim was 
that norms always related to the past and could no longer relate to the new emerging conditions 
of existence. Visible evidence of normality and generality was therefore deceptive in modernity. 
A visible persistence of force of habit could no longer be the sign inherently linked to 
contemporary conditions of a collective existence, and this was further defined by the problems 
distinguishing the sociologist from the biologist: the sociologist remains at a loss to know 
whether the social phenomena is normal since he ultimately has no means of determining 
reference points.  
 
In understanding Durkheim‟s project, one should note the significance of the text Socialism and 
what he derived from the industrialism taken up by Saint Simon. This was an economic function, 
taken as an auto-regulation of interests which was distinguished from social controls imposed by 
mere ideas. Its value appeared despite a “tendency to anarchy,” was a principle Saint Simon 
related to a dynamism of life. He conceived this in the manner of a vital principle drawing on “a 
substance of common life.” Durkheim related this dynamism to the tendency for an 
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“enfranchisement” of a „way of being‟ that offered a means to escape subordination of an 
untimely idea.
891
 
 
In this regard, Durkheim notes how Saint Simon never spoke of Plato or Rousseau, rather 
articulated his thinking by reference to Newton, Cabanis, Bichat and Adam Smith. The 
significance was that this could fore-ground the search for an immanent principle of distribution: 
Durkheim continues, -   
“To assume that the particular state of subjection in which industry had formerly 
been held, would not be in agreement with the new conditions of collective life, 
does not imply that every other type of dependence would be devoid of reason. It 
could well be that the transformation necessary does not consist in suppressing or 
subordinating but in changing form, not in making industrial values a kind of 
unlimited absolute beyond which there is nothing, but rather is limiting in a 
different manner and spirit than formerly...In fact, it is the general law of living 
things that needs and appetites are normal only on condition of being controlled. 
Unlimited need contradicts itself. For need is defined by the goal it aims at, and if 
unlimited has no goal since there is no limit.” 
Durkheim, who was also looking for a socio-political technique for regulating the capacity for 
development, understood this through the concept given under a „persistence of life.‟ The 
counter-example to these techniques appeared in the image of the “hypercivilization” of the 
Suicide text. Here an anomic tendency bred growing suicidal consequences for refined nervous 
systems of the excessively delicate and those less capable of attachment to collective objectives. 
These produced the discontinuities evident as the limits of collective forces from the individual 
perspective. Durkheim interpreted these as the dissolution of former collective powers. This 
indicates two ambitions; - 
-Firstly, to give the provisional concept to be explored through the analysis of two antagonistic 
forces confronting each other, a collective force that tries to take possession of the individual, the 
other individual force that repels it.
892
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-Secondly, he retainins the ambition for a science whose technique is appropriate to describe the 
“supra-organic” social life. This ambition would give form to the organic law whose function, if 
properly interpreted “can tell us the secret of the future.”893  
For the individual psychology, such a technique would open a negotiation in the forest of signs 
that combines diverse psychological dispositions of egoism, altruism with “a certain anomie” to 
offset one another. The excess of one or other element would be to the detriment of the others, 
but it is equally the case that a norm of moderate intensity in disposition, such as the average 
man, would become more rapidly dissolute in the face of the increasing transformations of the 
industrial society. Perhaps this should be taken as the driving force behind Durkheim‟s 
conception for a Science of Man, a failure he identified as the dissolution in the forces of 
fatalism waiting on the margins. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter examined the legacy for a Science of Man after experimental medicine separated 
the science of life from the philosophical debate on man. Physiology internalised values 
attributed to the vital and the positive within a functional domain. The chapter described 
Bergson‟s incorporation of this event into a historical continuity as the strategic dualism between 
experience and intelligibility. Bergson‟s own theory of psycho-physiological states substituted 
the normal/pathological dualism for „norm‟ and „real‟ extending a broader question of values 
held of vital function. This served Bergson‟s critique of a Positivist historical formations. The 
chapter described Emile Durkheim neo-positivist model derived of Claude Bernard‟s inner 
milieu. Durkheim‟s social domain internalised tensions attributed to the persistence of life. His 
historical perspective on the order of things was open to a special reasoning, the positive 
concept, internalising tensions identified with what earlier epochs protected under the notions of 
the theological. This was associated with an ambition for a Science of Man and its intrinsic 
dilemma around the problem of determinable norms. Did Durkheim follow Bernard‟s break with 
vitalism? Durkheim‟s was an open ambition for the functional concept that addressed the 
dissolution of the Enlightenment Science of Man in his era. 
                                                          
893
 Durkheim (1959)p244 
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Conclusion: The Vital and the Positive 
 
The thesis derived a contemporary context from Foucault‟s „crisis of the 1960‟ which was 
contrasted with the „rarefied form of positivism,‟ as Deleuze called epistemological analysis. He 
referenced the empiricist tradition and focussed on what Deleuze‟ own thought deliberately 
subjugated under a vitalism. In this thesis, vitalism was explained around the „age of Bichat‟ 
which Deleuze proposed as culmination of the Sensationalist model of the sign. By contrast, 
Foucault was approached through his engagement with Kant. These were the two perspectives 
explored as an Enlightenment project that developed alternatively to the model of a critique of 
reason. 
 
When Foucault discussed the „age of Bichat‟ in the Birth of the Clinic it gave a perspective on an 
Enlightenment Science of Man where medical Positivism saw the dissolution of its naive 
ambition. Gilles Deleuze described this event as the „delicate problem‟ of constituting a positive 
concept from the broader socio-political perspective of intrinsic values of the signs of life. This 
had a parallel with his interpretation of Nietzsche‟s genealogy and the signs „that have yet to take 
hold.‟ But the Enlightenment Science of Man was understood through the idea of a science that 
was the creation of man‟s higher faculties, this was the ambition of creating new philosophical 
and scientific languages with a practical application in man‟s world. While Kant‟s rational 
metaphysics divided this ambition on the basis of an 18
th
 century motif of power, he also looked 
for the „indispensable service‟ extending beyond the conditionality of the critical model. This 
was the alternative followed in the Opus Postumum systematically laying out theoretical 
possibilities of apprehending a science of nature as a logical system of concepts. This gave the 
perspective from which Kant‟s late Anthropology was a domain where historical knowledge 
competed with natural science, as the conflict of moral and theoretical aspects of a logic of man, 
left to be judged by a principle of the future.  
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The „age of Bichat‟ derived of Montpellier vitalism and followed the methodical engagement 
with what constituted vital phenomena. Bichat was influential for this Science of Man extending 
to the physical and moral whose micropolitics were influential for a nascent Positivism. 
Positivism saw this in life‟s capacity for organization, while vitalism meant the „hidden 
operations of nature.‟ This thesis found what Bichat understood as heuristic values derived of 
medicine took priority over the specificity of systematic science; the „age of Bichat‟ extended 
this to a reading of Saint Simon when it moved beyond a physiological debate to constitute a 
pragmatic knowledge for a socio-political domain. Saint Simon‟s enterprise centred on the 
aesthetic nature of this domain, with biological theories of animality and „aboriginal difference‟ 
giving its central ontological problems. His „industrial values‟ gave expression to man‟s inner 
drives as a class struggle and the concept of labour was his Positivism‟s perspective on values of 
an Enlightenment Science of Man.  
 
The legacy of Bichat‟s physiology also put these values into dispute; Comte‟s Positivism saw an 
epistemological strategy resisting philosophical interpretations of a Science of Man and Bichat 
was important because he constrained knowledge to its legitimate domains. But his „incomplete 
Positivism‟ opened to a structural thinking that overtook a broader practice of Science of Man 
after the 18
th
 century. The new paradigm for knowledge of life appeared with the experimental 
medicine of Claude Bernard and displaced an older vitalistic understanding of life, affirming 
functions dependent only on „conditions of existence.‟ This gave the „paradoxical link‟ with 
older question of values apprehended as true function during the Third Republic. Following the 
separation from a philosophy of the life, the rarefied approach was a progressive adaptation 
between experience and intelligibility, a stance serving Bergson‟s critique of Positivist historical 
formations. This precisely returned to a perspective on the normal and the pathological which 
Creative Evolution upheld as a neo-vitalism. 
 
The neo-Positive model in Emile Durkheim also looked to Bernard‟s interior milieu for a social 
model for a collective „order of things.‟ The values identified with positive signs which earlier 
epochs protected under a notion of the theological, and later taken up around the philosophical 
project, gave the perspective for a Science of Man in the 18
th
 century, where it was the loss of the 
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status of positive knowledge that Durkheim saw as the intrinsic dilemmas of legitimating a vital 
„norms‟ in modern society. It was precisely because the positive and the vital could not be 
sustained in relation to determinable sciences, social assemblages, or definite knowledge of the 
normal type that subsumed the positive and the vital under a social concept. At start of the 20
th
 
century, this carried this paradoxical link with the Enlightenment project. 
 
What remained of this project was to be constituted from the sciences in the terms of the day. 
This would reflect Kant‟s ambitions for a future metaphysics, as well as the historical physiology 
whose central role in Enlightenment vitalism gave the French perspective on a Science of Man in 
this thesis. During the 20
th
 century critique of values of humanism, the post-war period focused 
on the construct of man that followed Enlightenment thought through the 19
th
 century as it fed 
political arguments of the 20
th
 century. But the anti-humanism and the „death of man‟ that 
emerged though new physical and biological sciences, along with imports to France of 
phenomenology, emergence of structuralism and linguistics, all served an attack on the stable 
notion of man as a progressive, oriented, utopian ideal of man.  
 
The genealogy of the Science of Man has followed the constitution of a history that already was 
a post-Cartesian subject. It constituted a field around the values of positive and vital whose terms 
were historically resistant to being a determinable object of study. From this perspective, the 
Science of Man in the Enlightenment was not a simple humanism, but the project which as this 
history shows at no point gave a clear idea of what man was. The significant aspect for a 
contemporary thought was of the broader socio-political implementation that was already 
diverging from a humanism. This study ended prior to the First World War; it started with the 
1960‟s dispute over the humanism - further research would focus the transformation of the 
positive and the vital through this intervening period from which it emerged for contemporary 
thought through such influential writers as Foucault and Deleuze. 
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